The Political Economy of Ignorable Problems: Collective Choice and Denial
Abstract
Many policy problems (e.g., climate change, public debt, or humanitarian crises) are ignorable in the sense that individuals can choose not to acknowledge their existence. This paper develops a theory of how collective decision-making institutions influence the formation of preferences over addressing such problems. We present a model in which agents can adopt self-deceptive worldviews to mitigate the psychological discomfort of acknowledging a problem, weighing the benefits of future policy actions against the costs of recognizing unpleasant realities. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the policy action to be politically sustainable, which show how the incentives to adopt denialist worldviews are shaped by collective-choice rule. Anonymous voting rules, such as majority voting, are conducive to denialist free riding where agents delegate the burden of acknowledging the problem to others. The model predicts that collective decision-making generally amplifies denialist behavior and generates polarization of worldviews when action is implemented. These findings shed light on how the design of collective choice institutions affects both policy outcomes and individuals’ incentives to face uncomfortable truths.
Language
English
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