Author
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The Doctoral Training Unit (DTU) GREITMA of the University of Luxembourg focuses on researching how the European Union’s Single Market is being transformed by the interconnected “green” (environmental sustainability) and “digital” (technology and data) transitions. In this context, Prof. Anu Bradford’s 2020 book The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World represents a core theoretical and analytical framework for evaluating the international reach of the European Union’s Digital Single Market.
Bradford’s work has significantly impacted academics and practitioners by establishing criteria for analyzing the European Union’s (EU) global influence across various sectors, primarily through what she names the “Brussels Effect”. This concept was initially introduced by Bradford in her 2012 academic paper, The Brussels Effect, published in the Northwestern University Law Review,1 where she drew a parallel with the “California Effect”, a phenomenon first described by David Vogel in 1995.2 This article laid the conceptual groundwork, which was further expanded in her 2020 book.
Bradford’s book contributes to a broader discourse that challenges the conventional perceptions of the EU’s global power, establishing that it remains an “influential superpower that shapes the world in its image”3 through both theoretical and empirical lenses. It offers a novel perspective on the nature of global power in the 21st century, shifting the focus from traditional geopolitical and military power to the realm of regulatory influence.
In a nutshell, the Brussels Effect refers to the EU’s unilateral capacity to regulate global markets. Bradford puts particular emphasis on the unilaterality of such influence, highlighting that regulations originating from a single jurisdiction, here the EU, can permeate numerous aspects of economic activity across the global marketplace. Through this mechanism, the EU effectively promotes European integration and, according to Bradford, “harmonizes” markets upwards rather than downwards, by establishing strict standards.
In Bradford’s view, the Brussels Effect manifests in two principal ways:
- The de facto Brussels Effect, and
- The de jure Brussel Effect.
The de facto Brussels Effect describes how multinational corporations adjust their global operations to comply with EU regulations, primarily in response to market incentives. This occurs without requiring a direct regulatory response from foreign governments, as compliance is driven by market dynamics. Conversely, the de jure Brussels Effect involves foreign governments formally adopting EU-style regulations. These two phenomena are interconnected, with the de jure effect frequently building upon the de facto one. Often, once multinational companies have adapted their global practices to conform to EU standards, they gain an impetus to lobby for the adoption of similar regulations in their home jurisdictions. This strategy prevents a competitive disadvantage against domestic companies that do not export to the EU and, therefore, lack the incentive to conform to potentially costly EU regulations.
For the Brussels Effect to happen, the following five key criteria must be met:
- Market size: The EU’s single internal market represents the world’s second-largest economy, after the United States (US). Additionally, the EU is a critical export market for many US high-tech companies. Consequently, to maintain access to this attractive market, companies are incentivized to comply with EU legislation, thereby often extending these standards to their operations in other markets to avoid the complexities and costs of differential approaches. This voluntary extension of EU rules to global operations exemplifies the de facto Brussels Effect.
- Regulatory capacity and stringency: The EU possesses a robust and proactive regulatory framework, demonstrating a willingness to enact stringent standards. These rigorous regulations often foster a “race to the top”, compelling companies worldwide to adopt them to circumvent the complexity and expense associated with the differentiated production.
- Inelastic targets: EU regulations often target “inelastic” elements, such as consumers or specific product characteristics, which cannot be easily relocated or altered to evade compliance.
- Non-divisibility: It is frequently economically, technologically, or legally impractical for companies to segment their production processes or products to meet varying regulatory standards across different jurisdictions. For example, producing a single global version of a product that adheres to the highest standard is often more cost-effective and efficient than developing multiple versions.
- Lack of coercion: The EU rarely needs to explicitly compel other countries or companies to adopt its rules. Instead, market forces and the self-interest of multinational corporations, primarily for economic reasons, drive the voluntary adoption of EU standards.
In her 2020 book, Bradford analyzes the Brussels Effect through in-depth case studies, including competition law, digital economy, consumer health and safety, and environmental protection. In the context of DTU GREITMA, the Brussels Effect on the digital economy is of outmost importance.
In Chapter 5 of her book, Bradford first examines the General Data Protection Regulation4 (GDPR) and the regulation of hate speech in the EU.5 The GDPR stands as the most renowned and prominent example of EU legislation in the digital economy, as its strict data protection provisions have compelled companies globally to adapt their practices in order to be in compliance with the GDPR, leading to a widespread “Europeanization” of data protection regimes. Bradford also discusses the EU’s influence on online content moderation, acknowledging its more nuanced nature in light of the existing contrasting approaches, particularly in the US. Bradford emphasizes that the EU’s approach regarding data protection is grounded in a human-centric vision, prioritizing fundamental rights, ethics and fairness and aiming to empower both citizens and businesses in the digital realm. The EU seeks an internet that is open, fair, inclusive and people-focused, where digital technologies serve citizens and companies equitably while respecting consumer rights. Some of the largest multinational tech companies, which also includes a U.S.-based company, extended GDPR-like privacy protections to users outside the EU to circumvent the complexity and cost of maintaining separate systems.6
Secondly, Bradford mentions the now in force Digital Services Act7 (DSA), regulating online intermediary services, aiming to create a safer and more accountable online environment. While a more concrete impact of the DSA still needs to be developed further, it is evident that the criteria for the Brussels Effect may apply. It is crucial to note, however, that the EU is not the strictest regulatory environment when it comes to the regulation of online speech. Compared, for example, to countries like Russia or China, where the regulation of speech is primarily aimed at suppressing dissent, controlling information, and thereby constituting an actual hollowing out of free speech8, the EU’s approach under the DSA is fundamentally different. In the case of limitations (i.e., hate speech) on what can be expressed and disseminated freely within the EU’s online environment, these are specifically aimed at ensuring the protection of fundamental rights, combating illegal content (such as hate speech or child sexual abuse material), promoting consumer safety, and fostering a democratic online discourse, rather than stifling legitimate expression or political opposition. While the condition of stringency would typically be necessary for the Brussels Effect to occur, one may also consider the EU as the stricter regulator of what remains appropriate regarding limitations on fundamental rights. Unlike some regimes, mentioned above, where online speech regulation is frequently a tool for state control, suppressing political dissent, or orchestrating information dissemination to serve governmental narratives, the EU operates within a robust framework of established democratic principles and human rights. The DSA’s limitations on freedom of speech are subject to a clearly defined and judicially reviewable balancing test, ensuring that such a fundamental right is restricted only when demonstrably necessary to protect other equally important fundamental rights or public interests, such as combatting illegal content or ensuring consumer safety. Thus, the DSA imposes significant obligations on platforms, its aim is to foster a safer and more accountable online environment that genuinely upholds a balance of rights, rather than to curtail legitimate expression for the sake of state control.
Bradford’s book represents an indispensable contribution to understanding the evolving dynamics of global power and regulation, with a specific angle on the contribution of the EU in this global context. It offers a highly effective framework for comprehending how the EU, often without coercion, shapes global standards through its regulatory capacity. However, despite its significant contribution, a critical perspective is essential. First, caution must be exercised to avoid manipulating the criteria to identify a Brussels Effect where none genuinely exists. Adherence to the established criteria, or potentially identifying additional ones, is essential. Second, it is crucial not to foster an overly optimistic view that consistently portrays the EU as a global actor. A useful concept for a secondary reading of such discourse is Giandomenico Majone’s “political culture of total optimism”.9 This refers to a historical tendency among EU leaders and elites to be excessively positive about integration, often overlooking or downplaying potential problems and long-term negative consequences. Peter L. Lindseth notes that this tendency “flatters the egos of the technocratic and juristocratic elites that dominate the regulatory processes in the EU”. 10 This critique resonates with Bradford’s book’s sub-title, How the European Union Rules the World. Lindseth suggests that the EU’s actual global impact, while significant, may not fully justify a claim of global dominance in today’s world. The Brussels Effect’s prominence, or even its existence, diminishes when one of its conditions, especially market size, is not fully met. While acknowledging the EU’s power in the contemporary global landscape is important, one must be cautious not to label the EU as a global actor in every instance, thus avoiding claims of regulatory neocolonialism. Although the “Europeanization” of global markets is a valid observation, this nuance should be retained. Indeed, an internal complexity is compounded by the fact that the EU itself is not a monolithic block; rather, it comprises a diversity of constitutional systems and national identities among its Member States. The EU’s foundational treaties explicitly acknowledge and respect these national identities.11 This principle means that even when implementing EU law, such as through directives, Member States often retain a degree of leeway and discretion in how they transpose and apply the rules into their national legal orders, allowing for divergences reflective of their unique constitutional systems and societal preferences. Finally, while the EU undeniably exports significant values, it is crucial to ensure that this does not lead to a world where differences cannot exist, and where opposition (without being extremist) cannot challenge or contradict what a majority seeks to impose.
Recognizing potential pitfalls, such as the temptation to overstate the effect or fall into a “political culture of total optimism”, only strengthens our ability to accurately assess the EU’s influence. The ongoing dialogue around Majone’s concept and Lindseth’s observations encourages a more nuanced understanding, ensuring that academic discourse remains grounded in reality while acknowledging the effects EU policy and legislation have. Ultimately, the Brussels Effect highlights a unique and powerful form of global leadership. The EU’s commitment to stringent standards, supported by its vast market and regulatory capacity, demonstrates a compelling model for global governance in an increasingly interconnected world. While navigating the complexities of varied national interests and avoiding any perception of regulatory neocolonialism is vital, the EU’s capacity to export values (such as human rights, rule of law, democracy12 and human-centered regulations) and elevate global norms through regulation remains a significant positive force. By continually pushing for higher standards in critical areas like the digital economy, the European Union not only strengthens its internal market but also provides a beacon for a more responsible, rights-respecting, and competitive global digital future. Its influence, though sometimes challenging to implement and measure, is undeniably a powerful and often beneficial force for global good. Thus, while Bradford provides the essential lens, the preceding discussion represents my own expanded interpretation and application of these principles to the complexities of global digital governance.
1 Anu Bradford, “The Brussels Effect”, Northwestern University Law Review, 2012, Vol. 107, No. 1, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 533.
2 Vogel explained how certain political jurisdictions with stricter regulatory standards, particularly California, can drive an upward ratcheting of regulations in other regions because of economical rationale. David Vogel, “Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy”, Harvard University Press, 1995.
3 Anu Bradford, “The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World”, Oxford Scholarship Online, online edn, 2019, Introduction.
4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016, OJ L 119/1.
5 Now codified in the Digital Services Act (DSA) (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065).
6Apple, for example, implemented GDPR’s Article 25 principle of “privacy by design”. It also carries out privacy impact assessments, as required by the GDPR. Its single global privacy policy also reflects the GDPR, see here: Apple Customer Privacy Policy, [https://perma.cc/TG8J-YD7N] ; Privacy Policy [https://perma.cc/42BC-X6MJ]
7 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), 2022, OJ L 277.
8 Take into account the “Great Firewall of China”, an initiative managed by the Ministry of Public Security division of the Chinese government. As the nickname implies, the focus of this project is to monitor and censor what can and cannot be said/seen through an online network in China. See also about Russia’s “sovereign internet” laws: Human Rights Watch, Russia: Growing Internet Isolation, Control, Censorship, June 18, 2020.
9 Majone Giandomenico, “Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone Too Far?”, Cambridge University Press, 2014.
10 Peter L. Lindseth, “Book Review: Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World”, Oxford University Press, American Journal of Comparative Law, 2020, p 2.
11 Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
12 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).