Arnaud Dupuy, professor within the Department of Economics and Management has recently published two articles in SJR-ranked Q1 journals, International Economics Review and the Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Appearing in the October 2020 issue of the International Economics Review, Dupuy’s article “Taxation in Matching Markets”, was co-authored by Alfred Galichonz (NYU, SciencesPo) Sonia Jaffe (Microsoft) and Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard Business School, Harvard University). In the paper, the researchers analyse the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. The researchers’ model found that taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. In the paper, the researchers also adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to the setting at hand and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. The researchers show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss associated with both federal and state taxes.
Prof. Dupuy is the sole author of the second article, entitled “Migration in China: to Work or to Wed?” which was accepted in November 2020 by the Journal of Applied Econometrics. The paper develops a model encompassing both matching and hedonic models, studies its properties and provides identification and estimation strategies. The model is then applied to internal migration within China in order to estimate the migration surplus of singles and couples and the marital surplus of natives. Using counterfactuals the paper quantifies the “marrying-up” and the “work” effects of migration, that is to say how much a migrant’s decision to move is influenced by job opportunities at their destination and how much it is influenced by marriage market opportunities. In this paper, Prof. Dupuy draws the notable conclusion that as migrant women enter the urban marriage market, they generate sizeable equilibrium “marrying-up” effects for all men and women by changing the relative supply of women on both the rural and urban marriage markets.