Migration for Marriage
Abstract
The impact of policies restricting marriage migration depends on whether such migration is driven by preferences for marrying within one’s group (endogamy preferences) or by the benefits of residency in a developed country (migration gains). I develop a novel marriage matching model that incorporates the option of marrying from one’s origin country. I focus on British Muslims, as roughly half marry partners from their origin countries. I find that 80% of Muslim marriage migration is explained by endogamy preferences. As a result, increasing the costs of marriage migration does not promote integration through intermarriage but instead raises the share of unmarried Muslims.
About the speaker
Shadi Farahzadi is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Liverpool Management School, specializing in the economics of family, migration, and education. Her current research focuses on the integration of ethnic minorities. For more information, please visit www.shadifarahzadi.com.
Language
English
This is a free seminar. Registration is mandatory.
Supported by the Fond National de la Recherche
Luxembourg (19441346)