Redistributing with regulation? Evidence from rent control in France
Joint work with Guillaume Chapelle and Agathe Rosenzweig
Abstract
Price regulation redistributes surplus through market interventions, yet its welfare effects are rarely assessed by explicitly tracing both gains and losses. This paper studies rent control in France and provide an empirical welfare accounting that jointly measures benefits to tenants, losses to landlords, and fiscal costs. Using the staggered introduction of local rent control, quasi-exhaustive data on rental listings, and administrative records linking tenants and landlords, we estimate short-run rent reductions and characterize the policy’s redistributive incidence across income groups. We show that, although rent control reduces rents for incumbent tenants, it constitutes a blunt redistributive instrument: it does not specifically target the poorest households and also benefits relatively affluent tenants in large urban centers. We further document that housing ownership in regulated cities is highly concentrated at the top of the income distribution. As a result, losses are borne primarily by high-income landlords, while approximately 40 percent of the associated revenue losses are absorbed by the government. We also provide evidence on potential short-run efficiency costs through changes in market activity following the introduction of rent control.
About the speaker
Gabrielle Fack is Professor at University Paris Dauphine – PSL and a Research affiliate at CEPR and PSE
Language
English
This is a free seminar. Registration is mandatory.
Supported by the Fond National de la Recherche
Luxembourg (19441346)