

THE PARADOXICAL CASE AGAINST HARD INTEREST RATE CAPS – AND HOW FINTECH & REGTECH CAN SOLVE THE DILEMMA

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
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A.

The Issue

Data speaks...



Research question

1. *How to achieve fair interest rates?*
2. *Are there better solution instead of 'hard interest rate cap' to decrease interest rate?*

Embarking on terminology

- **‘soft caps’**
- **‘mezzo caps’**
- **‘hard caps’**

Why imposing interest rate cap?

- Ensuring a 'fair' price
- Prevention of exploitation by deceptive credit providers
- Political and economic reasons
- Challenging anticompetitive behavior
- Client protection

B.

The analysis

The weak fundament of interest rate regulation

- The cost of funds
- Credit risk: Substance vs Form
- Transaction costs
- Value-added services

Side effects of hard interest rate caps

- Deprive the quantity of credit available for the poor
- Limit product diversity
- Prevent providers to stay in the market
- Clients of MFIs are forced to re-enter the informal credit market
- Mission drift

The weak case for hard caps – in relation to service level

Cost	Service	Interest Rate (IR)	Appraisal
Low (-)	Low (-)	Too high	Could be (1) an efficient MFI or (2) inefficient MFI - with low service level and high MFI profit
High (+)	Low (-)	Too high	Inefficient MFI
Low (-)	High (+)	Too low	Could be an efficient MFI struggling with too low IR
High (+)	High (+)	Too low	Could be (1) an efficient MFI or (2) inefficient MFI - with high service level and both are struggling with too low IR

**We do not know who is of which type? -
- Information Asymmetry --**

Comparison with the North

- Differences in the ecosystem
- Effective interest rate disclosures

C.

Contribution

We add to the literature...

- To look at the clients side: the case for a credit register
- To look at the intermediary side: disclosure of effective rates
- Enhance competition among all credit intermediaries
- Facilitate Digital Financial Services (DFS)

Pro RegTech-based credit registers

- Mitigate the risk of over-indebtedness
- Increase efficiency, competitiveness and the volume of lending
- Reduce information asymmetry in the credit markets
- Enhance information of Central Bank on risk side => precondition for mezzo cap enforcement
- Decrease default rates

Enhancing competition

- It urges providers to propose the most attractive products and services to client.
- It helps to mitigate against economically inefficient and socially undesirable business model

Disclosure of effective rates

- Increase transparency
- Clients can obtain a clear picture to compare interest rates between lenders, while deceptive lenders will lose business
- Full disclosure paired with fair practice is the best protection for borrowers, particularly where financial literacy is low

Facilitating Digital Financial Services / DFS

- Decrease transaction cost
- Increase efficiency
- Enlarge potential outreach which could bolster financial inclusion
- Redefines accessibility and affordability
- Enables underserved clients to transact in small amounts at (hopefully) affordable costs
- Minimize the risk of financial crimes peculiar to cash-based transactions

D.

Conclusion & Theses

Conclusions

- Exorbitant microfinance interest rates are undesirable.
- A hard interest rate cap, albeit if it sets with good intentions, it most often fails to achieve the objective.
- One size fits all regulation disregards the unique needs of different MFIs characteristics.
- We recommend to focus more on cost side rather than income side:
 - a. Implementing Credit Register
 - b. Enhancing competition
 - c. Applying disclosure (transparency)
 - d. Facilitating Digital Financial Services

How FinTech and RegTech Resolve The Dilemma of Hard Interest Rate Caps in Microfinance

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