# Algorithmic Credit Scoring

and the Regulation of Consumer Credit Markets

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#### Overview

1. Rise of algorithmic credit scoring

2. Impact on consumer credit markets

3. Implications for consumer credit regulation

## Algorithmic Credit Scoring

Assessing Creditworthiness using:

1. Alternative Data

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2. Machine Learning

# Impact on Consumer Credit

Markets

# Impact depends on trade-off between and within different normative goals:

- 1. Efficiency
- 2. Distributional Fairness
- 3. Consumer Financial Privacy

## Efficiency

Faster, cheaper, more accurate risk assessment (thin-files)
Exploitation of consumer ignorance
Over-reliance on quantitative measurement

#### Distributional Fairness

Access to credit (thin-files)
Reduce discrimination due to animus
Algorithmic discrimination, Hirshleifer
effects, exploitation and rent-seeking

### Consumer Privacy, Autonomy

Access to credit supports financial autonomy
Over-reliance on predictions from (group)
data diminishes individual autonomy
Re-use of personal data without 'informed'
consent

#### Additional Dimensions

- + ML and Big Data as consumer-helping solutions?
- + ML and Big Data as *supervisory solutions* (suptech/regtech)?

# **Empirical Findings**

#### Bartlett et al (2019)

\*Algorithmic lending eliminates discrimination in loan origination, relative to face-to-face lending.

\*Doesn't eliminate discrimination in loan pricing, but still reduces due to greater competition from FinTech lending platforms.

#### Fuster et al (2018)

\*ML credit scoring increases accuracy of default prediction relative to simple logistic models, and increases access to credit.

\*But gains unevenly distributed: (i) accuracy gains accrue disproportionately *less* to Black and Hispanic borrowers; (ii) disparity in *interest rates* between and within groups increases, more for Black and Hispanic.

### Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017, 2018)

\*Alternative information improved access to credit — for the same risk of default, Lending Club consumers pay smaller spreads.

# Implications for Consumer Credit

Regulation

#### 3 priorities

1. ML model and product governance

2. Consumer financial privacy

3. Credit information market

#### ML Governance

\* Updated regulatory standards for ML model risk management (cf. SR 11-7, MiFID II, GDPR)

\* Model interpretability, alternative data, vendors

\*AI/ML corporate governance structure for firms, including (human) accountability and liability.

\* Senior managers and certification regime (UK)

### Consumer Financial Privacy

What is the appropriate level of consumer privacy in credit markets?

#### Consumer Financial Privacy

\* Data protection (GDPR) –vs– consumer credit laws?

\* Ethical Considerations?

\* Privacy-preserving techniques and user control over data?

#### **Credit Information Market**

\*Incorporate alternative data and insights:

→ Information sharing arrangements (Lenders <> CRAs)

→ Credit reports

#### References

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