Non-Disclosure Agreements and Externalities from Silence
Language: English
Registration:
– Free seminar
– Registration
– Deadline 16 January at 11.00
Contact:
dem@uni.lu
Tel: +352 46 66 44 6283
Abstract:
Do employment restrictions which prohibit workers from disclosing misconduct at work, which we refer to as `broad non-disclosure agreements’ (NDAs), distort labor markets? We develop a framework in which the legal risk from violating a broad NDA causes workers to under-share negative information about their employer, making it more difficult for high-quality employers to differentiate themselves to jobseekers. Changes in the content of Glassdoor reviews following the passage of three state laws that prohibited employers from using NDAs to conceal unlawful workplace conduct support this idea. By curtailing the flow of negative information, broad NDAs impose negative externalities on jobseekers who value such information and on competing employers who are less able to stand out.
About Jason Sockin:
Jason Sockin is currently a postdoctoral scholar with IZA in Berlin and will be joining The ILR School at Cornell University as an Assistant Professor in Fall 2024. My research centers on better understanding how the Internet and technology have fundamentally altered the ways in which workers and firms interact in today’s labor market. To this end, my work often incorporates novel datasets from online job boards, such as Glassdoor and Indeed. I have worked as a researcher at the U.S. Treasury, Penn Wharton Budget Model, Glassdoor, The Congressional Budget Office, The White House’s Council of Economic Advisers under the Obama Administration, and The Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Supported by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) 17931929