

# **Theory and Practice of Contemporary Diplomacy: Instructions for Use Diplomacy Lab 2024**

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## Introduction

### Diego Brasioli – Anna-Lena Högenauer

Following last year's success of the course activated within the Master on European Governance, and the creation of the University of Luxembourg Diplomacy Lab, we have decided to embark again, with this year's students, on another publication on the important subject of diplomacy in the contemporary world.

The inclusion of a dedicated course on diplomacy, encompassing both academic and practical components, within the Master's Degree on European Governance, generated significant interest among the students, and attracted a considerable number of enthusiastic participants, eager to examine the function of diplomacy within the framework of globalized international relations, focusing on the challenges and strategic goals it entails.

The lectures delved into various aspects of the contemporary world diplomatic system, including its form and functions. They also explored different negotiating techniques used to reach agreements, as well as the operations of missions, offices, conferences, and procedures involved in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The role of summits in the negotiation process was also examined, along with the evolving frontiers of diplomacy in areas such as security, human rights protection, and the environment.

Additionally, the lectures discussed how diplomacy can serve as a catalyst for economic interests, the consular activity and protection of citizens abroad, sports and cultural diplomacy, and the European Union's diplomatic service.

Students are at the heart of the UNI.LU DIPLOMACY Lab. Through the Young Researchers Committee, they help define the project's key topics, select speakers and plan events. This year they organized several seminars, in particular on original issues such as the “Feminist Foreign Policy”, and the Diplomacy of Indigenous People. In addition to that, they took active part in a conference organized by the Italian Embassy on the subject of the interplay between Artificial Intelligence and geopolitical equilibria, presenting their views on this topical issue.

The contemporary world is undergoing constant and fast change, marked by the development of new and interrelated challenges and threats. Therefore, it is crucial to examine potential frameworks for comprehending future scenarios in international relations. This investigation should begin by analyzing the factors that define the emerging global landscape: the energy supply crisis, demographic trends, migration patterns, climate change, concerns regarding food

security, exploitation of natural resources, advancements in technology, challenges in global trade, the impact of artificial intelligence, the rise of authoritarian populism, widening disparities and social inequalities, and the escalating risk of wars and conflicts.

In our increasingly interconnected and complex world, diplomats have assumed even greater significance. They are not only responsible for managing relations between states in the traditional sense, but also for safeguarding their nations' interests and advancing supranational and global objectives.

The current publication (following the one of last year entitled “Diplomacy in the Post-Globalized World: New Challenges and Strategic Priorities”, delves into the intricacies of today international scene, with special attention to the impact of the new digital technologies on geopolitical equilibria.

In fact, in this third decade of the 21st century, machines are transforming the world as we know it.

In a few years, artificial intelligence (AI) has gone from a theoretical wonder to an everyday reality in many areas. Its vast potential for use in many aspects of human existence makes it a real opportunity and strategic goal for corporations and governments, but also poses potential risks.

Advanced countries in the development of these systems can gain enormous strategic advantages, exponentially increasing their military power, surveillance, influence, and disinformation capabilities. Economic dependency on AI can also create national inequities, sparking a "technological arms" race and deepening global imbalances, with unknown effects on world peace and stability.

The publication, entitled “Theory and Practice of Contemporary Diplomacy: Instructions for Use”, illustrates the motivation of young researchers to look into this and other complex issues that dominate the current debate on international relations.

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*Director for Security and Disarmament and Deputy Director General for Political Affairs). He is particularly grateful to the young researchers who participate in the Uni.lu Diplomacy Lab because their innovative thinking and enthusiasm have taught him that, even after forty years of a diplomatic career, he still has a lot to learn about the most crucial international global issues. N.B.: “the views expressed in this publication are given in personal capacity and are not attributable to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.*

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# I. Rethinking the Role of Diplomacy in the Age of AI, New Digital Technologies and Social Media





## AI, Robot: On the impacts of AI on Diplomacy and Geopolitics

Beatrice Biffi

Artificial Intelligence, its benefits, risks and its influence on an ever-growing array of fields, wears the role of the protagonist in the eclectic theatre of the contemporary world. This often misleads the public into thinking, this complex net of chips, circuits and coding is one of the most impactful innovations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; however, its origin can be traced back to the last few years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century instead.

In 1997, Garry Kasparov, the world best chess player, lost to Deep Blue IBM's supercomputer<sup>1</sup>; a couple of years before the event this would have been unthinkable and yet in 2023, after ages of IT innovation and technological development, this barely surprises the public, revealing how accustomed people have grown to artificial intelligence and how present this reality is in everyday life.

From 1997 the process behind these tools changed completely if Deep Blue was considered a world-changing innovation it would not be considered at the level of an average Artificial Intelligence today. This was due to the process that led to its astonishing victory against a human; indeed its moves and strategies were not autonomously generated, they were a successful mix of other professional player's move, making it, along with other similar tools, a rule-based system<sup>2</sup>. The early forms of AI simply followed a human-given list of set instructions on how to behave facing certain situations and simply having to elaborate them.

In 2017 the rule-based approach was openly and publicly overcome; after ages of improvement, in the same fashion of Deep Blue, the, Google developed, algorithm AlphaZero efficiently beat the world most complex chess program performing moves that had never been seen before in history, revealing a new way of programming artificial intelligence. This time the process that led to the victory was not simply impulse-based or a re-elaboration, this time the AI tool was taught to learn and internalize chess as a whole and then autonomously elaborate a perfect scheme of responses<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Stefano Rocca. "Lettera Diplomatica" n. 1360, 20 September 2023

<sup>2</sup> Paul Scharre Michael C. Horowitz, and Robert O. Work. The Artificial Intelligence Revolution." *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: What Every Policymaker Needs to Know*. Center for New American Security, 2018.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20447.4>.

<sup>3</sup> Stefano Ronca *Lettera Diplomatica* n. 1360



If the 1997 Deep Blue seemed world-changing, the 2017 AlphaZero marked an essential turn in the development of artificial intelligence, changing completely the framework it works in and bases on, determining the possibility of, probable, infinite new applications, revealing to the public that scientists and technicians hold something close to an actual artificial brain.

The ground-breaking improvements in the AI system opened the way for further developments, initially limited to a restrict group of users and programmers making it a relatively elite-like tool. However, innovation is inherently unlimited, and needs to be widespread to be lawfully called innovation. The full democratization of this powerful tool is extremely recent, datable to November 2022<sup>4</sup> when OpenAI, made ChatGPT fully and freely accessible.

It took only a few months to gather millions of users, having the world face a completely revolutionized idea of AI: available, functional, and possible to be applied on almost any kind of relevant field of work. Such adaptability and pragmatism are likely to have a profound impact on the global economy and international security environment; many scholars, business leaders and politicians gathered around the thought of a possible new industrial revolution; indeed AI as a whole respects the basic criteria to trigger an industrial change. As in the first and second revolution, the public is dealing with a technology with a wide range of applications and that could allow the creation of special-purpose machines which could possibly replace physical labor for specific tasks.<sup>5</sup>

It could be stated that the world is moving into a new period of human consciousness which is not yet fully understood, the perception of the world will be inevitably different, but if usually this happened in a long period of time, making it almost imperceptible to the ones living through it, this one will be faster, leaving little time to adjust to it and adapt it in a functional and ethical way<sup>6</sup>.

Indeed, if AI only became public in 2022, many sectors from customer service realities to tech and educational companies have been actively using it for several years; the benefits this tool offers are undeniable, through its existence AI can be a significant aid for labour-intensive tasks, potentially increasing productivity massively, possibly leading to substantial economic growth and significant advancements in many fields.

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<sup>4</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Why AI matters? Opportunities, risks and regulation", The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2023, pp. 1-9, 08daa6\_f8db1a0af5e74c6c96fe425380b890fc.pdf (ai-geopolitics.org)

<sup>5</sup>Paul Schaare, Michael C. Horowitz, and Robert O. Work. "The Artificial Intelligence Revolution." *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: What Every Policymaker Needs to Know*. Center for New American Security, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20447.4>.

<sup>6</sup> Belinda Luscombe, 'Henry Kissinger's Last Crusade: Stopping Dangerous AI' *TIME*, 5.11.2021 (accessed 11.12.2023)

Great opportunities often carry substantial risks, and the continuously expanding realm of AI is no exception to this principle; most doubts and fears surround the job market; with an increased use of AI there is a concrete possibility many jobs could fade; along with it many forms of media seem to be at high risk of corruption. With the evolution of deepfakes and mass production of autoreferential information, trustworthy sources of news and data could easily turn into an unsure source; along this line the public opinion gathers around a general sense of weariness toward something that is human made, but it is unsure if it can be human-controlled.

On this note, what would happen if AI actively became part of military-geopolitical or diplomatic protocols? Would they be positively or negatively affected? Would it radically change a reality that has been human-led since its very first moments?

AI applications in the geopolitics and military field have been under the attentive scope of scholars and experts, focusing mainly on the applications it can have and the ethical risks it brings along. When actively employed in the warzone, artificial intelligence can reveal to be a useful tool in data analysis and image recognition, the public agrees with that and shares positive expectations around it, however when life-dead choices and target placement tasks are presented, fear takes over<sup>7</sup>.

As AlphaZero sacrificed pieces, professional chess players, retained fundamental would a militarized AI sacrifice people that humans would consider unthinkable to kill, would it strike targets that no one would have dared to strike or suggest solutions that would be in no way considered diplomatic? What is the process behind AI thoughts and conclusions, and will governors, diplomats, and high military ranks, be able to justify it?

When looking at this innovative tool the biggest concern is indeed the idea of opacity that surrounds it, indeed AI systems are often obscure to human decision-makers opening the so called, black box problem<sup>8</sup>; ML (Machine Learning) or DL (Deep Learning) process, can be impossible for humans actors to trace back, indeed the new AI system no longer rely on rule-based thinking, thus auditing and explaining the reasoning to the public and to the one affected by the machine choice result to be unattainable.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Lee Hardlington, Jens Binder, Sarah Gardner, Maria Karanika-Murray and Sarah Knight, The use of artificial intelligence in a military context: development of the attitudes toward AI in defense (AAID) scale, *front. Psychol.* 14:1164810. Doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1164810.

<sup>8</sup> Cynthia. Rudin and Joanna Radin, Why Arer We Using Black Box Models in AI When We Don't Need To?, *Harvard Data Science Review*, Vol. 1, No 2, 2019, available at: <https://doi.org/10.1162/99608f92.5a8a3a3d>.

<sup>9</sup> Michael Pizzi, Mila Romanoff, and Tim Engelhardt, 'AI for humanitarian action: Human rights and ethics' in *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 102, n. 913, 2021, p.152-153.

This further motivates the public weariness toward the employment of AI in fields that are, normally, human-led however, when this tool is used in more impersonal tasks it is well welcomed<sup>10</sup>, taming down the fears of a dystopian outcome.

Geopolitical, military and diplomatic actions have always been an inherent human field, where human relations, feelings and rational thoughts are not only required but mandatory. The introduction of AI in these realities is undeniably revolutionary, smoothing down processes that would have taken long time or allowing better recognition of images and interpretation of them, however emotional intelligence cannot be replaced. Using AI-supported system to make decisions on criminal sentences, asylum requests, diplomatic crisis, cases where fundamental freedoms are at stake and where individuals already are traumatized or distressed, would undermine individual thinking, enhance psychological harm, and come to the point of destroying social nets.<sup>11</sup>

It can be said AI shows potential to both serve human interest and to undermine them<sup>12</sup>; the breakneck speed this tool develops at reveals to be a resource and a threat, while human processes involve emotions, long thoughts and rational choices, AI seem to reach solutions with a speed that is utterly impressive; yet, are the answers given as valuable as the human ones? Is a handshake less valid than pixels and characters on a screen? Are humans sacrificable because an inexplicable machine thought said so?

The fields touched by this world-changing innovations are potentially unlimited, but ones like diplomacy, geopolitics, or human rights operation, will find a bone to pick with it. Finding the possibilities for a positive gain, way lower than any other reality, here the over-use of AI is an actual threat, causing mistrust in the institutions and possible harmful outcomes, revealing how this artificial brain cannot possibly substitute the efforts of human actors in creating a balance that changes through fears, hopes and emotions; matters that an AI, despite its speed and precision, will never be able to master.

Artificial Intelligence is however still human-made, and with proper regulations, a right educational process on its uses and misuses, it is a valuable partner, able to solve specific problems that humans alone could not sort. However, the question that the public has to ask itself is: will we be able to not let it wash us over?

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<sup>10</sup> Hardlington et al, “The use of artificial intelligence in a military context: development of the attitudes toward AI in defence (AAID), 2023

<sup>11</sup> Pizzi et al. ‘AI for humanitarian action: Human rights and ethics’ p. 157.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 160

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2. Ronca, Stefano Lettera Diplomatica n. 1360, 20 September 2023
3. Luscombe, Belinda. ‘Henry Kissinger’s Last Crusade: Stopping Dangerous AI’ TIME, 5.11.2021 (accessed 11.12.2023)
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5. Hardlington, Lee. Jens Binder, Sarah Gardner, Maria Karanika-Murray and Sarah Knight, “*The use of artificial intelligence in a military context: development of the attitudes toward AI in defense (AAID) scale*”, *front. Psychol.* 14:1164810. Doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1164810.
6. Pizzi Michael, Mila Romanoff, and Tim Engelhardt, “AI for humanitarian action: Human rights and ethics” in *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 102, n. 913, 2021, p.145-180.
7. Scharre, Paul, Michael C. Horowitz, and Robert O. Work. “The Artificial Intelligence Revolution.” *ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: What Every Policymaker Needs to Know*. Center for New American Security, 2018. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20447.4>.

# A New Cyber Diplomacy Attempt between the USA and China: An Overview of the Past, Present, and Future

**Dewi Purawanti**

## 1. Introduction

The era of globalization is widely known as a starting point of the rise of technology. Although conventional weapons of mass destruction have still always been a high-security issue in the international system, the rise of information technology and artificial intelligence has succeeded in rattling national and international security. Conflict and war have shifted from shores to cyberspace between countries or groups/individuals and countries.

China and the United States of America (USA) are the most powerful countries and have advanced technologies. These countries are also known for having fluctuating relationships regarding ideology, economics, security capacity, alliances, and, more recently, advancing technology and cyber security. The US-China cyber security conflict has emerged since the early 2000s, however 2013 is a remarkable period of cyber relations dynamic between the USA and China. The relations between the two deteriorated due to revelations by Edward Snowden, a former agent of the Central Intelligence (CIA) and a former agent of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States. He revealed the presence of a mass internet surveillance program conducted by the United States.<sup>13</sup> He also mentioned the cyber espionage activity conducted by the USA against China, which involved the surveillance of China's information technology, banks, and Chinese communist party leaders.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, the United States argues that China has been conducting a series of cyber espionage against the United States government institutions, such as the United States Department of Defence, from 2011 to 2013.<sup>15</sup> The state leaders of both countries thus have initiated a series of cyber diplomacy and bilateral dialogue, resulting in an agreement in 2015. However, the number of cyberattacks against each country until recent years resulted in distrust and accusations between the two countries. The USA declared that China had become a threat and the most advanced of USA adversaries in cyberspace.<sup>16</sup>

Between 2015 and 2023, the United States had three distinct presidents. Each president adopts a distinct policy direction, particularly in cyber security. The cyber diplomacy between the USA and China in 2015 under the Obama administration has been considered to have failed due to the persistent occurrence of cyberattacks. This paper aims to explain the factors that contributed to the failure of cyber diplomacy between the US and China in the past. In addition, this paper also tries to analyze how a new cyber diplomacy attempt between the US and China

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<sup>13</sup> David H Price, "The New Surveillance Normal: NSA and Corporate Surveillance in the Age of Global Capitalism", *Monthly Review*, 2014, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274283920\\_The\\_New\\_Surveillance\\_Normal\\_NSA\\_and\\_Corporate\\_Surveillance\\_in\\_the\\_Age\\_of\\_Global\\_Capitalism/download](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274283920_The_New_Surveillance_Normal_NSA_and_Corporate_Surveillance_in_the_Age_of_Global_Capitalism/download)

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Robert Bebbler, "China's Cyber Economic Warfare Threatens U.S", *US Naval Institute*, Vol.143, No. 7, 2017, pp.2

<sup>16</sup> Cybersecurity & Infrastructure of Security Agency, China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories, accessed at <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/advanced-persistent-threats/china>

can be structured to address the failures of previous attempts and foster a more cooperative and secure cyberspace.

## 2. Conceptual Framework

This paper aims to analyze the cyber diplomacy between the US and China using the concept of cyber diplomacy. Cyber diplomacy is a specific type of diplomacy. Diplomacy itself has a broad variety of definitions. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, diplomacy is:<sup>17</sup> “Skill in dealing with people without offending or upsetting them.”

To complement the definition of diplomacy, Hedley Bull defined diplomacy as

“the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means<sup>18</sup>.”

To sum up, diplomacy is the art and practice of negotiation by states, organizations, and individuals in order to preserve their interests as well as maintain bilateral and multilateral peace relations.

Cyber diplomacy emerged as a response to resolve either cyber conflict or cybercrime among states and to ensure peace and stability in cyberspace. The case of cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007 marked a starting point for the practice of cyber diplomacy in the international system.<sup>19</sup> Cybercrime itself is illegal actions conducted by organizations or individuals (non-state and state-sponsored) that attack and cause harm to the targeted computer system or network, critical infrastructure, and confidential information<sup>20</sup>. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), thus classified the cybercrimes such as<sup>21</sup>

- Illegal Access (hacking, cracking)
- Illegal Data Acquisition (data espionage)
- Cyber warfare (the use of information technology in armed conflicts)
- Cyberterrorism (propaganda and hacking activities)
- Cyber-attacks (computer viruses, denial of service attacks)
- Phishing
- Many more

Therefore, cyber-diplomacy refers to the implementation of diplomatic strategies and practices to accommodate national interests in the realm of cyberspace. These interests are typically outlined in national cyberspace and cybersecurity strategies, such as the strategy to combat cybercrimes and establish safe internet governance and freedom, which are regularly included in the diplomatic agenda.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Definition of Diplomacy by Cambridge Dictionary, accessed at <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/diplomacy>

<sup>18</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 156

<sup>19</sup> Amel Attatfa, Karen Renaud, and Stefano De Paoli, ‘Cyber Diplomacy: A Systematic Literature Review’, *Procedia Computer Science*, Volume 176, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2020.08.007>, pp.61

<sup>20</sup> International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Cybercrime Legislation Resources, ‘Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries’, *ICT Application and Cybersecurity Division Policies and Strategies Department*, March 2011, pp.26

<sup>21</sup> ITU, ‘Understanding Cybercrime’, 2011, pp. 42-119

<sup>22</sup> What is Cyber Diplomacy?, accessed at [https://www.cyber-diplomacy-toolbox.com/Cyber\\_Diplomacy.html](https://www.cyber-diplomacy-toolbox.com/Cyber_Diplomacy.html)

### 3. Analysis

#### 3.1. The ‘cyber-conflict’ Between the USA and China

There have been many cyber-attack operations carried out against each other. Hence, there are prominent operations among those disclosed by the government that have significant implications for bilateral relations. Edward Snowden exposed the National Security Agency’s “Shotgiant Operation” which was an act of cyber espionage from 2009 to 2013 targeted at Chinese politicians, banks, and more prominently technology and telecommunication company, Huawei<sup>23</sup>. Simultaneously, Beebus Operation was a practice of cyber attack in the form of espionage and phishing against the US Department of Defense, and US military drone technology from 2011 to 2013<sup>24</sup>. China was identified as the source of the attack by the US government. Although the Chinese government denied their involvement in the cyber attack operation, however, the US government tracked that those attacks were coming from a professional hacking organization sponsored by the Chinese Government<sup>25</sup>.

After the 2015 cyber agreement between the US and China, both countries are still subjected to cyber-attacks, leading to never-ending allegations between them. Furthermore, Microsoft publicly revealed in March 2021 regarding the threats from a Chinese state-sponsored organization called HAFNIUM.<sup>26</sup> This organization had utilized numerous undisclosed vulnerabilities in its Exchange email server software to attack customer networks.<sup>27</sup> As a result, thousands of email servers that had not yet installed Microsoft’s patch were vulnerable allowing hackers who are not affiliated with HAFNIUM could access and hack various institutions and individuals not only in the US but also all around the world<sup>28</sup>.

In response, China had consistently denied the accusation in lieu the Chinese Government pointed out that the US has conducted ten thousands cyber attacks against China. The Chinese Government stated the National Security Agency (NSA)’s office of Tailored Access Operations (TAO) has been doing numerous cyber espionage, one of them was accessing and stole the data of the Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xi’an which was funded by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.<sup>29</sup>

#### 3.2. Cyber Diplomacy between the US and China

<sup>23</sup> David E. Sanger dan Nicole Perlroth, “NSA Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat”, New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html>

<sup>24</sup> Robert Bebbler, “China’s Cyber Economic Warfare Threatens U.S”, *US Naval Institute*, Vol.143, No. 7, 2017, pp.2

<sup>25</sup> Vinay Pidathala, et.al, “Threat Research: Operation Beebus”, FireEye, <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/02/operation-beebus.html>

<sup>26</sup> USSC, China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States, accessed at [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter\\_3\\_Section\\_2--\\_Chinas\\_Cyber\\_Capabilities.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_3_Section_2--_Chinas_Cyber_Capabilities.pdf), 2022, pp.4

<sup>27</sup> USSC, (2022), pp. 4

<sup>28</sup> USSC, (2022), pp.4-5

<sup>29</sup> France24, China Accuses US of ‘Tens of Thousands’ of Cyberattacks, 5 September 2022, accessed at <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220905-china-accuses-us-of-tens-of-thousands-of-cyberattacks>



Despite numerous cyber attacks and operations conducted by each country, the US and China are utilizing diplomatic channels to address and resolve the conflict. Prior to the 2015 agreement, China President, Hu Jin Tao visited the United States in 2011 to fulfill an invitation by President Barack Obama.<sup>30</sup> This bilateral meeting aimed to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Both countries moreover expressed their intention and dedication to establish a constructive bilateral relationship in alignment with the national interest of both nations and the global community.<sup>31</sup> Both countries thus, also emphasize the needs of building trust and respecting their sovereignty.<sup>32</sup> This bilateral dialogue resulted in a “Joint Statement” which highlighted the further bilateral cooperation in socioeconomics, environment and security including cyber security.<sup>33</sup>

In the following years, particularly after Snowden revelations, the government leaders from both countries decided to meet bilaterally in 2015 delivering their national interest. President Xi Jinping in his dialogue with President Barack Obama stated that China would like to have win-win cooperation especially in combating cyber threats against them and would also like to rebuild trust.<sup>34</sup> Both countries therefore initiated US-China Cyber Agreement 2015 for not doing or supporting any kind of cyber espionage against each other.<sup>35</sup>

Furthermore in recent years, the US and China had reconstructed the bilateral relations, particularly after their meeting in the G20 Summit in Indonesia in 2022.<sup>36</sup> They, thus, agreed to have separate bilateral meetings. In November 2023, the Chinese President Xi Jinping and The US President Joe Biden held the face-to-face meeting in San Francisco.<sup>37</sup> In this meeting both countries agreed to strengthen bilateral relations and promote fair competition between them. Xi then pointed out five pillars to construct further relationship which are:<sup>38</sup>

- Establishing the stable and sustainable relationship with the US F
- Effectively respects each other principles and should maintain good communications, dialogues and consultations in addressing the issues
- Advancing mutually bilateral cooperation
- Advancing the role of both countries in the international arena
- Promoting people-to-people exchanges

<sup>30</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S-China Joint Statement”, 2011, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement>

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Ibid

<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> BBC, China’s XI wants ‘win-win Cooperation Operation’ with US, 25 September 2015, accessed at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34355581>

<sup>35</sup> John W. Rollins, “U.S – China Cyber Agreement”, CRS Insight, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf>

<sup>36</sup> Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, “Top Takeaways From the Biden-Xi Meeting in Bali”, *Reuters*, 14 November 2022, accessed at <https://www.reuters.com/world/top-takeaways-biden-xi-meeting-bali-2022-11-14/>

<sup>37</sup> Arendse Huld, ‘Xi-Biden Meeting: Productive Talks Lead to Increased Cooperation in Key Areas’, *China Briefing*, 16 November 2023, accessed at <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/us-china-meeting-productive-talks-lead-to-cooperation-in-key-areas/>

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

This bilateral dialogue resulted in the development of several key areas of cooperation such as counternarcotics, educational and cultural exchange, defense as well as in artificial intelligence (AI) governance.<sup>39</sup>

The implementation of cyber diplomacy in both countries has not entirely failed, as both countries still manage to have bilateral dialogue in addressing issues and conflict between them. Although the bilateral dialogue between these countries are not primarily talking about cyber security, the US and China always put cyber issues in their agenda and key points of negotiation. Instead, the cyber conflicts and allegations between them had created awareness of cyber issues and the importance of cyber diplomacy in order to tackle the issue as it would affect their trust on each other. Additionally, the technology and artificial intelligence has been further developing resulting in the need of these both super power countries to start to accommodate and raise the awareness on the importance of multilateral cooperation in order to maintain the stability and balance between AI and humankind in the world.

Such cyber attacks are still inevitable since there is no concrete evidence whether those attacks are coming from individuals/organizations or coming from state-sponsored organizations or even coming from the states itself. In the future, cyber diplomacy will still be useful for both countries in reconstructing their bilateral relations especially in cyber security and AI development. As long as both countries are still maintaining good communications and violating each other, the more advanced bilateral relations by diplomacy between the US and China, hence would possibly happen.

#### 4. Conclusion

The fluctuating bilateral relations between the US and China, particularly in cyber security and cyber space has resulted in numerous bilateral cyber diplomacy and dialogues in order to tackle the issue. Accusations between both countries are thus inevitable as a response to a series of cyber attacks against each other. However, despite the falling cyber diplomacy attempt in the past, both countries are still managing to rebuild the trust in each other and conduct the new cyber diplomacy reflecting the failure of previous cyber diplomacy attempt and thus established the more advanced areas of cooperation.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid

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## **Spy Tools for Sale in Exchange for Friendship: The Case Study of sales of Spyware by Israel and its Diplomatic Outcomes**

**Markus Formel**

As technological innovations progress, they create new fields where diplomatic conduct is expanding and evolving. This occurs in the realm of communication, such as social media diplomacy and new types of information warfare. It also expands to economic diplomacy conducted through the purchase or banning of certain digital services and products. An example of this is the ban on the procurement of 5G network infrastructure provided by Huawei in Europe and the prohibition of the Chinese social media platform TikTok in India. Technology and innovations are now at the center stage of world governments, with their capabilities being immense and the power derived from their utilization unprecedented. This technological leap also encompasses new methods of spying in combination with technology, known as spyware. In this essay, I will examine how the sale of top-tier spyware software developed by an Israeli company, NSO Group, is changing attitudes towards Israel on the international stage, while also helping to provide a diplomatic edge in relationships with other countries. I will demonstrate this through the potential use of Pegasus as a bargaining chip in exchange for recognizing Israel by Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—commonly known as the Abraham Accords. Additionally, I will explore the impact of the sales of Pegasus to African states and its effect on Israeli diplomatic power in the region.

The first iteration of the state-of-the-art military espionage spyware software, called Pegasus, was developed in 2011 by an Israeli company called the NSO Group. However, the first noted deployment occurred when a Canadian NGO, Citizens Lab, received a request from an Arab human rights defender, Ahmed Mansoor. He sought verification that the link sent by an unknown number was legitimate, as he had been promised a link to information regarding the practices of torture in the prisons of the United Arab Emirates<sup>40</sup>. However, it turned out to be an attempt to break into his phone and collect data. Pegasus is a state-of-the-art spyware software that relies on technological exploits to collect data from a target's device and then, without notice, transfer it to its end user. Due to this sophistication, it is used as a bargaining chip in securing diplomatic support worldwide. The key point regarding the provision of this

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<sup>40</sup> Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, "Pegasus as a Case Study of Evolving Ties between the UAE and Israel," *Gulf State Analytics*, June 9, 2022

technology and its correlation with diplomacy lies in the way the software is treated. As high-level military equipment, it receives such treatment. Every sale of Israeli military technology must be approved by the Ministry of Defense of Israel<sup>41</sup>. The process of which is, to this day, very opaque and secretive about the end customers of the software.

In the case of Africa, Israel has a vested interest in gaining the support of African states. Firstly, there are still states that do not recognize Israel, holding significant international clout, especially in the Arab-speaking world, and securing their support would tame the security threat, which stems from anti-Semitism, in combination with anti-Israelism in North Africa. The countries that do not recognize Israel in that region are Libya and Algeria; however, there are more countries with suspended relations, including Tunisia, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. To prevent potential security threats, Israel needs to invest many resources to be present on the continent - having representation in 10 countries - however, personal investment is also helped by other forms of diplomatic engagement. Israel provides military and technical support to the states, and the Pegasus software is a crucial part of this complex relationship between Africa and Israel. However, with the development of the Pegasus software, it became an important bargaining chip for rapprochement<sup>42</sup>.

The utilization of this method of rapprochement, after the use of Pegasus, can be seen when Israel gained observer status after decades of waiting within the African Union. Before this decision, it was reported that the Israeli side had approached several leaders of African states to facilitate the sale of the software. The countries of Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Morocco, Togo, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Cameroon, Uganda, and Ethiopia all supported granting observer status to Israel, and all of them have been provided with the software. One of the most ardent supporters of Israel in the African Union, Ghana, did so in 2016, and since then, it has remained one of the most steadfast supporters of Israel in the African Union. Ghana has also stood behind Israel after the terrorist attacks of October 7, along with Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo<sup>43</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> Drew Harwell, Ellen Nakashima, and Craig Timberg, "Biden Administration Blacklists NSO Group over Pegasus Spyware," *The Washington Times*, November 3, 2021.

<sup>42</sup> Suraya Dadoo, "Israel's Spyware Diplomacy in Africa," *Orient XXI*, September 12, 2022, <https://orientxxi.info/magazine/israel-s-spyware-diplomacy-in-africa,5859> (accessed 09.12.2023)

<sup>43</sup> Shola Lawal, "Israel-Gaza War: Why Is Africa Divided on Supporting Palestine?," *Al Jazeera*, October 14, 2023

Moreover, the sale of Pegasus has also played a tremendous role in establishing and maintaining ties with countries of the Abraham Accords - Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain - together with facilitating still not normalized relationships with Saudi Arabia. In the case of the three Abraham Accords countries, spyware has played a significant role in maintaining a presence in the region, carried out by a number of defense agreements signed in the spirit of the Abraham Accords. Morocco and Israel signed a security cooperation agreement in 2021, which later included cooperation on air defense and electronic warfare. Soon after resuming diplomatic ties and signing defense agreements, Israel was able to appoint its first military attaché in the country and recognize Moroccan claims to Western Sahara. A similar agreement was signed by Bahrain in 2022, and the United Arab Emirates<sup>44</sup>.

However, the country of highest importance is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia does not recognize Israel; however, there have been ongoing talks about official recognition. Saudi Arabia plays a dominant role in the Muslim world and is the regional hegemon. Additionally, it is one of the chief buyers of Israeli surveillance systems. It has reportedly struck a deal for 50 million dollars and a year-long partnership. The sale, one of many, acts as a connector between Israel and Saudis to bolster their security capabilities in the region, mainly to forge an alliance against Iran. It is, therefore, essential to have diplomatic rapprochement with the Kingdom to combat wider security concerns<sup>45</sup>.

Moreover, it is important to observe the patterns between Netanyahu's visits and state visits, coupled with the facilitation of Pegasus exports and the political gains achieved through the transaction. In the case of Hungary, Netanyahu visited in 2016, Pegasus was deployed in 2018, and Viktor Orbán also visited Israel. The deal resulted in maintaining pro-Israel ties in Hungary, exemplified by Hungary's voice in a European joint declaration to end hostility between Israel and Hamas in 2021<sup>46</sup>. In the case of Rwanda, Netanyahu visited in 2016, and the recorded use of Pegasus came in 2017 in exchange for a deal with the Rwandan government to accept refused asylum seekers. Moreover, both Azerbaijan and India acquired the software. In the case of Azerbaijan, it was to have an ally in the region against Iran, secure oil sales, and facilitate the

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<sup>44</sup> Marwa Fatafta, "Normalizing the Surveillance State-Cybersecurity Cooperation and the Abraham Accords," Middle East Research and Information Project, September 2023

<sup>45</sup> Amitai Ziv, "Where Netanyahu Went, NSO Followed: How Israel Pushed Cyberweapon Sales," *Haaretz.com*, July 20, 2021

<sup>46</sup> Ibid



export of arms. In the case of India, the interest also involved military cooperation and bilateral arrangements, followed by historical visits by both heads of states to each other's countries<sup>47</sup>.

With new innovations and technological products, new ways to conduct diplomacy will also emerge. From the banning of Huawei and TikTok to the sale of military-level spyware, technological products are becoming essential for maintaining, deepening, and establishing relationships with other countries. The sale of Pegasus spyware sheds some light on the future of spyware diplomacy, tremendously aiding Israel in furthering ties with regional neighbors. It has arguably helped Israel establish ties with the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain, countries that have all deployed Pegasus in their territories. Additionally, it has helped Israel bolster its international clout, as seen in the cases of India and Hungary, and facilitated a deal with Rwanda.

The shortcomings of this essay stem from the lack of information about the direct causation link between the sale of spyware and diplomatic engagement. Obtaining empirical data will be challenging. Thus, it is necessary to work with the limited anonymous diplomatic interviews available. In the end, it is crucial to raise questions about the ethical dimension of selling spyware to nations with varying levels of human rights violations, ranging from mild to severe. This raises concerns about the boundaries where ethical considerations intersect with national goals and the pursuit of power. These questions will become even more pressing in the coming years as most of the world gains full access to internet services, providing governments with extensive capabilities to use them to their advantage.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid

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## Technology and Public Diplomacy: The Use of Social Media and AI to Manipulate Through Disinformation

Anaïs Harket

Globalisation and the rise of social media platforms (SMP) called for increasing levels of communications between governments and populations. Social media users progressively became accessible targets for disinformation. Disinformation in public diplomacy is a strategy to deliberately convey false information leading to fear or suspicion among the population<sup>48</sup> with the objective of “unbalancing foreign governments by confusing and deceiving their citizens”<sup>49</sup>. Disinformation and diplomacy are closely linked, and these means were already used during the Cold War, to influence foreign populations through newspaper, radio, television, or flyers.<sup>50</sup> N.J. Cull defined public diplomacy as the “conduct of foreign policy by engagement with a foreign public”.<sup>51</sup> As such, the use of social media for public diplomacy allows governments to be closer to the foreign public by directly relaying information using various channels. Periods of crisis are the best opportunities to spread disinformation as it can be used to generate social disagreement, changing state policies or increase a government’s foreign policy presence to reach various objectives.<sup>52</sup> In this essay, we will see how social media and AI became popular tools for disinformation in public diplomacy.

### Social media platforms as ideal outlets to convey disinformation

Governments use social media as a way to easily, rapidly, and effectively communicate with citizens. The use of social media for disinformation has the aim to spread fabricated information to influence the opinion of citizens. The evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) allows for the extensive use of ‘deepfakes’ on SMP to convey disinformation. A ‘deepfake’ can be defined as an AI generated content where the face and the voice of a person is fabricated to convey a false

<sup>48</sup>UNHCR, *Using Social Media in Community Based Protection: A Guide*, p.230

<sup>49</sup> Rincón and Rodríguez-Cánovas, ‘Disinformation Propagation in Social Networks as a Diplomacy Strategy: Analysis from System Dynamics’, *International Relations and Social Networks* July 2021, page 35.

<sup>50</sup> Alfredo Guzmán Rincón, Sandra Barragán Moreno, Belén Rodríguez-Canovas, Ruby Lorena Carrillo Barbosa and David Ricardo Africano Franco, ‘Social networks, disinformation and diplomacy: a dynamic model for a current problem’, *Humanities And Social Sciences Communications*, 2023, page 3

<sup>51</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, *The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in US Public Diplomacy*, *International Studies Review*, March 2013, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 123-139, page 125.

<sup>52</sup> Rincón and Rodríguez-Cánovas, *Disinformation Propagation*, page 35

message and spread disinformation. AI generated videos that spread disinformation about the surrender of Ukrainian troops during the war could be found on pro-Russian pages to destroy the confidence in Ukrainian media and government officials.<sup>53</sup>

Social media is the best platform to convey disinformation, as the ‘rabbit holes’ allow for infinite suggested content, the lack of regulation by governments and the insufficient moderation by social media platforms. The tools used to convey disinformation such as bots, trolls, fake news or AI generated ‘deepfakes’ can successfully shape social media users’ minds. Moreover, it is challenging for the users to retrace the source of the information to verify its accuracy.

With the rise of SMP, individuals consume information in a new and different way. Information is not consumed through newspapers or media channels but by continuous news anchors and SMP that constantly need new information. News is easily shared online by users without being verified using other tools. Disinformation on social media spreads very fast, it is therefore challenging for governments to correct disinformation conveyed by foreign governments using public diplomacy.

Disinformation needs to target a public, by using SMP’s algorithms, targeted audiences are easily reached. Wars and conflicts, political turmoil or the recent global health crisis are examples of crises where disinformation is commonly used as individuals are looking for reassurance in explanations they choose to believe in. Furthermore, disinformation must not be confused with propaganda where the former is used to unbalance a state in the short term and the latter is used to keep populations under control in the long term, usually in absolutist regimes.<sup>54</sup> Similarly, disinformation fuels distrust in governments by the population. If disinformation is used in public diplomacy, it can be used to depict another state as fragile, or to critic another state’s position in a certain policy. Disinformation in public diplomacy to target another state is a powerful and effective way to question a government or its authority. Disinformation campaigns helps governments to convince foreign populations in favour of their own interests to successfully fulfil their foreign policy objectives.<sup>55</sup> Campaigns based on fake

<sup>53</sup> Satariano and Mozur, ‘The People Onscreen Are Fake. The Disinformation Is Real’, *The New York Times* 7/02/2023 (accessed on 12/12/2023)

<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/07/technology/artificial-intelligence-training-deepfake/html>

<sup>54</sup> Alfredo Guzmán Rincón et al., *Social networks, disinformation and diplomacy*, page 3

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, page 3

information are increasingly well-organised and efficient foreign policy strategies. Moreover, individuals using SMPs select the news they decide to trust. It is facilitated if disinformation targeting Americans uses AI technology to generate a ‘deepfake’ that looks and speaks like their target audience on American themes and narratives.<sup>56</sup>

### Disinformation fragilizing diplomatic ties

Disinformation in public diplomacy has the goal to lead to a diplomatic disadvantage for other foreign states as they target the foreign states’ citizens.<sup>57</sup> By using techniques of disinformation, a state usually takes profit from a crisis or an unstable government that can likely be questioned by citizens.<sup>58</sup>

Russia, China, and Iran are infamous users of disinformation for public diplomacy. By spreading disinformation to foreign populations, they have the goal to create distrust and destabilisation of individuals towards their own government.<sup>59</sup> The use of disinformation as a public diplomacy strategy by these three countries has the aim to create interference in the western democratic processes in their favour, to polarise foreign populations in favour of radical thinking and to diminish the confidence in traditional media outlets and institutions.<sup>60</sup>

During the 2016 U.S. elections, Russian agencies disinformed the American population to swing the results in favour of Donald Trump, ultimately in the interest of Moscow.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, Russian media also falsely accused NATO and the USA to be responsible for the creation of the Covid-19 virus to disadvantage the Chinese economy.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, the 2020 pandemic is the example of a global health crisis that rapidly turned into a political matter. It became a topic prone to disinformation to create distrust among the population. China often used social media platforms to convey disinformation in multiple languages to reach individuals in Argentina, the United States, Serbia, Italy, and Taiwan. Publications on social media related

<sup>56</sup> Clint Watts, ‘Disinformation’s Dangerous Appeal’, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 2, A Return to Great Power Competition (SUMMER 2020), page 21

<sup>57</sup> Alfredo Guzmán Rincón et al., *Social networks, disinformation and diplomacy*, page 3

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, page 3

<sup>59</sup> Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann, Doowan Lee and Andrew Dowse, ‘COVID Information Warfare and the Future of Great Power Competition’, *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 2020, Vol. 44, No. 2, page 15

<sup>60</sup> Alfredo Guzmán Rincón et al., *Social networks, disinformation and diplomacy*, page 3

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, page 2

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, page 2

to China praised the country for its assistance to European countries during the Covid-19 pandemic, while claiming European countries were incapable of providing the same support.<sup>63</sup>

Moreover, Russia and especially China were using social media platforms to spread disinformation targeting Westerners by claiming that the Covid-19 virus originated from American laboratories. This information was then relayed by the Chinese government on multiple social media platforms, especially on Weibo or WeChat, platforms that are not commonly used in Western countries.<sup>64</sup> By not being accessible to Westerners, suppressing the fake news becomes difficult.

In 2020, Taiwan has been the target of multiple disinformation campaigns originating from the Chinese government using popular social media platforms. They had the objective to destabilise the Tsai Ing-Wen government, re-elected in early 2020 and disfavoured by the Chinese government.<sup>65</sup> China-based actors used AI to generate a massive amount of content to overwhelm Taiwanese voters in order to influence the election results.<sup>66</sup> Disinformation against the Tsai Ing-Wen government had the goal to make voters change their mind to favour a pro-Chinese government.

According to Colonel M. Jackson, strong collaboration between various actors within governments is the most effective way to counter disinformation. Democracies are the best tool to counter disinformation as much as non-state actors, organisations and agencies can help on regulation to avoid disinformation.<sup>67</sup> Consequently, public diplomacy will not cease from using disinformation to reach certain foreign policy objectives, however some measures can easily be implemented. In my opinion, to effectively counter disinformation at the level of social media users, it is necessary for users to learn how to; analyse information and use a wide range of media outlets, to question the veracity of the sources and the possible existence of deep fakes, and to use quality media outlets or news redacted by associations, NGOs and working groups.

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<sup>63</sup> Sara Cook, 'Welcome to the New Era of Chinese Government Disinformation', *The Diplomat*, May 11<sup>th</sup> 2020 (accessed on 12/12/2023) <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/welcome-to-the-new-era-of-chinese-government-disinformation>

<sup>64</sup> Erika Kinetz, 'Anatomy of a conspiracy: With COVID, China took leading role', *AP News*, 15/12/2021, <https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-beijing-only-on-ap-epidemics-media> (accessed on 22/11/2023)

<sup>65</sup> Jude Blanchette, Scott Livingston, Bonnie S. Glaser and Scott Kennedy, 'Protecting Democracy in an Age of Disinformation', *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (CSIS) (2021), page 13

<sup>66</sup> Sara Cook, *Welcome to the New Era of Chinese Government Disinformation*, *The Diplomat*, May 11<sup>th</sup> 2020

<sup>67</sup> Michael Jackson and Paul Lieber, 'Countering Disinformation: Are We Our Own Worst Enemy?' *The Cyber Defense Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2020, page 46

For social media platforms, moderation is the key to be able to detect more efficiently AI-generated content and warn social media users to tackle disinformation. Finally for governments, interagency collaboration is necessary to overcome disinformation rapidly and efficiently, as well as collaboration with NGOs and associations to raise awareness on disinformation using communication campaigns on social media.

To conclude, disinformation on social media platforms using AI becomes increasingly sophisticated and it is harder for social media users to assess the accuracy of the data. Public diplomacy using disinformation is a concern for governments amid the current crises.



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## The Art of Cyber Diplomacy: On the Example of Japan

Gulalek Annamuradova

In today's digital era, the landscape of global security is undergoing significant changes, shaped profoundly by technological breakthroughs and the interconnected nature of cyberspace. The rapid progress in the spectrum of cyber threats, such as state-sponsored cyberattacks, cyberespionage, cyberterrorism, and the evolving patterns of cybercrime, increased the significance of international cooperation in the management of cyberspace. Cyber diplomacy has emerged as a crucial component of International Relations in the past two decades, serving as an essential instrument to address the issues posed by cyberspace. Differently from digital diplomacy, cyber diplomacy involves the utilization of diplomatic tools and diplomatic a mindset to tackle threats arising from the international use of cyberspace<sup>68</sup>. Particularly, by using the diplomatic resources and efforts in the cyber domain, it prioritizes safeguarding the national interests of countries. These interests are outlined in national cyberspace or cybersecurity policies and encompass topics like cybersecurity, cybercrime, confidence-building, internet freedom, and internet governance<sup>69</sup>. Cyber diplomacy holds a critical role in facilitating the prevention of potential conflicts and bridging gaps between nations in the context of cyber wars or cyber-attacks. It can be executed by a wide range of actors beyond traditional state diplomats, such as non-state actors, Internet company leaders, ICT entrepreneurs, and civil society representatives. It possesses three fundamental characteristics, compromising:

*"a. Existence of multiple stakeholders, not just governments, even though they are responsible for developing and implementing policies related to cyber security. The issue of cyberspace also involves international organizations that promote cooperation in this field (the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Telecommunication Union), the private sector that owns critical infrastructure, non-governmental organizations that support human rights, the academic environment that is involved in research and civil society.*

*b. Promoting the development of a legal framework by facilitating international agreements, encouraging responsible behaviour in cyberspace, highlighting existing risks, promoting dialogue and cooperation, building trust, and addressing cybercrime, investigating, and prosecuting criminals.*

*c. Capacity building, aiming to support countries in developing the technical and institutional capacities needed to address cybersecurity challenges through training and education, technical assistance, information sharing, and international cooperation"* <sup>70</sup>.

<sup>68</sup> Amel Attatfa, Karen Renaud, and Stefano De Paoli, "Cyber Diplomacy: A Systematic Literature Review," *Procedia Computer Science* 176 (2020): 60–69, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2020.08.007>.

<sup>69</sup> André Barrinha and Thomas Renard, "Cyber-Diplomacy: The Making of an International Society in the Digital Age," *Global Affairs* 3, no. 4–5 (2017): 353–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1414924>.

<sup>70</sup> Ioana-Cristina Vasiloiu, "Cyber Diplomacy: A New Frontier for Global Cooperation in the Digital Age," *Informatica Economica* 27, no. 1 (2023): 41–50., <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.24818/issn14531305/27.1.2023.04>.

The cyber diplomacy efforts have started taking place only in the second decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, as previously countries were solely focused on employing cybersecurity strategies on state level. The US International strategy for cyberspace in 2011 marked the beginning of cyber-diplomacy, stressing on international aspects of cyber issues. The strategy prioritized economy, network protection, law enforcement, military, internet governance, international development, and internet freedom, using diplomacy, defense, and development (3Ds) as pillars. Followed by many nations adopting cybersecurity policies that address international cyber concerns, it became a new arising domain of governance and contestation<sup>71</sup>.

### The Development and Composition of Japan's Cyber Diplomacy

The government of Japan initiated the development of a cybersecurity policy in the 2000s to facilitate coordination across government agencies in dealing with rising cybersecurity threats. The strategy commenced with a security guideline which was subsequently followed by the implementation of Special Action Plan on Countermeasures to Cyberterrorism of Critical Infrastructure. In 2005, the National Information Security Centre (NISC) was established by the government with the explicit purpose of developing a strategy for national information security and implementing a critical infrastructure action plan<sup>72</sup>. However, it was not until 2006 that Japan's engagement in cyber diplomacy began fostering international partnerships and collaboration with countries and regions that are aligned with democratic principles, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the realm of cybersecurity. And these efforts primarily take place within multinational frameworks such as the OECD and G8. In 2013, Japan released its first "Cybersecurity Strategy," setting an ambitious goal to become a leading cyberspace power. This strategy allocated a substantial portion to its "diplomacy," advocating a balanced approach to creating a safe and reliable cyberspace<sup>73</sup>. The Basic Act on Cybersecurity of 2014 further enhanced the NISC's role and strengthened government involvement in cybersecurity relevant matters<sup>74</sup>. Following the establishment of the legal framework by the Basic Act, the Japanese cabinet officially granted quasi-legal authority to a revised Cybersecurity Strategy in November 2015<sup>75</sup>. The 2015 Cybersecurity Strategy under Abe administration took a proactive approach to Japan's cyber efforts and pursued a broader diplomatic strategy to reinforce international rules and norms for cyber governance along with those of the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. Particularly, Japan rapidly built its own domestic policy infrastructure for defensive cybersecurity and progressively integrated its capabilities and strategy with the United States<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> Barrinha and Renard, "Cyber-Diplomacy: The Making of an International Society in the Digital Age.", 359.

<sup>72</sup> Dai Mochinaga, "The Expansion of China's Digital Silk Road and Japan's Response," *Asia Policy* 27, no. 1 (2020): 41–60, <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0005>.

<sup>73</sup> Wilhelm. Vosse, "Japan's Cyber Diplomacy," *EU Cyber Direct*, January 1, 2019, 1–21.


<sup>74</sup> Mochinaga, Dai. 2020. "The Expansion of China's Digital Silk Road and Japan's Response." *Asia Policy* 27 (1): 41–60. <https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0005>.

<sup>75</sup> Mochinaga, "The Expansion of China's Digital Silk Road and Japan's Response.", 54.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Kallender and Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Emerging Trajectory as a 'Cyber Power': From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 1–2 (January 2, 2017): 118–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1233493>.

As of current date, the core elements of Japan's Cyber diplomacy as outlined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) are centred around three pillars: promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, developing confidence-building measures, and cooperating on capacity-building. Underpinned by these pillars, Japan engages in bilateral cyber dialogues with 11 countries, including the US, Australia, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, India, ROK, Israel, Estonia, and Ukraine. Additionally, Japan holds dialogues with regional players like the EU and ASEAN as well as within the Japan-China-ROK and Japan-US-ROK trilateral cooperation<sup>77</sup>. The scope of Japan's cyber diplomacy on areas of cooperation, like capacity building, cyber dialogue, confidence building internet governance approach technical and training cooperation, is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1



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Japan participates in global cybercrime conventions with international bodies like the UNGGE and OECD. Conversely, the collaboration between the European Union and Japan in the fields of information and communication technology (ICT) and cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific region is motivated by their shared concerns regarding the offensive cyber capabilities

<sup>77</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan's Cyber Diplomacy," accessed December 15, 2023, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000412327.pdf>.

<sup>78</sup> Vosse, "Japan's Cyber Diplomacy .", p.7

of China, Russia, and North Korea<sup>79</sup>. China specifically through APT10, has been involved in information theft from Japanese organizations making Japan's economic growth and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) vulnerable since they both heavily rely on sophisticated technology for their operations<sup>80</sup>. The EU and Japan cyber relations are further driven by their common values, including the desire to establish a secure and accessible digital environment. They promote a multi-stakeholder model for governing the internet and collaborate on enhancing cyber capabilities, aiding nations with lower levels of cyber security. Japan has mostly prioritized ASEAN countries, whereas the EU and its member states have focused on Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia in terms of cyber infrastructure development efforts. Japan is currently the European Union's main partner in the Indo-Pacific region for promoting sustainable digital connectivity through the "Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between Japan and the European Union," advocates for further development of digital infrastructure in East Asia<sup>81</sup>.

## Conclusion

Cyberdiplomacy is a relatively new and developing field within the arena of international affairs. It is distinguished by its complexity and broad scope, presents opportunities as well as wide range of challenges and uncertainties to the states and non-actors. Due to its novel nature, traditional diplomatic tasks, like preserving peace and fostering mutual confidence among nations, are being constantly tested, requiring the development of new policies and strategies in the cyber domain<sup>82</sup>. Therefore, acknowledging cybersecurity's significance, numerous countries and organizations took proactive steps in the development of cybersecurity frameworks globally. As exemplified above, in its turn, Japan made substantial contributions to tackle cyber threats at both the national and international levels, demonstrating its dedication to resolving the uncertainties in this realm<sup>83</sup>. However, the absence of a universally accepted structure of governance in this field complicates the resolution of cyber conflicts and impedes the advancement of international collaboration. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is the only internationally legally binding force in the cyber realm. Adopted in 2001 by the Council of Europe, the convention aims to standardize the diverse and inconsistent national legislation related to cybercrimes<sup>84</sup>. Correspondingly, the realm of cyber governance and collaboration continues to be a delicate matter due to the conflicting approaches, values, and interests of prominent cyber powers, each of which actively pursuing its own unique strategies in the areas of cybersecurity, cyber warfare, internet governance, and

<sup>79</sup> Wilhelm Vosse, "A Conceptual Broadening of the Security Order in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of EU-Japan Cooperation in ICT and Cybersecurity," *Asian Affairs* 75, no. 4 (2022): 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2022.2090683>.

<sup>80</sup> Benjamin Bartlett, "Japan: An Exclusively Defense-Oriented Cyber Policy," *Asia Policy* 15, no. 2 (2020): 93–100, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27023905>.

<sup>81</sup> Vosse, "A Conceptual Broadening of the Security Order in the Indo-Pacific: The Role of EU-Japan Cooperation in ICT and Cybersecurity."

<sup>82</sup> Barrinha and Renard, "Cyber-Diplomacy: The Making of an International Society in the Digital Age.", 361.

<sup>83</sup> Yoko Nitta, "National Cyber Security Strategy: Are We Making Progress? Japan's Efforts and Challenges," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* IV (2014): 89–98, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43773652>.

<sup>84</sup> Dancă Dana, "Cyber Diplomacy – a New Component of Foreign Policy," *Jurnalul De Drept Si Stiinte Administrative* 1, no. 3 (2015): 91–97, <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=443948>.

data privacy. And in the meantime, developing or underdeveloped countries due to their limited capacities to actively engage in global cyber governance, experience a disparity as well as a discrepancy in the cyber realm<sup>85</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> Barrinha and Renard, “Cyber-Diplomacy: The Making of an International Society in the Digital Age.”,357.

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## The Role of Social Media in Foreign Relations: A Double-Edged Sword

Giacomo Teodori

In today's interconnected world, social media has emerged as a powerful tool that goes beyond borders and can consequently play a part in shaping foreign relations. Almost 4 billion people make use of these platforms, which is roughly half of the whole world population. Due to its widespread accessibility and the rapid dissemination of information, these platforms have dramatically transformed the way governments, diplomats, and citizens communicate and interact with each other. In this context, social media is increasingly playing an indispensable role. If it has undoubtedly brought numerous benefits on one hand, such as enhancing transparency, on the other, social media can also pose challenges, including the spread of misinformation and numerous potential cyber risks. This essay aims to explore the diverse impact of social media on international relations and discuss both its advantageous and detrimental aspects.

Foreign affairs officials possess an extra tool that gives them the possibility to interact closely with officials from other governments and can therefore stimulate deeper and more concrete ties. By giving them more opportunities to interact, we should expect a better exchange of views and opinions which could trigger a socialization process amongst diplomats with positive results. In other words, foreign relations should benefit from these new technologies as it would push for people to more frequent interactions that are essential in order to build and maintain relations with foreign countries. In diplomatic practice, social media can be an important tool for communicating the position of negotiation parties<sup>86</sup>. As seen during the Brexit negotiations, for example, they have been heavily influenced by numerous tweets of chief negotiators and other actors. Some scholars define the use of social media for achieving diplomatic objectives as digital diplomacy or e-diplomacy.

One of the key features of these platforms is the rapidity through which information travels around the world, also improving the speed at which communication between people takes place. Historically, traditional diplomacy was often limited in terms of time and space<sup>87</sup>. In

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<sup>86</sup> DiPLO, 'Internet and social media: A focus on diplomacy', <https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/internet-and-social-media-a-focus-on-diplomacy/> (accessed 12.12.2023)

<sup>87</sup> Ilan Manor, *The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy*, Global Public Diplomacy series (Palgrave Macmillan), Cham, 2019

contrast, social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram allow diplomats and governments to bypass intermediaries and communicate directly with public citizens both at the domestic and international level. Government officials can now use social media to share news, announcements, and updates, reaching a larger audience instantaneously. Thanks to these platforms, diplomats can communicate their foreign policies, share critical information and respond to global events in real-time. This happens every day on Twitter, for instance, this social media has been largely used by citizens to describe the events taking place in the israeli-palestinian conflict after the 7<sup>th</sup> of October<sup>88</sup>. At the same time, we can find tweets where governments show their position on the matter. Social media serves as a powerful tool for the projection of soft power, allowing nations to showcase their ideas, culture, and values to the global public. Countries can improve and refine their international image and influence through the creation of well-crafted online campaigns. For non-democracies this means that these platforms can be used to reinforce national propaganda in order to counterbalance other point of views arising from the same online instruments.

Social platforms allow diplomats to engage with a broader audience, fostering dialogue and mutual understanding with individuals who may not have previously had a voice in foreign policy matters. It has democratized participation by enabling citizens to interact directly with decision-makers, influencing public discourse and shaping foreign policy agendas. This mechanism contributes to increase transparency in a policy area which has historically been conducted away from the public eye<sup>89</sup>. These media have redistributed, at least in democracies, the power to influence foreign affairs issues and therefore opened the floor to a lot of new actors who previously had little to no part at all. More concretely, social media has empowered grassroots organizations and NGOs to participate in citizen diplomacy, promoting people-to-people interactions and building bridges between cultures. In times of political turmoil or emergencies, online platforms played a pivotal role in coordinating protests and drawing global attention to human rights violations, showcasing once again the power of social media to mobilize and catalyze change. It has created a sense of community on a global scale, transcending national borders and fostering cross-cultural exchange. Citizen diplomacy through online communication is an empowered form of soft power, fostering empathy, understanding, and trust, which are fundamental in international relations. Simultaneously, government

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<sup>88</sup> Mark Scott, 'Graphic videos of Hamas attacks spread on X', *POLITICO.EU*, <https://www.politico.eu/article/graphic-videos-hamas-attacks-spread-twitter-x-israel/> (accessed 01.02.2024)

<sup>89</sup> Leira Harvard, 'The Emergence of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly*, Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2019, Pages 187–198

officials can participate in this process: for example, platforms such as YouTube and Instagram provide diplomats with the ability to showcase the essence of their countries and to create positive narratives about their nations that can lead to a better political dialogue. This unity is important even when the world orders change in term of leaders and/or circumstances by keeping course of this relation<sup>90</sup>.

An additional example confirming the emergence of new actors entering the realm of foreign affairs is the interview of Vladimir Putin conducted by Tucker Carlson and accessible on various social media platforms. Now journalists play a role in shaping not only public opinion but also the foreign policy agenda itself by influencing officials positions through this kind of investigative journalism spread online. At the same time, the public opinion influenced by such reports can shape once again high politics affairs thanks to these platforms. It is evident how such instruments bring about not only major changes to the diplomatic field, but they also add layers of complexity to the subject. Moreover, digital diplomacy involves a new array of topics that gets into the international political dialogue. These include data protection, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence governance, alongside with traditional topics heavily influenced by digitalisation such as e-commerce or digital health<sup>91</sup>.

However, as we have mentioned, social media poses a threat to international relations. First of all, the well-known risk of misinformation, as non-verified or fake news can easily spread on social media. What will occur if unscrupulous interest groups or malicious foreign actors submit thousands of comments with unique appearances? How can we distinguish between genuine and fraudulent submissions? As of today, unfortunately we can't<sup>92</sup>. This type of information can contribute to social polarization, violence, and propaganda. Misinformation can actually spread faster and deeper in the web than the accurate one due to its counterintuitive or provocative nature. By directly engaging with the public, government officials as well, can use these platforms to manipulate public opinion, spread falsehoods and create confusion during times of international crises which can significantly impact foreign relations. For instance, that is what happened during the 2016 election in the USA with various reports of Russian

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<sup>90</sup> Jessica Ong Hai Liaw,. (2020). 'Digital Diplomacy: The Role Of Social Media'. *Solid State Technology*. 63. 7551.

<sup>91</sup> *Internet and social media: A focus on diplomacy*, cit.

<sup>92</sup> Benji Edwards, 'OpenAI confirms that AI writing detectors don't work' *Arstechnica Wired Media Group*, 2023, <https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2023/09/openai-admits-that-ai-writing-detectors-dont-work> (Accessed 15.03.2023)

interference<sup>93</sup>. Highly correlated to misinformation we can also encounter the issue of misinterpretation. The projection of a country's image together with a certain type of narrative, when misinterpreted<sup>94</sup>, risks to alter the previous image of that nation and can badly impact the relationship between these countries. Not to mention the fact that not just information but also images and videos can be faked and spread online for criminal purposes. The manipulation of this content is today a lot easier thanks to numerous editing programmes and artificial intelligence (AI).

Another issue is the fact that social media can guarantee anonymity to its users. This again is detrimental to the verification of information, but it acts as a shield when committing illicit acts. Fake profiles can manipulate public opinion and might aim to get at the centre of the international dialogue. As we have seen, even if social media could be used as an instrument for democracy, it is just as effective in promoting the contrary. Not only autocracies have adapted to these platforms, but they can become a less democratic place since it is vulnerable to either inaccurate content or content provided by foreign states or their proxies who wish to subvert the democratic process<sup>95</sup>. This new digital world, by giving voice to everyone, can mould a world web order within ours but different from it.

If traditionally diplomacy is used to discuss about war, peace and conflict laying the foundation for interstates communication, crises might also erupt from social media: this is the case of cyberwarfare. It is a new type of war where computer technology is used in order to disrupt the activities of a state or an organization. Hacking is the most prevalent form of cybercrime, in which a cybercriminal may utilize computer technology to unlawfully acquire personal information and details from individuals for malicious and exploitive purposes. For example, political adversaries may breach digital systems to obtain valuable information and use it for their own agenda, this statement can be applied both to domestic and international politics due to interstates rivalries. Should a leak of private information on social platforms take place due to criminal activity, it may have a rapid and profound impact on leading world affairs. That is because it could jeopardise or damage the reputations of entire states and their leaders. At the top of the diplomatic and political agendas of the most important international organizations such as the UN, NATO, ITU, OECD, OSCE, Commonwealth, G7 and G20, we find cyber

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<sup>93</sup> Federal Bureau of Investigations, 'Russian Interference in 2016 U.S. Elections', *FBI Most Wanted*, <https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/russian-interference-in-2016-u-s-elections>. (Accessed 13.03.2024)

<sup>94</sup> *Digital Diplomacy: The Role of social media*, cit.

<sup>95</sup> Sarah Kreps, *Social media and International Relations*, , Cambridge University Press, 2020

security<sup>96</sup>. Today's government officials must be prepared and well-equipped to deal with such challenges.

The role of social media in foreign relations cannot be ignored in today's globalized world. It has brought about a revolution of diplomatic practices: these new tools should help diplomats to better perform their duties as outlined in art.3 of the Vienna Convention namely to represent their nations, gather information, negotiate, promote solid relations and protect the interests of their citizens<sup>97</sup>. However, its dual nature must be acknowledged. Even though online platforms amplify voices, encourage the strengthening of global ties, and foster people-to-people diplomacy, it also perpetuates disinformation, fuels division, and poses digital threats to national security, particularly to democracies. It is crucial to understand these dynamics so as to fully harness its potential and mitigate effectively its risks. Governments and individuals together must navigate this complex landscape, benefiting from the advantages of social media while paying serious attention to its negative consequences in order to shape a more secure and interconnected world.

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<sup>96</sup> Viona Rashica, 'The benefits and risks of digital diplomacy', *SEEU Review*, 2019, 13(1), 75–89

<sup>97</sup> *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, United Nations, 1961,  
[https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9\\_1\\_1961.pdf](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf)

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## The Race for Semiconductors and its Implications on Geopolitics: A New Era of Diplomacy

**Ricardo Tavares Magalhães**

Semiconductors have been a hot debate in recent years and have drastically changed geopolitics and thus influenced global diplomacy. A race has been ongoing between nations to get hold of semiconductors and therefore microchips which power the most mundane electric household objects and at the same military-grade devices, this race has only been getting more ubiquitous and more important in ushering a new age in digital technologies and reshaping geopolitics. Now, a semiconductor is actually just a material that conducts electricity under certain circumstances. It serves as the fundamental component of microchips, which are minuscule devices made up of millions of transistors. Computers, smartphones, and a host of other electrical gadgets all employ microchips.<sup>98</sup> That is why some news outlets refer to microchips and others to semiconductors, for the sake of clarity I'll refrain from the latter. The major nations deeply involved in the semiconductor industry are China, the United States and Taiwan which puts them in a unique relationship. The USA, China and to some extent, the EU are competing for semiconductor supremacy while Taiwan is the hub of the semiconductor supply chain.<sup>99</sup> Both the US and China need semiconductors to bolster their domestic devices and therefore their military which just shows how essential they are as both have been rivals and tensions have been getting worse, especially regarding their trade war and the matter of Taiwan.<sup>100</sup>

Chris Miller, the author of *Chip War*, named this conflict/competition the chip war<sup>101</sup> which is fitting as the future may very well depend on semiconductors on who will have a foothold in this market, this will present diplomatic opportunities as well as challenges. One contemporary term for this type of diplomacy is called chip diplomacy which describes the diplomatic initiatives used by nations and businesses to protect their semiconductor supply chains and preserve their competitive technical advantage.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Trevor Thorton 'What is a semiconductor?', *The Conversation* 10.08.2022, <https://theconversation.com/what-is-a-semiconductor-an-electrical-engineer-explains-how-these-critical-electronic-components-work-and-how-they-are-made-188337> (last accessed 24 November 2023).

<sup>99</sup> Andrew Hill, 'The great chip war — and the challenge for global diplomacy', *Financial Times* 7.12.2022 <https://www.ft.com/content/7de40326-58a9-457b-a828-edf86031883e> (last accessed 24 November 2023).

<sup>100</sup> Fernando Leibovici and Jason Dunn, 'U.S. Trade of Semiconductors: Cross-Country Patterns and Historical Dynamics', *Economic Synopses* 31, pp 1.

<sup>101</sup> Hill, 'The Great Chip War'

<sup>102</sup> SemiWiki, Time for Chip Diplomacy, <https://semiwiki.com/china/286025-time-for-chip-diplomacy/> (last accessed 24 November 2023).

This essay will be structured with an introduction, followed by a main body which will include the geopolitical landscape surrounding the race for semiconductors and how diplomacy is involved and can contribute, in the form of global and chip diplomacy. All these points will be woven together into the conclusion which additionally will provide an outlook on the future with thoughts on the possible course of the wider geopolitical ramifications.

### **The geopolitics of the semiconductor race**

Now to understand the geopolitics surrounding semiconductors, one has to understand why they are so important to all parties trying to get hold of them. Semiconductors are instrumental in the development of electronic devices such as smartphones and military equipment, they enable society's productivity and capabilities as well as its security and advancement.<sup>103</sup> In case of conflict, military operations will only be possible with semiconductors and many nations such as China and the USA rely heavily on their military force even if both produce in-house microchips, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturer Company or TSMC is by far the biggest producer and innovator reflected by the quality of its semiconductors. The semiconductors literally shape our lives and will continue to do so, they are already one of the most sought-after resources which makes its geopolitics a recurrent discussion in multilateralism and diplomacy only more important.

John Naughton from the Guardian labels the race for semiconductors Cold War 2.0, the main weapons are no longer arms but semiconductors. There is a growing rift between Washington and Beijing, the US has enforced stringent export regulations on technology goods, one of which is aimed at preventing China from obtaining semiconductor chips manufactured in the United States or anywhere else in the globe. The intention is to impede China's advancement in the production of high-end chips. TSMC is even constructing a chip manufacturing facility in Arizona, presumably drawn by the US government's more than \$50 billion in incentives.<sup>104</sup> China also lacks the capacity to produce high-end chips, and TSMC is located in Taiwan, which the Beijing administration considers to be a part of its own country. According to the Economist, TSMC produces 84% of the world's most sophisticated chips, and if the company were to cease manufacturing, the whole global electronics sector would suffer unimaginable losses. It will

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<sup>103</sup> Aditya Sehgal, 'Geopolitics of Semiconductor Supply Chains: The Case of TSMC, US-China-Taiwan Relations, and the COVID-19 Crisis' Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection: 3592, pp. 4.

<sup>104</sup> John Naughton, 'Cold War 2.0 Will Be A Race For Semiconductors, Not Arms', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/18/cold-war-20-will-be-a-race-for-semiconductors-not-arms> (last accessed 24 November 2023).



take many years of labour before either America or China can hope to catch up to the firm's technology and know-how, which are maybe a decade ahead of those of its competitors.<sup>105</sup>

The EU however is not to be neglected in the race, like the US it is also worried about the safety and stability of the world's semiconductor supply chain, which is dominated by Asia and is under danger from geopolitical unrest and China's aspirations. The EU has launched its European Chips Act to increase domestic semiconductor production and research however the amount it intends to invest towards manufacturing and research dwarfs in comparison with the USA and South Korea.<sup>106</sup> If their objective is for Asia and therefore China to lose its market share in semiconductors, then both the EU and the USA should work together to prevent a transatlantic crisis over incentives and subsidies for semiconductors. Rather than focusing only on production, they should also take advantage of their individual advantages and collaborations within the semiconductor ecosystem.

On the chip sector front, China is facing many difficulties from overseas, the US and other Western countries have placed export restrictions on Chinese products such as Huawei and other Chinese chipmakers as a result of China's rapid technical advancement. As Beijing faces trade restrictions and experiences a sour relationship with Taiwan, it is more focused than ever on investing, expanding its market share, and developing its own semiconductor technologies.<sup>107</sup> The People's Republic of China is getting stark competition and is being isolated in the semiconductor market, yet China is steadily investing in in-house chips. The geopolitics here are very volatile and diplomacy would be an effective strategy for all parties to keep world order and improve even multilateral relations.

## Chip diplomacy

Chip diplomacy, also known as semiconductor diplomacy, is a diplomatic, geopolitical, and international relations tool for evaluating and reviewing semiconductor production, chip supply chains, and technological advancement between nations. It can enable cooperation and formal

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> CEPA, Confronting China and Catching Up on Chips, <https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/confronting-china-and-catching-up-on-chips/> (last accessed 25 November 2023).

<sup>107</sup> The Economist, 'Will China dominate the world of semiconductors?', *The Economist* 29.01.2022 <https://www.economist.com/international/2022/01/29/will-china-dominate-the-world-of-semiconductors> (last accessed 25 November 2023).

communication with chip companies and promote countries engaging in collaborative research and technological innovation regarding semiconductors.

The role of diplomacy here is crucial, it is capable of encouraging constructive and cooperative US-China relations in terms of the semiconductor sector. Shared interests and worries of both nations are prioritized by diplomacy by promoting bilateralism and talks with the goal of resolving existing disputes and establishing international regulations and rules for the chip industry. Consequently, this can also lead to an exchange of knowledge, technology and talent between Washington and Beijing. Not to forget the potential establishment of a strong and reliable international supply chain. Ergo, chip diplomacy might become a vital part of the positive development of US-China relations and a stronger and more dependable global semiconductor industry.

## **Conclusion**

Diplomacy involving semiconductors and its ramifications on geopolitics is a very much new branch of diplomacy but an essential one for global relations and can shape our society due to the dependence on and importance of electronics which require semiconductors. As many nations compete for the semiconductor industry, hostilities and tension arise and it is up to diplomacy to remedy and mitigate this movement and ideally find a solution where every party benefits and not just one. The geopolitics of chip competition has been fierce, and the participants count as one of the most influential nations in the world meaning there has been a lot of discussion on it therefore diplomacy is also so important in this context. It is strongly recommended that this type of competition does not harm world politics and only adds healthy and strong competition. The resource everyone is competing for is a crucial one and can determine one's fate even, such as the use of it in military equipment during conflicts and that is why mostly the US and China as they have been great rivals, are very keen on getting a hold of them. Chip diplomacy is a very much needed tool in these troubling times and it can positively contribute to world order and healthy competition. Also, the delicate matter of Taiwan in this context is a hot topic and it is difficult to predict what will happen next however semiconductor diplomacy as well as diplomacy should be used to the fullest extent. It will surely contribute to the future of the China-Taiwan relationship and the outcome will certainly be major.

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## II. Recent developments in diplomatic craftsmanship in Europe



## EU's Diplomacy Raising New Stabilitocracies in the Western Balkans

Donada Rata

### Introduction

After years of the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans, it ended up being seriously damaged in terms of credibility and in maintaining its founding values of democracy. EU diplomacy failure resulted in building the strongest 'stabilitocracies' in the Balkans since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the first decade after the wars in the region, the former Yugoslavia countries' attempts towards Euro-Atlantic integration from leaders driven by strong nationalist ideologies, and meanwhile promoting EU values, were the first signs of semi-autocracies, which later would be shaped as 'stabilitocracies'. The enlargement process became more and more technical for the Western Balkans, and their democratization was not a priority. Instead, the EU tried to save the region from another war. During this period, the EU went through a cascade of follow-up crises such as the Greek financial crisis, later in Slovenia and Brexit distracted their attention from the Western Balkans region. Meanwhile, lacking the tools to support the democratization of these countries resulted in raising corruptive leaders.

Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia are the purest examples in the early 2000s that show how 'new' political elites were trying to establish functional democratic institutions with a Euro-Atlantic vision to ensure the EU's support for their regime and rely on informal, clientelist structures, capture of institutions and media, and regular production of crises to undermine the rule of law.<sup>108</sup> This paper is going to describe how the EU's failure in the enlargement policy has been and is raising stabilitocracies and preventing the democratization of the Western Balkan countries for the sake of securing a peaceful and stable region. To understand this process of stabilitocracy raise, we are going to analyze the Western Balkan governments from 2000, specifically in Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania. As well, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a unique one due to the political system and how the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, imposes amendments to the Constitution of the Federation of BiH and the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which leads to the idea that the international community is establishing an 'ethnic stabilitocracy' rather than a democratic country.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Florian Bieber, 'The Rise (And Fall) Of Balkan Stabilitocracies', Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No.10, pp. 176-185.

<sup>109</sup> Benjamin Nurki. *Christian Schmidt's Stabilitocracy*. Vifa-recht.de. Retrieved December 15, 2023, from [https://intr2dok.vifarecht.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/mir\\_derivate\\_00014145/Christian\\_Schmidts\\_Stabilitocracy.pdf](https://intr2dok.vifarecht.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/mir_derivate_00014145/Christian_Schmidts_Stabilitocracy.pdf)



## Main ‘Stabilitocrats’ of the Region

The term ‘stabilitocracy’ was used by Antoinette Primatarova and Johanna Deimel back in 2012 to analyze Albania,<sup>110</sup> which “provides stability externally but domestically oscillates between democracy and autocratic tendencies”.<sup>111</sup> Thus, a ‘stabilitocracy’ as many scholars have been referring to it *‘is a regime with obvious democratic shortcomings that nevertheless claims to work towards democratic reform and offers stability’*.<sup>112</sup> As described by different scholars, the Western Balkans’ stabilitocracies claim to be reforming democracies and receiving external support, particularly from EU member states, for the sake of the (false) promise of stability.<sup>113</sup> In this way, Western Balkan governments intentionally cause instability with their neighbors or internally, as with the opposition or minorities, and the only stability they provide is in the promise made towards international actors. The initiation of stabilitocracies in the region starts from the 1990s when Croatia and Serbia received temporary support from the international community to maintain stability in the region. In North Macedonia, the shift towards a stabilitocracy occurred during confrontations with Greece related to the name disputes and NATO accession, bringing the country into a deep crisis after the former Prime Minister Gruevski’s corruption case. In Montenegro, the ruling party Democratic Party of Socialists ruled the country for a long period, with former President Milo Djukanovic building one of the most dedicated kleptocracies and organized crime havens in the region. On the other side, Serbia, as one of the most powerful stabilitocracies in the region, with its President Aleksandar Vucic being in power since from 2012. In Albania, with the new Prime Minister Edi Rama and his Socialist Party leading the country since 2013, which possess full control of institutions and media. Bosnia and Herzegovina face a different model of an unfunctional democratic system, due to institutional issues and constant tensions among entities give the dominant parties the opportunity to benefit from clientelist and informal control. Some of these leaders can maintain international community support and to have their approval as a way of securing internal and external legitimacy.

As the Montenegro’s most influential politician, Milo Djukanovic who led the country for years, started his political career as one of the closed allies of Serbian war-criminal leader, Slobodan Milosevic. He was right by his side when Milosevic embarked on bloody wars of aggression against Croatia and BiH. As he was known for getting involved in corruption and undermining the rule of law, stability in Montenegro and his loyalty towards western community, ensured the support from the EU, rather than encouraging systemic changes and democratic development.<sup>114</sup> In April of this year, he lost elections after being repeatedly accused of corruption and faced criticism for his alleged links to organized crime. Although, the EU reforms tried to address different issues in various sectors of the country, corruption and

<sup>110</sup> Florian Bieber, ‘The Rise (And Fall) Of Balkan Stabilitocracies’, Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No.10, pp. 176-185.

<sup>111</sup> Marko Kmezic and Florian Bieber, ‘The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans. An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the limits of EU Democracy Promotion,’ The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, March 1, 2017.

<sup>112</sup> Marko Kmezic and Florian Bieber, BIEPAG, March 1, 2017, pp. 95.

<sup>113</sup> Bieber, ‘Stabilitocracies’, pp. 179-185.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

organized crime, weren't being prevailed.<sup>115</sup> In Serbia, a country which has been ranked as hybrid regime in Freedom House in its "Nations in Transit 2022" report<sup>116</sup> meantime having the support of western and non-western powers such as Russia and China, the EU in particular ignored shortcomings in the rule of law or freedom of the media.<sup>117</sup>

The government of Serbia has not shown real efforts in getting closer to the EU and align with Western ideas, values, and beliefs.<sup>118</sup> Despite these factors, Vucic has been one of the longest 'stabilitocrats' that we have seen so far in the region. The EU has been willing to provide support to the government in Belgrade even at the cost of principles such as fair political competition, an even electoral playing field, and the institutional division of power among the branches of government.<sup>119</sup> Another 'stabilitocrat' from the region was Nikola Gruevski, former Prime Minister of North Macedonia which got support from the international community even after the growing pressure over opposition accusation that his government organized widespread wiretapping and rejected early elections. Following these events, the country entered in a deep crisis when *'armed and masked thugs beat up opposition MPs and journalists while shouting nationalist slogans and wrapping themselves up in the Macedonian flag'*.<sup>120</sup> However, Gruevski lost control over his government and failed to form a new one after the elections. Even though the EU initiated negotiations with North Macedonia, the delay in the enlargement process has intensified nationalistic rhetoric in the region.

However, in Albania, corruption, which has been highlighted in both domestic and international reports and implicated high-ranking public officials, has not received sufficient focus.<sup>121</sup> The European Union has been unable to address these issues and the use of citizens' personal data during the elections and not only, which goes against their policies.<sup>122</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina face a different situation than the other countries in the region, given the recent amendments imposed by the High Representative, Christian Schmidt, to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>123</sup> These amendments increased the number of delegates in the House of People of the FBiH and altered the process of nominating a president and vice presidents of the FBiH.<sup>124</sup> Instead of promoting the enforcement of democratic institutions, these changes have led to increased tensions between entities. Rather than fostering a democracy and a functional state, the

<sup>115</sup> Wouter Zweers, et al. 'The Eu as a promoter of democracy or 'stabilitocracy' in the Western Balkans', Clingendael Institute and the Think for Europe Network (TEN), pp. 30-55.

<sup>116</sup> Nations in Transit 2022, From Democratic Decline to Authoritarian Aggression, Freedom House

<sup>117</sup> Bieber, 'Stabilitocracies', pp. 184-185.

<sup>118</sup> Aleksandra Kozovic, 'The Role of the European Union in the Promotion of Western Balkan "Stabilitocracies": Case Study of Serbia', OpenSIUC, 2022, pp. 17-43.

<sup>119</sup> Wouter Zweers, et al. 'The Eu as a promoter of democracy or 'stabilitocracy' in the Western Balkans', pp. 45-55.

<sup>120</sup> Srda Pavlovic, 'Montenegro's 'stabilitocracy'', LSE, December 2016.

<sup>121</sup> Gjergji Vurmo, et al. 'Deconstructing State Capture in Albania', Transparency International and IDM, pp. 4-44.

<sup>122</sup> Wouter Zweers, et al. 'The Eu as a promoter of democracy or 'stabilitocracy' in the Western Balkans', pp. 18-55

<sup>123</sup> Benjamin Nurki. *Christian Schmidt's Stabilitocracy*. Vifa-recht.de. December 15, 2023.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

international community's interventions seem to be contributing to a state of 'ethnic stabilitocracy.'

**NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2023: OVERVIEW OF SCORE CHANGES**

▼ Decline    ▲ Improvement    □ Unchanged

Country	Democracy Score	Democracy %	NDG	EP	CS	IM	LDG	JFI	CO
<b>BALKANS</b>									
Albania	3.75 TO 3.79	46%							▲
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.29 TO 3.21	37%						▼	▼
Croatia	4.25	54%							
Kosovo	3.25 TO 3.29	38%			▲				
Montenegro	3.82 TO 3.79	46%	▼						
North Macedonia	3.82 TO 3.86	48%					▲		
Serbia	3.79	46%							

Figure 1. Nation in Transit 2023

Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2023

As shown in Figure.1, Freedom House Index which assesses democracy levels and human rights worldwide, has also recently documented negative trends in the Western Balkan economies. Specifically, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced unfavorable trends in the past year. In contrast, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia have demonstrated improvement compared to the previous year, though they still exhibit a low performance in democratic governance, freedom of media, civil society, and other variables. Meanwhile, Croatia and Serbia have maintained the same level of democratic state as the previous year. The key takeaway from this assessment is the significant lack of progress in their democratic levels, as indicated by the metrics used by Freedom House to score their democracies.

## EU Enlargement Policy Failure

As the EU enlargement policy has shown low credibility over time in transforming the Western Balkan economies into democracies, it has instead contributed to consolidating autocratic regimes and corruptive leaders such as Djukanovic, Gruevski, Vucic, Rama, and others. As many attempts have been done from the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the Deputy Director of the European Council of Foreign Relations in Sofia expressed that “this summit concluded that all Western Balkan economies 'will become an integral part of the EU' once they meet the established Copenhagen criteria, the EU's commitment to enlargement has suffered numerous setbacks”.<sup>125</sup> Meantime, the process of EU enlargement was followed by series of crises, including bilateral clashes between countries such as Greece and North Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia, Bulgaria and North Macedonia, and Kosovo-Serbia, the enlargement process has been damaged.<sup>126</sup> However, despite the internal tensions caused by the 'stabilitocrats' of these countries, a report published by the Netherlands Institute of International

<sup>125</sup> Vessela Tcherneva, ‘Before it’s too late: How the EU should support the Western Balkans’ EU accession’, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2023.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.



Relations listed four main flaws in the EU's democracy promotion in the WB6. These include the technical approach, leader-oriented approach, failure to act upon backlash, and the lack of timelines.<sup>127</sup> These are seen as flaws within the EU policy enlargement that have motivated leaders of the region to not fully implement the reforms or even when they have done their 'homework' were not rewarded.

## Conclusions

The mix of these factors has set the Western Balkan countries on an uncertain path. The EU's actions in the region, while attempting to address issues, have led to unintended problems, such as the rise of 'stabilitocracies'—systems favoring stability over true democracy. This approach has, in the long run, weakened the development of strong democratic institutions in the Western Balkans. Balancing the need for stability with the essential principles of democracy poses a challenge as these countries aim for EU integration. Professor Florian Bieber has pointed out, "the failure to establish stable and consolidated democracies after the end of communism and after the second democratic breakthrough in the early 2000s, popular trust in democracy and its institutions is low."<sup>128</sup> Even though there is hope that during the process of EU integration over time, the countries will become democratized, the features of 'stabilitocracies' will persist in the region's political systems.

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<sup>127</sup> Wouter Zweers, et al., pp. 43-55

<sup>128</sup> Bieber, 'Stabilitocracies', pp. 184-185

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## EU-OCT Partnership: Obligation or Geopolitical Game?

Sophia Vermaas

The European Union is known for its vast diplomatic relationships with the outside world. However, a group known as Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) has a special relationship with the EU. Since the treaty of Rome, the EU has a provision allowing for a special status with countries that have a constitutional link with France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. There are 13 OCTs located in the North Atlantic, Caribbean, Indian Ocean, Pacific, and Arctic, which are the following countries: Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, French Polynesia French Southern and Antarctic Countries, Greenland, New Caledonia, Saba, Saint Barthelemy, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Sint Eustasius, Sint Maarten (Dutch side) and Wallis and Fortuna. As expressed by the EU, the ‘OCT are seen as strategically important outposts spread all over the worlds as proponents of the EU values.’<sup>129</sup> Although these OCT are not the territory of the EU nor a part of the single market or the *acquis communautaire*, all nationals of OCTs are EU citizens and, among others, are granted preferential commercial treatment.<sup>130</sup> Since 2014, the Union has allocated more than a billion Euros towards cooperation between the EU and the OCT. However, the EU-OCT partnership remains largely unknown on the OCT. Therefore, this begs the question of what the Union is trying to achieve through this ‘checkbook diplomacy’. In this light, this essay will review the influence and impact of the EU-OCT partnership, with the focus of Greenland as concrete example.

### The Cooperation Framework

The legal basis for the cooperation can be found in articles 198 to 204 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This cooperation aims to ‘promote the economic and social development of the OCT and to establish close economic relations between the Community as a whole’ as well as to further promote the Unions values.<sup>131</sup> These articles serve

<sup>129</sup> European Commission (2009) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Elements for a new partnership between the EU and the overseas countries and territories’ (OCTs) COM (2009) 623, Brussels, 6 November.

<sup>130</sup> European Commission, Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland, [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/decision-overseas-association-including-greenland-performance\\_en#programme-in-a-nutshell](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/performance-and-reporting/programme-performance-statements/decision-overseas-association-including-greenland-performance_en#programme-in-a-nutshell) (last accessed 5 December 2023).

<sup>131</sup> Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) article 198-204

as the legal basis for creating the Association agreements that more concretely govern the relationship between the EU and OCTs. Since the beginning of the relationship there has been a Council decision which has governed the relationship between the two. The current framework governing the relationship between the EU and OCTs is the Decision on the Overseas Association, including Greenland (DOAG), which was adopted in 2021 in the light of the current 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework.<sup>132</sup> As such, the DOAG will also expire in 2027 and allocate 500 million Euros to project funding. On the institutional side, to increase OCTs' direct input to the EU, in 2018, a task force was created within the Directorate-General Cooperation and Development, now known as DG International Partnerships (DGINTPA).<sup>133</sup> Together with DGINTPA, the OCTs create the Multiannual Indicative Programmes, which identify the priority areas to which the funds will be dedicated.<sup>134</sup> These are specific to each OCT. Further dialogue between the EU occurs through the EU-OCT Forum, tripartite meetings and partnership working parties.<sup>135</sup> An important stakeholder in the relationship between the EU and the OCTs, is the Overseas Countries and Territories Association (OCTA). OCTA provides a forum for the OCTs to come together and discuss common problems. It is an important bridge between the OCT as a whole and the Commission during the above-mentioned dialogue opportunities.<sup>136</sup>

## The Importance of the Relationship

Despite the vast institutional structure and funding that the EU provides to the OCT, the impact of such remains limited in the eyes of those outside the governmental EU bodies. The EU has made many attempts to create a more inclusive collaboration to increase the effectiveness of the partnership; however, for many OCTs, the effect of such attempts remains minimal. Before the DOAG, the Commission called upon the OCTs to attest to the influence of the EU and give visibility to what the EU does for the OCTs.<sup>137</sup> However, this remains

<sup>132</sup> International Partnerships, Overseas Countries and Territories, [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/overseas-countries-and-territories\\_en#oct-eu-cooperation](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/overseas-countries-and-territories_en#oct-eu-cooperation) (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>133</sup> Rebecca Alder-Niesen and Ulrik Pram Gad (ed.), *The European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and Territories* (Routledge, 2013).

<sup>134</sup> International Partnerships, Overseas Countries and Territories.

<sup>135</sup> International Partnerships, Overseas Countries and Territories.

<sup>136</sup> Overseas Countries and Territories Association, 'Summary of the new OCTA Strategy 2021', <https://www.overseas-association.eu/content/uploads/2021/12/Summary-OCTA-Strategy-2021-2027-1.pdf> (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>137</sup> European Commission, '18<sup>th</sup> OCT-EU Forum 2020', <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-203723> (Last accessed 11 December 2023).

ineffective, as many citizens on OCTs do not know what the EU is, or if such knowledge is present, one does not know about the financial contribution of the EU. The Commission has recognised such an issue and is looking to increase its visibility. In 2022, DG INTPA started the Overseas Countries and Territories Youth Network, inviting youth between 20-28 to Brussels as part of their mandate to increase knowledge about the EU as well as the EU-OCT partnership, with the goal to increase visibility among OCT Youth.<sup>138</sup>

While the benefit for the OCTs is clear, the question remains as to what the EU gains from this partnership, as many criticise the Union for solely engaging in this partnership out of a treaty obligation.<sup>139</sup> However, the funding to the OCT provides a seat at the table for the EU, and particularly the Commission in geo-political affairs. With the OCTs being in practically every corner of the world, their geostrategic location provides an important gateway for the European Union when needed. Furthering the EU-OCT relationship will contribute to the ‘geopolitical Commission’, which Ursula Von der Leyen envisioned at the beginning of her mandate.<sup>140</sup> Primarily, this has also been the goal of DGINTPA Commissioner Uriplainen.<sup>141</sup> In this regard, the 500 million euros the EU has set aside for this partnership is a small price to pay.

## Greenland: Strategic and Geopolitical Outpost

One OCT, Greenland, is the prime example of why this framework is beneficial for the EU. The Union has consistently recognised Greenland's (geo-political) strategic importance, being the only OCT in the Arctic and the first OCT.<sup>142</sup> Almost half of the budget under the DOAG was retributed to Greenland, which confirms the importance over the OCTs as stressed

<sup>138</sup> International Partnership, What is the OCT Youth Network About?, [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/youth/overseas-countries-and-territories-youth-network\\_en](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/youth/overseas-countries-and-territories-youth-network_en) (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>139</sup> Niesen and Gad, *The European Integration*.

<sup>140</sup> European Commission, Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme 2019, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/speech\\_19\\_6408](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/speech_19_6408) (Last accessed 12 December 2023)

<sup>141</sup> International Partnerships, Geopolitical Commission builds on International Partnerships, [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/stories/geopolitical-commission-builds-international-partnerships\\_en](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/stories/geopolitical-commission-builds-international-partnerships_en) (Last accessed 12 December 2023)

<sup>142</sup> Gad, P Ulrik, ‘Greenland: A post-Danish Sovereign Nations State in the Making’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 49 (1): 98-118.

by the Commissioner herself.<sup>143</sup> The favouritism over the other OCTs can also be traced back to the previous association agreement (2012-2020), in which Greenland had its separate and additional agreement. Under the DOAG, as evident from the name, Greenland is also the only country which has specific provisions guiding the relationship between the two.<sup>144</sup> An integral part of the EU-Greenland relationship outside of the DOAG is the Sustainable Fisheries Agreement, in which Greenland also receives funding to support the fisheries sector, which is a key economic sector.<sup>145</sup> Greenland also has a permanent representation to the European Union, further strengthening the diplomatic ties between the EU and Greenland. In turn, the European Commission is also planning to open a Commission desk in Greenland to strengthen its presence in the Arctic.<sup>146</sup> Given the increasing importance of the Arctic regarding climate change, military reasons and the presence of critical raw materials, the relationship with Greenland through the EU-OCT framework gives the EU an important seat in this discussion and strengthens its diplomatic efforts.<sup>147</sup> As such, these efforts seem effective, as Greenland and the EU have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the strategic partnership on critical raw materials, of which 25 of the 34 can be found in Greenland.<sup>148</sup> Greenland, in turn, benefits from heavy investment in its education sector and support in green growth, including economic growth.<sup>149</sup>

### The Future of the Relationship: Greenland and the OCTs

While looking at the EU- Greenland relationship, a mutual benefit can be recognised in this relationship. However, looking at the bigger picture is the ‘chequebook diplomacy’ enough to effectively win over the hearts and minds of inhabitants of the OCTs in light of the goal of the EU-OCT partnership? While the EU is increasing its presence in Greenland, people are still

<sup>143</sup> European Commission, EU and Greenland sign strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains 2023, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_23\\_6166](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6166) (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>144</sup> International Partnerships, Overseas Countries and Territories.

<sup>145</sup> Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs, EU and Greenland reach agreement on new fisheries partnership, *European Commission*, 8 January 2021, [https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-greenland-reach-agreement-new-fisheries-partnership-2021-01-08\\_en](https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-greenland-reach-agreement-new-fisheries-partnership-2021-01-08_en) (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>146</sup> Hilde-Gunn Bye, The EU Strengthens Its Presence in Greenland 2022, <https://arctic.ru/international/20220928/1008127.html> (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>147</sup> Julia Neshewait, ‘Why the Arctic Matters 2021’, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/why-the-arctic-matters/> (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>148</sup> Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs, EU and Greenland reach agreement on new fisheries partnership 2021.

<sup>149</sup> International Partnerships, Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027 For EU Cooperation With Greenland 2022, [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/mip-2021-c2021-9159-greenland-annex\\_en.pdf](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/mip-2021-c2021-9159-greenland-annex_en.pdf) (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

unaware of the contribution the EU is making to Greenland.<sup>150</sup> When the Commission opens its desk in Greenland, it would be important for the EU to include the wider community through the inclusion of cultural events. As the goal of the EU-OCT partnership is to promote its values and contribute to the social and economic development of the islands, the Union needs to complement its ‘chequebook diplomacy’ with cultural diplomacy in Greenland as well as the other OCTs. Furthermore, OCTA, an important stakeholder, is facing increasing (financial) challenges, which may further hinder the continued dialogue between the EU and OCTs. Without proper communication, diplomatic efforts may be frustrated. While the economic contributions are beneficial to the OCTs, the EU needs to increase its visibility to increase its impacts, which can only be done through the inclusion of the communities of each OCT. A part of this responsibility also lies with local governments. With OCTA facing difficulties, increasing visibility through cultural diplomacy, which is particular to each island, will attribute more importance to the citizens regarding the relationship. This will ensure that the EU-OCT partnership becomes more resilient.

## Conclusion

The EU-OCT partnership has a long-standing history which is currently governed by the DOAG. For the Union, the OCTs present an important geopolitical outpost whose goal is to promote the social and economic development of the OCTs further. However, the Union's diplomatic efforts have been characterised as ‘chequebook diplomacy’ due to its lack of inclusion of social and cultural elements. By focusing particularly on Greenland, one can see the mutual benefits of the partnership. The EU-OCT brings the EU an important seat at the table to further its geopolitical goals while it invests in Greenland's education and economic sectors. However, it is increasingly important for the Union to include cultural diplomacy to increase its visibility and to foster a more resilient relationship.

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<sup>150</sup> Nielsen, Rasmus Leander, Researcher: The EU isn't good enough at drawing attention to its contribution to Greenland 2021, <https://www.kas.de/en/web/nordische/single-title/-/content/researcher-the-eu-isn-t-good-enough-at-drawing-attention-to-its-contribution-to-greenland> (Last accessed 12 December 2023).

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## **Navigating the Finnish-Soviet Cold War relations through cultural diplomacy: The overlooked importance of sauna**

**Miljaemilia Wala**

### **Introduction**

The importance of diplomacy throughout history mirrors the complex interplay of international relations. Even as society has navigated changes and global shifts, diplomacy has maintained its pivotal role in shaping states' international relations and advancing their foreign policy objectives. At its core, diplomacy remains rooted in managing the relationships between nations and their representatives.

The post-Second World War era witnessed a change in diplomatic practice as the importance of practicing diplomacy through multilateral frameworks rather than bilateral engagements was reinforced. Within this landscape, Finland emerged as a compelling case study due to its position between East and West and especially regarding its management of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union while upholding strict neutrality during the Cold War. Further, the diplomatic relations with the Eastern neighbor have never been easy to navigate, the Cold War climate put even more pressure on them. Important and often overlooked factor that contributed to achieving Soviet Union's confidence in Finland's neutrality was the role of ancient Finnish cultural tradition – sauna. The sauna, a cornerstone of Finnish culture, emerged as an important diplomatic setting, fostering trust and open communication between nations.

This paper delves into the pivotal role that sauna diplomacy as a form of cultural diplomacy has played and continues to play in Finland's diplomatic practice. Its prominence highlights the diverse and unforeseen facets diplomacy may assume. The paper is structured as follows. First diplomacy and its traditions are defined. Secondly, the case of Finland is discussed in terms of its neutrality. Thirdly, the role of sauna diplomacy in diplomatic practice is reviewed and finally, a short discussion and conclusion are provided.

## Defining diplomacy

As one of the oldest professions in the world, diplomacy has been around for centuries and continues to hold an important place in our society, politics and international relations. Until the years following the Second World War, diplomacy was focused on ‘high politics’ and dominated by bilateral diplomacy.<sup>151</sup> However, in the advent of globalization and the changes the international system was facing in the post Second World War climate, diplomacy and diplomatic practices have changed, placing more and more importance on the multilateral forms of diplomacy.<sup>152</sup> While the events and circumstances in the world have changed how diplomacy is exercised and who the diplomats are, the definition of the practice of diplomacy still remains relatively similar as what it has been.

It has been recognized that diplomacy and diplomatic practice are ambiguous concepts with no single all-encompassing definition of them.<sup>153</sup> However, certain overarching principles continue to be present in the definitions of diplomacy and diplomatic practice. Barston (2019), for example, defines the practice of diplomacy as “...concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors.”<sup>154</sup> Rudolph (2016) similarly describes diplomacy and its practices encompassing all negotiation methods. These methods involve peaceful interactions among official representatives of political bodies aiming to achieve political goals in regions where they lacked territorial control rights.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, particularly from a state perspective, diplomacy primarily involves advising, shaping, and implementing foreign policy, seeking to secure interests through peaceful means, primarily via their formal representatives—diplomats.<sup>156</sup> This underscores the close interconnection between foreign policy objectives and the practice of diplomacy.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Berridge, G. R. (2022). *Diplomacy: Theory and practice*. Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Satumaariq Ventelä, *Finnish Sauna Diplomacy as an Example of the Material Culture of Diplomacy* (2019). Tampere University Faculty of Social Sciences, Master’s Thesis

<sup>154</sup> R.P. Barston, (2019). *Modern Diplomacy* (5th ed. Routledge.) 2.

<sup>155</sup> Harriet Rudolph Entangled Objects and Hybrid Practices? Material Culture as a New Approach to the History of Diplomacy in Rudolph, Harriet and Gregor M. Metzger (eds.) Band 17 Material Culture in Modern Diplomacy from the 15th to the 20th Century. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2016.

<sup>156</sup> Barston 2019

<sup>157</sup> Berridge 2022, 6-9

## Finland's neutrality during Cold War

Finland's relations with its Eastern neighbor have been throughout history complicated, characterized mainly by fear and hatred.<sup>158</sup> Particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War and the lone battle against Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939-1940, Finland faced an especially difficult geopolitical climate positioned between the East and West. The most important foreign policy task for the small nation was to safeguard its independence and security.<sup>159</sup> Out of this grew the notion of Finland's neutrality that dominated the Finnish foreign policy with Soviet Union and Russia until the recent events that forced Finland to join NATO.<sup>160</sup>

Unlike neutrality chosen by Sweden and Switzerland for instance, Finland's neutrality as foreign policy grew out of pragmatism and circumstantial necessity.<sup>161</sup> Therefore, it should be viewed as neutrality in foreign policy in a different manner than for example neutrality exercised by those nation-states mentioned above.<sup>162</sup> Whilst Finland was in a very delicate position to exercise neutrality as it faced suspicions from East and West both alike, the small nation was able to do this very effectively, so well that Finnish neutrality as foreign policy became known all around the world and a term *Finlandization* grew from this practice during the Cold War.<sup>163</sup> The term Finlandization refers precisely to the strict neutrality exercised in Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War whilst being lenient and accepting especially towards the Soviet Union's foreign policy and other requirements.<sup>164</sup> This position was formalized through a 1948 agreement with Moscow, a time marked by intense hostility between the Soviet Union and Western nations. This treaty guaranteed Finland's protection from Soviet invasion, setting it apart from Eastern European nations. However, as part of the agreement, Finland committed to abstain from NATO involvement and permitted considerable Soviet influence over both its domestic and foreign policies.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>158</sup> Barston 2019, 45-47; Louis Clerc, *Cultural Diplomacy in Cold War Finland Identity, Geopolitics and the Welfare State* (Cham: Springer Nature, 2023), 48.

<sup>159</sup> Ralf Törngren, 'The Neutrality of Finland' *Foreign Affairs*, 1.07.1961, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/finland/1961-07-01/neutrality-finland>. Accessed 20 March 2024.

<sup>160</sup> Juhana Aunesluoma, and Johanna Rainio-Niemi. 'Neutrality as Identity?: Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War.' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 51-78. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925640>; Arter 2023

<sup>161</sup> Barston 2019, 46

<sup>162</sup> Aunesluoma & Rainio 2016; Clerc 2022, 47-50

<sup>163</sup> Arter, David (2023) From Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation to the end of Finlandisation? Finland's road to a NATO application, *European Security*, 32:2; Törngren 1961

<sup>164</sup> Aunesluoma & Raunio 2016

<sup>165</sup> Arter 2023

Neutrality as a term became embedded in the diplomatic discourse and has in fact recently resurfaced again in relation to the Russian invasion to Ukraine and the search for possible models of defusing tensions with Russia.<sup>166</sup> While this phenomenon of Finlandization and strict neutrality in foreign policy can be useful tools for understanding phenomena and processes elsewhere, it has been nonetheless recognized that Finlandization is ‘a sui generis’ Finnish phenomenon specifically tied to the intricacies of Finland’s history in the post-World War II context.<sup>167</sup> In terms of diplomacy and diplomatic practice, the question of how Finland actually managed to maintain friendly and neutral relations with the neighboring superpower offers a very interesting and fruitful ground to look at the relations and the importance of diplomacy from the cultural diplomatic perspective.

### Sauna diplomacy as a cultural diplomatic practice

Cultural diplomacy, seen as part of a country’s cultural and foreign policies, involves deliberate actions arranged, coordinated, or conducted by government institutions to advance the state’s goals.<sup>168</sup> As culture encompasses ideas, values and practices that create meaning in a particular society, cultural diplomacy can be seen as the practice of utilization of these aspects of culture to exercise public diplomacy and soft power to reach and foster mutual understanding.<sup>169</sup> Sauna diplomacy on the other hand has been defined as ‘diplomatic meetings which involve the sauna’ – essentially the conduct of diplomatic relations in the sauna.<sup>170</sup> Sauna is an important export of Finland to the world and inherently an integral part of the Finnish culture, to the extent that in addition to all government buildings in Finland, also all Finnish embassies, consulates and office of permanent representation to the EU must have a sauna in their premises.<sup>171</sup> Thus, it is argued here that the heritage of sauna diplomacy is an essential part of Finnish cultural diplomacy.

<sup>166</sup> Cora Engelbrecht, “Finlandization’ of Ukraine Is Part of the Diplomatic Discourse. But What Does That Mean?” *The New York Times*, February 2022, sec. World.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-finlandization.html>. (Accessed 12.12.2023)

<sup>167</sup> Arter 2023

<sup>168</sup> Clerc 2022,30

<sup>169</sup> David Clarke, *Cultural Diplomacy*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, November 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.543> (accessed 12.12.2023)

<sup>170</sup> Pertti Torstila, “Sauna Diplomacy; the Finnish Recipe” (presented at the XV International Sauna Congress, June 2010). [https://um.fi/speeches/-/asset\\_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/valtiosihteeri-torstilan-puhe-saunakongressissa-tokiossa-sauna-diplomacy-the-finnish-recipe-](https://um.fi/speeches/-/asset_publisher/up7ecZeXFRAS/content/valtiosihteeri-torstilan-puhe-saunakongressissa-tokiossa-sauna-diplomacy-the-finnish-recipe-)

<sup>171</sup> Gannon, M., & Pillai, R. (2010). “The finnish sauna. In Understanding Global Cultures: Metaphorical Journeys Through 29 Nations, Clusters of Nations, Continents, and Diversity”.153-167.; Fota, Ana. “Finland’s Top Political Ally: The Sauna.” *POLITICO*, April 2023. <https://www.politico.eu/article/finland-sauna-culture-diplomacy-brussels/>. (accessed 11.12.2023)

Notably, in the management of the Soviet-Finnish relations during Cold War, sauna diplomacy played a key role. The practice of sauna diplomacy is often associated with the long-term president Kekkonen who mitigated finely the tensions with the East and West alike. He has been regarded as the biggest advocate of sauna diplomacy as his political strategy with the Soviet Union in fact embedded the concept of sauna diplomacy and played a crucial role in handling the delicate relationship with the Soviet Union.<sup>172</sup> Kekkonen is known to have invited Soviet diplomats and leaders to hold important diplomatic meetings in the sauna at his residence in Tamminiemi.<sup>173</sup> Whilst some have ironically stated that Kekkonen sweated his Soviet guests into cooperation in his sauna, the fact is that the sauna played a vital role in fostering trust and confidence with the Eastern neighbor.<sup>174</sup> In sauna all are equals, no hierarchy exist and there are no superpowers or minipowers, no servants nor superiors. As Kekkonen used to say: “it is easier to openly discuss problems in the sauna since you don’t keep your politics up your sleeve when you are not wearing sleeves”.<sup>175</sup> As a result of the absence of power politics and coercion, the sauna is a diplomatic site for fostering friendships, trust and cultivating diplomatic communication, all essential for better functioning diplomatic relations.

While the Cold War era together with the leadership of Kekkonen and his management of the Soviet relations may have witnessed the peak of sauna diplomacy, the concept has not decreased in importance when it comes to practicing Finnish cultural diplomacy. As Ventelä (2019) notes in her recent research, Finnish diplomats and ambassadors around the world continue to choose sauna as a meeting place for the same reasons as Kekkonen chose to do so during the Cold War.<sup>176</sup> Further, as inviting guests to the sauna is an inherent part of friendliness culture in Finland, doing so in the context of international diplomacy also communicates hospitality, friendliness, and gives a positive image of Finnish culture for country branding purposes.

## Discussion and conclusion

Being one of the oldest professions in the world, diplomacy continues to hold

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<sup>172</sup> Fota 2023

<sup>173</sup> Ventelä 2019

<sup>174</sup> Torstila 2010

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ventelä 2019

important value for society and states. Diplomacy and diplomatic practice have evolved throughout history, and they embed different variations and types of diplomacy. Yet, all aspects of diplomacy still contribute to the same ultimate goal – maintenance of peaceful relations between nations, groups or individuals. Moreover, especially from the state-centric perspective, diplomacy plays an important role in achieving the foreign policy goals of the nation-state and contributes therefore to the managing and maintaining relations with other states or actors in the international system.

This paper has discussed sauna diplomacy as an example of Finnish cultural diplomacy especially in relation to the Cold War era and Finland's neutrality during that time. It serves as an interesting example since it shows how an ancient cultural element of a nation can foster diplomatic relations and contribute to the achievement of state's foreign policy goals. Ultimately, sauna diplomacy has been documented to have played a crucial role in fostering confidence with the Soviet Union and this way upholding the foreign policy objective of neutrality. Certainly, most Finns acknowledge the importance of sauna for Finnish culture and cultural heritage but doubtfully as many know how important its role has been and continues to be in Finnish foreign policy and diplomatic practice.

Albeit the importance of sauna in the contemporary diplomacy and diplomatic practice continues, unfortunately sauna also creates gender divisions as not all cultures view the mixed nudity in a sauna in a similar unproblematic manner as the Finnish culture does. Yet, sauna and sauna diplomacy have served as important elements to foster culture through diplomacy, and they illustrate how various and unexpected forms of diplomacy can play a crucial role in diplomatic practice.



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## Public Diplomacy of Ukraine: Achievements and Perspectives

Yelyzaveta Vishniakova

Ukraine declared its Independence on the 24<sup>th</sup> of August 1991. After centuries of years of struggle and imperial oppression, Ukrainians were united in one independent state. However, back then, a lot had to be done so that Ukraine could take a firm position in the world arena. While Ukrainian authorities primarily focused on establishing new political and economic ties, aspects of image and cultural recognition did not receive due priority. Only in last decade has Ukraine launched a number of ambitious projects in the sphere of international public relations and has so far achieved noticeable success.

The first project that deserves attention is the Ukrainian Institute. It was established in 2017 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, with headquarters in Kyiv. The idea behind the institution was to create a separate body that would facilitate the strengthening of Ukraine internationally through tools of cultural diplomacy and become an intermediary for developing cultural ties between Ukraine and countries worldwide.<sup>177</sup> In 2023, the Institute opened its Representative Offices in Berlin and Paris with the mission of introducing Ukrainian culture to the European public.<sup>178</sup> It is especially important for the country to raise awareness about its language, literature, artists, and musicians in order to ruin the Russian “one nation” narrative and demonstrate that Ukrainians are different. With this aim, the Ukrainian Institute initiated an online platform, “Explore Ukraine”, where people can access free online courses in English about Ukrainian history and culture.<sup>179</sup> A significant part of the information is dedicated to Crimea, which was occupied by Russia in 2014 as allegedly historical Russian territory. From the course, the general public can learn about Crimea and Crimean Tatars, the indigenous people of Ukraine, who have been leaving on the peninsula for centuries and are now struggling for their right to self-determination.<sup>180</sup> Another refreshing project by the Institute addresses Ukrainian gastronomic traditions. Together with the *izhakultura* platform, it created an illustrated book, “UKRAINE. Food & History”, that provides a new insight into Ukrainian cuisine as a part of the intangible cultural heritage of Ukraine. The authors of the book not only describe traditional Ukrainian dishes and unique cooking techniques but also devote special attention to table settings

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<sup>177</sup> Ukrainian Institute, Ukrainian Institute: Mission, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://ui.org.ua/en/mission-2/>.

<sup>178</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ukrainian Institute Opens its Representative Office in France, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayinskij-institut-vidkriv-predstavnictvo-u-franciyi>.

<sup>179</sup> Ukrainian Institute, Insight UA, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://de.ui.org.ua/en/explore-ukrainian-culture/>.

<sup>180</sup> Ukrainian Institute, Crimea, history and people, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://ui.org.ua/en/sectors-en/crimea-history-and-people-2/>.

and decorations appropriate for various events, from family dinners to diplomatic receptions.<sup>181</sup> Finally, the Ukrainian Institute conducts comprehensive work in order to facilitate the participation of Ukrainian artists in local cultural events across Europe. Film and music festivals, art exhibitions, conferences, and others are among them.<sup>182</sup> This kind of activity provides artists with the possibility to engage in the European cultural network and, in this way, raise awareness about the modern culture of Ukraine.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has a department responsible for public diplomacy of the country that supports specialised NGOs in carrying out various activities aimed at promoting Ukraine worldwide. A prominent example of such cooperation is Ukraine.ua, an ambitious and successful project in the sphere of digital diplomacy by Brand Ukraine NGO. It is the official website of Ukraine, which serves as a landmark of the country and is available in 8 languages, including English. It provides information on travel options, learning opportunities, and investment perspectives.<sup>183</sup> The project gained its popularity by promoting itself on social networks. It started by publishing fascinating videos about Ukraine's natural and historical landmarks on Instagram, but currently the picture is strikingly different. Due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the information presented on the website and social networks became irrelevant. The content placed in social networks that now have a large audience, in particular Instagram and TikTok pages have 1.1 million followers each, and the Facebook account is followed by 285 thousand people, centres around the subject of the invasion. It demonstrates realistic pictures of everyday life and the struggle of the people of Ukraine during the war period. The website Ukraine.ua has not been updated since the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022. However, within the framework of this project, there was created a new official website dedicated to the war, its heroes, victims and survivors. It also serves as a news platform where people can read information about current events in Ukraine and analytical material with a major focus on the topic of war.<sup>184</sup>

Another acknowledged project fulfilled in cooperation between the Ministry and an NGO is CorrectUA. Together with StratCom Ukraine, the Department General for Public Diplomacy and Communications launched an online campaign, that urges the international community, in particular other states, international organisations, media, and airports, to use transliteration from the Ukrainian language for naming Ukrainian cities. It became a topical question for Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as the country started to distance itself from everything connected to Russia and to recover its national identity. Among the examples of differentiating

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<sup>181</sup> Ukrainian Institute, UKRAINE. Food & History, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://ui.org.ua/en/sectors-en/ukraine-food-history/>.

<sup>182</sup> Ukrainian Institute Programmes and projects, accessed December 11, 2023, <https://ui.org.ua/en/projects/>.

<sup>183</sup> Ukraine.ua, Ukraine Visit, explore, invest and trade, study, accessed December 12, 2023, <https://ukraine.ua/>.

<sup>184</sup> Ukraine.ua Russia invaded Ukraine, accessed December 12, 2023, <https://war.ukraine.ua/>.

spelling are: Kyiv instead of Kiev, Kharkiv and Lviv instead of Kharkov and Lvov, Odesa but not Odessa and many others.<sup>185</sup> The spelling of the capital of Ukraine became a centre of debate, which was marked on social networks with a special hashtag #KyivNotKiev. Every day during the campaign, the Ministry posted on its Facebook and Twitter pages instances of the use of Kiev instead of Kyiv by leading foreign media outlets.<sup>186</sup> Eventually, the efforts bore their results, and in 2019 such, media giants as the Associated Press, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Telegraph, and the BBC started to use Ukrainian-language derived “Kyiv” in their publications.<sup>187</sup> Finally, the United States Board on Geographic Names changed the English spelling of Ukraine’s capital from Kiev to Kyiv after receiving an appeal from Valeriy Chaly, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the United States. It was a pivotal decision because many international organizations, such as the International Air Transport Association, used the U.S. database of geographic names, and eventually, a larger number of international airports switched to writing Kyiv instead of Kiev.<sup>188</sup> Thus, the CorrectUA campaign is an outstanding example of a relatively small diplomatic initiative, that brought about significant outcomes by mixing traditional diplomatic actions and social media mechanisms.

While numerous projects in the sphere of public diplomacy are conducted by governmental authorities, specialised agencies, and NGOs, the focus of this paragraph is the significance of an individual initiative and aspiration. In 2022, UNESCO added Ukrainian borsch to the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.<sup>189</sup> It is a notable achievement for Ukrainians as borsch represents not only a traditional dish but also an essential element of the culture. Its recognition is owed to a Ukrainian chef, Yevgen Klopotenko, who became a driving force behind the project. The activist collected numerous pieces of evidence proving that cooking the dish has been practiced in the modern territory of Ukraine for centuries and ruining the stereotype that it was Russian soup. He also gathered authentic recipes and methods of cooking borsch throughout the country, culminating the effort in producing a

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<sup>185</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine CorrectUA, accessed December 12, 2023, <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/correctua> (accessed 12 December 2023).

<sup>186</sup> UATV.UA, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry Launches Worldwide Campaign #CorrectUA, *Freedom*, October 3, 2018, <https://uatv.ua/en/ukraine-s-foreign-ministry-launches-worldwide-campaign-correctua/>.

<sup>187</sup> Peter Dickinson. Kyiv not Kiev: Why spelling matters in Ukraine’s quest for an independent identity, *Atlantic Council*, October 21, 2019, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/kyiv-not-kiev-why-spelling-matters-in-ukraines-quest-for-an-independent-identity/>.

<sup>188</sup> Toma Istomina, Kyiv not Kiev: US changes spelling of Ukrainian capital, *Kyiv Post*, June 13, 2019, <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/8532>.

<sup>189</sup> UNESCO, Culture of Ukrainian borscht cooking inscribed on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, UNESCO, last modified April 20, 2023, <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/culture-ukrainian-borscht-cooking-inscribed-list-intangible-cultural-heritage-need-urgent>.

documentary film, *Borsch: The Secret Ingredient*.<sup>190</sup> This meaningful accomplishment demonstrates how one person who is highly enthusiastic and persistent in his endeavour can bring about results of international and political importance.

The public diplomacy of Ukraine has become a powerful and successful instrument for promoting its image in the world. Nevertheless, Ukraine is still struggling to take a firm place in the international arena, and soft power mechanisms can facilitate this process. In order to attain this aim, Ukrainian public diplomacy practitioners should engage more foreign politicians, diplomats, and public figures in their projects to increase the visibility of their activities not only among the general public but among those who have more influence. Decision-makers might be losing the question of culture from their sight, giving priority to more urgent matters. However, very often, culture is a substantial element of a problem, especially when it comes to Russian aggression against Ukraine. Leaders and their advisers who make core decisions regarding the country should perceive Ukraine as an independent nation with its own cultural peculiarities rather than a former part of the Soviet Union. Additionally, it is crucial for Ukraine to consider the emerging multipolarity of the world. While its digital marketing activities cover audience from all over the globe, especially English-speaking audience, offline public diplomacy initiatives of Ukraine majorly take place in the European Union. It would be beneficial for the country to launch more foreign representation of the Ukrainian Institute and initiate public diplomacy projects in geopolitically important parts of the world, in particular in Asia and North America. In this way, Ukraine can raise its recognition, gain support from the foreign public, and fight against narratives of Russian propaganda more efficiently.

In conclusion, Ukrainian public diplomacy is a new and dynamic tool that the country successfully applies in its international policy. It has launched numerous original and engaging projects that familiarised foreign communities with the past and the present of Ukrainian society. Ukraine has a lot to say to the world, and employing of public diplomacy instruments is a great way to do that. Ukraine possesses significant potential to make itself visible not only as a former part of an empire or a victim of military aggression but also as a nation with a remarkable history and vivid culture.

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<sup>190</sup> Billetdeaux, Mia. 'Borsch, a Ukrainian staple, explained', *The Kyiv Independent*, accessed December 12, 2023, <https://kyivindependent.com/borsch-a-ukrainian-staple/>.

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## Punching Above Your Weight - Dutch Permanent Representatives through the years

Casper Peterse

Embassies are known worldwide. They renew your passport when in a foreign country. They stimulate and promote cooperation between the sending country and the host country and inform the sending country about the developments in the host country. Embassies are bilateral posts. For national representation in an international organisation, each member state has a permanent representative—the government's agent for the organisation. They are the head of the so-called Permanent Representations, a multilateral embassy. Some embassies, such as Vienna (UN & IAEA) and Brussels (EU), also host the Permanent Representation. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has thirteen Permanent Representatives around the world.<sup>191</sup> Even on its territory, to the OPCW<sup>192</sup> and the ICC<sup>193</sup>, as both organisations have their headquarters in The Hague. Other representations are to the United Nations in Geneva, Vienna and New York, and probably the most important representation is the Dutch Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels.<sup>194</sup> The European Union is the most important international organisation for the Netherlands. Its international and even national conduct is in cooperation or in line with the policy made by the European Union. The representation is also the most significant representation of the Netherlands with 120 employees, supplemented with national experts from The Hague who *fly in* for Council Committee meetings. Every ministry is represented, even within the European Commission, through Seconded National Experts.<sup>195</sup> The Pem Rep can be seen as a mini-government in itself. They see themselves as the bridge between the Brussels bubble and national politics, The Hague. They have a variety of tasks, from lobbying to fill Dutch candidates in strategic positions to working with the national instructions in the European decision-making carrousel. The head of the Dutch outpost to the EU is the Permanent Representative and his deputy.

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<sup>191</sup> The Netherlands and you, 'Permanent Representations' <https://www.netherlandsandyou.nl/permanent-representations> [accessed on 10 December 2023]

<sup>192</sup> The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the OPCW, The Netherlands and the OPCW" <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-representations/pr-opcw-the-hague> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>193</sup> The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the ICC, The Netherlands and the ICC <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-representations/pr-icc-the-hague> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>194</sup> The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European Union, The Netherlands and the PR EU <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-representations/pr-eu-brussels/the-mission> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>195</sup> EU Careers, 'Seconded National Experts' <https://eu-careers.europa.eu/en/node/136> [accessed on 10 December 2023]



## Permanent Representatives to the European Union

The Permanent Representation is headed by the Permanent Representative, as of writing, Robert de Groot, and his deputy Micheal Stibbe.<sup>196</sup> Next to them is the representative of the Political and Security Committee, Roger van Laak—all three work in the Council of the European Union committees, COREPER I and COREPER II. The Permanent Representation building also houses the Dutch Embassy to the Kingdom of Belgium. Who deals with cooperation and interaction between the Netherlands and Belgium. Belgium is the second-biggest trading partner after Germany.<sup>197</sup> Belgium is the only country with three Dutch ambassadors, with Thijs van der Plas as NATO ambassador.<sup>198</sup> The Permanent Representative is equal to ambassadors; therefore, they have the same diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.<sup>199</sup> It is essential for ambassadors in ‘less-like-minded’ countries and practical in countries like Belgium.

The Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the European Union “promotes the Dutch interest in the European Union”<sup>200</sup> in the Council of Ministers and through lobbying the European Commission and the European Parliament. This is done throughout the organisation; in practice, the majority is through EU civil servants with Dutch nationality. Lobbying your ‘own citizens’ is more accessible as they speak the same language, share some cultural and social affiliation and are more likely to see what they can do. However, this is not a clear division as influential EU civil servants will be lobbied regardless of nationality as long as they are relevant to Dutch interests. On the other hand, various EU civil servants with Dutch nationality have never been contacted or requested. They do not depend on the Dutch government for their professional career. Or as a cabinet member described it: “Only when you are high up in the organisation will the Netherlands see you”.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European Union, “The Netherlands and the PR EU, 2023

<sup>197</sup> Government of the Netherlands (2023), ‘Belgium and the Netherlands: good neighbours, loyal friends and solid trading partners’ <https://www.government.nl/latest/weblogs/the-work-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs/2023/trade-mission-and-royal-visit-to-belgium> [accessed on 5 December 2023]

<sup>198</sup> The Netherlands and Joint Delegation to NATO, “The Permanent Representative” <https://www.netherlandsandyou.nl/web/pr-nato-brussels/about-us/permanent-representative> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>199</sup> Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into force 24 April 1964) UNTS 500

<sup>200</sup> Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European Union <https://www.permanentrepresentations.nl/permanent-representations/pr-eu-brussels> [accessed on 20 November 2023]

<sup>201</sup> Interview with an EU civil servant working at a commissioner’s cabinet.

## Permanent Representation of the Netherlands

The proximity to the main Commission building (The Berlaymont) says much about the country's influence within the Brussels Bubble. It is easier to invite Commission members and more likely to have a higher turnout during events. The Netherlands has their Permanent Representation no further than a five-minute walk from the Berlaymont.<sup>202</sup> It reflects the outside influence of the Netherlands in the European Union over the years.

But they are moving out.<sup>203</sup> The Dutch Pem Rep will move closer to the European Parliament. Officially to show the increased significance of the Parliament during the EU decision-making, but it is a reduced influence of the European Commission, still the guardian of the Treaties and the initiator of EU law.<sup>204</sup> It is seen as a loss for the Dutch representation, but inevitable. Whether it is emblematic remains to be seen. The Permanent Representations hosts receptions and networking events for EU staff. To build a bridge between The Hague and Brussels civil servant apparatus. People are less likely to come if it is not close to their workplace. However, the Netherlands is considered the smallest among the big and the biggest among the small countries. These could only be shifted through EU enlargement to the East and the Balkan. In recent years, the power balance has moved eastwards.<sup>205</sup> Not in favour of the North-west country of the Netherlands. Especially after Brexit. The Netherlands cannot hide behind the UK for objections against the German-French engine.

## COREPER II

To understand COREPER, the consolation of the 27 permanent representatives, the Council of the European Union must be understood.<sup>206</sup> The Council of the EU represents the Member States in the EU's decision-making process, primarily the ordinary legislative procedure. They meet around 70 to 80 times per year in different configurations.<sup>207</sup> Ministers of agriculture meet when agriculture is up for discussion. The foreign ministers meet when foreign and security affairs are

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<sup>202</sup> The Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the European Union, "the Netherlands and the PR EU", 2023

<sup>203</sup> Tom Bouwmans (2022), "Tachtig miljoen voor nieuw onderkomen Nederland in Brussel" *Brusselse Nieuwe* <https://brusselsenieuwe.nl/tijdelijke-huisvesting-van-de-permanente-vertegenwoordiging-in-brussel/> [accessed on 20 November 2023]

<sup>204</sup> European Commission, 'What the European Commission does in law' [https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law_en) [accessed on 10 December 2023]

<sup>205</sup> The Economist, 'The war in Ukraine has made eastern Europe stronger' *The Economist* (London, 27th February 2023) <https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02/27/the-war-in-ukraine-has-made-eastern-europe-stronger> [accessed on 24 April 2023]

<sup>206</sup> Hodson and others, *The Institutions of the European Union* (5<sup>th</sup> ed, Oxford University Press 2022) 78

<sup>207</sup> Ibid

concerned. These meetings are the last in line for the decision-making procedure within the Council. Most work is done on the administrative level, with the permanent representatives as agents of their respective governments.

The Dutch permanent Representative sits on behalf of the Kingdom in COREPER II<sup>208</sup>, le *Comité des représentants permanents*. His deputy sits in COREPER I.<sup>209</sup> The latter comprises six Council configurations: agriculture and fisheries, competitiveness and environment, and so-called ‘low politics’. Meanwhile, the former deals with ‘high politics’, such as economic and financial affairs, foreign affairs, general affairs, justice, and home affairs. The *Antici* and *Mertens* groups prepare these meetings.<sup>210</sup>

The role of the COREPER II is laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon.<sup>211</sup> It is the main preparatory body of the Council of the European Union, as all topics that are discussed on the ministers' level should first be examined by COREPER unless the ministers decide otherwise. Hence, it is no decision-making body of the European Union. The Permanent Representatives have three main tasks in COREPER. As mentioned, the preparatory work for the Council. It ensures consistency in policy and negotiating compromises between the members for adoption by the Council.

### Influence of Dutch Permanent Representatives

As a founding father of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Netherlands has had an outsize influence in the European Union compared to its population. Influence is a complex assessment for outsiders, but throughout the years, the Netherlands has been popping up behind Germany, France and Italy regarding influence in the Brussels bubble.<sup>212</sup> Various factors have contributed to this, known for its expertise in areas highly relevant in today's EU and sparse. Like financial instruments and transport. Next to this, the size and openness of the Dutch economy.<sup>213</sup> An essential indication in the internal market. The Netherlands is a full member of the European Union, with no opt-outs and a member of the Schengen zone and the Eurozone.

“Nothing is possible without men; nothing lasts without institutions.”<sup>214</sup> And the European Union is no stranger. The Netherlands has had several vital functions in recent years. In the civil service apparatus of the European Commission, there are currently three Directorate-Generals with the

<sup>208</sup> European Council & Council of the European Union, “COREPER II” <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/coreper-ii/> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>209</sup> European Council & Council of the European Union, “COREPER I”

<sup>210</sup> Hodson and others, *The Institutions of the European Union*, 51

<sup>211</sup> Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) 240(1)

<sup>212</sup> Caroline de Gruyter, *Beter wordt het niet* (De Geus 2021)

<sup>213</sup> The World Bank, “GDP (current US\$) - European Union” [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU&most\\_recent\\_value\\_desc=true](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU&most_recent_value_desc=true) [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>214</sup> Jean Monnet, *Memoires* (1<sup>st</sup> ed, Fayard 1976)

Dutch nationality, including the influential DG ECOFIN.<sup>215</sup> However, the Netherlands has a low but strategic representation within the Cabinets of the Commissioners, only four cabinets.<sup>216</sup> Political appointees were Frans Timmermans as vice-president and the right hand of Jean-Claude Juncker.<sup>217</sup> Followed by a stint as First Executive Vice-president next to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.<sup>218</sup> And Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem as chairperson of the Eurogroup between 2013 and 2018.<sup>219</sup> And finally, Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who led the EU-turkey Deal in 2016 during the Dutch Council presidency<sup>220</sup> and as one of the longest-serving heads of government, has significant influence. A feature of importance to the European Council, which enabled the Netherlands to punch above its weight.

Besides the politicians, the current Permanent Representative has significantly influenced the COREPER. Robert de Groot has been on POLITICO's influence list.<sup>221</sup> His upcoming promotion to the European Investment Bank as vice president marks his influence in recent years. He has been highly rated as an influential figure in the Brussels bubble through his expertise and experience nationally and in Europe. Before being appointed Dutch Permanent Representative, he was a Prime Minister's office member.<sup>222</sup> He has been the Director-General on European affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During his mandate in COREPER II, he has been credited with punching above the country's weight.<sup>223</sup> Diplomats observe his strong link with the national capital and the government's trust. As well as his expertise and experience. Aside from his personal capabilities, the Netherlands has had an outsized influence because it is the biggest country among the small states and the smallest nation among the big states. Furthermore, it has expertise in niche areas needed in the European Union, such as financial instruments, transport and agricultural innovation.

Robert De Groot aligns with the tradition of outsized influence as a Permanent Representative. His predecessor, Pieter de Gooijer, was the Permanent Representative between 2011 and 2017.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>215</sup> EU whoiswho, 'Maarten Verwey' DG ECFIN [https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/person/-/person/ECFIN/COM-CRF\\_5-00006AA070D2-00003D4D7--](https://op.europa.eu/en/web/who-is-who/person/-/person/ECFIN/COM-CRF_5-00006AA070D2-00003D4D7--) [accessed on 5 December 2023]

<sup>216</sup> Commissioners Thierry Breton, Wopke Hoekstra, Didi Reynders, and Maros Sefcovic

<sup>217</sup> European Commission, 'Frans Timmermans' [https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/frans-timmermans\\_en](https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/frans-timmermans_en) [accessed on 20 November 2023]

<sup>218</sup> European Commission, 'Frans Timmermans' 2023

<sup>219</sup> Jeroen Dijsselbloem, De Eurocrisis (Prometheus 2018)

<sup>220</sup> European Parliament (2020), 'EU-turkey migration agreement' [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-003828\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2020-003828_EN.html) [accessed on 5 December 2023]

<sup>221</sup> Jacopo Barigazzi, 'How ambassadors took over the EU' (Politico.eu 24 June 2021) <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-ambassadors-coreper-power-center/> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>222</sup> Rijksoverheid, Ambassadeur Robert de Groot <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/ambassades-consulaten-en-overige-vertegenwoordigingen/ambassadeurs/g/groot-robert-de-groot-robert-de> [accessed on 20 November 2023]

<sup>223</sup> Barigazzi, 2021 'How ambassadors took over the EU'

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

And an influential one, according to Politico's power matrix.<sup>225</sup> Experience, seniority and substantive knowledge all contribute to the influence of the Permanent Representative. His mandate marked the Dutch EU Council presidency in 2016. It has been seen as a successful presidency by concluding the EU-Turkey migration deal and supporting the work of the other countries in the trio presidencies, Slovakia and Malta.<sup>226</sup> It helped that the Dutch Commissioner at the time was Frans Timmermans, a Foreign Minister before his EU appointment and tasked with the Better Regulation Agenda<sup>227</sup>, which was in line with the Dutch EU's priorities at the time.

## Conclusion

Punching above the shoulders will result in a dislocated shoulder. Mark Rutte is on his way out, Robert De Groot is promoted to EIB vice-president, and Frans Timmermans has resigned from the College of Commissioner. While Wopke Hoekstra was appointed, he is by no means as influential; he is "just" a commissioner and not an executive vice president. And it remains to be seen if he will be reappointed for the next commission period. The Netherlands will have difficulties maintaining the influence it has had over the years during the next Commission mandate. A long-term strategy is required for the future. Seconded National Experts is a short-term limited way of exercising influence within the European Commission, and the Netherlands continues to be present. However, the permanent staff has not lived up to its percentage for EU civil servants. A new prime minister and new Permanent Representative have to make a name for themselves and start from scratch. This will require a constructive approach and a role as bridge builders. Based on the recent election results, whether the next government can do so is difficult.<sup>228</sup> 'The EU is a bit like an oil tanker sailing through, and then the question is: do you want to be sucked into the wake or do you want to be at the wheel?'<sup>229</sup> The question remains where the Netherlands will be sitting.

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<sup>225</sup> Ryan Heath, 'Power matrix: Ranking Europe's leaders and ambassadors' (Politico.eu 28 April 2016) <https://www.politico.eu/interactive/power-matrix-charting-the-eu-players-by-country-european-council-national-capitals-leaders-ambassadors/> [accessed on 19 November 2023]

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Interview with Dutch Seconded National Experts in 2023

<sup>228</sup> Tim Ross, Pieter Haaeck, Eline Schaart and Jakob Hanke Vela, 'Geert Wilders is the EU's worst nightmare' (Politico.eu 23 November 2023) <https://www.politico.eu/article/geert-wilders-is-the-eus-worst-nightmare/> [accessed on 6 December 2023]

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### III. The Diplomatist's Old Tool Box in a Changing World



## Beyond Borders: exploring the dynamics of Space Diplomacy

Sara Maria Barbaglia

From the mid-1950s, the Space Race started. It was one of the battlefields of the Cold War and for that reason, it developed not only the scientific field but also the international political and diplomatic arena<sup>230</sup>. In this paper, we aim to analyse the origins of space diplomacy, its development, and its future prospects. We discuss legal development at the international and regional level, the latest developments in space Diplomacy for Luxembourg and future challenges. Was space diplomacy fought or decided with cooperation? What are the areas in which space diplomacy is going to develop?

Artificial actions in outer space have a big impact on our day-to-day life. Weather forecasts, global environmental security, satellite TV, and navigation tools depend on satellites around the Earth. The Cold War had a big impact on the early development of space exploration, and consequently space diplomacy. While the first space agency from the Soviet Union was announced in 1955, the first successful launch of a satellite, Sputnik, happened only in 1957<sup>231</sup>. In 1958, the Committee on Space Research<sup>232</sup> was founded to promote scientific research of Space at an international level, as well as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the US. Space diplomacy was not born intrinsically peaceful, even if its legal development turned out differently.

Other than the Race to Space, used in a diplomatic fight between the Western and Eastern blocks, many international agreements and resolutions were signed and approved at the United Nations level regarding the peaceful use of space<sup>233</sup>. These agreements determined a huge cooperation that overcame the geopolitical tensions of the moment. The most relevant treaty is the Outer Space Treaty<sup>234</sup>, and it determines that States may explore and use Space freely, without ever

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<sup>230</sup> History editors, The Space Race, 21/2/2020, online article by History, accessed 2/12/2023

<sup>231</sup> Royal Museums Greenwich, 'Space Race Timeline', , <https://www.rmg.co.uk/stories/topics/space-race-timeline>, accessed 10 December 2023 (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>232</sup> COSPAR charter, <https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/about/charter/> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>233</sup> United Nations, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND OTHER AVAILABLE LEGAL DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO SPACE-RELATED ACTIVITIES, Vienna, 1999, p. 10

<sup>234</sup> Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 2222 (XXI), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1966

claiming sovereignty and without harmfully contaminating another planet and harming humanity. Mass destruction weapons cannot be set up. The idea is that Space exploration and use *serves* humanity, rather than dividing it. Following the first Treaty on Outer Space, other 4 were created and they formed the 5 UN space treaties: the Rescue Convention<sup>235</sup>, the Liability Convention<sup>236</sup>, the Registration Convention<sup>237</sup>, and the Moon Agreement<sup>238</sup>.

International treaties started to proliferate at a regional level, such as the EUTMESTAT in Europe<sup>239</sup> for the use of meteorological satellites, as well as the creation of space agencies. The Soviet Union and US were the first ones, but many governmental and regional ones were created, within the most renowned, the European Space Agency<sup>240</sup>, ESA. Its programs aim at developing research in the immediate space environment, the solar system, and the universe. Moreover, it develops satellite-based technologies and services, as well as European industries and space organisations outside Europe.

When it comes to outer space diplomacy in 2023, actors vary and nowadays they include governments, international space agencies, private companies, and international organisations<sup>241</sup>. Generally, governments are considered the stakeholders, and some of them developed a space program to improve their research, technology involved, and space exploration missions. Other than the prestige involved, space exploration is also a matter of exploitation of new materials and minerals, and technological development.

In this regard, the leading European country is Luxembourg. It is the second country worldwide to develop a legal framework securing property rights when it comes to space resources<sup>242</sup>. As mentioned, this does not regard only governments, but also space agencies, research centres, and

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<sup>235</sup> Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, entered into force in 1968

<sup>236</sup> Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, entered into force in 1972

<sup>237</sup> Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, entered into force in 1976

<sup>238</sup> Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, entered into force in 1984

<sup>239</sup> Convention for the Establishment of a European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites, entered into force on 19 June 1986

<sup>240</sup> ESA was firstly the European Launch Development Organisation (ELDO) and European Space Research Organisation (ESRO). The two agencies were merged in 1975 to create ESA.

<sup>241</sup> Diplo, Space Diplomacy, <https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/space-diplomacy/> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>242</sup> Luxembourg Space Agency, 'Commercial Uses', <https://space-agency.public.lu/en/space-resources/commercial-use-space-resources.html> (accessed 14.12.2023)

private actors. Some of these comprise the European Space Resources Innovation Centre (ESRIC)<sup>243</sup> which specialises in researching space resources, Luxembourg Space Agency (LSA)<sup>244</sup> which promotes the Space sector in Luxembourg, as well as the Start-up Support Programme<sup>245</sup> which incubated relevant start-ups in the field. Luxembourg is not doing all of this on its own. Countries entering dialogue and partnerships with Luxembourg are always increasing. The USA is the latest to join the list which comprises China, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Belgium, Poland, Czech Republic and Portugal<sup>246</sup>.

Challenges in Space diplomacy shifted therefore from the sole prestige of the Space Race to the actual use of Outer Space for growth purposes. These comprise the cost of space expeditions and technology that would make them more sustainable<sup>247</sup>, the use of spacecraft for cargo delivery, its consequent space junk, and space tourism. Luxembourg is mostly focusing on the former, while private companies in the US, such as SpaceX, are expanding on the latter. This company has returned spacecraft from low-Earth orbit, as well as delivered cargo to and from the International Space Station. Lastly, it has opened the area of Space tourism<sup>248</sup>.

Other challenges that both private companies and government might face are space debris and its effects. In fact, Earth's orbit is littered with around 9000 metric tonnes of debris, composed by derelict spacecraft, spent rocket stages, hardware released during missions and much more. The problem with these elements is that they are zooming uncontrollably around the earth at high speed, and they can cause harm to the International Space Station, as well as to functioning satellites<sup>249</sup>. This problem presented itself when Russia, in a blunt demonstration of military force, deliberately fired a missile at an inoperative satellite, causing shards of hardware to be sent around the orbit at thousands of kilometres per hour. While Russia brought up such a problem, it was already theorised by Kessler in 1978. He started that a chain reaction of cascading collision could make Low-Earth orbit completely inaccessible due to the dangers of debris. Space diplomacy should then come in the picture, since this problem cannot be taken up by one country on its own, nor private companies. In fact, while Russia's Pandora box's opening was highly

<sup>243</sup> European Space Resources Innovation Centre, <https://www.esric.lu/> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>244</sup> Luxembourg Space Agency, <https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/lisa.html> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>245</sup> ESRIC news, *The ESRIC Start-up Support Programme (SSP) announces the second incubated start-up*, ESRIC, Start-up programme III, <https://www.esric.lu/news-detail> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>246</sup> Luxembourg Space Agency, 'International Collaboration' <https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/international-collaboration.html> (accessed 14.12.2023)

<sup>247</sup> Space Summit 2023, Resolution on Lifting Europe's Ambitions for a Green and Sustainable Future, Access to Space and Space Exploration, ESA/C-M/CCCXX/Res.1, adopted on 6th November 2023

<sup>248</sup> SpaceX Mission, <https://www.spacex.com/mission/>

<sup>249</sup> Hollinger P., 'How space debris threatens modern life', *Financial Times*, June 2022

condemned, it highlighted a need for an international body regulating space debris and overall satellites, as well as an important collaboration with private companies, since in the last four years, they have been the ones sending the most satellites in orbit<sup>250</sup>.

Space diplomacy has therefore been legally constructed as an area for international cooperation, even if it developed as a run for prestige during the Cold War. Its developments went further across the national borders and aimed at international cooperation intrinsically. Private actors started playing a determining role, maturing new areas of research and funding technology development even more. Both companies and governments should come together to discuss regulations regarding orbit's challenges, such as space debris and the consequent access to space.

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<sup>250</sup> Hollinger P., 2022



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## Culinary Diplomacy: Sushi and Hamburgers as Cultural Ambassadors

Mariia Mirat

Culinary diplomacy is one of the most popular and effective soft power tools that is used in cultural diplomacy. It helped not only to strengthen relationships between countries, but also to promote the culture of the country outside its borders in a very soft way through introducing culinary and cultural traditions. In this research paper I would like to look at a specific example and discuss how two polarizing but popular dishes: sushi and hamburgers have changed the cultural image of Japan and the United States. In addition, I would like to explore how two cases of food diplomacy strategies can potentially enhance the country's image on the global stage and influence international relations. Moreover, I would like to examine how successful and effective it is to use food diplomacy as a soft diplomatic tool that aims to promote the national interests and values of a certain country.

This relatively new concept of food diplomacy refers to the use of food as a tool not only to push forward cultural and gastronomic features of a particular state, but also to enhance the stance of international relations between countries.<sup>251</sup> Different food diplomacy systems have been competing with one another on the global stage, and there has even been launched the annual event 'World Food Prize' which is supported by the United States Department of Agriculture. The organization rewards individuals or institutions for their contribution in addressing food security issues (awarding those who have enhanced the availability and quality of food in the world).<sup>252</sup> This event aims to promote sustainable and accessible food systems globally, and the founders hope to inspire people to take part in collective commitment to shape food diplomacy internationally.

In addition, food diplomacy includes culinary traditions that can take different forms (dinners, cooking masterclasses, culinary exchange experiences, food festivals etc). The aim for this tool is to help to shape international cooperation among countries by using a soft tool to promote a country's traditions, introduce people's eating habits to others and encourage peace. The main goal is to create a common space where countries' representatives can

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<sup>251</sup> Christian John Reynolds, "The Soft Power of Food," *Food Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 1 (2012): 47–60, <https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:114753933>.

<sup>252</sup> World Food Prize Foundation, "About the Foundation," World Food Prize Foundation, 2023, [https://www.worldfoodprize.org/en/about\\_the\\_foundation/](https://www.worldfoodprize.org/en/about_the_foundation/).



communicate through cultural exchange. By introducing people to different food habits and customs, food diplomacy promotes mutual understanding and respect.

One excellent example of food diplomacy is Sushi which was invented around the 8th century in Japan and has evolved into a recognized symbol of Japanese cuisine. Sushi are not only associated with Japan as a country on the map, but they illustrate such local cultural characteristics as attention to details, accuracy and perfectionism.

Japan has successfully promoted sushi culture globally to the extent that today we simply cannot imagine a modern megapolis without a sushi restaurant or a sushi delivery service on a Friday night. Japanese chefs are internationally recognized and restaurants are always popular and full of customers. As a result, it has not just made us love sushi as a dish, but also to learn to use certain cooking and eating techniques (chopsticks, a plate for soy sauce, a place for ginger and of course wasabi on the side - without all these the sushi experience is incomplete). It became globally identified as something ‘exotic’, ‘modern’ and at the same time accepted as an ‘eating out’ food.<sup>253</sup> On the global stage, sushi has also contributed to demonstrating cultural achievements of Japan for other countries. For instance, in September 2023 the Japanese Embassy in the United States organized the event for the members of the U.S. Congress where sushi plates made with seafood that came all the way from Fukushima (Japan) were served.<sup>254</sup> The dinner symbolized cross-cultural connections and a bridge between Japan and the United States. As a result, the American lawmakers enjoyed a shared experience that humanized the diplomatic relations. The event created a long lasting shared memory for its members that will serve in the future as a positive contribution to friendly relations and mutual respect among states.

Eventually, sushi has helped to shape an overall positive image of Japan all over the world. It has become known worldwide and inspired other countries to use their cuisines in public cultural diplomacy strategies (for example, “Kimchi diplomacy” in South Korea or “Global Thai’ in Thailand).

Now, let’s take a look at another, this time American, example of a successful food diplomacy - the case of McDonald’s - a symbol and cultural ambassador of the United States of

<sup>253</sup> Theodore Bestor, “How Sushi Went Global,” *Foreign Policy* 121 (November 1, 2001), <https://doi.org/10.2307/1149619>.

<sup>254</sup> Yoshihisa Komori, “US Congress Members Enjoy Sushi With Quality Seafood From Fukushima,” Japan Forward, September 21, 2023, <https://japan-forward.com/us-congress-members-enjoy-sushi-with-quality-seafood-from-fukushima/>.

America. The phenomenon of ‘hamburgerization’<sup>255</sup> has had a significant impact on the perception of the country around the globe. Two brothers Maurice (“Mac”) and Richard McDonald opened the first McDonald’s back in the 1950s in California and it quickly expanded across the country<sup>6</sup>. Already by the 1960s the American businessman Raynold Albert Kroc made the chain become iconic for the United States,<sup>256</sup> and the concept of fast food with hamburgers and fries with ketchup on top for lunch has become widely spread and used as a tool for the United States to promote its values and interests around the world.<sup>257</sup> These values are the following: the idea of a quick and easily accessible food, consumerism, globalization, equality and innovation.<sup>258</sup> McDonald’s and other American fast-food chains like Burger King or KFC have implemented a standardized menu that is usually the same all over the world, which also reflects the value of cultural assimilation for the American society that created a sort of a ‘global community’ with similar eating habits and preferences. Moreover, brands have successfully adapted the menus of some of their restaurants to suit the eating habits of the local population. For example, excluding pork from their dishes in Muslim countries or introducing special menu items that include popular ingredients from the country in which the restaurant operates. These brands have not just contributed in American soft power diplomacy and shaped a positive image on the country, but also increased the amount of jobs in different countries and increased their economic development through promoting the spirit of entrepreneurship and capitalism. The memorable and symbolic example is the opening the first McDonald’s in Moscow right next to the famous Red Square in 1990 with about 38,000 customers waiting in huge lines for their portion of burgers and fries.<sup>259</sup> The opening, that would have been impossible to imagine just a decade ago, has now reflected the wind of changes in the political agenda of the West and the East. Having the food chain restaurant in the capital of a communist country symbolized the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.

<sup>255</sup> Sri Herminingrum, “A Cultural Dimension of American-Indonesian ‘Fast Food Diplomacy,’” *Humaniora* 32 (2020): 1–9, <https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:214372100>.

<sup>256</sup> Jane McGrath, “How McDonald’s Works,” howstuffworks, October 20, 2008, <https://money.howstuffworks.com/mcdonalds.htm>.

<sup>257</sup> Alan Hess, “The Origins of McDonald’s Golden Arches,” *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 45, no. 1 (1986): 60–67, <https://doi.org/10.2307/990129>.

<sup>258</sup> Qing-jiang Yi-jun, Zhang Wang, “McDonald’s Democracy - A Cultural Perspective,” in *2006 ASN Conference: Bridging the Sino-American Divide* (Hong-Kong: USCET, 2006), 1–22, [https://uscet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/mcdonalds\\_democracy\\_-\\_a\\_cultural\\_perspective\\_by\\_wang\\_qing-jiang\\_zhang\\_yi-jun.pdf](https://uscet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/mcdonalds_democracy_-_a_cultural_perspective_by_wang_qing-jiang_zhang_yi-jun.pdf).

<sup>259</sup> Charles Maynes, “McDonald’s Marks 30 Years in Russia,” Voice of America, February 1, 2020, [https://www.voanews.com/a/europe\\_mcdonalds-marks-30-years-russia/6183551.html](https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_mcdonalds-marks-30-years-russia/6183551.html).

Despite that, some people may argue that American fast food culture is promoting unhealthy lifestyle habits and increasing obesity problems for young people causing addiction to processed high calories food. Despite the critics, the United States food diplomacy approach is recognized as an important example of soft power in cultural diplomacy and the fact that there are thousands of fast food restaurants opened in more than 110 countries worldwide proves this point.<sup>260</sup>

In conclusion, food diplomacy is an excellent example of the effectiveness of soft tools over the hard ones. In this paper we saw how sushi and hamburgers reflect cultural differences between Japan and the United States. Sushi are deeply rooted in Japanese culture and history, they represent a careful approach to serving and choosing dish ingredients, attention to detail, while maintaining the respect for traditions and cultural heritage of the Japanese population. On the contrary, hamburger diplomacy represents values of standardization, democracy and accessibility of the food. They promote the concept of globalization and a fast-paced lifestyle. Sushi is more about authenticity, while hamburgers represent universality. They may differ in their approaches to food diplomacy but the result is the same - it offers various opportunities to countries for cultural exchange on the international stage.

Moreover, both approaches have helped their countries to improve their images abroad by using economic and cultural soft power. Sushi has served Japan as a way to promote the cultural image of the country, and hamburgers helped the United States to spread its values globally. I believe that food diplomacy will continue to shape the international relations system simply because people tend to appreciate shared meals or culinary experiences. Food unites us as social units within the family, among friends, partners or colleagues, and it helps to overcome language and cultural barriers. There is a great potential of using this tool for influencing national identities all over the world seamlessly and peacefully. Adaptivity and creativity of food diplomacy can cultivate mutual respect and understanding, as well as appreciation of cultural diversity of one another. Culinary exchanges and adaptations of traditional dishes allow people to communicate beyond political diplomacy. While our world is becoming increasingly globalized, the concept of breaking bread together can help to build bridges and contribute to a more harmonious global community.

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<sup>260</sup> Statista, "Number of McDonald's Restaurants Worldwide from 2005 to 2023," Statista, March 18, 2023, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/219454/mcdonalds-restaurants-worldwide/>.

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## Gastrodiplomacy and the Many Ways it Can be Used on Contemporary Diplomatic Relations

Matheus Fischer Meyer

### Introduction

The ritual of sharing a meal is known to have been practiced by humans for centuries, with evidence dating back to 12.000 years ago. Such ritual is still, evidently, adopted all over the world since it is a trigger for the production of endorphins, which increases one's well-being and helps on the creation of social bonds.<sup>261</sup>

This positive effect didn't go unnoticed on the highest governmental levels, who started to use banquets and official dinners to try and obtain benefits or make even tighter ties – being them of friendship, business, or cooperation – through what is called Culinary Diplomacy. One of the best and most important examples of this strategy is its usage during the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) by French foreign minister at the time, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord who used French cuisine – and Chef Marie-Antonin Carême's incredible quality – to bring better outcomes to France after Napoleon's downfall. As is well known, Carême's gastronomy was, in part, responsible for the Congress' decisions.<sup>262</sup>

The use of a country's cuisine or regional products is not, however, only reserved for high-stakes diplomacy since food is present almost everywhere and at any time in one's life. With the renovation of public diplomacy after the terrorist attacks on September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2001, and its two-way communication way between the parties – that can be State or non-State entities – in order to increase mutual understanding and, hopefully, respect, countries started to search for new ways of reaching and influencing citizens of different countries in order to project their soft power.<sup>263</sup> This is how gastrodiplomacy came to be, by the words of one of the first to name

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<sup>261</sup> Charles Spence, "Gastrodiplomacy: Assessing the Role of Food in Decision-Making," *Flavour* 5, no. 4 (December 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1186/s13411-016-0050-8>.

<sup>262</sup> Sam Chapple-Sokol, "Culinary Diplomacy: Breaking Bread to Win Hearts and Minds," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 8, no. 2 (2013): 161–83, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-12341244>.

<sup>263</sup> Hwajung Kim, "Bridging the Theoretical Gap between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 15, no. 2 (August 31, 2017): 293–326, <https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.293>; Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (March 2008): 94–109, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>.

such concept, “a form of public diplomacy that combines cultural diplomacy, culinary diplomacy and nation branding to make foreign culture tangible to the taste and touch.”<sup>264</sup>

Many people mix both culinary diplomacy and gastrodiploamacy exactly because both are based on the specific cuisine of a county (it can be both the country one is representing or the one they are trying to negotiate with); however they have very different scopes and reach their targeted audience in diverse ways. As already mentioned above, culinary diplomacy has a more official and formal nature, used in high stake discussions and negotiations between heads of state or their ministries. Gastrodiploamacy, on the other hand, has a more embracing role allowing a deeper and more direct contact between governments and citizens, as well as citizens and citizens – since this tool can also be used by private businesses or institutions who are accredited by the government to do so – furthermore allowing people outside of the elites to be reached by the effects of the initiatives.<sup>265</sup>

Gastrodiploamacy was seen by many middle powers as an interesting strategy to increase their recognition on the population of other countries. Since those middle powers don’t have enough military or economic power to increase their influence in the international system or to compete with great powers, they make use of their soft power to try to influence others, doing this by special attributes like gastronomy, as it’s the case in gastrodiploamacy. In other words, middle countries overcome their lack of resources with gastrodiploamacy to have a better insertion on the international arena.<sup>266</sup>

## Initiatives

The first documented use of gastrodiploamacy was by the Kingdom of Thailand in 2002 via their Global Thai Program, which had as an initial goal to increase the number of Thai restaurants all over the world increasing, consequently, the interest that people had in the country. It also had the intention to increase and facilitate the import of specific products of the Thai cuisine, since they are necessary for the making of authentic Thai dishes, which was successful, since seafoods and other Thai specific products saw an important increase on their exports on the

<sup>264</sup> Paul S. Rockower, “Recipes for Gastrodiploamacy,” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 8, no. 3 (2012): 235–46, <https://doi.org/10.1057/pb.2012.17>. p. 235

<sup>265</sup> Rockower; Mary Jo A Pham, “Food as Communication: A Case Study of South Korea’s Gastrodiploamacy,” *Journal of International Service* 22 (2013): 1–22; Samuel Tettner and Begum Kalyoncu, “Gastrodiploamacy 2.0: Culinary Tourism beyond Nationalism,” *ARA: Revista de Investigación En Turismo* 6, no. 2 (2016): 47–55.

<sup>266</sup> Fatin Mahirah Solleh, “Gastrodiploamacy as a Soft Power Tool to Enhance Nation Brand,” *Journal of Media and Information Warfare* 7 (June 2015); Willem Oosterveld and Bianca Torossian, “A Balancing Act The Role of Middle Powers in Contemporary Diplomacy,” <https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/strategic-monitor-2018-2019/a-balancing-act/>, 2019; Rockower, “Recipes for Gastrodiploamacy”; Pham, “Food as Communication: A Case Study of South Korea’s Gastrodiploamacy.”

years after the start of the Program. Apart from that, Thailand also saw, due to the increased interest for the country's cuisine and culture, an increase in tourists visiting the country.<sup>267</sup>

Peru was another country that embarked on the gastrodipomatic adventure, starting from 2006 with the influence of Chef Gastón Acurio. Chef Acurio, who is internationally known by his restaurants that appear between the best in the world, started to give more importance and emphasis on the influence of the Peruvian cuisine on the people's national identity – another very important factor of gastrodipomacy, which has a strong role on increasing national pride around national dishes and culinary practices – and on how Peruvian cuisine could bring positive change on the position of Peru in the international system bringing, at the same time, economic and social benefits. After additional initiatives taken by Chef Acurio, as the creation of the Peruvian Gastronomy Association (APEGA) in order to promote Peruvian cuisine around the world, and of the Lima's International Gastronomic Fair, the Peruvian Government included in 2008, through its International Affairs Ministry, gastronomy on its Cultural Foreign Policy Plan, which gave the green light for the *de facto* Peruvian gastrodipomacy.<sup>268</sup>

Tourism in Peru was also positively affected by the government's initiative since people started to become interested in visiting the country with the purpose of tasting Peruvian food and regional meals. Considering the foreign tourists visiting Peru in 2018, those who's primary reason to visit was the country's gastronomy were 15%, being the third biggest reason. There's also an important increase in spending on food, since restaurants and food services account for 23% of the money tourists spend in the country.<sup>269</sup>

We can see from the examples above how middle powers make use of gastrodipomacy to bring more attention to their nation brand to get better recognition by foreign citizens as well as to

<sup>267</sup> The Economist, "Thailand's Gastro-Diplomacy," <https://www.economist.com/asia/2002/02/21/thailands-gastro-diplomacy>, February 21, 2002; Juyan Zhang, "The Foods of the Worlds: Mapping and Comparing Contemporary Gastrodipomacy Campaigns," *International Journal of Communication* 9 (2015): 568–91, <http://ijoc.org>; Tanja Strugar, "Eastern Gastrodipomatic Efforts: Asian Nations as Pioneers in the Use of Cuisine in Cultural Diplomacy," *The Art of Food: Culture and Food Diversity, Gastrodipomacy* (Barcelona, July 2015); Dana Luša and Ružica Jakešević, "The Role of Food in Diplomacy: Communicating and 'Winning Hearts and Minds' Through Food," *Medijske Studije* 8, no. 16 (August 16, 2017): 99–119, <https://doi.org/10.20901/ms.8.16.7/PRIMLJENO>.

<sup>268</sup> Martín Díaz Acevedo, "Gastrodipomacia Como Herramienta de Política Exterior. Estudio de Caso: Perú" (2016); Carolina Merino Araya, "Fortalecimiento Da Imagem Do País Através Da Gastrodipomacia Na Projeção Externa Do Chile, Com Base No Caso Peruano," *Revista Chilena de Relaciones Internacionales*, 2018, [www.rchri.cl](http://www.rchri.cl); Irina Gusinskaya, "Dipomacia Gastronómica: El Turismo Gastronómico Como Un Medio Para Cambiar La Imagen Del País. El Caso de Rusia" (Master Thesis, Mondragon Unibertsitatea, 2017); Fabio Parasecoli, "How Countries Use Food to Win Friends and Influence People," <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/20/food-diplomacy-countries-identity-culture-marketing-gastrodipomacy-gastronativism/>, August 20, 2022.

<sup>269</sup> PROMPERU, "Perfil Del Turista Extranjero 2018" (Lima, October 2019), [www.promperu.gob.pe](http://www.promperu.gob.pe).



get economic and political benefits from it. Due to the success from middle powers, however, great powers such as France and the United States started to use gastrodipomatic strategies, albeit in a different way, since said countries don't need to resort to soft power strategies to get more visibility in the international scene. These countries are using gastrodipomacy to reshape the cultural views of their cuisine and their people, shedding a new light on regional differences and specialized products, such as presenting the distinction between regional cuisines in the Unites States, proving that the country eats things other than fast-food, and promoting French champagne and protected cheeses in the global market.<sup>270</sup>

Due to the nature of gastrodipomacy as being a form of public diplomacy, it is becoming more and more important in horizontal Track Three diplomacy (which is diplomacy on the people-to-people level), which was already hinted above. Since gastrodipomacy uses food as a resource to increase one's understanding of another country or culture, it is a valuable tool when it comes to the integration of immigrants and refugees, since it brings together people from different realities to find common ground on at least one thing, which is an important first step for integration and acceptance. This interaction is being supported by governments, non-governments organizations and the civil society in order to empower refugees, migrants, and asylum-seekers, exposing the population from the receiving country to their cultures and traditions, trying to clear the first barrier for their integration, which would be prejudice; the immigrants, on the other hand, receive better chances for starting a new life in another country, since these initiatives also offer them important entrepreneurial opportunities.<sup>271</sup>

## Conclusion

Gastrodipomacy began as a public diplomacy tool used by middle powers to increase the recognition of the country by foreign population and to increase their influence in the international system. Since the first initiative by Thailand, this soft power strategy saw great success in winning people's heart through the universal concept that gastronomy is. Since then, many other countries jumped into these unknown waters to take advantage of the benefits of this new form of diplomacy. Great powers also realized that they could utilize gastrodipomatic

<sup>270</sup> Paul Rockower, "A Guide to Gastrodipomacy," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (Taylor and Francis, 2020), 205–12, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429465543-25>.

<sup>271</sup> Rockower; Stella Wasike, Pontian Godfrey Okoth, and Edmond Were, "The Nature of Track Three Diplomacy and Its Influence on Cross-Border Security Relations between Kenya and Somalia," *International Journal of Managerial Studies and Research* 4, no. 7 (July 2016), <https://doi.org/10.20431/2349-0349.0407001>.

strategies in order to reshape people's ideas about the country, as well as promote their specialties to increase their consumption – and benefit economically from it.

Due to gastrodiploamacy's position inside contemporary diplomacy, it also began to be used in a people-to-people (P2P) level, in a way to decrease migratory stress between citizens, as well as disarm extremist feelings, since being knowledgeable of a culture is the best way to lessen prejudice. Initiatives that are made together with the population, not above it, through high level discussions, are of utmost importance in today's society, since we're more connected than ever, as well as more politically and socially involved; governments that work with foreign citizens, if done correctly, can benefit enormously from this connection.

Gastrodiploamacy is and will continue to be an important source of nation branding recognition, international insertion, and of P2P diplomacy, and countries should work on developing such strategies, even to deescalate tense relations with other nations. Food is everywhere, why not enjoy it together and build better relations?

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## Hostage Diplomacy

Nicole Tubbay

Hostage diplomacy refers to the practice of incarcerating foreign nationals on questionable or illegitimate grounds to use them as bargaining chips for the release of those held in the captor's country or to obtain concessions. Unlike abductions carried out by criminal or terrorist organizations, the culprits in this case are governments whose goal is to target other governments. The individuals who are kidnapped in these instances are considered collateral damage.<sup>272</sup> Danny Gilbert describes hostage diplomacy as *a tool that bad actors around the world can use to take advantage of wealthy Western democracies that care about the freedom and liberty of their citizens around the world*.<sup>273</sup> The first step in hostage diplomacy is when the government detains a foreign national who is suspected of committing a crime, usually espionage, and files formal charges against them. It concludes when the government engages in negotiations to secure the release of the captive by making diplomatic or economic compromises. During the course of events, the individual who is being accused transforms from a prisoner to becoming a valuable asset utilized for negotiation.<sup>274</sup>

In Ancient China, hostage-taking was widespread as a method of guaranteeing security until the mid-17th century. The Chinese dynasties have utilized this system to ensure a harmonious connection between two governments or tribes, as well as to secure their devotion and loyalty.<sup>275</sup> Unfortunately, this approach is still employed in the contemporary period and the nation that is most affected is the United States. Hostage diplomacy is a prevalent strategy in authoritarian nations like Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Turkey, and China, where they leverage their justice systems to influence foreign policy.<sup>276</sup> The primary catalyst for the acceleration of hostage diplomacy in the modern era was Iran. In 2009, Clotilde Reiss, a French student, was held captive in Iran until the country successfully negotiated the release of Ali Vakili Rad, a convicted assassin responsible for the 1991 killing of the final prime minister under the Shah

<sup>272</sup> Daniel Iriarte, "Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países", El Orden Mundial, June 7, 2023. <https://elordenmundial.com/encarcelarte-liberar-trafficante-armas-nueva-estrategia-paises-autoritarios/>

<sup>273</sup> NBC NEWS. "Discussing the Dilemmas of Hostage Diplomacy at Aspen Ideas Festival." June 28, 2023. Video, 12:35, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcJxdWuwvK8&t=1033s>. (accessed 09.12.2023)

<sup>274</sup> Danielle Gilbert and Gaëlle Rivard Piché, "Caught between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers". *Texas National Security Review* 5, no. 1 (2021/22): 11-32, <https://doi.org/10.15781/4n39-ja85>

<sup>275</sup> Lien-sheng Yang, "Hostages in Chinese History." *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 15(3/4), 507–521. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2718238>

<sup>276</sup> Iriarte, "Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países"

of Persia's rule, who was imprisoned in France.<sup>277</sup> The efficacy of this method prompted other nations to emulate it.<sup>278</sup> The main challenge faced by Western Governments is the ambiguous differentiation between a hostage and a detainee. According to Danielle Gilbert and Gaëlle Rivard Piché, *“Legally, the victims of hostage diplomacy are detainees. Functionally, they are hostages. This inherent duality makes hostage diplomacy... difficult to counter because of the ways it blurs established categories of detention, norms of state behavior, and the rule of law.”*<sup>279</sup> Consequently, a legal distinction has been made by the US between hostages—those taken by non-state entities- and wrongfully detained; detentions can be considered unlawful if they are solely or substantially due to being a US national, influencing US policy, or securing concessions, or if credible reports suggest the detention is a pretext for an illegitimate purpose.<sup>280</sup> Hostage diplomacy functions as a sort of hostage-taking by enforcing concessions from other nations through prolonged human captivity. Thus, detentions under the pretense of law are hostage takings,<sup>281</sup> even though the perpetrator is a state. The U.S. law outlaws paying ransoms to foreign terrorist organizations but does not prohibit giving concessions to state actors. States may employ legal means, such as extradition, to return captives. Danielle Gilbert and Gaëlle Rivard Piché provided three negotiation techniques to secure citizens' release<sup>282</sup>:

1. The Negotiation Space: The target state can enhance its position by reassessing the scope of discussion and considering other countries that have an interest in the matter. Any hostage diplomacy scenario must be seen as a multi-player game, not a two-player one. Deepak Malhotra, an expert in negotiations, provides recommendations for an effective multilateral negotiation strategy: It is essential to consider all parties' interests, limits, options, and perspectives, considering factors like who can sway the other party, how the deal impacts non-participants' interests, and whether it makes sense to negotiate with numerous parties concurrently, sequentially, or separately.<sup>283</sup>
2. The Psychology of the Deal: Changing the context can help negotiations. Consider the psychology of the deal, not just its leverage. Both parties in hostage

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

<sup>278</sup> Iriarte, “Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países”,

<sup>279</sup> Gilbert and Piché, “Caught between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers”

<sup>280</sup> Ibid., 14

<sup>281</sup> Ibid., 7

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 23-26

<sup>283</sup> Deepak Malhotra, “Control the Negotiation Before It Begins,” *Harvard Business Review* (December 2015), <https://hbr.org/2015/12/control-the-negotiation-before-it-begins>, 66–72.

diplomacy have positive and negative leverage, both of which can benefit or harm the other party. In negotiation, it is important to prioritize your partner and assert equality in the face of dominance. In discussions with high stakes, it's natural to focus on the consequences of a failed settlement. Failure to obtain a negotiated settlement is not necessarily bad and can have positive consequences. A state's BATNA (the best alternative to a negotiated agreement) improves its negotiating position, allowing it to confidently reject poor offers. In cases where a negotiated settlement is difficult and a state's BATNA is weak, failing to reach a compromise may result in severe consequences.

3. Expanding the Pie: Rejecting the "myth of the fixed pie" can assist negotiations. Positional and principled bargaining are used by experienced negotiators. One party claims money, territory, or status at the expense of another in positional bargaining. Inherently zero-sum, positional bargains try to reach a compromise between the two parties. On the other hand, principled negotiating views negotiations as a creative problem-solving opportunity. Principled negotiations can provide excellent solutions by addressing parties' underlying interests rather than their stated requests. Hostage diplomacy is a philosophical, not positional bargaining because there is no fixed resource distribution, and both sides have interests at stake.

Undoubtedly, each negotiation is unique and cannot be mechanized. The nature of this work involves constantly adapting agreements to various circumstances according to Ambassador Rodger Carson. Furthermore, he asserts that to successfully perform this task, *you need to bring your rational side, but you definitely need to bring that human intuitive*. He continued to say that one must be open to considering an opposing perspective, even if it contradicts one's own beliefs.<sup>284</sup> Without engaging in negotiations, this mission is unlikely to be successful, as evidenced by the war on terror, where there was an attempt to cooperate with European partners by avoiding negotiations with hostage-takers. It was noted that the United States and the UK, whose citizens were specifically targeted by ISIS, showed less willingness to engage in discussions. In contrast, other countries like France and Spain were more inclined to bargain, resulting in the successful liberation of the detainees.<sup>285</sup> Kylie Moore-Gilbert asserted that all

<sup>284</sup> NBC NEWS. "Discussing the Dilemmas of Hostage Diplomacy at Aspen Ideas Festival"

<sup>285</sup> Danielle Gilbert and Brian Hanson, "This Era of Hostage Diplomacy Requires New Answers", November 9, 2023, in Deep Dish on Global Affairs Podcast, produced by Kyra Dahring, published by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, podcast, MP3 audio, 34:51, <https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/podcasts/era-hostage-diplomacy-requires-new-answers>



the deals from the perpetrators are opportunistic in nature and that it is important to use a practical and pragmatic approach, as diplomacy operates under the constraints of *realpolitik*, making it unattainable to achieve a perfect deal.<sup>286</sup> By law, individuals who engage in criminal activities are held accountable and face consequences. However, it is concerning that those who engage in hostage diplomacy evade punishment. Moreover, these regimes occasionally request the exchange of their citizens, who have been convicted of crimes and incarcerated in Western nations, in exchange for the release of unjustly held individuals:

- Brittney Griner, an NBA player, was arrested in Russia in 2022 and sentenced to nine years in jail for drug offenses. A ten-month negotiation process with Washington led to the December transfer of Griner for Viktor Bout, a Russian arms trafficker convicted of narcoterrorism in the US in 2011.<sup>287</sup>
- During the period from April to October 2022, the Biden Administration conducted a prisoner exchange. Former Marine Trevor Reed was swapped for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko, while engineer Mark Frerichs, who had been kidnapped by the Taliban for two years, was exchanged for Afghan drug trafficker Haji Bashir Noorzai.<sup>288</sup>
- In 2021, Meng Wanzhou's case was resolved. She was imprisoned in Canada at the US's request for violating Iran sanctions. In response, China arrested two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. Wanzhou pleaded guilty to a reduced charge to return to China after long negotiations. Finally, the 'two Michaels' in Canada were released after 1,019 days.<sup>289</sup>

Daniel Iriarte stated that “*democracies cannot use those same tools against their adversaries without betraying their own legal foundations. Faced with this impotence, many governments are agreeing to negotiate these exchanges*”.<sup>290</sup> Danielle Gilbert further underlined the value of rejecting the notion that these agreements are fair. The issue at hand is not a matter of fairness but rather concerns governments prioritizing their national interests in order to safeguard their

<sup>286</sup> Shaun Ley, “What is hostage diplomacy and why is it on the rise?”, April 14, 2023, in The Real Story, produced by Ellen Otzen and Rumella Dasgupta, published by BBC News, podcast, MP3 audio, 49:13, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct4q6h>

<sup>287</sup> Daniel Iriarte, “Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países”

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Gilbert and Piché, “Caught between Giants: Hostage Diplomacy and Negotiation Strategy for Middle Powers”: 11-32,

<sup>290</sup> Daniel Iriarte, “Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países ”

nationals overseas. These governments are determined to take necessary actions for the return of those who have been unjustly trapped in this circumstance.<sup>291</sup>

In an attempt to minimize these tactics, Canada initiated the first global accord to end arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations, the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention. The US, EU, Japan, and Israel are among the 69 signatories. Daniel Iriarte argued that “*This international rejection may have a deterrent effect, but the measure is little more than symbolic and governments can do very little*”.<sup>292</sup> Moreover, there have been suggestions to impose travel restrictions on citizens to countries that engage in these unfair detentions. President Joe Biden advised all Americans to “take precautions” and follow State Department travel recommendations before traveling abroad after Russia freed Brittney Griner.<sup>293</sup> These measures are difficult to implement to many countries and impossible to China. Russia is another example: since the invasion of Ukraine, Washington has advised Americans to leave, but not after Gershkovich's arrest. Even in the worst situations, accredited journalists, relief workers, and diplomats will be on the ground. Moreover, several countries have sanctioned the officials involved, although doing so can increase their number and impact in a climate of escalating international conflict.<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> Shaun Ley, “What is hostage diplomacy and why is it on the rise?”, April 14, 2023, in The Real Story, produced by Ellen Otzen and Rumella Dasgupta, published by BBC News, podcast, MP3 audio, 49:13, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct4q6h>

<sup>292</sup> Daniel Iriarte, “Diplomacia de Los Secuestros, La Nueva Estrategia de Los Países”

<sup>293</sup> Katryn Watson “The Countries Where the State Department Warns That Travelers Risk Being Wrongfully Detained.” *CBS News*. December 9, 2022. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-wrongfully-detained-state-department-countries-travel-advisory/>.

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## A UN Convoy, Some Armed Men, and a Diplomatic Incident: The Case of Luca

Attanasio

Chiara Cupola

“They create a desert and call it peace.”

- Tacitus

In February 2024, it will be three years since the death of Luca Attanasio, the Italian ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) killed in North Kivu, at the Est of the country. Since 2017 Attanasio worked in Kinshasa, after previously serving in Switzerland, Morocco and Nigeria. He is described as a very attentive man, extremely devoted to his cause; he truly believed that for doing his job he needed to be on the field, regardless of the risks – he usually said that he did it for “not leaving anybody behind”<sup>295</sup>. That is why he decided to move to the DRC with his wife and their three daughters. He always gave his personal and professional commitment to defending human rights, especially of children. He aimed at bringing peace to a country torn apart by decades of conflicts. In 2017, he founded “Mama Sofia” with his wife, an NGO that provides healthcare, education, and clean water to poor Congolese women and children. Attanasio was involved in the community and took his job extremely seriously. Nevertheless, what happened the 22<sup>nd</sup> of February of 2021 on that road near Goma, is not clear yet.

After the decades under the Mobutu regime, and two bloody and devastating wars, in 2003 the Democratic Republic of Congo was finally established. However, “the difficulty in dismantling a war machine once it has been set in motion”<sup>296</sup> were demonstrated and peace was not gained right after the end of the war. Moreover, dismantling the system of war economy that reigned in the region has been almost impossible. In particular, the eastern region in which Attanasio was killed, has been defined “the powder keg of Africa”, a place in which the situation has never been easy to understand, let alone trying to resolve it. Eastern Congo emerged as a paradigm case of brutal war over natural resources. The DRC has one of the richest soils in the world when it comes to minerals, but it is nonetheless one of the poorest countries in the world.

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<sup>295</sup> Armando Massanisso, “Luca Attanasio: chi era l’ambasciatore di pace ucciso in Congo due anni fa”, *Osservatorio Diritti*, 22 February 2023, <https://www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2023/02/22/luca-attanasio-ambasciatore-morte-biografia/> (accessed 7th December 2023)

<sup>296</sup> David Keen, *Useful Enemies. When waging wars is more important than winning them.*, Yale University Press (London, 2012), 165

Decolonization did not bring growth and prosperity but only lead to new forms of dependency in which richer countries fought with each other to gain some revenues from Congolese soil, at the expenses of people living there. Despite decades of work to “clean” mineral extraction in the country with initiatives like the Kimberley Process<sup>297</sup> and the iTSCI<sup>298</sup> for the responsible extraction of resources, Congo is still far from reaching a comprehensive and effective agreement to regulate small-scale mining. Most of minerals are extracted artisanally, without the use of machines and often without regulations too; prioritizing profit became the new subtle but no less violent form of domination and exploitation. Post-colonial crisis brought to a substantial increase in inequalities which lead to a whole new marginal class, composed mostly of young men without land to work on, and in a society in which the school system is wrecked. Often, the two available choices that children have are either joining a militia group and become a soldier or working in artisanal mining.<sup>299</sup> Most of them try to work in mines for some years in order to help their families and have enough money for going to school, but once you enter in the system is not easy to get out, the pay miners receive is not enough and it is even less for women and children. The exploitation of child labor is an issue upon which Luca Attanasio worked extensively, he wanted to help poor children to have a better life there. Since 2001, there has been intensive work made by NGOs and “UN investigations to turn a spotlight towards the illegal exploitation and trade of minerals”.<sup>300</sup> Unsurprisingly, the UN’s peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is one of the biggest and most dangerous operations in the world. Moreover, the eastern part of the country does not really communicate with the central government in Kinshasa. That area has always been kind of decentralized and followed its own rules.

The difficulties of the country in which Luca Attanasio found himself, were the same that brought his life to an end and the same that made it difficult to find a culprit. The Italian ambassador was traveling on a UN convoy going through the Virunga national park, a reserve in which there are several active militia groups, coming from the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda. Despite this was known, the road on which Attanasio was travelling was declared secure. In February 2022, two WFP officials have been accused by the Public Prosecutor of Rome of manslaughter for committing severe negligence and irregularities that contributed to making

<sup>297</sup> Kimberley Process, <https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/> (accessed 7<sup>th</sup> December 2023)

<sup>298</sup> iTSCI, <https://www.itsci.org/fr/> (accessed 7<sup>th</sup> December 2023)

<sup>299</sup> Luca Jourdan, *Generazione Kalashnikov. Un antropologo dentro la guerra in Congo*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed, Edizioni Laterza & Figli (Urbino, 2010), 77-121

<sup>300</sup> Christoph Vogel, *Conflict Minerals Inc. War, Profit and White Saviourism in Eastern Congo*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed, Oxford University Press (New York, 2021), 4

the trip of the convoy dangerous and prone to found itself in an armed attack. Apparently, the two officials would have falsified travel documents necessary to organize the mission of Attanasio and obtain the required permission of the UN Security Council. Regulations says that before a mission, a request must be sent to the UN at least 72 hours in advance. Moreover, they should have said five days prior to MONUSCO what the mission was about, so that they could provide further escort or armored vehicles. According to the allegations, the two officials would not have done nothing of sort and would have even falsified the documents needed, by saying that on the vehicles there were only WFP staff instead of an ambassador and his escort.<sup>301</sup>

The convoy has probably been stopped for a robbery. According to eyewitness account, six men armed with Kalashnikovs and machetes made the cars stopped and people inside the vehicles started giving them what they had, including the ambassador. When the robbers realized that the people they halted did not have a lot of money with them, they decided to kidnap them and ask for \$50 million as ransom; then the situation quickly degenerated. From that moment accounts are also less clear; what we know is that Attanasio died because of the injuries sustained in the attack, after being transported to the UN hospital in Goma. With him, an army police officer, Vittorio Iacovacci and a WFP driver Mustapha Milambo died too, while other people survived the assault. Right after the attack, local media attributed it to militia groups, others said that the perpetrators belonged instead to the army because there are not active militia groups in the area in which the convoy was attacked. The situation, however, can rapidly change in such a fragile environment and at the time no official declarations were made. In January 2022 the Congolese government said that some people were arrested after being accused of taking part into the attack, portraying them as a criminal gang that wanted to kidnap the ambassador. In April 2023 six men have been sentenced to life imprisonment (when the court agreed to not sentence them to death after the requests made by the Italian government and the families of Attanasio and Iacovacci). However, the process did not let emerge anything new. The UN also send a fact-finding mission to DRC, but all the information they got are reserved to protect privacy of victims and safeguard the investigations.<sup>302</sup> Latest suppositions have linked the death of the ambassador with visa racketeering. Presumably, according to suspicion of an Italian deputy, Attanasio was killed because he wanted to denounce a trade of

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<sup>301</sup> Il Post “Cosa sappiamo della morte di Luca Attanasio, un anno dopo”, Il Post, 22 February 2022, [https://www.ilpost.it/2022/02/22/luca-attanasio-morte-indagini/#:o\\_](https://www.ilpost.it/2022/02/22/luca-attanasio-morte-indagini/#:o_) (accessed 8th December 2023)

<sup>302</sup> Marina Forti, “La verità sulla morte di Luca Attanasio è ancora lontana”, *L'Essenziale*, 13 September 2023, <https://www.internazionale.it/essenziale/notizie/marina-forti/2023/09/13/processo-attanasio-congo> (accessed 9th December 2023)

illicit visa for the Schengen area.<sup>303</sup> Many unresolved issues are still left behind. In the summer of 2023, the family of the ambassador accepted the compensation, and it is not civil party in the process anymore.<sup>304</sup>

There are no doubts about the fact that the ambassador knew how the situation was in that part of the country. He worked and lived there long enough to be aware of the risks too. So, could we attribute what happened to the negligence of someone? Was it simply a diplomatic incident? Did Attanasio just find himself in the wrong place at the wrong moment? We do not have enough answers yet, and there are high chances that we will not have answers at all. This is a great example of how sometimes diplomacy cannot work properly in countries that have internal disfunctions and active conflicts. If the central government of DRC has difficulties in managing what is happening in its eastern regions, how can we, as outsiders, think that we will be able to cooperate with regions that do not even trust their own government? With the upcoming elections, citizens of DRC will have to decide who will be the new president of the country. In perfect DRC style these elections have not been easy, especially because of the flare-up of violence in the eastern regions – more than 120 militia groups are active now. There are still a lot of uncertainties about the future of the DRC, but we can hope that one day the DRC will be able to achieve the peace it deserves, just like Luca Attanasio have worked and hoped for.

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<sup>303</sup> Edoardo Romagnoli, “Attanasio, dietro la morte in Congo il racket di visti per l’Europa, *Il Tempo*, 19 October 2023, <https://www.iltempo.it/esteri/2023/10/19/news/luca-attanasio-ambasciatore-congo-motivi-morte-racket-visti-migranti-37252792/> (accessed 9th December 2023)

<sup>304</sup> Gabriele Bassani, “Luca Attanasio e il prezzo della verità, la famiglia: ‘Sì al risarcimento, pensiamo alle bimbe’”, 7 July 2023, <https://www.ilgiorno.it/monza-brianza/cronaca/luca-attanasio-famiglia-risarcimento-a7356825> (accessed 9th December 2023)



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## **The Silent Negotiator: Charlie Chaplin's Philosophical Lens Illuminating AI's Role In Modern Diplomacy**

**Vyara Noncheva**

The landscape of diplomacy has always been influenced by the alternation of seasons, though not limited to only four, but rather unfolding a vast palette of endless combinations of colours and nuances. As exciting and dynamic this field may sound, it inevitably carries a cloud of challenges, let say opportunities - food for thought. A new seasonal weather also introduced the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI), leading to successive and profound transformation of the diplomatic landscape. One of the chief challenges invoked by the fusion of technology and international relations, standing at the heart of the European Union, comprises namely the myriad of ethical dilemmas which herewith demand careful consideration. The present article explores the nuanced intersection of AI, diplomacy, and the timeless philosophical insights of the cinematic icon Charlie Chaplin in relation to the ethical challenges faced by diplomats. The following paragraphs aspire to raise questions rather than provide an explicit, definite answer.

Why this English actor is at the core of the reflection? Charlie Chaplin is widely renown for masterfully capturing the human experience amid rapid changes brought by modernisation. His philosophical lens demonstrated in his silent movies, such as "*Modern Times*"<sup>305</sup>, are pivotal for the reflection on the delicate balance between progress and the preservation of human values: he managed to intricately portray the struggle of the individual against the dehumanising forces of technology. The prominent factory scene on the assembly line, where the protagonist is in a chaotic and repetitive environment, subject to monotonous tasks and constant pressure to keep up with the fast-paced machinery, exemplifies in a humoristic manner this notion of the dehumanising nature of the modern world. Hereby, Chaplin's mostly recognisable iconic Tramp character<sup>306</sup>, later identified as a social outcast with a kind heart through which he illustrates the everyman, would serve as a vignette to illuminate the impact of AI. Through the movie, Chaplin suggests that authority takes advantage of the working class and prioritises efficiency over humanity: pattern to be found also in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The genuine and sympathy evoking character suggests that not he is the problem, but the society in which he lives.

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<sup>305</sup> Charlie Chaplin, 1936, *Modern Times*, <https://www.charliechaplin.com/en/films/6-Modern-Times> .

<sup>306</sup> Pamela Hutchinson, 'Charlie Chaplin and the Tramp: the birth of a hero'. *The Guardian*, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/film/filmblog/2014/jan/27/charlie-chaplin-tramp-birth-hero>. (accessed 20.02.2024)

“The opening clip of the movie shows sheep running in a field, implying that workers are sheep.”<sup>307</sup> In 1936, this scene depicted the impact of the Great Depression illustrating how unemployment and capitalism value more than the individuality of the workers, impersonalising and de-autonomising workers. Applied to a different time, the message of “*Modern Times*” remains relevant: the rise of and the race for AI dominance could undermine the individual and their personality in the long term. This narrative explores the unintended consequences of technological advancements. In an AI driven diplomacy, diplomats must carefully navigate potential unintended outcomes, anticipating and addressing unforeseen challenges arising from the use of AI.

In the realm of digital diplomacy, AI can furnish diplomats with *coup d’oeil* in diplomacy, offering valuable insights in international statecraft.<sup>308</sup> Although still limited, the use of AI in consular affairs and public communications is discussed: Regarding negotiations, AI may demonstrate its utility more effectively in examining past negotiation dynamics rather than forecasting the results of ongoing processes. This is partly due to the potential constraint on maneuvering margins introduced by the use of AI, particularly when acknowledging the influential roles of constructive ambiguity and irrational elements in negotiation scenarios.<sup>309</sup> Turning to the ethical dilemmas of AI in diplomacy, several factors must be considered since AI systems involve human actions such as judgements and decision-making: transparency, accountability, bias, fairness and finally privacy concerns. Given that algorithms are fed by large amounts of data which could possibly be inaccurate, behold biases or be inappropriate for the targeted situation, the algorithm risks exacerbating existing biases and hence misleading.<sup>310</sup> In that context, how can diplomats be held accountable for decisions influenced by complex algorithms? Hereby, Chaplin’s advocacy for social justice prompts scrutiny of potential biases embedded in AI systems: In *Modern Times* the injustice is portrayed by the oppressive working conditions of the factory workers. Additionally, ethical concerns arise from the vast amounts of data collected and analysed suggesting the potential misuse of sensitive information. Chaplin’s movie ends with hope despite any dark disheartening statements: “*Let us fight for a world of reason, a world where science and progress will lead to all men’s happiness.*” Despite the

<sup>307</sup> Ciara White, ‘Analysing Charlie Chaplin’s “Modern Times”’, *The Chronicle*, 2021, <https://thechronicleclc.com/787/arts-entertainment/analyzing-charlie-chaplins-modern-times/>.

<sup>308</sup> Abigail Darwish, ‘The Art of Digital Diplomacy?’, *Modern Diplomacy*, <https://modern diplomacy.eu/2023/10/25/the-art-of-digital-diplomacy>

<sup>309</sup> Geneva Internet Platform, Artificial intelligence and diplomacy: A new tool for diplomats?, 2019, <https://dig.watch/event/artificial-intelligence-and-diplomacy-new-tool-diplomats> . . (accessed 09.02.2024)

<sup>310</sup> Lala Jafarova, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Diplomacy, in *E-International Relations*, 2023, <https://www.e-ir.info/2023/08/01/artificial-intelligence-and-digital-diplomacy/> . . (accessed 18.02.2024)

ethical dilemmas, AI also presents opportunities for positive diplomatic outcomes providing diplomats with hope to apply AI for fostering international cooperation and for conflict resolution. Thus, *Modern Times* proudly stands for us as a timeless social commentary whose message continues to chant over the years.

Coming to the AI implications on modern diplomacy, one could undoubtedly stumble upon the communication breakdowns.<sup>311</sup> Chaplin's films frequently depicted the challenges of communication in a rapidly changing world. It could be argued that by keeping on the silent tradition, less misunderstanding is generated than in case of actively communicating with language; not to mention the semantical side and language barriers. His movies proved to be widely understood also on silent mode: a movie that transcends language. To highlight the impact of modernisation on interpersonal relations and the potential loss of meaningful communication, serves the "nonsense song and dance" sequence, in which Chaplin's character is working as a night watchman in a department store: the Tramp attempts to communicate and entertain using a gibberish song and a dance routine that involves playful gestures and funny movements. However, the message is lost in the nonsensical language and physical comedy. This scene can be interpreted as a commentary on the difficulty of effective communication in the face of technological advancements. After all, the role of diplomats encapsulates the complexity of communication and conveying messages is a sort of an art. In the context of AI, the risk of misinterpretations or breakdowns in communication between nations is even higher given that AI software seemingly resembles human interaction. Further to this adds the unavoidable loss of authenticity. Chaplin's emphasis on authenticity and genuine emotion invites contemplation on whether the integration of AI encompasses the sincerity of diplomatic interactions. Who could ensure and how that the use of technology does not lead to this loss when negotiating? Followingly, in this foggy landscape the advent of AI introduces a shift in the role of diplomats: rather than replacing diplomats, AI augments their capabilities. General advice would be the need to adapt to the evolving landscape, mastering the art of integrating technology while preserving the human touch in diplomatic engagements. Easily said, yet how to be done? In other terms, how can diplomats embody Chaplin's principles of ethical leadership amidst the complexities of AI? **With a *Smile***<sup>312</sup> on the face would be a simple answer: smile, the symbol of hope and resilience in the face of adversity; smile, the symbol of human connection.

<sup>311</sup> Lala Jafarova, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Diplomacy, in E-International relations, 2023, <https://www.e-ir.info/2023/08/01/artificial-intelligence-and-digital-diplomacy/>.

<sup>312</sup> Charlie Chaplin, Smile lyrics, <https://www.charliechaplin.com/en/articles/42-Smile-Lyrics>.

Charlie Chaplin's philosophical lens offers a unique perspective, urging diplomats to navigate the challenges of the AI era while preserving the timeless values of transparency, fairness, authenticity, and ethical leadership. In this delicate dance between technology and humanity, diplomats must ensure that the silent negotiator of AI serves as a tool for progress rather than a harbinger of unintended consequences. Looking back at mentioned movie, now that we are once again in *Modern Times*, reflected to the current period, one could still ask: Have things changed and changed enough? One is certain:

***“The future of the modern world demands modern thinking.”<sup>313</sup>***

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<sup>313</sup> Charlie Chaplin, Quotes, <https://www.charliechaplin.com/en/quotes/35> .

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#### IV. Diplomacy for Advancing a Sustainability and Fundamental Rights Implementation Agenda





## Empowering change: The Importance of Women in Climate Diplomacy

Hannah Pauly

Climate Change is the most pressing current issue of international politics. Towards the middle of the century, it will lead to the displacement of millions of people as many parts of the world will not be inhabitable in the future due to droughts, rising sea levels or lack of drinking water and food as a direct consequence of climate change<sup>314</sup>. Of all people displaced due to the impacts of climate change, 80% are women and girls<sup>315</sup>. A recently published report by UN Women finds that by the middle of the century up to 158 million women and girls globally may be pushed into poverty due to climate change<sup>316</sup>.

It is widely recognized that climate change is a collective action problem and can only be resolved through international cooperation efforts in the form of climate diplomacy<sup>317</sup>. Many of the international climate negotiations focus heavily on economic and technical topics, especially with nations rich in natural oil or gas defending their national approaches<sup>318</sup>. Due to its cross-cutting nature, climate change is often perceived as an issue that concerns all people likewise and is “gender-neutral”<sup>319</sup>. However, women and other marginalized groups are disproportionately affected by climate change<sup>320</sup>. Hence, their perspective needs to be considered to ensure sustainable, equitable and just solutions. Although women are disproportionately hit by the effects of climate change, they continue to be underrepresented in international climate diplomacy. At the most recent international climate conference in Dubai, only 38% of the party delegates were women<sup>321</sup>.

<sup>314</sup> International Organization for Migration, *Migration and Climate Change* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration/2008), p. 11.

<sup>315</sup> Amali Tower ‘The Gendered Impacts of Climate Displacement’, *Climate Refugees*, 19 May 2020.

<sup>316</sup> UN Women, *Feminist Climate Justice* (New York: UN-Women: 2023), p.7.

<sup>317</sup> Michèle B. Bättig and Thomas Bernauer, ‘National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?’, *International Organization* 63 (02): 281-308.

<sup>318</sup> Minu Hemmati and Ulrike Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations: experiences, challenges, and steps forward’, *Gender and Development* 17 (1), 19-32. p.20

<sup>319</sup> Hemmati and Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations’, p.22.

<sup>320</sup> Mirian Gay-Antaki, ‘Feminist geographies of climate change: Negotiating gender at climate talks’, *Geoforum* 115 (2020), 1-10, p.1.

<sup>321</sup> Brianna Fruean, Hilda Flavia Nakabuye, Txai Suruí, ‘Breaking the green glass ceiling: Where were the women at COP28's World Climate Action Summit?’ *Context*, 2 December 2023.

This paper aims to examine the role that women play in international climate diplomacy by asking to what extent women are represented and why their representation is so important for durably tackling the climate crisis and its implications.

## What is Climate Diplomacy?

There exists no universal definition for what climate diplomacy entails. However, generally it can be defined as an effort of entities to approach the issue of climate change and ensure the “ambition and functioning of the international climate change regime”<sup>322</sup> through diplomatic means. As climate change is perceived as a global public good due to its cross-cutting nature<sup>323</sup>, climate diplomacy aims to foster multilateralism and international cooperation.

The most prominent forum for international climate diplomacy is the Conference of the Parties (COP) established as the governing body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It brings together the 198 membership parties of the UNFCCC once a year to take decisions about the implementation of measures upholding the convention and mitigating climate change<sup>324</sup>.

COP and climate diplomacy in general has often been criticized for centering around economic issues and national interests, overlooking the interests of marginalized groups<sup>325</sup>. However, in recent years, the effect of climate change on vulnerable groups has received more attention<sup>326</sup>. Notably, the Council of the EU Conclusion on Climate Diplomacy specifically “underlines that gender equality, women’s empowerment and women’s full and equal participation and leadership are vital to achieve sustainable development, including climate change adaptation”<sup>327</sup>, demonstrating the centrality of the representation of women for the success of climate diplomacy. However, it does not establish by the Council how the representation of women in climate diplomacy can be achieved.

<sup>322</sup> Climate Diplomacy, ‘What is Climate Diplomacy?’, <https://climate-diplomacy.org/what-climate-diplomacy#:~:text=Climate%20diplomacy%20calls%20for%20preparing,diploamacy%20and%20external%20policy%20instruments> (last accessed 15 December 2023).

<sup>323</sup> Bättig and Bernauer, ‘National Institutions’, p.283.

<sup>324</sup> United Nations Climate Change, ‘Conference of the Parties (COP)’, <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop> (last accessed 15 December 2023).

<sup>325</sup> Hemmati and Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations’, p.20.

<sup>326</sup> Gay-Antaki, ‘Feminist geographies’, p.2.

<sup>327</sup> Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, 6094/18, 26 February 2018, p.5.

## Why we Need Women in Climate Diplomacy

Among many other marginalized groups, women are disproportionately affected by climate change. The 2023 Synthesis Report by the IPCC recognizes that the impacts of climate change greatly depend on gender and socioeconomic status<sup>328</sup>. This is because groups that are already discriminated against in a society are often hit the hardest by external shocks<sup>329</sup>. In many countries of the global south for example, women often fulfil tasks like growing food or procuring water. Such traditional roles are getting more difficult as they are directly dependent on effects of climate change such as droughts or floods. Generally, gender norms and traditions lead to women being affected differently by climate change<sup>330</sup>. Hence, it is important for them to be present at climate negotiations and shed a light on these issues to ensure an equitable approach to climate diplomacy. While diplomacy continues to be “a man’s world”<sup>331</sup>, in the past, the advocacy of women at international climate negotiations has increased the role that integrating gender aspects in the climate change regime has played<sup>332</sup>.

Indeed, the participation of women in peace negotiations has produced more durable peace agreements. Krause et al. demonstrate that women seek the expertise of civil society groups and establish networks that inform negotiations and help to achieve a more diverse approach to the issue. Furthermore, peace agreements signed by women depict a significantly higher implementation rate of agreement provisions<sup>333</sup>. Coincidentally, Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi find that the representation of women in parliaments results in less carbon emissions of a country<sup>334</sup>. This shows that the participation of women in diplomatic efforts is pivotal to implement change. Women approach negotiations collaboratively and tend to include cultural and equity issues<sup>335</sup>. Moreover, their presence in politics results in increased funding for health, foreign aid and expenses that specifically address the needs of women<sup>336</sup>. This is especially important in countries where women and other vulnerable groups are more affected by climate change, as such decisions are important to tackle their structural disadvantages.

<sup>328</sup> IPCC, *Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report* (Geneva: IPCC: 2023), p.51.

<sup>329</sup> Kristina Lunz, *Die Zukunft der Außenpolitik ist Feministisch* (Berlin: Ullstein: 2022), p.297.

<sup>330</sup> Sam Wong, ‘Can Climate Finance Contribute to Gender Equity in Developing Countries?’, *Journal of International Development* 28 (2016), 428-444.

<sup>331</sup> Lunz, ‘Die Zukunft der Außenpolitik’, p.57.

<sup>332</sup> Hemmati and Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations’, p.25.

<sup>333</sup> Jana Krause, Werner Krause, and Piia Bränfors, ‘Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace’, *International Interactions* 44 (6): 985–1016. P.1006

<sup>334</sup> Astghik Mavisakalyan and Yashar Tarverdi, ‘Gender and climate change: Do female parliamentarians make difference?’ *European Journal of Political Economy* 56 (2019), 151-164.

<sup>335</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Women’s Participation in Peace Processes’ <https://www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/why-it-matters> (last accessed 15 December 2023).

<sup>336</sup> Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi, ‘Gender and climate change’, p.151.

Especially in climate diplomacy, where climate finance is decided, women facilitate important financial aid for countries of the global south<sup>337</sup>. Hence, including women in international climate diplomacy is crucial to ensure a holistic approach to climate change mitigation policies that can effectively address the issues of all people.

### **To What Extent are Women Represented in Climate Diplomacy?**

The importance of the representation of women in climate diplomacy has been structurally recognized by an increasing number of states adopting feminist approaches to how they conduct international affairs. In recent years many countries have adopted a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) as part of their foreign affairs strategies. The first country to introduce such a policy was Sweden in 2014. Since then, countries like Canada, France, Luxemburg, Mexico, Spain, and Germany, among others, have followed<sup>338</sup>. The Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) defines FFP as “the external action of a state that defines its interactions vis-a-vis states, supranational organisations, multilateral forums, civil society, and movements in a manner that prioritises equality for all, enshrines the human rights of women and other politically marginalised groups, and wholeheartedly pursues human security and feminist peace”<sup>339</sup>. One of the three guiding principles of FFP is representation. This means that in its foreign policy and hence diplomatic efforts, a state ensures the fair participation of women and girls in all decision-making processes<sup>340</sup>. The German FFFP specifically aims to apply this feminist approach to climate diplomacy<sup>341</sup>. Notably, guideline four recognizes the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and include them as vital stakeholders in Germany’s climate diplomacy<sup>342</sup>. Nonetheless, many feminist foreign policies fail to comprehensively address the gender-related impacts of climate change<sup>343</sup>.

While these commitments represent milestones for the acknowledgement of both the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and the importance of their presence and active role in Climate Diplomacy, women continue to be underrepresented in

<sup>337</sup> Cali Nathanson and Amy Myers Jaffe, ‘Women and Gender in Climate Diplomacy’ <https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/women-and-gender-climate-diplomacy/> (last accessed 15 December 2023).

<sup>338</sup> Lunz, ‘Die Zukunft der Außenpolitik’, pp. 202-217.

<sup>339</sup> Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, ‘The CFFP Glossary’ <https://centreforfeministforeignpolicy.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CFFPGlossaryfinal.pdf> (last accessed 15 December 2023) p.1.

<sup>340</sup> Lunz, ‘Die Zukunft der Außenpolitik’, p.202


<sup>341</sup> Federal Foreign Office of Germany, *Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy*. P. 10

<sup>342</sup> Federal Foreign Office of Germany, *Shaping Feminist Foreign Policy*. P.46

<sup>343</sup> UN Women, *Gender Responsive Approaches to Foreign Policy and the 2030 Agenda: Feminist Foreign Policies*. P. 5

international climate negotiations. In the past, individual women have been crucial for the success of agreements<sup>344</sup>, however, structurally they continue to be underrepresented. At COP28 in December 2023, only 38% of party delegates were women, which is a mere 1% more than at COP27 in 2022 and 3% more than at COP26, where women made up 35% of the party delegates<sup>345</sup>. However, it must be noted that more delegates were present at COP27 than COP26, meaning that parties are “bringing thousands more delegates [...] but they are not bringing more women”<sup>346</sup>. While these numbers show a clear improvement to the first COP, where only 18% of delegates were women, there is no linear progress to the representation of women. As women represent half of the world’s population, states need to make sure that this is reflected in their delegations.

Figure 1: Percentage of female party delegates



Source: <https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/women-and-gender-climate-diplomacy/>

Delegations to COP conferences are usually comprised of senior staff from relevant ministries and representatives from the industry<sup>347</sup>. The delegation is led by the head of delegation, the most prominent person of a delegation. At this highest level, women are substantially less represented: At COP27 only 20% of delegation heads and deputies were women<sup>348</sup>.

<sup>344</sup> Hemmati and Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations’, p.28.


<sup>345</sup> Fruean et al. ‘Breaking the green glass-ceiling’.

<sup>346</sup> WEDO, ‘Women’s Participation in the UN Climate Change Convention’. [https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/WEDO\\_WomensParticipation\\_2023\\_EN.pdf](https://wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/WEDO_WomensParticipation_2023_EN.pdf) p.3

<sup>347</sup> Hemmati and Röhr, ‘Engendering the climate-change negotiations’, p. 26.

<sup>348</sup> WEDO, ‘Women’s Participation’, p.7.

Figure 2: percentage of female heads of delegations



Source: <https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/publications/women-and-gender-climate-diplomacy/>

It is crucial that women are part of the delegations in international climate diplomacy as politically salient issues are discussed and important decisions made at this level. However, only because women are part of a delegation does not ensure their representation in negotiations. In specific areas of negotiations such as finance and technology, women are less represented<sup>349</sup>. This shows that the international community must do better to ensure women have a seat at the negotiating table.

### No Climate Justice Without the Perspective of Women!

To conclude, women are disproportionately affected by climate change, yet continue to be underrepresented in Climate Diplomacy where states collaboratively negotiate this issue. This paper demonstrated that women are crucial for the establishment of just and equitable solutions to this crisis. However, it is not enough to increase the presence of women in diplomatic efforts regarding climate change mitigation. Rather, more women and other marginalized groups must be granted access to the negotiating table. Climate change will not be solved by easy answers. Rather, it needs to be approached with new ideas centred around a just transition for all people everywhere. Current balances of power will need to be challenged as climate justice cannot be achieved by the same people and systems that are currently

<sup>349</sup> WEDO, 'Women's Participation' p.7.



preventing meaningful change. This requires radical and far-reaching changes that can only be achieved if all those affected are invited to the table.



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20. Wong, Sam. 'Can Climate Finance Contribute to Gender Equity in Developing Countries?', *Journal of International Development* 28 (2016), 428-444.

## Environmental Diplomacy – the vital solution for the European Union before the threat of the Inflation Reduction Act-

**Rafaela Lara Caetano Reinhardt**

In international affairs, environmental diplomacy is the practice of negotiations related to environmental governance held by states and other players. Environmental diplomacy began to be at stake when nations started to view the topic as a threat to one ‘high politics’ foreign area, i.e., security. Thereafter, environmental security started to evolve, not only as a national security problem but also as a global one.<sup>350</sup>

Consequently, a vast number of agreements and discussions have been taking place for the last twenty years, for example, those taken by the United Nations Climate Change in the form of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement.<sup>351</sup> Nonetheless, the challenges around sustainability and climate change have not decreased. On the contrary, the UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell, in his closing speech at the last annual United Nations climate meeting in Dubai, called COP28, confessed that fossil fuels were not yet banned from the world. However, he affirmed that it was the beginning of this achievement and urged all governments and businesses ‘to turn these pledges into real-economy outcomes, without delay’.<sup>352</sup>

Therefore, states must cooperate to overcome one of the most dangerous global threats, i.e., the challenges of global change. Especially because ‘territorial boundaries rarely reflect natural boundaries’<sup>353</sup>, environmental impacts do not limit themselves to the territory of the actor of the damage but go beyond that.

Moreover, according to NASA, ‘[c]limate data records provide evidence of climate change key indicators, such as global land and ocean temperature increases; rising sea levels; ice loss at Earth’s poles and in mountain glaciers;’<sup>354</sup> and hence, affects the whole population around the

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<sup>350</sup> Nicolas, Leila, and Kallab, Elie. *Effective Forms of Environmental Diplomacy*. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2023. Accessed December 15, 2023. ProQuest Ebook Central.

<sup>351</sup> United Nations Climate Change. About the Secretariat, 2023 <https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

<sup>352</sup> United Nations Climate Change. COP28 Agreement Signals „Beginning of the End“ of Fossil Fuel Era, 2023 <https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era>

<sup>353</sup> Nicolas, Leila, and Kallab, Elie. *Effective Forms of Environmental Diplomacy*.

<sup>354</sup> NASA Global Climate Change Vital Signs of the Planet. What Is Climate Change? 2023 <https://climate.nasa.gov/what-is-climate-change/> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

world and is a reason to explain why many industrial countries have engaged on clean and renewable energy in the last years.

Nonetheless, climate and environmental diplomacy goes beyond the impact of human activities on nature *per se*. It is also an important key to promoting economic growth and an excellent tool to diminish competition and increase harmony between allies and rivals in the race for the development of new technologies.

Therefore, as Nicolas and Kallab rightly define, ‘[t]he economy and environment are interconnected. Environmental diplomacy will not succeed without considering economic interests. Besides, economic diplomacy will not be sustainable unless it addresses environmental issues.’<sup>355</sup>

The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) are examples of how economic diplomacy goes hand in hand with environmental diplomacy, which requires great negotiation abilities from the diplomats serving these countries, as will be demonstrated below.

On 16 August 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was signed by American president Joe Biden.<sup>356</sup> IRA is ‘a legislative package combining large- scale green subsidies with healthcare savings and new revenue measures, is a milestone in US climate policy.’<sup>357</sup> While the White House describes the IRA as ‘is a transformative law that is helping the United States meet its climate goals and strengthen energy security, investing in America to create good-paying jobs, reducing energy and health care costs for families, and making the tax code fairer’<sup>358</sup>, the EU reacted fearfully, thus responded proposing The Net Zero Industrial Act (NZIA).

Although the IRA is a legislative piece that intend to close two-thirds of emissions of green-houses of the US – i.e., the only country behind China in CO<sub>2</sub> emission in the world – which

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<sup>355</sup> Nicolas, Leila, and Kallab, Elie. *Effective Forms of Environmental Diplomacy*.

<sup>356</sup> The White House. Building a Clean Energy Economy: A Guidebook to the Inflation Reduction Act’s Investments in Clean Energy and Climate Action. CleanEnergy.Gov January 2023, Version 2. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Inflation-Reduction-Act-Guidebook.pdf> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

<sup>357</sup> Kleimann, D., Poitiers, N., Sapir, A., Tagliapietra, S., Véron, N., Veugelers, R., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2023). Green tech race? The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act. *The World Economy*, 46, 3420–3434. <https://doi-org.proxy.bnl.lu/10.1111/twec.13469> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

<sup>358</sup> The White House. FACT SHEET: One Year In, President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act is Driving Historic Climate Action and Investing in America to Create Good Paying Jobs and Reduce Costs. 16 August 2023 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/16/fact-sheet-one-year-in-president-bidens-inflation-reduction-act-is-driving-historic-climate-action-and-investing-in-america-to-create-good-paying-jobs-and-reduce-costs/> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

would meet its climate target by 2030, it has also discriminated subsidies that counter World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, therefore are illegal.<sup>359</sup>

The IRA includes subsidies conditional on local content requirements (LCEs) and large-scale manufacturing subsidies, which are potentially market- and trade-distortive. Moreover, IRA explicitly affirms that ‘from 2024 and 2025, any use of batteries and critical minerals from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea will make a vehicle ineligible for the tax credit.’<sup>360</sup>

Hence, the IRA is a clear action of the US in competing with China and its allies, forging a strong internal market in clean energy, and investing in new energy technology. However, it also does not consider international agreements already reached in the WTO that promote fair trade competitiveness around the world, which harms US allies, such as the EU. This is certainly unacceptable, and the EU, as much as other states, must take effective actions before this scenario.

Albeit not certain, the concerns of Europe on the American bill, ‘which gives tax credit for each eligible component produced in a U.S. factory’<sup>361</sup> is that, because of the subsidies and lower energy American prices, the IRA ‘would take away potential investment from the continent’<sup>362</sup>, i.e. European continent.

Moreover, although the NZIA proposed by the EU – that sets ‘an industrial policy to promote cleantech manufacturing organised in four steps’<sup>363</sup> – which addresses the issue in an insufficiently meaner and will not be detailed in this discussion, the European Union has been seeking diplomatic solutions addressing the IRA issue.

More specifically, ‘[b]ilateral EU–US negotiations have been taking place within the framework of a dedicated ‘IRA Taskforce’ since October 2022, focusing on the IRA implementing regulations, which have been adopted by the US administration in December

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<sup>359</sup> Kleimann, D., Poitiers, N., Sapir, A., Tagliapietra, S., Véron, N., Veugelers, R., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2023). Green tech race? The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act. *The World Economy*.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid.

<sup>361</sup> Riham Alkousaa; Matthias Williams EU in talks with U.S. over new IRA law trade issues. 3 November 2022. *Reuters* <https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-talks-with-us-over-new-ira-law-trade-issues-2022-11-03/> (accessed on 15 December 2023).

<sup>362</sup> Ibid.

<sup>363</sup> Kleimann, D., Poitiers, N., Sapir, A., Tagliapietra, S., Véron, N., Veugelers, R., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2023). Green tech race? The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act. *The World Economy*.

2022 and March 2023 respectively.’<sup>364</sup>, which are related to electric vehicle tax credit and associated LCRs for battery and critical mineral components.<sup>365</sup>

The aim of the EU in these bilateral negotiations is to be considered as a free trade agreement partner, because while ‘[t]he IRA prescribes that parts and components supplied by US ‘free trade agreement’ partner jurisdictions are to be treated as local content for the purposes of EV tax credit eligibility.’<sup>366</sup>, the Internal Revenue Service of the United States implemented guidelines which ‘broadly clarify that the term ‘free trade agreement’ is not defined under US law but would, for IRA purposes, require three substantive elements: trade preferences and provisions on environmental and labour protection.’<sup>367</sup>

Moreover, Kleimann, Poitiers, Sapir, Tagliapietra, Véron, Veugelers and Zettelmeyer address that the EU has started to negotiate a bilateral agreement on critical raw material with the US regarding Electric Vehicles tax credit eligibility. Also, a similar agreement was reached by Japan with the US. They, furthermore, emphasise that ‘in any case, the EU must not accept to become a party of a discriminatory institutional arrangement that would violate Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on regional trade agreements.’<sup>368</sup>

The most desirable way to solve the possible international environmental subsidiary race would be the EU to start a plurilateral or multilateral agreement on the topic, according to Kleimann, Poitiers, Sapir, Tagliapietra, Véron, Veugelers and Zettelmeyer once more. They highlight that [t]his would be a response not just to the IRA, but to the problem that the design and scale of desirable environmental subsidies is on a collision course with existing international subsidy rules and national trade remedy (i.e. anti-foreign-subsidy) regulations.’<sup>369</sup>

In conclusion, as it was demonstrated, environmental diplomacy demands from diplomats political and technical knowledge to gain an interesting agreement for their home country in bilateral agreements, but first and foremost it requires specific knowledge regarding global environmental issues, considering the necessity of a posture that goes beyond their national

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> IRS. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. <https://www.irs.gov/inflation-reduction-act-of-2022> (last accessed on 15 December 2023).

<sup>366</sup> Kleimann, D., Poitiers, N., Sapir, A., Tagliapietra, S., Véron, N., Veugelers, R., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2023). Green tech race? The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Net Zero Industry Act. *The World Economy*.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

interest and forges a global approach to the issue at stake. This is needy due to the universal consequences of any aspect of climate change. Therefore, environmental diplomacy demands from its actors more compassion and altruism to the extent that their work must benefit their governments and not harm the global population, thus legitimising their economic diplomacy wins with global environmental diplomacy commitment.<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>370</sup> Nicolas, Leila, and Kallab, Elie. *Effective Forms of Environmental Diplomacy*.



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## Feminism Sells? The Crisis and eventual Abandonment of Feminist Foreign Policy in Sweden

Adrian Aleksander Wróbel

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In 2015, the Swedish coalition government of Stefan Löfven enacted the “Feminist Foreign Policy”. The brainchild of the foreign minister Margot Wallström. Its intent was best described in her own words as “three Rs: Representation, Rights, and Reallocation”<sup>371</sup>. The program was ambitious in its assumptions, presenting itself as questioning the current status quo of security by asking the question of who is providing security, and for who it is provided.<sup>372</sup> However, these grandiose statements seem null and void, as the proceeding government of Ulf Kristersson officially abandoned this policy, stating that foreign policy should be based on Swedish interests and Swedish values.<sup>373</sup> This begs the question – what are Swedish values and Swedish interests, and in what ways did the Feminist Foreign Policy counteracted them. Why did Sweden abandon its feminist policy? This essay aims to answer this question by first establishing the theoretical dimension of a feminist foreign policy, to then to see if these assumptions are consistent with the Swedish attempt, and if the policy failed because it did not go far enough. Secondly, this essay will analyse whether the policy failed because of its contradictions with Swedish society, as well as external international factors.

Feminist foreign policy has its roots in the feminist school of international relations. While defining its core tenets is more difficult than well established staples, such as neo-realism or liberalism, there is a clear image of a constructivist approach designed to question the status quo, the status quo being that politics is a game that benefits power hungry men, who can act on their surroundings.<sup>374</sup> Feminist scholarship debates this argument by questioning why is the sphere of International relations modelled after stereotypically male lens.<sup>375</sup> To achieve this, Feminist IR scholarship explains how this masculine projections invalidates the feminine perspective, and as such tries to not only include their perspectives, but also to show how

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<sup>371</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Handbook Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy*, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2019.

<sup>372</sup> Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond, ‘Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making: Ethics, Politics, and Gender’, *Ethics and International Affairs*, 30/3 (2016) p 325.

<sup>373</sup> Hanna Walfridsson, ‘Sweden’s New Government Abandons Feminist Foreign Policy’, *Human Rights Watch*, 2022 <: [www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/31/swedens-new-government-abandons-feminist-foreign-polic](http://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/31/swedens-new-government-abandons-feminist-foreign-polic)> [accessed 8 December 2023].

<sup>374</sup> Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics - Who Gets What, When, How: With Postscript*, McGraw Hill, 1958, p 29.

<sup>375</sup> Mary Caprioli, ‘Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis’, *International Studies Review*, 6/2 (2004) p. 254.

masculine perspective do not include a women's perspective and struggles they are subject to.<sup>376</sup> An evidence of this masculine bias in security perspective is the focus on "hard" security, seen as masculine, or manly, and protecting weak, and feminine.<sup>377</sup> As such, a feminist foreign policy can be expected to have certain characteristics. Its main assumption is representation of underrepresented groups. As the name would suggest, these policies include voices of women, but this approach goes further and states that the current system under represents everyone, men and women alike.<sup>378</sup> What is more, violence in these theories is not understood in and of itself, but is considered a symptom of "systemic violence"<sup>379</sup>, where the violence is endemic within the system.<sup>380</sup> To deconstruct that, the feminist approach analyses the power structures of the international system and with intersectionality, apply models of known inequalities to other.<sup>381</sup>

While the Swedish example of the feminist foreign policy abide by these characteristics, there were irregularities criticised even within the feminist scholarship. In theory, the policy was detailed and complex. In the official handbook by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the program's external objectives included full enjoyment of human rights, freedom from physical, psychological and sexual violence, sexual and reproductive health, political participation, economic rights and empowerment.<sup>382</sup> However, these statements are accompanied by statements encouraging women's visibility in leadership positions.<sup>383</sup> Another, makes a flashy hashtag #Morewomenmorepeace, hoping to promote the inclusion of more women in the peace-making process. While at first they seem innocent and were most likely written with good intentions in mind, they show that the Feminism proposed by the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry is not consistent with the theoretical understanding of Feminist International Relations. Gender equality purely in numbers of representation of women within the ministry and ad hoc help in women's rights was an element before the official implementation of this

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<sup>376</sup> V. Spike Peterson, 'Feminist Theories Within, Invisible To, and Beyond IR', *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, X/2 (2004) p 37.

<sup>377</sup> Cornelius Adebahr and Barbara Mittelhammer, *Defining Feminist Foreign Policy, A Feminist Foreign Policy to Deal with Iran?, Assessing the EU's Options* (2020) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27697.5> p. 7.

<sup>378</sup> Cornelius Adebahr and Barbara Mittelhammer, *Defining Feminist Foreign Policy, A Feminist Foreign Policy to Deal with Iran?, Assessing the EU's Options* (2020) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27697.5> p 5.

<sup>379</sup> Adebahr and Mittelhammer, *Defining Feminist Foreign Policy* p 7.

<sup>380</sup> Eric M. Blanchard, 'Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory', *Signs*, 2003 p 1291.

<sup>381</sup> Adebahr and Mittelhammer, 'Defining Feminist Foreign Policy'. p 7

<sup>382</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Handbook Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy*, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2019 p 19.

<sup>383</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Handbook Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy* p. 53.

policy (although usually referred to as gender equality)<sup>384</sup> as well as afterwards, with Ulf Kristersson reaffirming his governments' focus on gender equality in 2023.<sup>385</sup> This change in name brought consequences, with the positive aspects being committing more time and effort to gender equality tasks.<sup>386</sup> Indeed, even using the word "Feminist" indicates a commitment to a line of thinking that cannot have other interpretations, for better or worse as we will discuss it later. However the actual implementation lacks any kind of enforcement, and that decision was enacted by design with the intended purpose being freedom of pursuing feminist foreign policy goals within the realms of possibility.<sup>387</sup> At the same time however, the freedom in choosing the methods meant that certain areas of Swedish foreign policy, such as the Inspection for Strategic Products, which had never implemented it – most likely related to the area in which this agency operates, that being weapons' exports.<sup>388</sup> Due to its history of military non-alignment, Sweden developed a wide array of native military industry. However, research discovered certain discrepancies between the data listen in "The Feminist Foreign Policy in Theory and current data, where Sweden is no longer 15<sup>th</sup> biggest weapons exporter.<sup>389</sup> <sup>390</sup> In fact, in the same database, we can observe that after introducing the feminist foreign policy, the weapons sales dropped, and remained below the peaks before 2014.<sup>391</sup> However, the problematic nature of these arms deals is the receiver of Swedish products. Best illustration of this aspect is the 2015.

On 11<sup>th</sup> of February 2015, foreign affairs minister Wallström has given a speech in Swedish Parliament, criticising Saudi regime's human rights violations in regards to the case of human rights blogger Raif Badawi, who was sentenced to 1000 lashes.<sup>392</sup> Simultaneously, a memorandum on extension of an Arms deal was occurring around the same time, with the final

<sup>384</sup> Ann Towns, Elin Bjarnegård and Katarzyna Jezierska, *More Than A Label, Less Than A Revolution: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy*, 2023 p 93.

<sup>385</sup> Stephenie Foster and Susan A. Markham, *Feminist Foreign Policy in Practice*, *Feminist Foreign Policy in Theory and in Practice* (Oxon, 2023) p 55.

<sup>386</sup> Towns, Bjarnegård and Jezierska, 'More Than A Label, Less Than A Revolution: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy' p 76

<sup>387</sup> Towns, Bjarnegård and Jezierska, 'More Than A Label, Less Than A Revolution: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy', p 102.

<sup>388</sup> Towns, Bjarnegård and Jezierska, 'More Than A Label, Less Than A Revolution: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy' p 103.

<sup>389</sup> Foster and Markham, 'Feminist Foreign Policy in Practice: Introduction' p 58.

<sup>390</sup> theglobaleconomy.com, 'Arms Exports - Country Rankings', *The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*, 2023 <[https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/arms\\_exports/](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/arms_exports/)> [accessed 7 December 2023].

<sup>391</sup> SIPRI, 'Exports of Arms from Sweden from 2010 to 2022', *The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*, 2023 <<https://www.statista.com/statistics/865412/exports-of-arms-from-sweden/>> [accessed 7 December 2023].

<sup>392</sup> Fiona Robinson, 'Feminist Foreign Policy as Ethical Foreign Policy? A Care Ethics Perspective', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 17/1 (2021) p 27.

decision being its rejection.<sup>393</sup> These events has caused Saudi Government to uninvite the Swedish foreign affairs minister from an event hosted by the Arab League in Cairo, as well as recalling their ambassador and refusal of issuing visas to Swedish nationals.<sup>394</sup> With other gulf states following suit, Swedish government decided to attempt to damage control and send representatives carrying letters from both prime minister Stefan Löfven and King Carl XVI Gustaf, explaining that the foreign affairs minister did not in fact tried to insult Islam.<sup>395</sup>

Ultimately, this situation proves that the reason behind the cancelation of feminist foreign policy is not actually the critique from the feminist side. While the critique did exist and was potentially valid, even the critics noticed the positive effects of this policy, with both the actual achievements, as well as the usage of the word “Feminist” allowed Sweden promoting women’s rights, even if the policy was not a revolution it was heralded as. Rather, the image of an internationally weak state unable to defend its interest took place.

To understand that we need to first understand Swedish perceptions of themselves, or more specifically, how Sweden wished to be perceived. Swedish international branding pictures an almost utopian like progressive idyll, with each and every Swede embracing progressive values. Famous image of “Swedish dads” taking fair shares of parental leaves, statements of Sweden being “the most gay friendly country in the world” mix with stories derailing the patriarchal status quo.<sup>396</sup> However, the data depicting actual Swedish society indicates that the concept of gender equality is yet to full set in, with the majority of employees in stereotypically gendered vocations do not include the other gender – technical graduates are still predominately occupied by men, and nurses and preschool teachers by women, and even the idea of feminist struggle to achieve reforms is almost entirely omitted.<sup>397</sup> The potent image of a unified Sweden with citizens who all respect and value gender equality has bled into the patriotic view of Swedish society, where the idea of gender equality is a value that is at stake.<sup>398</sup> This is one of the “values” mentioned in the justification of the current administration. Feminist label insinuates that there

<sup>393</sup> Malena Rosén Sundström, ‘Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy in National Newspapers in EU Member States (2014–2020): Media Logic or Political Logic?’, *European Journal of Communication*, 38/2 (2023) p 172.

<sup>394</sup> Sayaka Fukada, ‘Radical Democracy Practice with Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy: The Case of Diplomatic Crisis Between Sweden and Saudi Arabia’, *社会システム研究*, 25 (2022), p 234.

<sup>395</sup> Robinson, ‘Feminist Foreign Policy as Ethical Foreign Policy? A Care Ethics Perspective’ p 27.

<sup>396</sup> Katarzyna Jezierska and Ann Towns, ‘Taming Feminism? The Place of Gender Equality in the “Progressive Sweden” Brand’, *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 14/1 (2018) p 59-60.

<sup>397</sup> Jezierska and Towns, ‘Taming Feminism? The Place of Gender Equality in the “Progressive Sweden” Brand’ p 60.

<sup>398</sup> Jezierska and Towns, ‘Taming Feminism? The Place of Gender Equality in the “Progressive Sweden” Brand’ p 61.

is still work to be done in this area, whereas gender equality is the desired results of a feminist struggle.

However, the dissonance between conservative population and a left-wing idealistic image has caused a rift. From 2018, Swedish Democrats grew to be the second force in Rikstag, and confidence and supply of the Ulf Kristersson's minority government. Their rise in popularity can be attributed to the intense politization of the immigration issues, and information from Malmo's crime statistics picked up by right-wing politicians – especially the “Malmo is the capital of rape” notion.<sup>399</sup> As such, the notion of feminism was also seen to fail to protect the victims, especially in relations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Another reasoning behind the abandonment of the feminist foreign policy was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Swedish long-standing neutrality has been reworked into a military non-alignment after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, with Sweden joining in NATO's partnership projects, such as Partnership for Peace in 1994, and joining the EU in 1995.<sup>400</sup> Despite this, Social Democrats have been opposed further integration into the alliance. Right wing alliance on the other hand, has been supporting NATO accession<sup>401</sup>, with Swedish Democrats reforming their stance on the membership in case of a joint bid with Sweden.<sup>402</sup> This change, as well as the general societal trend of supporting NATO membership is explained by the ongoing war in Ukraine, with over 60% of Swedes supporting the country's membership as of 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2023.<sup>403</sup> As such, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2022 Swedish Government announced the country's plans to join, and interestingly, the same year, 19<sup>th</sup> of October, the feminist foreign policy was officially scrapped. However, domestically, the feminist legacy has left its imprint in the way of thinking of Swedes regarding its country's attempt to join NATO. In Swedish media, Sweden is portrayed as a woman, a bride, marrying its protector.<sup>404</sup> In another, the attempts to sway the Turkish president's veto were depicted in a political cartoon, where Ulf Kristerson eats

<sup>399</sup> Jezierska and Towns, ‘Taming Feminism? The Place of Gender Equality in the “Progressive Sweden” Brand’ p 55-56.

<sup>400</sup> Karl Ydén, Joakim Berndtsson and Magnus Petersson, ‘Sweden and the Issue of NATO Membership: Exploring a Public Opinion Paradox’, *Defence Studies*, 19/1 (2019) p 11.

<sup>401</sup> Ydén, Berndtsson and Petersson, ‘Sweden and the Issue of NATO Membership: Exploring a Public Opinion Paradox’.

<sup>402</sup> Anna Ringstrom, ‘Sweden Democrats Leader Wants Party to Change on NATO Membership If Finland Applies to Join Alliance’, *Reuters*, 2022 <<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-democrats-leader-wants-party-change-nato-membership-if-finland-applies-2022-04-09/>> [accessed 8 December 2023].

<sup>403</sup> Torbjörn Sjöström, ‘Natoopinionen 80% Tror På Medlemskap’, *Novus*, 2023 <<https://novus.se/egnaundersokningar-arkiv/natoopinionen-80-tror-pa-medlemskap/>> [accessed 8 December 2023].

<sup>404</sup> Emma Rosengren, ‘Gender, Sexuality and Emotion in Visual Representations of Sweden Joining NATO’, *Journal of Autonomy and Security Studies*, 7/2 (2023) <https://jass.ax/index.php/jass/article/view/87> p 123.

Erdogan's dismembered bottom.<sup>405</sup> These depictions can be seen as an inappropriate critique of the government, but with public polls showing increasing support for NATO membership, these can be interpreted as genuine opinions of current state of affairs.

The critique of the feminist foreign policy from the right is one of the main reasons of repealing of Feminist Foreign Policy. The Saudi affair, connected with a politicised issue of migration and a new military conflict close to Swedish borders, public and political opinion shifted closer to a neorealist approach based in military strength and capabilities. What is more, the idyllic picture of Swedish progressive and universal gender equality was never actually representing Swedish society accurately. Feminist foreign policy, the gender equal promoting image of Sweden, and its actual society were misaligned, and what is occurring now, is a convergence of all three.

In conclusion, the most principal factors for retracting the feminist foreign policy did not come from the criticism of the aims and their realisation. While critique was levied upon shortcomings, especially in the area of structural changes, or lack thereof. Instead, the policy's eventual demise lays within a combination of internal factors, and the abrupt shift brought upon by Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, those were just the catalyst of an actual image of Swedish society, or rather its stark contrast with the image of Sweden in the broadcasted to the rest of the world. Feminist foreign policy was deemed to be unfit, as majority of Swedes voted for right-leaning parties of varying degrees. The use of the word "Feminist" was successful as a branding tactic, and it did signify a clear message just by existing, but internally it was mismatched from the experiences at home, with heavily gendered workforce and problematic crime statistics.

It appears then the image of Swedish utopia is over, and in its stead, is an image of Sweden – a country just like any other.

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<sup>405</sup> Rosengren, 'Gender, Sexuality and Emotion in Visual Representations of Sweden Joining NATO'.



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## How do non-western countries use vaccine diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy?

**Julia Maria Rudolphy**

Vaccine Diplomacy exists since the discovery of the first vaccines.<sup>406</sup> But not every country has the ability to secure vaccines for their population on their own, leaving them dependent on other countries. Since the Covid-19 pandemic, we see that a shortage of vaccines creates the question on how vaccines are distributed and why.

At the beginning of this paper follows a definition of vaccine diplomacy. In the existing literature, there is a differentiation made between vaccine empathy und vaccine diplomacy. Vaccine empathy meaning „an individual or a nation’s capability to sympathize with other individuals or nation’s vaccine wants and needs.” and Vaccine Diplomacy meaning “a nation’s vaccine efforts that aim to build mutually beneficial relationships with other nations ultimately.”<sup>407</sup> Others, as Hotez define Vaccine Diplomacy as an “all-encompassing term referring to almost every aspect of global health diplomacy based on vaccines. It looks primarily at international organisations and NGO’s. The important aspect of this definition is the look at the possibilities of vaccine diplomacy as a live-saving and conflict-resolution tool.”<sup>408</sup> For this paper we are using the first definition. The reason for this is that we are not focusing on international Organisations and NGO’s but in the practised foreign policy of certain countries regarding vaccines.

Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, we see a change in the distribution of vaccines. While the richer countries had a role in donating vaccines to poorer countries before, we can see that they started to protect their own interests first, by making deals with vaccine producers beforehand, leaving poorer countries behind. This is in the literature but also in the media often referred to as “vaccine nationalism”.<sup>409</sup> The distribution mechanism for the western vaccines was mostly market-based, meaning that the companies could most of the time decide for themselves which country will buy the vaccines. Since poorer countries were not able to follow

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<sup>406</sup>Su, Z.; McDonnell, D.; Li, X.; Bennett, B.; Šegalo, S.; Abbas, J.; Cheshmehzangi, A.; Xiang, Y.-T. “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations - Vaccine Empathy or Vaccine Diplomacy? A Narrative Literature Review. *Vaccines*, 2021, 9 (1024).

<sup>407</sup>Su et al. (2021).

<sup>408</sup>Serena, Giusti; Ambrosetti, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti.”Making the Best Out of a Crisis: Russia’s Health Diplomacy during COVID-19. *Social Sciences*, 2022, Vol. 11 (53).

<sup>409</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming. “Political economy of vaccine diplomacy: explaining varying strategies of China, India, and Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy.” *Review of International Political Economy*, 2023 Vol. 30(3), p. 865-890.

the rising prices resulting from this mechanism, they were in a clear disadvantage,<sup>410</sup> leaving them dangerously exposed to the virus and endangering their complete health care system.<sup>411</sup> This is where certain non-western countries stepped in. The most important ones in this regard are China, Russia and India, although they were following different strategies and goals that will be analysed further in the following sections.

First, we will look at the different strategies the countries followed before there will be a conclusion drawn about the goals from these strategies.

There are certain aspects of a countries advantages in the health care sector that are important for the strategies. Those are research and development, usually leading to a transfer of technology, vaccine production, leading to manufacturing site (domestic and abroad) and vaccine distribution, leading to distribution channels, which can be either bilateral or multilateral<sup>412</sup>. We can see that all the three countries prefer bilateral options before multilateral possibilities, because it is helping them to use vaccine diplomacy as a tool of soft power<sup>413</sup>, what will be analysed in a later paragraph. Russia is strong in the development and research, as can be seen by the fact that Russia was the first one to claim a working vaccine. But since they do not have an advantage in the production of vaccines, they push technology transfer. India has the advantage in the production and is using this advantage in a great scope.<sup>414</sup> China has a balance regarding these two aspects but has an advantage regarding its distribution mechanisms.<sup>415</sup>

While all of the three countries donated and sold vaccines on the whole world, by taking a closer look you can see that they put a special focus on areas and countries nearby, that they try to take influence on in other policy areas as well.<sup>416</sup> You can see this in the example of Russia, using his vaccine in areas and countries that once belonged to the Soviet Union and that Russia is trying to take influence on, for example Belarus and Ukraine, despite a ban on Russian vaccines from Ukrainian side. Russia started to give shots of his vaccine in Donetsk and Luhansk, areas that where one of the first to fall victim of Russia's aggression against

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<sup>410</sup>Lee, Seow Ting. "Vaccine diplomacy: nation branding and China's COVID-19 soft power play". Place branding and public diplomacy, 2023, Vol.19 (1), p.64-78.

<sup>411</sup>Su et al. (2021).

<sup>412</sup>Suzki, Yang (2023).

<sup>413</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

<sup>414</sup>Sharun, Kahn; Dhama Kuldeep. "India's role in COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy". *Journal of Travel Medicine*, 2021, Vol 28(7).

<sup>415</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

<sup>416</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

Ukraine.<sup>417</sup> Even though not using military power, China is focusing its selling and marketing strategies on developing countries that it is also giving other kinds of aid in the areas of infrastructure and culture, partly very contested on an international stage.<sup>418</sup> China is using in this instance something called “smart power”, a combination of soft power, in this instance including culture and health diplomacy and hard power, in this instance the economic power of China.<sup>419</sup> While there are countries all over the world being targeted by these Chinese strategies, it also focuses on countries and areas, it wants to take influence on, for example Nepal, a country that India is trying to influence as well and other regions of the world, where there has been an influence from the U.S.<sup>420</sup> in the past, where China is in this scenario able to shine. The numbers show that all of the three countries, while acting on an intentional stage, are investing much more in vaccine diplomacy if they calculate a win for them in influence on their neighbours and other countries that are also the target of other foreign policies of these countries.<sup>421</sup>

Now this raises certain questions going along with these strategies. One question is the relationship between western countries and non-western countries. Reading this paper one could ask, what role western countries are playing in this scenario. There is definitely a shift going on in the importance of health and especially vaccine diplomacy taking place. While in the past, western countries had a greater influence, since the pandemic, they have shown more self-interest than before. This may be the result of a much more urgent situation regarding the immunity of their own population.<sup>422</sup> They secured themselves the majority of vaccines although they are only representing 16% of the world population.<sup>423</sup> This, together with the already discussed problem of the market distribution of western vaccines leaves the poorer countries empty-handed, leaving a void of demand, that non-western countries are happy to fill. The absence of western vaccines and action on the side of the richer western countries leads to greater opportunities for the non-western countries.<sup>424</sup>

Now how about the side of the receiving countries. There are certainly positive but also negative aspects as well of the distribution of vaccines through non-western countries. First of all, it is

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<sup>417</sup>Serena, Giusti; Ambrosetti, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti (2022).

<sup>418</sup>Lee, Seow Ting (2023).

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<sup>420</sup>Safi, Michael. “Vaccine diplomacy: west falling behind in race for influence”. The Guardian, 19.02.2021, (accessed 29.11.2023)

<sup>421</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

<sup>422</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

<sup>423</sup>Lee, Seow Ting (2023).

<sup>424</sup>Garnier, Salomé. “Filling the Void: Vaccine Diplomacy and Shifting Global Health Dynamics”. Harvard International Review, 25.03.2021, <https://hir.harvard.edu/vaccine-diplomacy/>, accessed 15.12.2023.

important to mention, that without China, Russia and India, a lot of developing countries would face humanitarian crisis and catastrophic situations in their health care system.<sup>425</sup> Nevertheless, the question arises, if these countries only profit from these strategies in the long term. One concern of certain countries is that the vaccines coming from Russia and China do not fit the western standards on safety. An example in this instance would be Brazil, who ordered vaccines from these states, but then only approved them in emergency situations or not at all.<sup>426</sup> In countries where these vaccines were officially approved for the use, the citizens are very critical of their safety.<sup>427</sup> Russia and China are trying to use the vaccines to enhance their trustworthiness and safety in the medical sector and their general image in the world stage in general. Regarding the fact that their vaccines still are not recognized as much as the western ones and the population remain very critical, this seems to only work partly. Another concern arising is the dependency that comes along with these measurements. China as well as Russia are exercising technology transfer to some extent. While Russia is outsourcing their production in great parts, China uses models that enable developing countries to produce the vaccines on the spot, enabling them to boost their own health sector and secure the vaccine supply in the long term. Nevertheless, this also leaves the countries dependent on the supply chain happening through China. While Western countries have their production secured in western countries as well, the dependency of developing countries is giving China, Russia, but also India certain amounts of soft power. Some even refer in the context of Chinas vaccine diplomacy to a form of hegemony.<sup>428</sup> This might raise certain concerns, regarding the sustainability of long-term developments for poorer countries.

In conclusion, we can see that non-western countries gained importance in the field of vaccine diplomacy. This is also rooting in an absence of western countries since the Covid-19 pandemic, leaving the international stage open to use vaccine diplomacy as a tool to achieve goals in foreign policy. There are certain advantages for poorer countries, yet, the also increase the dependence on non-democratic states, that might be a problem for their future development.

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<sup>425</sup>Su, Z.; McDonnell, D.; Li, X.; Bennett, B.; Šegalo, S.; Abbas, J.; Cheshmehzangi, A.; Xiang, Y.-T (2021).

<sup>426</sup>Suzki, Mao; Yang, Shiming (2023).

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1. Chapter page illustrations have been created using artificial intelligence image creating software.