Most people assume that when they search online, scroll through a marketplace, or use a digital platform, the results appearing at the top are there because the product is popular, relevant, or simply the best match.
But what if the platform behind the top-ranked search results is also competing with the businesses it ranks?
This is where self-preferencing comes in. The term describes a situation in which a dominant company uses its position to promote its own services more visibly or more favourably than those offered by rival businesses. In practice, this can shape what users see, what they click on, and ultimately which companies succeed in the market.
Why self-preferencing matters so much in EU competition law is because it touches on a basic and difficult question: where does legitimate competition end, and where does abuse of power begin? The issue became widely known through the Google Shopping case and remains central today, with new cases continuing to reach the EU Courts.
At the same time, self-preferencing is no longer only discussed in traditional competition enforcement. The Digital Markets Act now explicitly prohibits self-preferencing for designated gatekeepers, making the topic one of the key meeting points between competition law and regulation in the EU.
These questions also shape the doctoral research of Maria Ana Pocas Lourenço at the University of Luxembourg´s research centre for European Law, where she is pursuing her PhD.
Maria’s research connects directly to the II. European Competition Law Circle, taking place on 26 February 2026 at the Luxembourg Centre for European Law (LCEL).
Ahead of the event, Maria shared her perspective on why self-preferencing has become such a central issue in EU competition law and what she hopes to see discussed at this year’s Competition Law Circle.
Self-preferencing is a very topical issue in EU competition law, arguably because it reflects a broader shift in enforcement. Its relevance can be traced back to the landmark Google Shopping case, where the Commission found that Google abused its dominant position by favouring its own comparison shopping service over competitors in search results. The Commission and the EU Courts treated this as an independent form of abuse, but it remains unclear in which situations self-preferencing constitutes an abuse under Article 102 TFEU and when preferential treatment is not caught by the prohibition.
Similar questions have re-emerged with the Commission’s decision in Google AdTech (AT.40670), now under appeal before the General Court (Case T-794/25), which may provide further clarification. More broadly, self-preferencing matters because it sits close to other forms of abusive conduct (such as refusal to supply or margin squeeze) while potentially being assessed under different legal “templates”. Finally, it is central in digital markets and is also addressed by regulation: the Digital Markets Act introduces a per se prohibition for designated gatekeepers.
I am focusing on how the case law of the EU Courts has relied on the concept of ‘competition on the merits’ to reconcile different philosophies of intervention that have informed the application of Article 102 TFEU over time, thereby shaping its scope. Self-preferencing is particularly relevant to my research because it raises complex questions about the notion of abuse under Article 102 TFEU and the contemporary meaning of competition on the merits.
While self-preferencing has emerged prominently in the context of digital markets, its legal significance extends beyond that context. The way in which self-preferencing has been addressed by the European Commission and the EU Courts has the potential to recalibrate the threshold of intervention under Article 102 TFEU more broadly, influencing the concept of abuse across a wide range of market settings. As such, self-preferencing is a valuable lens to examine (still ongoing) shifts in the interpretation and application of Article 102 TFEU.
From a research perspective, I am particularly interested in hearing the speakers’ opinions on the legal categorisation of self-preferencing under Article 102 TFEU, and how it relates with previously established practices, namely refusal to supply and tying. In this respect, I am curious to see whether self-preferencing is regarded as a logical and coherent ‘new’ legal test under Article 102 TFEU, or whether it instead signals an undue further compartmentalisation of the concept of abuse.
In this train of thought, I would be particularly interested to hear whether the speakers find it convincing that the Bronner conditions do not apply to self-preferencing and, in that respect, what this may imply for the future of Bronner in the EU Courts’ case law. This question becomes even more intriguing in light of the recent judgements Lukoil Bulgaria and Android Auto.
In a similar vein, it would be interesting to see discussed how the Commission’s approach to remedies has changed, in particular when comparing its much-contested approach in Google Shopping (where it imposed Google to comply with the principle of non-discrimination) with Google AdTech, in which the Commission has indicated that structural remedies may be necessary.
More generally, I am very interested to see how the speakers conceive the concept of competition on the merits in contemporary case law, in particular how they place it the form- effects-based debate. Along the same lines, I would be very glad to hear whether the speakers consider that enforcement in the digital markets has promoted a new ‘paradigm’ or ‘philosophy of intervention’ in EU competition law, potentially leaning away from a predominantly welfarist-centred logic to a more fairness-oriented one. Still on this point, it would be interesting to see addressed the recent geopolitical developments, and whether this ‘new’ trend, if deemed to exist, may itself be under threat.
I believe that the LCEL is an ideal place to conduct research in EU law, under the guidance of some of the most prominent scholars in the field, in an environment that is both supportive and intellectually stimulating, and where researchers are given the opportunity to participate in a wide range of very engaging academic events. As the Centre regularly hosts seminars and conferences, it offers continuous opportunities to learn and exchange ideas.
I am very glad and fortunate being able to pursue my doctoral research in a centre that provides all the necessary conditions to develop my work, in an environment where I feel supported both academically and personally. As the PhD journey can at times feel a bit lonely, being embedded in such a research community is invaluable.
For Maria, the European Competition Law Circle is not only an opportunity to engage with current developments in EU competition enforcement, but also a valuable space for academic exchange at the highest level. As her research shows, self-preferencing raises fundamental questions about how EU competition law should respond to market power in fast-changing sectors and where the boundaries of lawful conduct under Article 102 TFEU should be drawn.
The European Competition Law is hosted annually. Organised jointly by the LCEL, the Association of European Competition Law Judges (AECLJ) and with the participation of the members of the General Court of the European Union