Diplomacy in the Post-Globalized World: New Challenges and Strategic Priorities

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With a foreword by Jean Asselborn

UNI.LU DIPLOMACY LAB

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The UNI.LU. DIPLOMACY LAB

Diplomacy in the Post-Globalized World: New Challenges and Strategic Priorities

Foreword by His Excellency Mr. Jean Asselborn,

Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg

It is with great pleasure that I welcome this excellent initiative of the University of Luxembourg, in collaboration with the Embassy of Italy in the Grand Duchy, to create a center of studies on international relations in the contemporary world (*Uni.Lu Diplomacy Lab*).

In a country such as Luxembourg with a very active foreign policy, frontrunner of the European integration process and host country to several European and international institutions and organisms, initiatives such as the the creation of the Uni.lu Diplomacy Lab fall on a particularly fertile ground. Indeed, the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs consistently supports the creative potential of the academic world and its fruitful synergies with the foreign policy reality.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represents a real paradigm shift for the international order. Peace on the European continent is no longer a given, and peaceful coexistence in Europe has been dramatically disrupted. But above all, it is the entire value system on which our civilization is founded that is being called into question. Luxembourg, in the European Union and in NATO, as well as bilaterally, stands with Ukraine and will continue to help Ukraine as it defends itself against the brutal aggression by Russia for as long as necessary. I will never accept that might would make right, and that a country such as Russia can simply invade its neighbour in utter disrespect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. It is our collective responsibility to preserve the rules-based international order created after World War II.

This war therefore also reminds us once again how valuable and indispensable the European Union is as a peace project. One of the lessons to be learned from the current crisis is surely the need to invest even more into peace in the future: to protect our citizens, our way of life, and our values and ideals of tolerance and respect.

The Luxembourg diplomacy is sparing no effort to promote, in Europe and around the globe, peace, prosperity, the enhancement of human rights and the pursuit of dialogue, so as to contribute actively and constructively, as much as possible, to the solution of the many crises affecting our world.

The current crisis can be an accelerator for a number of projects already underway on the national, European and global levels, such as an effective energy transition, the reaffirmation of our resilience, the reduction of our dependence, the protection of our critical infrastructures, and the strengthening of our defense capabilities.

These are global challenges that closely affect the future of the next generation. The students of today will be the managers, diplomats, policymakers, journalists and thought leaders of tomorrow. Giving them a voice is critical, especially when it comes to major international issues.

We need their candid vision, their strong opinions, their enthusiasm, their willingness to learn, and their ability to be proactive!

For these reasons, the student-oriented approach of the *Uni.Lu Diplomacy Lab* is particularly welcome. The creation of such a center of studies is extremely timely, more so than ever at this complex juncture in international relations.

I am sure that the *Uni.Lu Diplomacy Lab* will be able to successfully tackle its mission to conduct in-depth research while encouraging lively debate and exposure to the practice of diplomacy that lead to fresh ideas for solving the problems and challenges faced by our societies at the national, regional, and global levels.

The Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs is looking forward to a fruitful cooperation.

On the Importance of Actively Involving Young Scholars in the Theoretical and Practical Analysis of the Complexities of Today's World.

The UNI.LU DIPLOMACY LAB Project.

Diego Brasioli – Anna-Lena Högenauer

The contemporary world is in continuous rapid evolution and is characterized by the emergence of unprecedented, interconnected challenges and threats. Hence, the pressing need to study possible models for understanding the future scenarios of international relations, both in the short and medium term, starting from the analysis of the elements that characterize the new world that appears to be emerging around us: energy supply crisis, demographic dynamics, migration flows, climate change, food security issues, exploitation of the planet's resources, new technologies, crisis of world trade, implications of artificial intelligence, growth of the phenomena of authoritarian populism, widening gaps and social inequalities, and the risk of ever more extensive conflicts. In short, the key factors of the new global strategic balances (or imbalances).

In this increasingly interconnected and complex world, diplomats have taken on even more important roles, not only in the traditional field of dealing with relations between states, but also in the protection of their countries' national interests, as well as in the promotion of super-national and global goals.

The decision to establish, within the framework of the Master's Degree on European Governance, a specific course devoted to diplomacy in its theoretical and practical aspects aroused a great deal of interest among the students, who participated in large numbers and with enthusiasm, proving that the subject of international relations is considered a very important one by the younger generation. The practice-oriented course that took place in the Fall semester of 2022/2023 aimed at exploring the role of diplomacy in the context of globalized international relations, and its challenges and strategic priorities. The lessons described the subject through both the analysis and study of relevant documents and texts, as well as through the discussion - in an interactive fashion - of practical examples taken from current events. Ample space has been given for open debate among the participants, as well as intense interaction with lecturers/practitioners. The students received guidance and personalized feedback, getting examples from diplomatic practice based on real examples and testimony.

We thank the many experts and diplomats who participated in the lectures, sharing their experiences with the students and animating an always lively and stimulating debate. In particular, we had the participation of accredited ambassadors to Luxembourg from France (Claire Lignières-Counathe), Czech Republic (Vladimír Bärtl), United Kingdom (Fleur Thomas), Austria (Melitta Schubert), Belgium (Thomas Lambert), the EU Commission Representative (Anna Calteux), Michael And Shalom Konstantino of the US Embassy, the Human Rights Coordinator of the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Anne Goedert) the President of the Italy-Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce (Fabio Morvilli), the Editor in Chief of Delano Magazine Publications (Duncan Roberts) and other qualified experts.

The discussions that took place during the lectures provided an in-depth look at topics such as the form and functions of the contemporary world diplomatic system; the different styles of negotiating techniques to finalize an agreement; the functioning of the various missions, offices, conferences, techniques and procedures of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; the role of summits in the negotiating arena; the new frontiers of diplomacy in the field of security, human rights protection and the environment; the role of diplomacy as a multiplier of economic interests; consular activity and the protection of one's citizens abroad; sports and cultural diplomacy; and the EU diplomatic activity.

During the course, students developed the idea of creating a center of studies on diplomacy and international relations, which would give rise to increasingly dynamic and proactive activities in these areas. Thus, the idea of the Diplomacy Lab project came to light: a nonprofit cultural project of the University of Luxembourg, student-centered and dedicated to promoting the study and understanding of major issues in international affairs. Through its activities (round tables, conferences, lectures, publications), the project aims to deepen knowledge, promote debate, and propose solutions to the challenges of European and international politics.

Students are at the heart of the UNI.LU DIPLOMACY Lab. Through the Young Researchers Committee, they help define the project's key topics, select speakers and plan events. In the Diplomacy in the Contemporary World course, they work on joint publications on current issues and the role of diplomacy in an increasingly complex and interconnected world. The UNI.LU DIPLOMACY LAB fills a void in the landscape of study centers in Luxembourg: the intention is to create not the traditional, old-fashioned think tank composed solely of acclaimed experts, but rather to animate a broader debate among young people, and to offer them the opportunity to make their voices heard on the major issues of international relations in the contemporary world. The fresh

vision and proactive ideas of young people, especially on current major international issues and future world scenarios, deserve to be known and discussed, because the students of today may be the practitioners of tomorrow. Their visions of the challenges and opportunities of international relations may one day shape the international initiatives and negotiations.

In addition, the UNI.LU DIPLOMACY LAB has the support of senior scholars, with an equally strong commitment to education and training, conferences and advice on international trends. Its work is characterized by an interdisciplinary approach and encourages the active involvement of institutional actors, research centers, think tanks and analysts in the field of international relations. Their role is to support the debates in the areas of interest defined by the students.

As part of the UNI.LU DIPLOMACY LAB, the idea was born to collect in this publication the final papers prepared by the students of the diplomacy course, accompanied by articles written by professors and experts in the field.

The publication is thus structured in five parts, in addition to this brief introduction: A first chapter, in which professors and experts offer their reflections on some of the most compelling issues of international relations in the post-globalized world. Four more chapters (II-V) in which students focus on some specific aspects devoted to the New Post-Global (Dis)Order, its impact on regional balances, and the analysis of some strictly national perspectives on Global Affairs. The last of these chapters is significantly devoted to analyses of the very essence of diplomacy, an art (or science, or rather a craft) that arose at the dawn of human history and which still today does not cease to provide valuable tools in the field of international relations.

Finally, we feel it is useful to provide some brief clarification on the source of this publication: in its editing, for the part written by the students, we relied exclusively on the papers submitted at the end of the course on Diplomacy in the Contemporary World. The contributions are thus not meant to be exhaustive analyses, but rather critical reflections by students on some of the key aspects of diplomacy. Reflections that motivate students to engage with the issues of today, and that have already inspired ideas for future activities, such as roundtables and seminars, on specific topics to be carried out in the context of the DIPLOMACY LAB.

The authors of all contributions to this publication have been given complete freedom of expression; the views expressed in these papers are thus those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their employers or institutions.

Diego Brasioli is a career diplomat, currently serving as Ambassador of Italy to Luxembourg. Previously, he has served in Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon, USA (Los Angeles), Romania, as well as in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Director for North Africa and the Middle East, Director for Security and Disarmament and Deputy Director General for Political Affairs). He is particularly grateful to the young people who participate in the Uni.lu Diplomacy Lab because their innovative thinking and enthusiasm have taught him that, even after forty years of a diplomatic career, he still has a lot to learn about the most crucial international global issues.

Anna-Lena Högenauer is Associate Professor in Political Science at the University of Luxembourg and Director of the Master in European Governance. She has previously worked at Maastricht University. She holds a PhD from the University of Edinburgh, an MA from the College of Europe and a BA from King's College London. Her research focuses on European Union politics, with a particular emphasis on democracy, accountability and parliamentarism. She also works on the role of small states in the European Union and co-edits the Routledge book series on Small State Studies. She is also on the editorial board of the journal Small States & Territories.

Rearranging a Disjointed World.

Is Diplomacy Still Relevant?

Diego Brasioli

"Uncertainty Is the New Certainty"[1]

The dramatic events of the past three years, between the Covid-19 pandemic and the first *"mondialized war"* (as for the brilliant definition of Bertrand Badie[2]), have violently catapulted us into the phase of post-globalization and the *return of empires* in international relations.

In these tumultuous months, especially since February 2022, the new dynamics of the world are overwhelming the certainties on which we had hitherto built our opinions and convictions, with a rapidity as unusual as it is dramatic and fraught with unknown consequences.

The Ukrainian tragedy is not simply a return to war on our continent, a kind of stuttering of history. Rather, it is a completely new international phenomenon, a conflict that is radically reorienting our view of globalization. This simple observation not only leads to a new definition of war but also enables us to discover new and profound dynamics in the processes of the international system, upending the very basis of alliances, sovereignty, rules-based order, and North-South relations, and thus sanctioning the death of *old geopolitics*[3].

It is as if the war in Ukraine and, before that, the Covid-19 crisis have reactivated telluric fault lines that we thought were forever dormant. The upheaval resulting from this earthquake has not only brought instability and destruction to the surface but has also radically changed the foundations of our world. Think of the different scenarios of crisis: conflicts, challenges to democratic systems, migrations, climate change, shortage and diversification of energy supplies, demographic trends; and the list is much, much longer. All these aspects are obviously interconnected and make ours an age of great uncertainty.

The elements that characterize the *Mundus Novus* that is emerging around us are in fact not only numerous but of unprecedented complexity, and they constitute the key factors of the new *asymmetrical global strategic (dis) equilibria*[4].

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[1] Klaus Werner Iohannis, , President of Romania: quote from the keynote speech given at the opening session of the 1st European Investment Bank (EIB),Forum "*Adapting to a Changing World*", Luxembourg, 27-28 February 2023.
[2] Marie-liévine Michalik, "Badie, Bertrand, « En Ukraine, nous assistons à la première guerre mondialisée»", *Le Figaro International*, 21 April 2022.
[3] Bruno Maçães , *Geopolitics for the End Time, From the Pandemic to the Climate Crisis* (London:Hurst, 2021).
[4] Brantly Womack, , *Asymmetry and International Relationships* (Charlottesville:University of Virginia Press, 2015).

When the dust of the ruins of war and other global upheavals has settled (hopefully soon, if it ever does), we will look around to see how to rebuild, on a new basis, a world order that has been completely disrupted.

The need to diversify energy sources will force us to abandon polluting alternatives and switch suppliers. The voice of the countries of the South will resound louder than ever. The world's demographic landscape will change completely: by 2050, Africa will have between 2.5 and 3 billion inhabitants. Two out of every five children will be born on the African continent, with a very high population growth rate[5]. New economic powers will emerge[6]. Hopefully, Europeans will wholly understand the importance of belonging to NATO, the EU, and a united front of Western nations that uphold the same democratic standards.

The "new normal" is already taking shape: a growing global south, free of the obligations of alliance with either superpower. And things will probably only get more complex and challenging.

It is indeed one thing to live in a world dominated by two or three superpowers; it is quite another to be faced with a situation of fragmentation among competing actors on the international stage, characterized by a myriad of national and regional interests.

Geopolitical issues will, in a sense, be more *democratic* and *flexible*, but this will not necessarily guarantee greater world peace or stability.

These new scenarios therefore urge us to an intense exercise of intellectual resipiscence, dictated by the pressing need to understand where we are heading to and what lies ahead of us.

This exercise should be based not so much on *doxa*, on superficial common opinion, not infrequently hostage to the inadequacy of the tools for grasping the reality around us, as on *episteme*, the knowledge and deep understanding of the true causes and effects of the events unfolding under our eyes and affecting our lives.

The Importance of Foreign Policy in Our Lives: The Role of Diplomacy

One of the most important lessons that the current situation is giving us is that really no one can ignore what is happening in the international arena any longer. In fact, this has always been the case, but perhaps we were not fully aware of the importance of foreign policy for our daily lives.

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[5] The Economist, "Africa's population will double by 2050", *The Economist*, 26 March 2020.
[6] In 2022 the world's largest economies were, in order, the US, China, Japan, Germany and India. In 2050 they will be China, US, India, Indonesia, Germany. In 2075 China, India, USA, Indonesia, Nigeria. Germany, first in Europe, will be ninth as Kevin Daly and Tadas Gedminas, "The Path to 2075 — Slower Global Growth, But Convergence Remains Intact", *Goldman Sachs,* 6 December 2022.

Most of us were used to considering crises in distant parts of the world as events with no real influence on our daily lives: they deserved the ephemeral space of a brief news item on television or a brief blurb in the newspapers, only to be forgotten shortly afterwards. This is no longer the case, and we learnt this with a *reality check* as unexpected as it is painful.

Thus, we have now learned to our cost that it is indispensable to look beyond national borders and act energetically at the international level. "*Choices, or lack of choices, in foreign policy will inevitably - in the short and medium term - have profound effects on domestic policy. What are all too often described as emergencies, understood as sudden and transitory events, are instead structural issues that, if not addressed collectively and in supranational frameworks, will resurface ever more acutely*"[7].

One of the fundamental tools of international relations, if not the one traditionally considered the most important, is diplomacy, i.e. the activity of negotiating foreign policy affairs on behalf of the state.

More concretely, diplomacy can be defined as the set of procedures through which a State maintains normal relations with other subjects of International Law (foreign states and other entities with international personality), in order to reconcile their conflicting interests and to favor mutual collaboration for the satisfaction of common needs.

According to Encyclopedia Britannica, "*diplomacy is the established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence*"[8].

A recent, acute definition has been given by the brilliant American diplomat, currently serving as Director of the CIA, William J. Burns: "*Short of war, diplomacy is the main instrument we employ to manage foreign relations, reduce external risks, and exploit opportunities to advance our security and prosperity. It is among the oldest professions, but it is also among the most misunderstood, and the most unsatisfying to describe*"[9].

Diplomacy, One of the Oldest Activities of Mankind

[7]Andrea Ruggeri, , "E se parlassimo di politica estera?*", il Mulino,* 8 February 2021.
[8]Chas. W. Freeman, and Marks Sally, "Diplomacy" Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy. (last accessed 17 April 2023)
[9] William J. Burns, *The Back Channel* (London:Hurst & Co. 2019), pp. 9-10.

Diplomacy is one of the oldest activities of mankind. However, the name "diplomacy" was first given to this set of activity by the Irish politician and thinker Edmund Burke in 1796. Before that, it was not an official part of the English language. In fact, the English word derives from the French *diplomatie*.

This, in turn, derived from the Greek term δίπλωμα, composed of "diplo", meaning "folded in two," and the suffix "ma", meaning "an object." The folded document (e.g. an official one) conferred a privilege—often a permit to travel or immunity—on the bearer, and the term came to denote documents through which princes granted such favors to diplomats and envoys.

The art of diplomacy began in ancient times, and its history starts with the socialization process of human beings. One of the very first examples of socialization between different groups or tribes of primitive men was the use of envoys to exchange messages, in order to avoid conflicts.

According to the theories of Bronislaw Malinowsky[10], Marcel Mauss[11] and Claude Lévi-Strauss[12], indigenous peoples had developed sophisticated techniques of exchanging messages and gifts to pursue peaceful relations with neighboring communities.

Treaties between different cities in Mesopotamia, in what is now Iraq, date back to 2850 B.C.E. Leaders of Egypt and Canaan (an ancient country in the Middle East) exchanged diplomatic letters in the 14th century B.C. Writing on the walls of ancient Mayan buildings in what is now Mexico indicates that Mayan cities exchanged diplomats, as well as in China and classical India. The Greco-Roman world developed the art of diplomacy as a tool for regulating relations between city-states and peoples. Embassies were first established in northern Italy in the 14th century, and diplomacy developed above all in Europe, especially around the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years War, and based on the theories of Grotius[13].

For most of history, diplomacy was concerned with negotiations between two nations. A country or region often had dozens of trade or border agreements, each limited to a single other country or region. Bilateral relations are still a very common form of diplomacy[14].

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[10], Bronislaw Malinowski. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagos of Melanesian New Guinea*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1992.
[11] Marcel Mauss, . *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, (London:Routledge, 1990).
[12] Regina Schwartz , *The Book and the Text: The Bible and Literary Theory*, (Oxford:Blackwell,1990).
[13] Britannica, "History of Diplomacy", https://www.britannica.com/topic/diplomacy/History-of-diplomacy (last accessed 17 April 2023).
[14] Geoff. R Berridge, *Diplomacy. Theory and Practice* (London:Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

In the 20th century, the scope of action diplomacy has further expanded through multilateralism. Today, the United Nations (UN), whose mission is primarily to promote cooperation and settle conflicts among nations, plays a large role in diplomacy (the General Assembly, the main body of the UN, has 195 members). Multilateral organizations have sprung up everywhere, both in the military field and in the field of economic and social integration (NATO and the European Union are some of the most successful examples of this trend)[15].

Is Diplomacy Still Relevant?

Faced with the raging conflict in Ukraine, and the apparent inability, so far, to find a negotiated solution to the crisis (apart from the worthy attempts to reach agreement on some specific marginal aspects, such as the exchange of prisoners, made by some third countries), many are led to wonder about the prospects for an agreement, which indeed appear very distant, and come to the conclusion that diplomacy has failed, having lost its relevance.

Many indeed advocate for an international peace conference for Ukraine and are quick to proclaim the futility of diplomacy in the wake of every previous attempt to engage in productive negotiations.

This is flimsy reasoning; people who hold it demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the current crisis and, more importantly, a complete ignorance of what diplomacy is.

A conference is the conclusion, not the beginning, of a challenging negotiating process that must take into account the competing claims, phobias, goals, and views of the contestants. To those who hasten to decree its end, we should remind them that diplomacy is no magic wand.

In 1986, when I started working in diplomacy, the world was in the midst of a sort of "second cold war", a period of increased international tension between the two blocs[16]. Around that time, international tensions had reached a new worrying level, and the situation was characterized by an increasingly acute conflict on European land. The outlook for the future was gloomy. Instead, we were on the immediate eve of a protracted period of upheavals, many of which were positive and the result of bold diplomatic efforts: advancements in European integration, the spread of democracy, and the protection of human rights; a stage of economic expansion brought on by globalization; and the resurgence of a controlled multilateralism in response to new global

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[15] Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* London:Reaktion Books Ltd, 2010).
[16] David S Painter, *The Rise and Fall of the Second Cold War, 1981–91 - The Cold War: An International History*, (London:Routledge,1999), pp. 95–111.

challenges like climate change and the information age. Nonetheless, warfare has continued and is still a factor in interstate conflict.

This is especially true now since we are in the midst of a historical turning point, highlighted by the concern that previous achievements or advancements can suddenly disappear. In particular, some long-term trends, such as the expansion and reshaping of the international order and the intensification of power rivalries, even in close-by regions vital to our interests like the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Africa, more accurately reflect a true "change of epoch", with the appearance of a new European conflict triggered by the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

As an alternative to war, diplomacy is the primary vehicle for advancing national interests (economic, political, and strategic). Moreover, diplomacy may be the most effective vehicle for advancing the common good and the interests of the whole international community, rather than simply those of particular nations, as we have plainly seen in the period of multilateralism and globalization. And in this sense, diplomacy makes no exception to Darwin's theory that it is not the strongest or the most intelligent beings who survive, but those who can best adapt to change.

Whether it is a science, an art, or a craft, diplomacy is a tool that is used in every human action. Even though we are not all career diplomats, we are all negotiators.

In this, there is no mystery in the diplomatic art, as Daniele Varè, Italian ambassador to Luxembourg in the 1920s, wrote in his memoirs:

> "Diplomacy is the art of getting what we want, applied to foreign politics. Outside this special field we are all diplomats: in our business, in our family life and in our love affairs"(…) "The essence of diplomacy has remained the same throughout the ages. There are no arcana in diplomacy (…) Our arts are the immemorial devices of the peasant in the market-place, buying and selling his wares".[17]

Varé therefore defended the function of diplomacy that was questioned in the face of new communication techniques as early as the 1920s: what purpose do diplomats and embassies serve, it was argued, when leaders can now communicate instantly and directly with one another without the need for intermediaries? Diplomacy had already been declared dead at the time of the invention of new technological tools like the telegraph and the telephone; more recently, in the 1980s, with the

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[17] Daniele Varè,*Laughing Diplomat* (London, John Murray, 1938).

invention of the Internet, many once again claimed that diplomacy had lost all utility before realizing its utility once more at the onset of the first crisis.

This nonetheless demonstrates that, if diplomacy wants to continue to be an effective alternative to conflict, and an engine not only for promoting the interests of the individual state, but for the achievement of the supranational cooperation, it must know how to adapt, as it always has, to the new techniques of communication and the new technological advancements in our society.

Therefore, for today's diplomacy, the real challenge is not efficiency but innovation without losing sight of the need to continue to be "humanized." We personally have no doubt that diplomacy is still the preferred instrument for pursuing the interests of individual states, resolving crises, and achieving common goals in international relations. Yet if diplomacy is to fully regain its significance as a public institution, further changes must be made[18].

Diplomacy in the Face of the Challenges of the *Fourth Industrial Revolution*: Yes! To Innovation, but the Human Factor Remains Essential

There is no escape to the fact that, if efficiency and cost-cutting are the new guiding principles of public service, nations should fully embrace the new technologies. The Fourth Industrial Revolution - with fast-pace advantages in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), Web3, blockchain, 3D printing, genetic engineering, quantum computing - is bringing the physical, digital, and biological worlds together, and diplomacy needs to be ready for a tsunami of change: foreign policy-related government organizations could consider using blockchain technology into passports and border controls; machine learning could be taken into account to make foreign policy decisions; the possibility of establishing virtual embassies could be taken into account in special cases, such as the US Virtual Embassy in Iran, which was established in 2011[19], or the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) most recent launch of an embassy in Hebrew on Facebook[20], which aims to foster understanding between Israel and Palestine.

A few countries are getting ready for the upcoming changes. Denmark in 2017 named the first tech ambassador in the world[21], while the following year France appointed its country's first ambassador

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[18]Rodrigo Tavares "International diplomacy needs an overhaul to stay relevant. Here's why", *World Economic Forum*, 2 May 2018.

[19]US Virtual Embassy Iran, https://ir.usembassy.gov/ (last accessed 17 April 2023).

[20]Ilan Manor and Marcus Holmes, 'Palestie in Hebrew: a new approache to Palestinian digital diplomacy', *International Affairs*, 29 January 2019.

[21]Derek Du Preez , "Why Denmark appointed the world's first Digital Ambassador", *Diginomica*, 18 September 2017

for digital affairs (*ambassadeur pour le numérique*)[22], both with the goal of improving connections with large tech companies. In 2022, Barbados was the first country in the world to establish a digital embassy in a *metaverse* (the Caribbean island struck an agreement with *Decentraland*, a company that hosts a user-owned, 3D digital world, comprised of 90,601 plots of 'land')[23].

However, despite the fact that these tools can complement one another quite well, there is a widely held belief among insiders that, despite the benefits of new technologies now and in the future, diplomacy will hardly be able to abandon its traditional methods, where the human element still plays a crucial, unavoidable role. As Ambassador Brett Bruen, former White House Director of Global Engagement[24], has affirmed,

"Diplomacy is going to be stubbornly stuck in the old ways of engaging, and while having a Twitter account or a metaverse embassy may be a way to complement that engagement, it is certainly not a substitute (...) "I remain highly skeptical that the old art of diplomacy can be practiced in these virtual spaces".

If diplomacy is to remain relevant, it must certainly take advantage of new technologies, but above all it must not lose sight of its fundamental asset: the human factor.

The humanization of diplomacy in the current day should come first. Instead of acting as the state's personal emissaries, as was the case historically, diplomats should gradually be expected to represent the interests of the population of their country as a whole.

Thus, every ministry in a national government must be present in missions abroad, as is already the case in the best-staffed embassies. Only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) can possibly be in charge of every aspect of a country's international activities, so the ability to operate internationally should be granted to a number of public officials, particularly the senior representatives of several ministries. Representatives from various departments, not just qualified diplomats, are therefore expected to work more and more in embassies.

In the foreseeable future, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, through their peripheral network of embassies and consulates, will have to coordinate one state's national policies carried out overseas,

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[22] Ministère de l'Eurppe et des affaires étrangères,"La mission de l'Ambassadeur numérique" https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/diplomatie-numerique/la-mission-de-l-ambassadeur-pour-le-numerique/ (last accessed 17 April 2023).
[23] Jim Wyss, "Barbados Is Opening a Diplomatic Embassy in the Metaverse", *Bloomerg*,14 December 2021.
[24] Global Situation Room, https://www.globalsitroom.com/team (last accessed 17 April 2023)

articulating all different diplomatic activities into a unified, transparent, and accountable foreign policy.

In a world characterized by increasing complexity and by conflicts with a global reach, the scenarios that open up appear increasingly inextricable.

If the human factor in international relations continues to prove decisive, it is the big game of data utilization that could make the difference in the future.

A recent study by Roland Bouffanais and Lim Sun Sun has explored the new frontiers of classical diplomacy supported by the big hi-tech game of data utilization.[25] They write:

> "Digital disinformation, cyberwarfare and AI-driven military campaigns have changed the face of geopolitics and raised the stakes for diplomatic negotiations. In a complex and rapidly technologizing world, can we conceive of diplomacy to also be enhanced by computation? Computational diplomacy is a nascent field of computational social science that seeks to marry insights from complexity science with international relations to illuminate the nature of diplomatic activity and its effects (…) In an intensely digitalizing world, marrying diplomacy with big data may not be that far-fetched. By developing computational diplomacy as the science of an art, we may even help lay the foundations for a more stable world order".

Innovations such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and digital monitoring are changing the way individuals live, the way governments run their nations and the way power is exercised in the international sphere.

Advances in technology are already shaping under our eyes the future of geopolitics.

To grasp where the world is heading, it is essential to comprehend both the benefits and risks of technology. Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt argues that a nation's ability to create and embrace new technologies, or 'innovation power', will be decisive in defining the outcome of the current competition between major powers..[26]

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[25] Roland Bouffanais and Sun Sun Lim, "Computational diplomacy – the science of an art?", *The Interpreter, Lowy Institute,* 13 September 2022.
[26] Eric Schmidt, "Innovation Power - Why Technology Will Define the Future of Geopolitics", *Foreign Affairs*, 28 February 2023.

In the historical conjuncture of our time, characterized by an unprecedented level of uncertainty and severe threats to peace and security, it is not surprising that even in the broader public debate - and no longer only among professional insiders - more and more attention is being paid to the opinions of experts, analysts and authoritative political scientists.

In a situation of acute military and ideological conflict, the view advocated by the school of *realism* in international relations seems to be gaining a dominant position again, compared to the theories of the exponents of *liberalism*. One example above all: the broad debate generated by Henry Kissinger's statements on the Ukraine crisis, inspired by the more pragmatic sense of *realpolitik*[27].

And yet, it seems as though new perspectives are emerging before us that are complementary to the traditional (and, in some respects, no longer wholly adequate) antagonism between *liberalism* and r*ealism*: they are indicated to us by personalities like the Saudi Nayef Al-Rodhan, one of the most interesting figures (if only for being a neuroscientist, before being a philosopher of politics) in the contemporary panorama of the study of international relations, with his theory of *symbiotic realism*[28], where the human factor is fully taken into account again[29].

Today more than ever, diplomats' toolbox has to be fully equipped: not only they have to be excellent negotiators, but also effective public communicators and promoters of peace and understanding between peoples; they typically function as bridge-builders, connectors, and hubs in the context of modern networking theory; and they bear the responsibility to act as service providers for others active in the field of international cooperation. Moreover, in today's world, diplomats typically work in a sensitive international context and need to build the capacity to quickly learn and apply new information and technologies.

To be able to perform an ever-increasing variety of tasks, today's diplomats must be equipped with new professional skills and a solid multidisciplinary approach to reality in order to work effectively as managers of international relations.

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[27]Jack Dutton, "Henry Kissinger's Shifting Views on Ukraine", *Newsweek,* 18 January 2023.

[28] Nayef Al-Rodhan, *Symbiotic Realism: A Theory of International Relations in an Instant and an Interdependent World* (Münster; Lit Verlag.)

[29] Since 2002, Nayef Al-Rodhan has been focusing his studies on the interplay between neuroscience and international relations, paving the way for the application of neuroscience and the neurobehavioral consequences of the neurochemical and cellular mechanisms underlying emotion, amorality, fear, greed and domination in the analysis and conceptualization of contemporary trends in geopolitics, global security, national security, cross-cultural security, war and peace. He is currently director of the Geopolitics and Global Futures program at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

When faced with a crisis as severe as the one in Ukraine today, we need to return to the noble art of diplomatic negotiations. Supporting traditional diplomatic skills, such as intuition and perseverance, with promising new tools of the technological revolution, such as "computational diplomacy," could prove to be crucial.

N.B.: The views contained in this paper are expressed in a personal capacity and are not attributable to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

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Chapter I

Diplomacy in the Post-globalized world

A Global Geopolitical Overview

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One of the frequent mantras in these years is that "geopolitics are back", possibly with a revenge, often with a gleeful expectation for some new exciting warlike permanent condition, becoming finally the new normal of international life. That said, geopolitics have never disappeared, they just were eclipsed in mainstream perception by a fair amount of economic chatter, that in most cases did not explain not even economy itself and often covered substantial operations of value extraction and market dominance. In this article we will first sketch a different way of considering geopolitics and then do a short global geopolitical survey.

Towards quantum geopolitics

Geopolitics are the conscious projection of a political project on the geographic dimension; thus, geoeconomics are the conscious projection of an economic enterprise on the geographic dimension. This definition has the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of geopolitical prediction and, worse, those of geopolitical retroactive and adaptive "prediction" because it starts not from pre-conceptions, but from concrete accomplishments recorded in and proven by history. Ideas shape of course the actor's minds, but political and strategic decisions are, more often than not, the fruit of short-term calculations and not of academic grand schemes.

In the past Mackinder and Spykman have placed great emphasis on the command of East Europe, the Heartland and/or the Rimland as precondition for world domination/control fashioning indeed the thoughts of generations of scholars and specialists. Nevertheless, historic reality until now has disproven this concept: the great powers controlling the Heartland did simply not control the world; they surely controlled an important part of it, but they remained confined within these vast spaces, often subjected to powerful centrifugal forces. The Mongol Empire in 1279 held sway over much

more than Mackinder's Heartland or Pivot Area and still it was not dominating the world; a similar fate was encountered by the Russian empire, Soviet Union and actual Russia, taking also into account nuclear deterrence which is a denial instrument, not one to extend control.

If we consider the three true globalisations in world history (Spanish, British, American), meaning control over territories across the globe and global influence, they have all on decisive element in common: an oceanic fleet; this instrument what sorely was missing the Mongols when invading Japan, the Chinese Ming dynasty after Admiral Zheng He, the czars, Soviet Union until the advent of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov and is still unavailable to current Russia. Mahan's ideas are still more relevant today, at least until actual carrier, amphibious and surface groups are not neutralised effectively by new weapons.

Zbigniew Brzezinski's brilliant "Grand Chessboard" has the advantage of the experience in real politics and in fact is the rationalisation after the crumbling of Soviet Union of an existing containment policy to which he contributed from 1966 to 1981, accompanied by the indefinite projection of a state of world affairs desirable for the elite he represented at the time. Like other interesting concepts (Clash of Civilisations, Global War on Terror, Thucydides' Trap), it would have been defined correctly during the Cold War as an ideological statement, that was clearly *en vogue* during the short US unipolar moment, that ended with the failed control of Iraq after its invasion by choice.

It is evident that containment was a geopolitical project for a Soviet Union capable to project power globally with limited capabilities, whereas actual Russia in rather incapable to keep its influence even beyond its borders and is forced to seek a "special relationship" with China, in a completely different position compared to the Soviet Union. "Zbig" was a remarkable visionary, but it would be an analytical and logical error to attribute to his capacity of viewing the world in 1997, and formulating the desiderata of a past elite, the mystical power of a (self-) fulfilling prophecy.

In order to free geopolitical analysis from this national conditioning, it may useful to adopt the concept of *Geonetworks. Geonetworks are networks within a specific geographic space that include political, economic, strategic, cultural, social, technological (etc.) relations and aspects. Some of these relations extend to other geonetworks, others ones stay within the defined geographic space, while some aspects and relations have global relevance. Geonetworks are inherently open spaces, but some enjoy of a relatively greater connectivity due to their position and infrastructure development. They are not defined by the importance of the states/governments/regimes present (or by their borders), but by main geographic features, although what happens within these networks is*

influenced by specific state and non-state actors.

The world can be divided into four Geonetworks, mainly centred around oceans: Pacific, Indian, African and Atlantic.

Light blue: Pacific Geonetwork. Green: Indian Geonetwork. Red: African Geonetwork. Yellow: Atlantic Geonetwork.

These geonetworks are crossed by *Seven Shaping Flows, i.e., flows that shape different relationships with varying intensity and scope*:

- Eco-system (e.g., the level of sea, climate change, human/animal border)
- Drinking water
- Food/Agri-tech
- Real/virtual migrations
- Conventional (fossil)/non-conventional (renewable)/digital energy
- Invested/financial capital
- Knowledge.

These concepts are compatible with the theories of chaos and complexity, and they consider the implications of Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which in turn prepares the way to the application

of the indeterminacy principle borrowed from quantum physics, used as a metaphor in political matters.

Explaining through a comparison, one cannot with the same certainty at the same moment determine the political position and the course of action that a decision-maker will take and one cannot necessarily know if a decision maker will take one decision or another, even having at disposition the best intelligence and knowledge about the person. I can know that a certain politician intends to vote favourably to the government in a confidence motion, but I am not sure until the vote that this person will vote so and I am equally unsure if she/he will vote yes, no, abstain, change party or be absent. More problematically, if a journalist asks that person about his/her intentions, the outcome could be influenced not only for that person, but also for others that are not in that particular field of view (implication of the principle of entanglement). Uncertainty and ambiguity are an old reality in politics since millennia, but the way to define and consider them can be more conscious today and helps in avoiding the typical manipulation of alt-, post-truth and gaslighting techniques. Using now these instruments, we can try to do a world geopolitical overview, starting from the least considered geonetwork.

African Geonetwork

The geonetwork is a long-standing fragility condition because its three shaping flows for survival (eco-system, drinking water and food/agri-tech) have a high probability of negative developments with a very high impact on the area. The war in Ukraine has further sharpened the risks of famine to the point that Africa is cut in two by countries of highest and very high concern, according the evaluations of the UN WFP and FAO: it is a belt wider than the geographic Sahel stretching from Mauritania till the Red Sea, including Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Nigeria as probable worst cases, while DRC and Kenya are countries of very high concern. In Africa, agriculture provides for 70% of African livelihoods, 30% of the continent's GDP, 50% of the continent's export value, and 65% of the continent's labour force. By the way, with the exception of Mauretania and Kenya, the famine belt coincides with the conflict area sharply cutting across the geonetwork.

Energy flows are still heavily dependent from fossils and are influenced by the considerable price increase created by EU variable price hubs, price-capping dynamics and by the war in Ukraine that has strongly reduced the supply of fixed price energy to Europe, generating on the one hand some opportunities for energy producers (Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Angola, Egypt), but on the other increased prices in several African countries (Economist Intelligence Unit). Renewables investments are one digit across the geonetwork and, for the time being, only stand-alone and

mini-grid solutions offer some concrete mitigation and security of supply solutions.

Finally, the global monetary tightening, due to the end of quantitative easing cycles and to war-induced inflation in relevant parts of the Atlantic geonetwork, sharpens the risk of default across the continent, despite GDP growth rates around 4% and beyond are frequent. This happens in a context where risky borrowing had been fuelled by the favourable cycle of high commodity prices prior to the Biden administration. This year the public debt of Tunisia, Egypt, Eritrea is extremely concerning, a situation, similar to a block of countries in South East Africa (Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe). Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Republic of Congo, Malawi are in a very concerning situation (around 80% of GDP). Some concrete prospects in the medium term are offered by the possible accession of the African Union in the G-20 under the Indian presidency and the steady progress of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) negotiations.

Internal causes are several, long standing and well known, but the additional strain caused by the war in Ukraine and the entailed sanctions against the Russian aggressor, after the heavy toll exacted by the pandemic, are strangling the geonetwork. Contrary to what told by some fear mongering politicians, internal migration within the geonetwork has cushioned the flow of migrants outside the continent for decades, but it is a fact that from 1990 to 2020 (UN DESA estimates) the percentage of external flows has almost tripled to a point that presently there is a balance between internal migration (48%) and external one (45%). This has obvious implications on economies in the Atlantic geonetwork, especially those with an important aging population (a gap of around 4 million workers is estimated in the EU by 2019).

In this context the quest for peace and security is essential, because from this depends the improvement of economic security, poverty reduction and increased education and investments. The first security level is internal and concerns a mix of militias, corruption, illegal trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and military coups. Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in: Burkina Faso twice, Chad, Guinea, Mali twice, and Sudan. Failed putsches happened in CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, in addition to those that possibly were attempted in Gambia and in São Tomé and Príncipe.

The second is external and its most visible aspect is geopolitical competition: China, Russia (Libya, Mali, CAR, Guinea, Angola, Sudan, Republic of the Congo, DRC, Gabon), USA, the EU, in different ways, have tried to consolidate or widen their influence. Also middle powers have become more influential like Japan, Turkey and some Gulf states. In this respect, the expansion of embassies in the area by Qatar and Turkey after 2010 is remarkable. In terms of aid, the annual PRC

(Popular Republic of China) contribution is around $6 billion/year, the US one amounts to $34 bn in 2019 and the combined "Western" aid is around $150 bn/year; although in 2021-2022 a sharp competition between China and Japan could be observed in terms of pledges (between $30 and 40 bn).

In this context, it is still improbable in the next five years the rise of one or more federating countries. The traditional leaders (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa) are all hampered at different levels and Kenya is still a promise to be tested.

Indian Ocean Geonetwork

This geonetwork risks to be conceptually simplified by one long standing geopolitical idea and the superposition of a new one: namely the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. It is on the one hand a conceptual mirage of past times and on the other an understandable US-led strategic construct. The Middle East was middle at the time of the British Empire between the metropolitan port of London and the viceroyal port of Bombay. After the ruin of the Empire, caused by the Second World War, and the decolonisation of India, the Middle East continued to be used as a legacy denomination, often associated to Northern Africa due to Panarabism and energy matters while the USA-USSR confrontation was ongoing.

With the end of the Cold War, geography and local interests hollowed the concept, resulting in three connected but quite distinct areas: North Africa, notwithstanding the Arab linkages; Levant, centred around the Israel/Syria couple; and the Arabic/Persian Gulf. The latter belongs to the Indian Ocean Geonetwork, while the other two are part of the Atlantic Ocean network.

The Indo-Pacific, notwithstanding its venerable origins in Haushofer's writings, was re-born by the confluence of different political discourses. Japan introduced the concept of a "broader Asia" and of "confluence of two seas" in August 2007 during high-level contacts with India. Australia used the Indo-Pacific term in its official white paper "Australia in the Asian Century" in 2012, considering the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean as one strategic arc.

Obviously, the US example gained more traction: after an ambiguous beginning in 2011 with the "Asia-Pacific" term, used by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the Indo-Pacific Corridor, mentioned by Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013, the State Department in 2014 intended by Indo-Pacific the vast littoral arc stretching from South Africa to Australia. In 2015 the Department of Defense defined it as an area spanning from the West Coast of the United States to the eastern coast of Africa, while in the same year India started using its own definition. Other pragmatic and

political adjustments followed, but the concept was enshrined in the US strategic commands structure as US INDOPACOM (enlarging the old Pacific Command). Strategic realities had already prepared the US Navy to this enlargement since 1979, when the threat a revolutionary Iran was countered first with a rapid deployment force and then with the dedicated US CENTCOM (Central Command): the military assets and the logistics flowed from the Pacific to the essential logistic node of Diego Garcia and to the US bases in the Gulf, strategically subordinating the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.

And yet, this debate risks to obscure one very important trend and evolution: before the Indian Ocean was heteronomously defined either by Great Britain (from West to East) or by one of the true winners of the II WW, the USA (from East to West); while after 1991 (defeat of Iraq in the Second Gulf War), two main regional powers are emerging with enormous difficulties: India and Iran. In 2003 the PRC became the third biggest world exporter, using also the Indian Ocean as a conduit for economic flows to the Mediterranean, changing its economic orientation while leaving intact its strategic position (from Mediterranean to *Chindoterranean*); a development that will be eventually reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI - from East to West). While Iran is still contained by various actors and interests, India, despite the burden of the strategic Sino-Pakistani antagonism, has started defining autonomously the function of the ocean and hence part of the geonetwork, also through an inclusive concept of Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific, with India at the centre, extends from the African to the Americas' shores, without any containment implications towards any country. At the same time, the Indian Navy claims the entire Indian Ocean as its area of responsibility; not a small strategic signal, similar in intentions and capabilities, to the Monroe doctrine in 1823.

From the fundamental viewpoint of the eco-system, the Indian Ocean geonetwork is living on borrowed time, taking into account that nearly half the world's container traffic moving through the region. The Indian Ocean is the fastest warming one in the world: countries with low-lying coasts and islands are at serious risk of suffering disastrous inundations or to be submerged in due time (in the order of impact: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Iraq, Pakistan, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros); monsoons, that are essential for agriculture, may be disrupted with unforeseeable consequences; cyclones have doubled in the last forty years; heatwaves are decreasing the presence of phytoplankton in the sea food chain. Another important issue is the accumulation of solid (plastic) waste, both within the countries and in the Ocean with the formation of giant waste floating islands.

If one takes into account the second vital shaping flow (drinkable water), the countries that are risking a very high-water stress are in the order (according to estimates of the World Resources Institute's Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas): Qatar, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, UAE, Bahrein, India, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Oman, while Yemen, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq risk a high-water stress. India with its 1,4 billion inhabitants, is, of course, the most important problem. These problems are affecting almost uniformly all major rivals in the geonetwork (and also in the Levant, with Israel at a very high-risk level).

Energy is an essential flow that has been disrupted severely by the war in Ukraine because European countries were forced to compete in the existing LNG gas market, which has brought major energy consumers like India to restart massively coal production and to refuse to adhere to the G-7 anti-Russian price cap. Also, countries like Pakistan and Indonesia are profiting from discounted Russian energy (and derivatives) prices. Paradoxically these imports allow to rebalance in a certain measure the market for more tolerable energy prices in Europe. Major producers in the Gulf have naturally kept close to their national interest avoiding price dips and have been further induced to consider the reserve solution of the nuclear energy option. This may be one of the longer-term implications of the recent PRC sponsored Irani-Saudi diplomatic agreement (12/03/2023), if it holds: not only possibly defusing in time another attempt by Mr Benyamin Netanyahu to attack the Iranian nuclear deterrent infrastructure, but laying the ground for a successful civil nuclear energy cooperation with Beijing's participation.

Besides, Tehran and Riyadh are the largest Islamic finance hubs after London, while Abu Dhabi and Dubai and Singapore are global finance hubs. The whole geonetwork is severely unbalanced in favour of the geographical extremes of the geonetwork, since only New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur have an international standing.

Much has been said about the macro-economic and strategic implications of the Chinese BRI, both in its continental and oceanic segment and regarding the quite silent, but unmistakeable maritime competition between Beijing and New Delhi, especially through a well devised Chinese strategy of naval bases and friendly commercial ports spanning from Kyaukpyu/Chittagong to Djibouti (possibly with a new base in the Maldives). The essence of the problem is that, although the BRI is per se a positive development for international trade because it covers a gap in the global transportation system, it needs to distribute its benefits along its path (allowing forms of multi-stake holder governance) and to include in some form also India. But while the commercial and especially naval competition is very visible in the mainstream discourse and often construed as an

inevitable rivalry, it is important to look at internal instabilities and at the non-state actor dimension of the strategic picture.

Organised crime, mob violence and vigilantism are on the rise in several countries; India's and Pakistan's major insurgencies are still active, albeit at a reduced rhythm and taking into account a certain degree of political accommodation, compromise and collusion; Afghanistan is far from being stable and Burma continues it repression of ethnic rebellions since 1948. On the African coast, Somalia, Kenya and Mozambique are still plagued by jihadism, while on the opposite shores Thailand still has an active insurgency in its deep South.

Pacific Ocean Geonetwork

The geonetwork has become pivotal for world economy even more after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, since five of the former G-8 economies have been hardly hit by the war. If the first predictions feared a severe recession in 2023, data show that the slowdown is less severe and that a rebounding 2024 could be envisaged. At global level the GDP growth was 3,2% (IMF). The USA expanded by 2,1% during last year, while the Eurozone by 3,5%, avoiding a contraction. China's economy contracted quite steeply from 8,4% in 2021 to 3% in 2022. What influenced the Chinese data, is valid also for other Pacific geonetwork economies: a combination of (mis)management of the pandemic, weaker global demand, inflation and wider geopolitical uncertainty. The bottom line is that no country recovered to pre-pandemic levels, the USA being those nearest to the objective: its position near previous levels is five times better than the UK and three compared to the EU. Energy prices are not foreseen to substantially reduce during 2023. On the other hand, India with China, it will account for half of global growth this year, versus just a tenth for the US and euro area combined (IMF).

Regarding energy security of supply and its consequences, the USA profited from its shale production and its imports from the Western Hemisphere mainly (Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico) to gain from EU imports, after the cuts imposed on Russian products, and China absorbed the flows of Russian energy negated to European countries. On the other hand, the Eurozone pays in March 2023 still five times more its energy than before the war.

It is important to understand that, at economic level, geopolitical uncertainty is less directly tied to the Russian invasion and more to fundamental choices on the direction of globalization: the more protectionist measures will be adopted by key economies, for whatever reason, the more the fabric of globalization, free trade and shared growth will be rended, also at considerable cost for aspiring protectionist countries. Nevertheless, in this re-, friend-, near-shoring talk and action, Mexico is

particularly suited as country, because already with the creation of the then NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area, 1994), the local assembling companies (maquiladoras) were a first case of nearshoring for lower segment industrial manufacturing. Will this estimated trillion-dollar relocation help in reducing the ongoing cartel war in Mexico? It is a vital question for the country and the Western Hemisphere at least.

The realities of legal economy are unfortunately connected to those of the illegal one and also in this respect this geonetwork is central in world affairs. The strategic scene of the area is defined by the triangle between China, the USA and Mexico. The dynamics both within, across and outside these countries have brought to three remarkable developments: the creation of one the biggest human trafficking markets, a very important environmental smuggling phenomenon and the emergence of the dominance of synthetic drugs vis-à-vis traditional vegetal ones. The North American side of the triangle is also characterised by an impressive illegal cross-border arms trade and by one of the longest and fiercest mafia wars in the world (the cartel war is lasting since 2006, when the Chinese competition killed the maquiladoras system).

The great power competition is essentially centred around a Chinese gradual, but deliberate and focussed effort to transform the Pacific Ocean from a totally US-controlled region into a contestable strategic space. One of the visible contention bones regards the future of Taiwan, seen by Beijing as the indispensable completion of a national resurgence and rebuilding process.

Nevertheless, the highest stake is on the one hand the Chinese control of African and Latin American markets, while securing the sea lines of communication between China, the Gulf and Europe via the Malacca Strait; a relative success in the BRI would lessen the importance of the maritime strategic component and contribute in reducing regional tensions. On the other hand, Washington finds unacceptable any diminution of its oceanic dominance because the Pacific, since the late Nineteenth century, was and remains a vital interest. This can be a serious casus belli for a world war, not matter the initial incident.

Atlantic Ocean Geonetwork
This geonetwork is caught in a considerable transformation crisis which is multipronged:

- geopolitical, from a stable Euro-Atlantic reality, limited to the North Atlantic and rather disconnected from the Caribbean and South America/Sub-Saharan shores in the South Atlantic with some exceptions during the Thor-Jupiter crisis (so called Cuban crisis, 1962) or the closure of the Suez Canal (1967-1975) to a much more connected and unstable

all-Atlantic space, presently pressured by Euro-Asiatic conflicts in and around Ukraine;

- political, from prevalently homogeneous polities in the Western Hemisphere (USA, North America with a Latin America under western influence) and in Europe (NATO/EU vs Warsaw Pact/COMECON), to fractured and unstable ones across the oceanic space, featuring both democracies in internal crisis and illiberal governments with nationalistic and aggressive postures;

- economic, for multiple factors. Among the most relevant ones on can mention: technological imbalances regarding IT and AI investments and achievements; energy insecurity divides between areas that have intra-hemispheric supplies and those who are dependent from less stable or dangerous suppliers; fault lines dividing very few countries with highly developed financial sectors and a majority of still manufacturing countries, when not mainly dependent from the primary sector and, finally, big tech monopolies versus less advanced and dominant companies in the geonetwork.

If one would simplify, the northern part of the Atlantic Geonetwork is still in a relatively good position for what regards the three shaping flows necessary for survival (eco-system, drinking water and food/agri-tech), although the defrosting of the Arctic is a serious concern. It is instead in a complicated situation concerning real migrations (while better equipped for managing tele-working and thus virtual migrations), while it has to overcome substantial disparities in the management of energy, financial and knowledge flows. That said, the Northern Atlantic region of the geonetwork is heavily dependent from the Southern region in terms of: eco-system (El Niño and La Niña weather patterns in the Pacific indirectly and the Atlantic Oscillations directly; the link between Sahara and the Amazonian forests; effective control of pandemics); food, raw materials, conventional energy streams and legal/illegal flows of human beings, supplementing a negative demography in most Northern countries.

Evidently the Russian aggression against Ukraine has dislocated a security architecture that existed since 1991, but that revealed itself as an unfinished settlement. On the one hand the success of the European Union in offering a package of essential freedoms within a rather structured open market and with the background guarantee of peace and security among its members created a strong drive towards accession by many countries that had been relatively poor and previously neutral or within the Warsaw Pact/Comecon/Soviet Union/Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, despite several efforts, Russia was visibly unsatisfied with a de facto arrangement that did not guarantee a defined buffer zone between itself and NATO. Probably the NATO-Russia treaty of

Pratica di Mare (2002) came too late, when the fragile democracy in Moscow had been left dying through international indifference and was probably unable to put down roots anyhow. One can discuss if a formal peace treaty would have been indispensable to close what in reality has been a Third World War, fought by proxy across the globe and defined as Cold only for the "privileged" countries, living under the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) through 10.000 nuclear strategic warheads per contender.

Unfortunately, this is a moot point for actual political conditions. It is plain that, if one allows the precedent of changing borders with a war, Europe will become a very dangerous region, since many borders could be contestable at least since the post-1945 order crumbled in 1989. Resuming in a slogan: "Today Crimea, tomorrow Kaliningrad" (the old German Königsberg). The real issue is how to restore security, sovereignty and independence as foundation of the European peace for more than 33 years since 1989, taking into account that the previous period of peace lasted from 1945 for 44 years with guaranteed security, but often limited sovereignty and independence.

At the same time there are two factors that influence heavily a satisfactory outcome, one endogenous and one exogenous. The first one is linked to the crisis of the European Union due to three conditions:

1. the crisis of democracy under the pressure of powerful economic special interests, generating social gaps and hence populism, democratic backslidings, etc.;

2. the quandary of a nation state that is unable to mobilise resources and redistribute wealth to support socially sustainable democracies;

3. and the crisis of an enlargement that has been evidently too hasty and not adequately shored up at institutional level. The irony of the latter is that EU member states stalled Turkey's accession since 1987, also due to the weight of a population 84,78 million that would have impinged on existing power balances, and accepted 96,18 million in nine different countries, whose democratic record was not better than the one of Ankara or that of Madrid.

If the European Union will be unable to overcome these three crises in due time, it will be increasingly difficult for the USA to compensate a power vacuum in the geonetwork, no matter how much member states will invest in defenc

The exogenous factor is the mentioned great power competition between China and USA. If already the current and disgraceful war in Ukraine, creates huge damages to the European economies, one

should beware about even more hard consequences in a war that most probably will not be limited to the Indo-Pacific theatre.

Conclusions

Using the definitions of geopolitics and geoeconomics (*Geopolitics are the conscious projection of a political project on the geographic dimension; thus, geoeconomics are the conscious projection of an economic enterprise on the geographic dimension.*) and the concepts of *Geonetwork* and *Shaping Flow*, we have tried to sketch a short global geopolitical survey.

The Africa Geonetwork is still exposed to very severe risks for the survival of several of its populations due to climate change, drought, famine and epidemics, fuelling in turn the scourge of internal and cross-border wars and insurgencies. Energy and monetary flows are equally unfavourable, especially in heavily indebted countries. On a very volatile internal security situation, great and medium power competition worsens the general conditions, making it very unlikely that some of the five-six more important countries may assume a continental leading function. Migration is increasing, especially towards the Atlantic Geonetwork, whose population is inexorably aging with few exceptions.

The Indian Ocean Geonetwork is in a transition from a geopolitical space that was defined by external powers, to a condition where it may be more defined by local powers, mainly India, Iran and the GCC, with some limited African and Australian contribution. Its top problem is its survival in medium-term climatic changes (it is the fastest warming ocean), while the BRI could be still open to diplomatic and economic adjustments.

The Pacific Geonetwork is even more pivotal for world economy after the war in Ukraine: is has shown, together with other entities in the Atlantic Geonetwork, a remarkable resistance to inflation, but a lacklustre resilience. In the end, India with China as major engine, it will account for half of global growth this year, versus just a tenth for the US and euro area combined. Here geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainties are directly tied to fundamental choices on the direction of globalization: the more protectionist measures will be adopted by key economies, for whatever reason, the more the fabric of globalization, free trade and shared growth will be rended, damaging also the interest of aspiring protectionist countries. In meantime, illegal economies are well integrated by strong organised criminal networks in the China-Mexico-USA triangle that have created one of the biggest human trafficking networks, a threatening environmental smuggling dynamic and achieved the dominance of synthetic drugs vis-à-vis traditional ones. The great power competition is essentially centred around a Chinese gradual, but deliberate and focussed effort to

transform the Pacific Ocean from a totally US-controlled region into a contestable strategic space. This is considered by Washington unacceptable and can develop into a serious world war casus belli.

The Atlantic Geonetwork, despite enjoying in its Northern subregion relatively good conditions in the shaping flows essential to survival, is undergoing a difficult transition at geopolitical, political and economic level because the relatively clear cut situation during the Cold War is no more existing and because internal disparities regarding technology, energy insecurity, the financial sector and the big tech monopolies have become sharper in time. Evidently Russia's aggression has dislocated a not so stable security architecture, whose recreation is a complex undertaking because the EU is facing at the same time a triple crisis regarding democracy, the viability of the nation state and a serious enlargement fatigue, while having the looming threat beyond the horizon of a world war centred on the Indo-Pacific theatre.

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Some Reflections on Diplomacy in a Digital Age

Arlette Conzemius

Looking back at the beginning of my career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg in the ealy 1980s, I can only be struck by the huge changes that diplomacy has undergone in all these years. Society has evolved and today, diplomats are a much more diverse group. There is more ethnic diversity and more gender equality, less formality. In the same way as diplomacy opened to societal change, it has had to modernise and adapt to technological developments, first and foremost in the way governments and their diplomats communicate with each other and with their counterparts in foreign countries.

In what follows, I will offer some reflections on diplomacy in the digital age, mostly based on personal experience, as I witnessed the growing impact of the internet on the profession during my career. It is in no way an exhaustive study of all aspects of the question.

Diplomacy is the instrument by which sovereign nations conduct foreign policy, that is, how they deal with other states. Foreign policy allows a nation to ascertain its position on the international scene, to achieve its own national interests as well as to cooperate with other nations to reach international goals. It involves all efforts by governments in their interaction with other governments to ensure peaceful coexistence between nations.

In the past, diplomatic activities proceeded at a much slower pace: Messages delivered by horseback messengers took weeks to arrive, ambassadors and foreign dignitaries undertook long journeys before reaching their post or destination. In the 19th century, Ministers and diplomats gathered in Vienna for one year to reorganize Europe after the Napoleonic wars, taking the time to meet and to entertain while allowing negotiations to proceed at their own, slow pace. In the 1950s still, it was possible for Luxembourg Ministers to leave the country for a long journey lasting several weeks to attend the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, as well as the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. What seems like a luxury today - as Government officials are jetted in and out of international gatherings at record speed – was just the normal way to conduct business.

Diplomacy has progressively adopted new communication channels as new technological tools became available, thus facilitating and speeding up the transfer of information: the telegraph, telephone, television. In the 1980s, telexes were still used to send reports and many documents were

sent by postal mail, which could lead to long delays. Posted in Washington at the end of the 1990s, I remember seeing piles of Luxembourg newspapers delivered to my desk that were outdated upon arrival.

In the 1980s, the adoption of the fax constituted a significant progress, as telecopying allowed the quick transmission of documents and images from one part of the world to another.

But the real revolution came with the **development of the internet**. It has had a profound impact on the way diplomats fulfil their missions by transforming the way people communicate, gather and exchange information. Having started my career when the internet did not exist, it was amazing to see how it has progressively changed our way of working.

Over the last centuries, the essence of the work of a diplomat has not fundamentally changed. Diplomats represent their own government in another country while at the same time informing their authorities about relevant developments occurring in their host countries. They facilitate contacts between governments and organise official visits of delegations from both countries. They are involved in negotiations both at the bilateral and multilateral levels and in mediation efforts when crisis situations occur. But diplomats do not exclusively deal with high-flying political issues. They also perform an important and more practical task in the consular field, assisting national citizens abroad, especially when emergency situations require humanitarian assistance or evacuation. In their host country, diplomats also promote the many facets of their own nation by organizing cultural or economic events and by reaching out to civil society.

Many aspects of what can be called "conventional diplomacy" are conducted in a discreet way. When a delicate political subject is discussed between leaders, when new business contacts are sounded out, these talks are mostly conducted in a very restricted and private way. Negotiations on a peace settlement or mediation efforts must remain confidential until a positive result has been achieved. Often, the key to a successful deal is the guaranteeing of confidentiality until all conditions for an agreement are met.

But there is another side of the profession that is much more open and visible. It involves all efforts to promote ideas or positions abroad through public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy includes all the government-sponsored efforts to influence a foreign audience and is an element of what has been defined as "soft power". The objectives of public diplomacy are varied but they all serve the national interest of a given government. Through nation-branding

activities, a government promotes a positive image abroad by emphasising policies or activities that highlight the country's particular achievements in the political, economic or cultural fields. For a small country like Luxembourg, it is quite important to get some visibility on the international scene. In some parts of the world, the country is either totally unknown or known only as a financial centre with a strong connotation as a tax haven. Nation-branding, through social media, makes it possible to present and explain other characteristics of the country, contributing to giving it a much more balanced image.

As communication is at the heart of public diplomacy, the internet became a very valuable tool for diplomats who were quick to embrace it to facilitate their work, both for their own communications needs and, through social media, to reach out to wider audiences.

The internet has allowed diplomats to upgrade their internal communications systems. By definition, diplomats work and live in foreign countries all over the world, but they need to be in constant contact with their home country.

Connecting the Foreign Ministry and the network of embassies through a secure email system has been of great value since it allows instant communication with a large number of recipients, which improves information sharing. The internet has abolished distance and any Embassy, even if located in the most far-away place, remains connected, provided it has a working internet connection. The downside is that even differences in time zones will no longer protect a diplomat's private life. Connectivity never stops and reactions are expected to be almost instantaneous.

Communication by email is quick, efficient and it tends to be more informal. The use of the internet has thus also changed the way diplomats conduct business, twisting some of the ancient rules of Protocole that have traditionally organised relations between Governments and Embassies. Instead of requesting meetings in a formal way, diplomats choose to contact foreign officials directly, just backing-up their request with an official note. Through emails, they can break through administrative barriers and contact the right interlocutor in a fast and direct way.

Most Foreign Ministries and embassies manage their own website where they publish information about the policies or events that they wish to emphasize as well as practical information for citizens or travellers. It has become possible to assist citizens by providing services online. This is particularly helpful for consular services, travel advice or emergency responses in disaster situations.

But over time, rather than publishing information on websites, it has become much more effective to actively engage with citizens on social media, on platforms such as Twitter Facebook or Instagram. They make it possible to reach out directly to diverse groups and to provide up-to-date information. During the pandemic, when neighbouring countries were taking restrictive measures, embassies were very busy communicating on social media about developments that could affect people who needed to travel. As measures kept changing at a rapid pace, social media was the most flexible communication channel.

Embassies have official twitter accounts, and many ambassadors manage their own personal account. They are used to advertise their activities and highlight their priorities while spreading their messages to a large number of people and to various groups.

Foreign Ministries often encourage their diplomats to be present on social media and to engage with citizens in both their home and host countries. Sometimes, they are requested to hold a regular blog in order to inform about their activities or to share reflections with the public. For a profession that is often criticized for its perceived glamorous lifestyle, this is a chance to gain better visibility and explain what diplomatic work is really about.

Diplomats are not the only officials to use social media. National leaders in different countries now communicate with each other directly, both privately and publicly, and no longer seem willing to be constrained by the often-stilted protocol and formal rules which for so long governed that sort of high-level interaction between countries. Some leaders are active tweeters and tend to use their personal accounts in a spontaneous way to react to events taking place on the international scene: congratulations, condolences or other messages are often sent via Twitter. Although more spontaneity seems to be possible online, it must be said that most of the messages sent by leaders are now almost as carefully drafted as official communiqués.

The pressure on diplomats to be present in the digital sphere is increasing since no one wants to miss out on this new phenomenon. However, in most cases, there has been no formal training on the use of social media and not every diplomat feels at ease in the digital world. Foreign Ministries should have a clear strategy on what they want diplomats to achieve, and they should give them some guidelines on how to communicate effectively with the media. It will also be necessary to keep track of future innovation happening in the field of digital communication and see how to apply them to the work of diplomats.

The internet, combined with the generalisation of smartphones, tablets and laptops has made it possible to disseminate a wealth of information instantaneously. Social media allows any individual to post what is often unchecked and unfiltered information. News about any country in the world is readily available through websites, social networks and streaming services. By analysing content published on social media, diplomats can get a better understanding of underlying trends in society. Tools like automatic translation have already helped to overcome language barriers and it is be expected that new developments in artificial intelligence will greatly increase the possibilities to analyse information extracted from the internet.

In this flow of information, "fake news" and disinformation will be mixed in with real facts. However, in given circumstances, social media can be a valuable source of information. On the evening of 15 July 2016, when I was posted in Turkey, fighter jets and helicopters started to fly over my building indicating that something very unusual was going on. As I tried to find out what was happening, I turned to Twitter and learned that a coup attempt was underway, long before any TV news channel was able to report it. This is because some individuals were witnessing events as they were happening and were able to post them immediately on their smartphone.

By becoming active in the digital world, diplomats have embarked on what is now called "**digital diplomacy**". In a narrow sense, it simply means that diplomats are proficient and present online. In a broader and more ambitious sense, it refers to the use of the internet to pursue foreign policy objectives. Events happening in the world of social media, especially in the "Twittersphere", matter, which means that foreign policy can no longer be restricted to government-to-government relations. Non-state actors are important as well. Governments need to observe, comment and sometimes counter some of the views expressed in the digital sphere.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office who promotes an active presence of diplomats on social media explains on its website why digital diplomacy is important:

"Those whose ideals and objectives we oppose are active and highly effective at using the web. If we don't take up the digital debate, we lose our argument by default. Many of our partners, particularly those outside government, have an established digital presence, engaged audiences and expertise in achieving goals online. If we don't work with them, we're missing a huge opportunity."

Because digital diplomacy permits the fast and wide dissemination of information, it makes it possible to communicate fundamental messages about values and principles that a particular country shares with like-minded partners. When addressing populations living in an autocratic

regime, it is important to communicate about democratic values and standards. Social media facilitates engagement with a wider audience in civil society, such as groups that resist dictatorial tendencies, opposition groups, political activists, or non-governmental organisations that you might not be able to reach out to otherwise. Some governments and their diplomats have developed a real expertise in using social media to pursue specific objectives, be it supporting political opponents, asking for the liberation of hostages, or supporting human rights movements.

The Internet, unfortunately, does not only serve as a positive force of change. Authoritarian or autocratic regimes have less laudable foreign policy objectives. As an instrument, the internet and social media are being used or misused to destabilise free and open societies. We have witnessed many disinformation campaigns or attempts to interfere with national elections. These regimes do not hesitate to use the internet as a weapon against democracies, as recent cyberattacks against hospitals or critical infrastructures have shown. But for authoritarian regimes, as far as their own populations are concerned, social media represents a danger. Their first move against opposition forces is to suppress freedom of expression by shutting down social media networks, as regularly happens in Russia or China.

Hacking, cyberattacks, and the use of internets trolls show that the internet space is not without dangers. All users should be aware of security rules, especially as concerns the forwarding of classified documents and the use of private phones to conduct official business. Even Heads of State or of Government can have their phones hacked. The WikiLeaks episode which made public confidential American cables dealt a blow to the culture of secrecy that still prevailed in diplomacy. It forced it to become more open and more accessible.

Sometimes, the social media platforms in themselves can become problematic. Suspected to be delivering information on its users to China, the Tik Tok App has been banned by several Western countries for use on official phones.

The internet has given diplomacy new instruments to conduct foreign policy, mostly through a more open and dynamic public diplomacy. Has diplomacy thereby become more effective?
It is certainly difficult to measure the results of the activity happening on social media. A diplomat who tweets actively will certainly increase his/her visibility among the community of tweeters who belong to a specific group of interested followers. Does it make it possible to reach a wider public? How effective are campaigns that aim at liberating hostages or political prisoners? Is it possible to measure how these campaigns might have influenced public opinion?

The effectiveness of digital diplomacy is real but should probably not be overestimated. Social media is about messaging and messaging cannot replace action. Real and concrete results in diplomacy are nearly always the result of long, hard, patient hours, days, weeks, and months - and sometimes years – and not the result of sending out a tweet.

When trying to solve a difficult issue or to reach an international agreement, there will always come the moment when Governments and officials will have to sit down and negotiate face-to-face. These talks will most likely be conducted by professionals behind the scenes. The human factor in international relations remains important. It is of fundamental importance to be able to create trust and confidence and to establish a network of trusted people. This is why diplomats spend a lot of their time attending meetings, events, and receptions. They need to talk to political party leaders, officials, businesspeople, artists, opinion leaders and the media. There might always come a moment when one of these individuals will be a helpful contact to solve a bilateral issue.

Conventional diplomacy as it has been practised for centuries retains its value. However, digital tools have brought a new dimension to classical diplomacy, and they complement it in a very efficient way. Digital diplomacy, as a new kind of public engagement will increasingly become an inherent part of any diplomat's job description, and future diplomats will thus need to be proficient online.

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Possible New Scenarios for Monetary Challenges in the Years to Come

Angelo Federico Arcelli

Whilst today we still live in a post-Bretton Woods era, as the dominant currency in the settlement of international trades is still the US Dollar, which also maintain its position at the centre of the international system as the primary reserve currency Worldwide, we need to consider that what has been developed since August 1971 is something profoundly different than the mechanism theorized in 1944.

Rather, today we are on the verge of a new major change, possibly driven by the digital revolution and all its consequences. In fact, as we all recall, the Bretton Woods system had flaws and limits which were exposed by the early 1960s, when trade imbalances caused tensions within the group of advanced economies, and, in the end, given the pressure on the U.S. Federal Reserve System (the Fed) to honour the dollar peg on gold, it led to the US abandoning the agreement in August 1971.

Since then, the international monetary system had evolved, but the currencies of the Western countries were free to float with neither fluctuations bands nor any peg. Since its origins, the system gave the United States a relevant advantage: as the owner of the central currency the US got what we then called an "exorbitant privilege" as the sole issuer of such currency. In the last 50 years the central position of US Dollar in the international economy and trade has also represented the way the US leadership has consolidated.

The leverage that the US Dollar (and somehow, in recent years, the role of the Euro) allows to the US and their allies represents a tool which influences from within the economy of any competing power and allows the West an undisputable leadership, even beyond military and geopolitical aspects. But the rising role of China, which aims competing for global leadership, could also imply a quest for the dominance in the international trade and related tools for payment settlement.

In this scenario, in the first two decades of the New Millennium, the role of digital tools, including payment tools and crypto-assets, created the conditions for a challenging environment for Central Banks. And the growing tensions amongst areas of the World had made even more difficult their role, as today we live in a historical moment of change.

On one side we see China's interest in a reshaping of the international monetary system which could reduce the role of the US Dollar; on the other the US and its main allies wish to protect the role of the US Dollar, to the point of risking a "decoupling" in the international monetary system; the EU

struggling to find a stable equilibrium under the stress of the recent economic and geopolitical implications (current Ukraine crisis may also cause, as a side effect, the acceleration of decoupling).

But a force silently influencing all the players' agendas is and will be the digital revolution. In fact the shift in the available set of payment tools that it represents is putting pressure on Central Banks – Worldwide – to the point of the concrete developing of the idea of the "Central Bank Digital Currencies" (CBDC), which seems a defensive move aiming at maintaining the full control of monetary policy.

And that, likely, if becoming reality also in the Western countries, might lead to the need of a new deal and, possibly, a renewed IMF treaty, if not even a new stability guardian, empowered to intervene in a different monetary landscape.

Will it be something planned (so by the growing introduction of central bank digital currencies on different platforms) or something coming from the growing challenge to traditional monetary tools currently represented by the development of cryptocurrencies, digital currencies and all the other monetary tools which are starting to be widely used, including in the Western countries?

Current Ukrainian crisis and the possible downfalls of what is happening is pushing the "decoupling" option high in several political agendas, in particular the ones of those countries which fear that the dollar weaponization as well as any form of financial warfare could be something so harmful to be well considered ahead of any geopolitical strategic decision. Likely, the USA and its allies, mainly Europeans, will have to rally in order to preserve the role of the US dollar and, consequently, of the Euro, as main and sole reserve currencies worldwide.

But a possible question, in this time of uncertainty, is precisely if the strategy to strengthen the bond amongst Western allies – which needs to be demonstrated on the field, given multiple distinctions also within the EU – will be the only and best option. Clearly this is a US-led decision, but an analysis about pros and contra of the eventual negotiation of a new scheme to manage international monetary policy is an idea which deserves some consideration, also in order to evaluate if the financial World stability, if restored by a rebalanced agreement eventually extended to emerging powers, may lead to a new "dividend of peace", both in terms of maintaining the substantial leadership of the US and the West, and, possibly, helping settling the warfare scenario we are now seeing emerging.

Anyway, whatever option is pursued by the US and its allies, this will anyhow impact substantially our current post-Bretton Woods architecture, at least in the capability of organizations as IMF and

central bank to preserve financial stability and control on money supply. Actually, a step change like this could represent an ancillary way to push, indirectly, for the need of a new architecture, which, if not agreed/proposed in advance by the US and allies, will imply relevant geopolitical consequences worldwide. Should the Western World be timely in react to a war which (hopefully, but also likely) will not necessarily be fought by the military in the first place?

The Ukraine war has created a new casus for the international geopolitical equilibrium and, at least for what Europe is concerned, also heightened awareness amongst EU Member States of the full extent of EU dependency on Russian gas imports, at least for some relevant economies (Germany, Italy). Such event might likely enhance the chances of a new European deal on energy, which, in turn, might impact the future vision of Europe that member states agree upon.

Nevertheless, the events of 2022 also created a general awareness on a path of some kind of "decoupling" as possible future consequence of current crisis: in fact the World seems accelerating on that path, although in far less structured and planned way than the one which Western observers saw as a possible option for China until 2021.

Rather, China seems willing to take a more prudent approach, and this seems clear at least until the early 2023 months, which makes the global scenario even more uncertain. In consequence, despite the current debate on new EU energy strategies, any observer should pay close attention to current geopolitical turmoil, which is highlighting a transition phase that might impact monetary stability.[30] What can be the next likely path for the more developed areas of the World? It is difficult to say, but it seems that the US Dollar will remain at the centre still for a while, which, in turn, makes the Euro stronger in perspective terms.

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How Can Global Solidarity Partnership Be Effectively Improved to Achieve the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* Goals?

Giovanna Gnerre Landini

The strengthening of a proactive *partnership* between all the international, regional and national actors involved in the pursuit of common aims - and unavoidable due to their co-presence/coaction – and concretely centered on the promotion of sustainable and egalitarian human, social and environmental long-term development, is a main goal of the international community. In fact, in an interconnected and interdependent world, it is not conceivable to approach *global solidarity* without paying close attention to this aspect. The maintenance of peace and the strengthening of prosperity for People and for the Planet, now and in the future, must represent a cornerstone in the relations between all those to whom responsibility is attributed starting from the Member States of the United Nations[31]: their growing interdependence is a key structural feature of the current international system.

It is clear that now more than before the commitment of the sovereign States alone, if not firmly anchored to a consolidated partnership with the other "main actors" (including non-state actors and transnational actors) in the international legal system in pursuing human, social and environmental development, is not enough. The international community should be considered the one which, driven by the same aim of equality, non-discrimination, fairness and common values such as, among others, the protection and promotion of human rights, moves conscientiously in taking in concrete consideration all its components, in order to make joint efforts really effective in a medium-long term framework.

Nevertheless, the question is what binds us (all of us who are part of it as individuals, associations, organizations and States) in an "*international community*".
Facing with this issue in his speech at the fifty-second DPI/NGO Conference in New York in 1999 (a year before the *Millennium Summit*), the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi A. Annan answered: "*In the broadest sense there is a shared vision of a better world for all people, as set out, for example in the founding Charter of the United Nations. There is our sense of common vulnerability in the face of global warming and the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction. There is the framework of international law, treaties and human rights conventions. There is equally*

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[31] According to art. 1 of the United Nations Charter, *Purposes and Principles* (par. 1), and Chapter IX, *International Economic and Social Cooperation*, artt. 55-60 (in particular art. 55). Text of the UN Charter available at the following link: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.

our sense of shared opportunity, which is why we build common markets and joint institutions such as the United Nations. Together, we are stronger"[32].

Regarding the will to make the international community able to face the challenges of the new Millennium, UNSG Annan highlighted the need that the States appeal to a political will for cooperation: "*until we summon that political will, and until we show ourselves more ready to define national interest in a way that better responds to global imperatives, the international community will remain, at best, a disappointing "work in progress"*. An ever-greater and widespread awareness of interdependence can make it possible to "*stitch together the strands of cooperation into a strong fabric of community for the new millennium*"[33].

The international community is composed by a number of actors linked by common moral objectives, therefore not a purely legal entity but rather "*the key manifestation of, the progressive cosmopolitan development of modern international law*"[34].

The strengthening of a multilateral system - attentive to a structure of relationships in which everyone (actors and stakeholders), at different levels and in different fields, are committed to act together for a long-term structural and social transformation - is one of the objectives of the *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*[35]. This Plan of Action, unanimously adopted on 25 September 2015 by the 193 Member States of the United Nations (General Assembly Resolution 70/1), represents a global agenda to end poverty by 2030, and pursue a sustainable future for all, and contains 17 *Sustainable Development Goals* (SDGs), divided into 169 targets[36]. It certainly represents one of the most ambitious initiatives undertaken at an international level, in the e for international cooperation, having as its general aim of "transforming our world".

The *2030 Agenda* has decisively updated two important complementary documents adopted in 1992 and 2000:

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[32] Address by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan entitled "*The Meaning of International Community*", 15 September 1999 (SG/SM/7133 NGO/313 PI/1176), available:
https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990915.sgsm7133.doc.html.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Schmidt D. R., *The International Community: Conceptual Insights from Law and Sociology*, in E-International Relations, 27 November 2015, available:
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/27/the-international-community-some-conceptual-insights-from-law-and-sociology/; on this issue, see *inter alia* Fassbender B., *The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community*, Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009.
[35] *UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, available: https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.
[36] Within the 169 targets identifies, 244 indicators are informed whose list was updated and revised in 2017 by the *Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators* (see, Report of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators, E/CN.3/2017/2, Annex III).

1) *Agenda 21*, a comprehensive action plan to be taken globally, nationally and locally adopted by more than 178 Governments at the United Nations *Conference on Environment and Development* (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992). It is divided into 4 sections: 1) social and economic dimensions, 2) conservation and management of resources for development, 3) strengthening the role of major groups, 4) means of implementation.[37] This programmatic Agenda focused on development and environmental sustainability, highlighted the need for "building endogenous capacity" in order to implement it at different levels with a specific attention to the efforts of the UN Member States responsible to foster such synergies by creating partnerships (Chapter 37). An essential role was attributed to the so-called *major groups* (Women, Children and Youth, Farmers, Indigenous Peoples, NGOs, Trade Unions, Local Authorities, Science and Technology, Business and Industry)[38]. The *2030 Agenda* integrated the list of such major groups with other relevant *stakeholders* including, among them: academia, volunteers, older people and people with disabilities making them ever more concretely essential to the achievement of the Agenda's goals[39].

2) The *United Nations Millennium Declaration* signed by 189 UN Member States in September 2000 in New York set out 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 21 targets focused on issues such as: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 3) Promote gender equality and empower women; 4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) Ensure environmental sustainability; 8) Global partnership for development with great attention to strengthening the role of the United Nations as a fora and greater effective instrument in achieving these objectives (VIII. *Strengthening the United Nations*, 29-32)[40].

The *Millennium Declaration* was adopted after four *Decades of Development* convened by the United Nations (1960-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-1999)[41]. In the fourth decade (on *Human Development*), the UN Member States have come to terms with the observation that

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[37] The Conference was promoted by UNCED (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development). For detailed information on the conference documents, see United Nations, *Report of the United Nations on Environment and Development*, Vol. I (resolutions adopted by the Conference), UN, New York, 1993 - A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I).

[38] Agenda 21, Chapter 23, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf.

[39] For further information about the *stakeholder groups*, see https://hlpf.un.org/mgos.

[40] The Declaration was adopted as the final document of the *Millennium Summit* (6-8 September 2000), General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 18 September 2000,
available: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/559/51/PDF/N0055951.pdf?OpenElement.

[41] Documents on these four Decades of Development, see *UN Documentation: Development,*
https://research.un.org/en/docs/dev/1960-1970.

"economic growth" could no longer in itself represent a discriminating value for aspiring to an equitable development. They realized the terribly need to enhance the "human" element, thus bringing attention back to the multiformity of ideas, actions and perspectives in the global community to be taken into consideration when dealing with the issue of development.

In 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted the *Declaration on the Right to Development* that recognized the *human development* as "*an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized*"[42]. This Declaration is a non-legally binding instrument; nevertheless, it laid a very important basis in the recognition not only of the human dimension inherent in development process but also that such development is has to be interpreted as an *inalienable human right*[43].

While some significant progress on the MDGs has highlighted the value of global action, they have been uneven across regions and countries with millions of people left behind, especially the most disadvantaged and because of their sex, age, disability, ethnicity or geographic location[44].

The *2030 Agenda*, in addition to being more ambitious (aiming higher than hopefully achievable), integrated the *Millennium Declaration*, extended the time limit for the implementation and developed further pragmatic and action aspects on the basis of sustainability not only in terms of common objectives to be achieved but also of shared approaches and contents and of active participation.

In order to make the global system effective in pursuing common purposes, it is more than necessary to think of this system as anchored to a structure of cooperation, solidarity and coordination, which increasingly integrates the presence and the actions of civil society and other non-institutional actors in decision-making processes within multilateral forums. This approach can support ever-greater adaptation of multilateralism to a system that is in continuous and unstoppable change[45], renewed in the face of the complex challenges posed by current societies in particular

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[42] *Declaration on the Right to Development* (1986) UNGA 169; A/RES/41/128 (4 December 1986), available https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/496/36/IMG/NR049636.pdf?OpenElement.

[43] This Declaration has laid the foundations for an increasingly substantial discussion on the need to link the *human development* to other inalienable rights as recognized by the *Core International Human Rights Instruments* (OHCHR website, https://www.ohchr.org/en/core-international-human-rights-instruments-and-their-monitoring-bodies).

[44] Among the issues: persistence of gender inequality, particularly in the labor market and education; the particularly negative impact of climate change and environmental degradation on the poorest people; conflicts and humanitarian crises with millions of people still excluded from access to basic services,
see United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015* (published in April 2016), p. 8 .
available https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf

[45] On *multilateralism*, European Parliament resolution on *the EU and the defence of multilateralism* (2020/2114(INI)), text of the resolution adopted on 6 July 2022, see

from a sustainability perspective and in order not to run into what can be defined as the "sustainability paradox"[46].

This can make more sense by placing greater attention to the path that leads *from local to global* (as a more substantial integration of the approach from global to local, GLOCAL): if that is true that between the 1990s and the 2000s, within the third phase of globalization, there has been the rediscovery of the importance of the "local dimension" and its human and economic value, the perspective of movement *from global to local* has perhaps shown some limits not in the rediscovery of the local dimension *per se* but rather in thinking of it as a predominantly unidirectional path. Substantially integrating an approach that moves from local to global means, today in particular, restoring to the local dimension its real value of driving force in the achievement of common objectives and which together are linked for a "global" purpose.

Good governance, decentralization and participation, social security, transparency and accountability, are all elements to be considered as preconditions for the realization of these common goals in order to reach a concrete development consensus, which can lead to broadening the view of action in a constructive and unstoppable sense. In the resolution adopting Agenda 21, UN Member States affirmed that they were "determined to mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders, and all people"[47]. Therefore, alongside the development priorities, one of the main aims of the *2030 Agenda* is to build more inclusive and peaceful societies.

Discussed and adopted at the height of the third wave of globalization, the MDGs certainly found limits in setting up a partnership (the eighth goal: "*Global partnership for development*") based mainly on economic-financial cooperation. This was the outcome derived from the affirmation of a

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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0286_EN.html. "*Hybrid multilateralism*" refers to the participation of *non-state actors* in global governance for the environment in particular in the post-Paris Agreement, the legally binding international treaty on climate change adopted by 196 Parties at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) on 12 December 2015 (entered into force on 4 November 2016); for further information on the Agreement, see: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement. For an analysis on the concept of "hybrid multilateralism", see *inter alia* Bäckstrand K., Kuyper J. W., Linnér B., Lövbrand E., *Non-state actors in global climate governance: from Copenhagen to Paris and beyond*, Environmental Politics, 26:4, 561-579, 2017.

[46] Individuals, civil society, organizations and States (and all other active actors coming, among others, from business, political, third sectors) can attribute different meanings to the concept of *sustainability* and have different expectations and this happens even more easily when all the dimensions that are in it are not integrated into the action approach inherent. On the concept of "sustainability paradox", see *inter alia* Durden, C., *Towards a socially responsible management control system*, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 21 No. 5, 2008 (pp. 671-694).

[47] Supra, *footnote 7* (p. 2 of the Agenda 21 resolution).

new paradigm of economic-commercial relations, which has compromised, at least initially, the launch of a common action plan for development based on strategies to support the inevitable global social and cultural interdependencies (which, as a consequence, also entailed the emergence of a multipolarity with competing powers, and which has diverted attention from common social priorities).

As for the strengthening of the global partnership, Goal 16 of the *2030 Agenda* *"promotes peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provides access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all level"*. This goal - not openly stated in the MDGs - has to be read into close connection with Goal 17 (*Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development*): the economic-financial dimension (*means of implementation*) is essential in order to effectively achieve the objectives as a whole.

Both these goals should be read as based on the principle of sustainability and capacity building, and therefore must be treated in a synergistic way in order to "*ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels*" (Target 16.7).

The *2030 Agenda* is leading the global community along a multidirectional path (in terms of objectives and measures to be taken to achieve the 17 SDGs) which, if not actively covered by all those involved, risks to lose sight of the general aim of this plan of action that is to transform our world.

In a world society that seems to have entered a new phase of international relations (with an increasingly marked interconnection that goes beyond geographical contiguity), it is increasingly crucial and no longer deferrable to invest in the value of inclusive and participatory societies for sustainable human development. To concretely give attention to this approach means, for sovereign States, investing decisively in the positive value of diversity and heterogeneity for global justice, recognizing the importance of the endogenous networks in international cooperation, as well as enhancing the synergies between actors and stakeholders committed to achieving integrated objectives.

In this way, it will be possible to make the concept of "global" more accessible to all (also in terms of governance) and to give real value to the concept of "sustainability", so that it does not remain

only on paper, but takes the form of an effective and long-term commitment towards what, a few decades ago, the Brundtland Report (1987) had already defined as "our common future"[48].

> "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others." (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971)[49]

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Durden, C. 'Towards a socially responsible management control system'. *Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal* 21(5): 671-694.

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[48] The concept of *sustainable development* was defined for the first time in the *Brundtland Report* (*Our Common Future*, 1987, UN General Assembly 42/427). This Report of the WCED (World Commission on Environment and Development), chaired by the then Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was the main reference document for the Rio Conference (June 1992). In the Report made up of over 1600 pages, the foundation lines of a new development model based on sustainability were proposed, anticipating what would later become an imperative: the shared elaboration of the strategies to be adopted with the participation of *all the actors* involved in the world community: States, international and non-international organizations, non-state actors and civil society *"meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs"* (*Report*, Part I, Chapter 2, Par. I, *The Concept of Sustainable Development*).

[49] Rawls J., *A Theory of Justice*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971 (pp. 3-4).

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Chapter II

A New Post-global (Dis)Order?

Globalisation is Dead, Long Live Globalisation:
the Meaning of Post-Globalisation

Bram D. Koers

Globalisation is a term that has been defined in many ways, and post-globalisation is a concept that has even less immediate clarity. Although there are many authors who agree that there is something "different" about globalisation in the twenty-first century compared to the 1990's, there is little agreement on how this should be called, if it would be a different phase in globalisation[50] or something else entirely that has come after a period of globalisation, or even what it entails, exactly. Many of these disagreements come from the fact that globalisation itself does not have a universally recognized meaning. This essay will first discuss certain perspectives on globalisation before discussing what post-globalisation is, might become, and what this might mean for diplomacy.

Globalisation

Globalisation is a concept that is widely used in academic and non-academic contexts, with different academic disciplines having different views on the matter. For most historians, globalisation is something that has always existed, from the neolithic to the present[51]. Other scholars, such as most political scientists and global studies scholars, have a different view of the concept. "Globalisation" as a word took off only in the late 1980's to early 1990's[52], although the phenomenon is seen by them as having started in the 20th century, even if authors did not yet have the term to describe it as such[53].

It was thus known that there was "something going on" before the word to describe it became widely used, and so too may "post-globalisation" evolve. The idea that something has changed and that the term "globalisation" without any qualifiers does not fit the bill anymore is not unique, but consensus about what is different and how it should be described does not exist. The public view of globalisation as a technocratic pre-ordained fact of nature has lost ground, especially since the Great

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[50] Klaus Schwab (and the WEF)'s concept of "Globalization 4.0", for example, which is linked to the "4th Industrial Revolution" due to the advance of interconnectivity and automation. Klaus Schwab, 'Globalization 4.0 - what does it mean?', *World Economic Forum*, 7 February 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/globalization-4-what-does-it-mean-how-it-will-benefit-everyone/. Compare also Alan S. Blinder, 'Fear of Offshoring', *CEPS Working Paper No. 119*, December 2005, http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/119blinder.pdf. He uses "Third Industrial Revolution" but means the same thing as Schwab.

[51] Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The Ages of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 1-31

[52] Paul James and Manfred B. Steger, 'A Genealogy of 'Globalization': The Career of a Concept', *Globalizations* [2014/11(4)], pp.417-434

[53] Ibid., pp. 421-422

Recession[54]. Globalisation was used as such by multinational corporations and leaders of major Western countries to depoliticise and deproblematise neoliberal programmes under the guise of a politically neutral term[55], though this is not all it was. As an empirical phenomenon, globalisation has accelerated substantially in the 1990's and 2000's and is as such a phenomenon of its own, separate from neoliberalism or capitalism[56].

The late 2000's, the time of the Great Recession, also marked the end of the explosive growth of interest in the term "globalisation". Figure 1 visualises this decline with the use of the Google Books Ngram Viewer[57]. The terms were barely used before 1990, in line with James and Steger's argument that it took off in the 1990's[58]. The decline of the concept's use, even if not as explosive as its rise, is clear. Interestingly, this decline is not visible in (simplified) Chinese-language texts for the Chinese translation of "globalisation", as can be seen in Figure 2. Chinese is truly an outlier here, with other languages following the English trend of decline around 2007, as can be seen in the graphs in the appendix. The rise of the concept of globalisation also started later, with it really taking off in the 2010's. This paper does not aim to explain this discrepancy, and it remains to be seen if the concept remains as prevalent as it has recently been or whether it, too, is past its peak.

Figure 1: Prevalence of the term globalis/zation in English-language books between 1950-2019. Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer, accessible at https://books.google.com/ngrams/. Graph made with case-insensitive search and a smoothing of 1.

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[54] Matthew Louis Bishop and Anthony Payne, 'The political economies of different globalizations: theorizing reglobalization', *Globalizations* [2020/18(1)], pp.1-22

[55] Ibid.: p. 2; there are also critical accounts who argue that the policies being defended and the ideology being obscured are *capitalist*, not liberal, such as Eric Cazdyn and Imre Szeman, *After Globalization* (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell: 2011). This claim can be found on page 20 and sprinkled throughout the book.

[56] Victor Roudometof, 'The new conceptual vocabulary of the social sciences: the 'globalization debates' in context, *Globalizations* [2020/18 (5)], pp.771-780

[57] Michel, Jean-Baptiste, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden 'Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books', *Science* [2011/331 (6014)], pp. 176-182

[58] James and Steger, 'A Genealogy'. They also include a graph on the utilisation of the term (p. 2), but their data ends in 2008 and does not include the Commonwealth spelling of the word.

Figure 2: Prevalence of the term 全球化 (globalisation) in simplified Chinese-language books between 1950-2019. Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer, accessible at https://books.google.com/ngrams/. Graph made with case-insensitive search and a smoothing of 1.

The empirical phenomenon, rather than the concept, of globalisation has also started to plateau, though it is not in decline[59].

The *process* of globalisation may thus be slowing down, but we are not returning to a pre-globalised world. Post-globalisation thus does not entail a return to the past, but rather a period that is distinct from both the 1990-2010 period of rapid globalisation and the "before times". Globalisation has not and will not lose its relevance, but the way it manifests itself is different. It may shift from globalisation of material things, such as the movement of people or goods, to the globalisation of immaterial things, what Steger and James call "disembodied globalisation". If measured through the growth of cross-border bandwidth, this type of globalisation has neither stalled nor declined but is still growing rapidly[60]. These changes have implications for conducting diplomacy in this changing world.

Post-globalisation

The emergence of globalisation as a buzzword in public debates and core concept in academia in the 1990's led to the emergence of many "neo" and "post" versions of the traditional "isms", such as neoliberalism and post-Marxism[61]. These prefixes signified the idea that we were moving past the era where the descriptors without prefixes applied, whilst recognizing that the new concepts are an evolution of the old. They did not as much replace the old versions as they adapted the concepts to a new time. The core was not wrong or no longer applicable, thus, but the specific variation

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[59] KOF Swiss Economic Institute, KOF Globalisation Index,
https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html (last accessed: 27 January 2023)
[60] Manfred B. Steger and Paul James, *Globalization Matters: Engaging the Global in Unsettled Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 205
[61] James and Steger, 'A Genealogy', pp. 423-430

needed to be changed. Post-globalisation follows in this vein. Globalisation is not over, and we are certainly not returning to the world that was before. The globalisation of the 2010's and 2020's is markedly different from the 1990's, when the term first gained prominence.

Flew uses the term similarly in the field of communication studies[62]. He argues that the 1990's and 2000's can be seen as a period of "high globalisation", with 2007 being the year of "peak globalisation"[63]. The time after this period is then the period of "post-globalisation". As argued before, there may be more of a plateau in globalisation than the retreat of globalisation that Flew describes. Nevertheless, even a slowing down of the process is a significant departure from the heydays of globalisation.

There have also been significant non-economic changes since the 1990's that concern globalisation. The rise of the populist right across the west, with as the most prominent examples the 2016 election of Donald Trump in the US and the "Leave" vote in the Brexit referendum of the same year. In public parlance, "globalisation" became a word that frustrated voters and populist nationalist rally around as the enemy[64]. After Trump got into office, he withdrew from TPP, the Paris Climate Accords, and renegotiated NAFTA into the USMCA. His campaign slogan of 'America First' also reflects the deep distaste for 'globalisation'. The Brexit referendum was somewhat less clear-cut, as Theresa May aimed to steer the country towards a 'Global Britain', framing Brexit not as a revolt against globalisation per se but the European Union in particular. Although the idea of 'Global Britain' being able to recapture its former "glory" of the British empire was both delusional and a reflection of longing for a deeply unfair imperialist time[65], it is a reflection of the complex nature of phenomena that have sometimes been grouped as "anti-globalist" or related terms. "Anti-globalist" movements are often composed at least partly of visions of a different globalisation, not deglobalisation per se, or otherwise quickly crash into the empirical reality of globalisation and the difficulties with retreat. 'Global Britain' and its yearning for free-trade agreements, just not the ones the European Union (EU) has signed, is an example of the former, with the troubles associated with leaving the EU being an example of the latter. The renegotiation of NAFTA into USMCA is similarly an example of talk about deglobalisation meeting reality. Trump described NAFTA as "one of the worst trade deals" in history and a "nightmare", but

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[62] Terry Flew, 'Post-Globalisation', *Javnost: The Public* 25 (1-2): 102-109
[63] Ibid. : 103-105
[64] Flew, 'Post-Globalisation', pp. 102-103; Steger and James, *Globalization Matters*, pp. 17-18
[65] Bishop and Payne, 'The political economies', p. 5

the renegotiated USMCA retains most of NAFTA[66]. For populist "anti-globalists", the optics and framing might sometimes be more important than the substance.

A post-globalised world thus does not mean that all, or even many, international agreements and globalised achievements will be dropped. They have and will, however, come under increased public and political scrutiny. Political mobilisation against large free trade agreements, such as CETA or TTIP, is an example of this.

Diplomacy

The changes that have pushed the world in the direction of post-globalisation have impacts on the conducting of diplomacy. The politicisation of globalisation and most international contacts and agreements, with which diplomacy is inherently concerned, increase the sensitivity of international agreements and interactions. The public-political angle must be accounted for more than was necessary in the past, with ideological and party-political differences between negotiating partners becoming more relevant. It also increases the likelihood of direct political interference, guidance and oversight regarding these issues, which might complicate the work to be done by professional diplomats. As Sir Humphry Appleby put it: "They always say that one Prime Minister's lunch with an ambassador destroys two years of patient diplomacy." This increased attention is especially pronounced if a government comes to power that campaigned on "anti-globalisation" issues. Furthermore, the plateau of material and economic globalisation also has impacts on the focus of the diplomatic corps. The shift towards other forms of globalisation, with a larger importance on cultural and digital matters, necessitates different expertise and strategies.

Conclusion

Globalisation, both as an empirical phenomenon and a concept, took the world by storm in the 1990's. Empirical globalisation increased rapidly and was often framed as a near-fact of nature, about which it made no sense to have political debates. At the same time, academic interest in the concept exploded, with many seeing it as a term that fit with the changes occurring around them.

This period in the history of globalisation is now over. As an empirical phenomenon, it has not and will not disappear. Claims of "de-globalisation" or a return to a time before are overblown. However, it has slowed down and appears to have reached a plateau, especially regarding economic globalisation. The phenomenon has also become increasingly politicised and polarised, changing

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[66] Ana Swanson and Jim Tankersley, 'Trump just signed the U.S.M.C.A. Here's what's in the new NAFTA', *The New York Times*, 29 January 2020

the way politicians and the public interact with the concept. The concept has also lost some of its prevalence in the academic sphere. The explosion in its use came to a halt around the time of the Great Recession, approximately simultaneously with increased criticism and scrutiny about it in the public sphere.

These changes mean "post-globalisation" may be a better term to describe the current time. It does not entail the disappearance of globalisation or a return to how things were before, but rather an evolution of the original concept. Globalisation is still relevant, but its manifestation and the debate around it have changed significantly from the 1990's when the term was originally popularised. "Post-globalisation" recognises this: we are past (post) the 1990's, the original associations with globalisation in its heyday do not all hold true anymore. At the same time, it departs from this original conceptualisation and builds upon it.

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Appendix

All the following graphs were made with Google Books Ngram Viewer, available at https://books.google.com/ngrams/. All graphs are made with case-insensitive search and a smoothing of 1.

Figure 3: French

Figure 4: German

Figure 5: Italian

Figure 6: Russian

Figure 7: Spanish

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The International System: Structure Within Chaos?

Lilly Grande

'Anarchy is what states make of it'[67], the title of an article by the political scientist Alexander Wendt, is one example of the perception of the international system that exists in political science. To be able to describe and understand this system, '[i]t is necessary to be familiar with theory, because facts do not speak for themselves.'[68] Political theories can support the process of describing, understanding, and managing the international system. This text has the objective to give an informative overview of the most common theoretical approaches in political science and their perception of the international system.

The individuals which manoeuvre the international system are not solely politicians and political scholars, but also diplomats. Diplomacy as a way of communication between nations relies on the construction of the international system since it is 'central to the language of diplomacy and the way states interact'[69] and diplomats need to be aware of the playing field they are operating on, to be able to fulfil their mission to the best of their abilities.

But before it is possible to examine the theory behind the international system, it is necessary to clarify the terminology. When speaking about the *international system*, this text is referring to the metaphorical playing field, actors like states are operating on and where they interact with each other. Although domestic systems are sometimes seen as important contribution to the format of the international system, they will not be a focus of this text, but rather there will be a focus on mostly political relations between states. There are different possibilities to name this level playing field, but even though there are differences between the *rules-based order*, the *liberal international order* or the *international system*, this text will show that these terms are at their core all referring to the same concept: a platform on which actors operate and interact with each other.[70]

As already mentioned, there are different theoretical views which seek to define the rules of the international system, but even though political scholars are present in the literature concerning this

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[67] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization*, 46 (2), p. 391.

[68] Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford University Press Inc.: New York: 2010/4th edition), p. 53.

[69] Roy Allison, 'Russian Revisionism, Legal Discourse and the 'Rules-Based' International Order', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 72 (6), p. 977.

[70] For this reason, the terms rules-based order and international system will be used interchangeably throughout the text, while the term *liberal international order* will be exclusively used for the liberal view on this concept.

particular problem, it needs to be mentioned that a large part of the debate is done by legal scholars, who dispute how much the rules-based order is defined by international law.[71] Among political science scholars, the main competing theories in this field are Realism, which is widely accepted as 'the dominant theory of international relations'[72] and Liberalism as the most prominent contester.

Realists mostly describe the international system in its most natural state as anarchical, so without any internal structure and within this system states, as actors, are on the search for the most secure position.[73] Kenneth Waltz as a prominent scholar of Neorealism described the international system, because of its anarchical character as a system of 'self-help'[74], since there is no authority, which would be able to effectively enforce rules. The need for security can be met by the hegemonic theory, which is widely regarded as a related theory to Realism. The hegemon is a centre which provides the security the other states are looking for, while the hegemon can meet its own security needs by surrounding itself with like-minded states to support its ambitions. A final big part of Realism's perception of the international system is balancing. This is another way, in which states can cope with the anarchical system around them and is mostly depicted by the balance-of-power theory, which, put simply, suggests that states, in an effort to meet their objectives, align themselves with states, who have similar objectives to form a counterweight to powerful states.[75] By following this strategy, they balance out the increased power, which the other state would have over them. This objective of power maximization is a very typical viewpoint of Structural Realism.[76] Realism, in conclusion, mainly argues that states are constantly looking for a stable balance between power and security within the anarchy of the international system.

Liberalism on the other hand is often regarded as 'the historic alternative'[77] to Realism. As such it would be logical, that Liberals disagree with Realists, but when it comes to the structure of the international system as anarchical, both theories agree with each other. Yet there are naturally differences between both theories, which can be seen by looking at two scholars, which have come up with a widely acknowledged perception of the Liberal International Order.[78] These scholars are

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[71] Major discussions or arguments in the context of law will not be made in this text, since the premise here is to determine the debate which is held by political scientists. Discussing international law and how it influences the international system would go beyond this.
[72] John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. (Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 117.
[73] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 91.
[74] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Waveland Press, Inc.: Long Grove, Illinois: 2010/reissued), p. 111.
[75] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 118.
[76] Baylis et al., *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 109.
[77] Ibid p. 117.
[78] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 121.

G. John Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney. Ikenberry is one of the most active scholars in this research area[79], mostly supports in his texts a liberal point of view and argues against realist ideas. To explain the concept of the liberal international order in the way liberal scholars see it, Ikenberry and Deudney provide a very helpful argumentation, in which they define five components of the Liberal International Order: 'security co-binding, penetrated hegemony, semi-sovereignty and partial great powers, economic openness, and civic identity and community'[80]. These components are seen as vital parts of this Order. In detail, security co-binding refers to states binding each other into structures of international institutions, e.g., NATO, to keep a certain sense of security about each other.[81] The second vital component of the Liberal International Order is a penetrated hegemony[82]. Within this argument, hegemonic theory is accepted as a legitimate explanation for the international system and further developed by adding transnational relations as 'vital component of the operation of this system'[83]. Another important component, they define is 'Semi-sovereignty and partial great powers'[84], which almost exclusively refers to Germany and Japan as states, which have 'strong self-imposed constitutional restraints'[85] and therefore only a restricted amount of (military) power, as result of the post-war time. This leads to unique positions within the international system and both of them qualifying as partial great power.[86] As fourth component of the Liberal International Order, the authors name Economic openness, which is explained by Liberals through the 'rise of 'embedded liberalism' among the advanced industrial nations'[87] as well as the 'pursue [of] foreign economic policies'[88]. Finally, the authors name Civic identity as the fifth and last component of the Liberal International Order. With this, they refer to 'common norms, public mores, and political identities'[89] and mean thereby a shared cultural identity between the states of the system. All these five components are what constitutes the Liberal International Order, according to Deudney and Ikenberry. By providing these explanations, they provide a very visual idea of the Liberal International Order.

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[79] Malcolm Jorgensen, 'The Jurisprudence of the Rules-Based Order: The Power of Rules consistent with but not binding under international law', *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, 22, p. 225.
[80] Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The nature and sources of liberal international order', *Review of International Studies*, 25, p. 195.
[81] Deudney and Ikenberry, ,The nature and sources of liberal international order', pp. 182-183.
[82] Ibid p. 184.
[83] Ibid p. 186.
[84] Ibid p. 187.
[85] Ibid p. 188.
[86] Ibid pp. 188-189.
[87] Ibid pp. 189-190.
[88] Ibid p. 190.
[89] Ibid p. 192.

To honour the quote of Alexander Wendt's 'Anarchy is what states make of it'[90] which formed the beginning of this text, it is important to have a quick look at Constructivism next, since it tries 'to conceptualize the relationship between agents and structure'[91], therefore also between states and the international system. The theory of Constructivism assumes anarchy as the fundamental base of the international system and is convinced that states try to stay as secure as possible within this anarchic system.[92] Until this point, the constructivist viewpoint is very similar to Realism, but Constructivists are convinced, the 'international system is constituted by ideas'[93]. These ideas are e.g., belief systems like ideologies, but need to be believed in by a numerous group of individuals, otherwise it is not seen as influential.[94] This added dimension of ideas makes Constructivism stand out, since the theory does not believe that states are alike, like it is e.g., the case in Realism. Instead, states are constituted of the most prominent ideas, which will influence their behaviour, additional to their security needs.[95]

The fourth theoretical approach of International Relations, which will be analysed in this text is Marxism. This is an intentional choice, because even though it is often debated, whether or not it is an important theoretical approach, Marxism is part of every handbook on political theories and in the case of this text strengthens the claims, other theories make. Marxism mostly argues, using the concepts of capitalism and class struggle, with especially capitalism often displayed as source of national or global struggles.[96] Karl Marx himself did not provide a definition of the structure of the international system, but there came scholars after him, who interpreted his former work. According to them, Marxist theory agrees with Realism and Constructivism as well, that power and security are important dimensions of the international system.[97] But Marxism's 'focus is first and foremost economic power and capability which is then connected with political power'[98], so in contrast to other political theories, in Marxism economy and politics are inseparable. One account of Marxism to explain the international system is the world-systems theory. This theory introduced a semi-periphery to the world economy, located between the core and periphery, which has characteristics of both. Through its unique features it 'plays a vital role in stabilizing the political structure of the world system'[99], yet it needs to be stated, that this theory mostly focusses on the

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[90] Ibid p.391.
[91] Baylis et al., *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 146.
[92] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 168.
[93] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 179.
[94] Ibid pp. 164-165.
[95] Baylis et al., *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 146.
[96] Ibid, p. 130.
[97] Srđan Ž. Slović, Marx's approach to international relations, *Baština*, no. 54, 2021, p. 122.
[98] Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 194.
[99] Baylis et al., *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 133.

explanation of the global economy, so a deeper analysis of this theory will not result in new findings for the international system and its relations with diplomacy.

In conclusion, it seems like no other explanation for the international system is as popular as anarchy. All discussed theories agreed on some form of anarchical structure, but they have different understandings of how this anarchy influences the international system. But what does this mean for diplomats and the interaction between states? It certainly underlines the fact that there is no way to force diplomacy and no way to ensure fair diplomatic negotiations, since in the anarchical system no state or institution can ensure the rules. Instead, the states can just choose to not follow common ideas about interaction with each other and diplomatic etiquette. This is proven time and time again by states who interact with other states without meeting international norms and beliefs, which other states or organizations are trying to enforce. Examples of this, among others, are aggressions like wars or one-sided negotiations. So, diplomats as representatives of their state need not only to be able to assess the motivations and objectives of other states but must be able to predetermine the other state's way of negotiation, in order to be prepared and to be able to fulfil their mission.

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Unveiling the Challenges of Climate Diplomacy:

A Retrospective Look at the Climate Talks and the Path to a Sustainable Future

Ioana Larisa Nițu

Climate change is one of the most pressing global challenges of our time, with significant impacts on the environment, human society, and the economy. Our total well-being, including our health, food production, housing, safety, and employment possibilities, may be impacted by the consequences of climate change. People who reside in underdeveloped nations and tiny island states are already disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change. In addition to forcing communities to migrate due to sea level rise and saltwater contamination, climate change may also result in extended droughts that put people at danger of starvation. Sadly, it is anticipated that as a result of the consequences of climate change, an increasing number of people may eventually have to abandon their homes and towns.[100] Climate diplomacy is the process of addressing this challenge through diplomatic means. As climate change is a global problem that requires international cooperation, climate diplomacy has become an essential aspect of international relations.[101]

The environment, human civilization, and the economy are all significantly at danger due to the pressing worldwide issue of climate change. The use of fossil fuels and deforestation are the main causes of the Earth's climate changing at an alarming rate, according to scientific research. Rising sea levels, more frequent and intense heatwaves, droughts, storms, and an increased danger of floods are just a few of the repercussions of climate change that are already being felt around the world. Ecosystems, wildlife, and human communities—particularly those in developing nations—are being severely harmed by these changes.[102]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 2022 report highlights that the levels of greenhouse gas emissions over the past 10 years are the highest ever recorded in human history. It emphasizes the need for immediate and significant cuts in emissions across all industries, otherwise it will not be possible to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The emissions reduction commitments

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[100] United Nations, *Climate Action*, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-climate-change (last accessed 23 January 2023).

[101] Climate Diplomacy, *What is Climate Diplomacy?* https://climate-diplomacy.org/what-climate-diplomacy. (last accessed 23 January 2023)

[102] United Nations, "Climate Action".

made by countries prior to the COP26 summit indicate that the warming will exceed 1.5°C and it will become increasingly difficult to keep it below 2°C.[103]

One of the key ways to address climate change is through international cooperation and diplomacy. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main international body responsible for negotiating and implementing agreements to address climate change. The most significant of these agreements is the Paris Agreement, which was approved at COP 21 in Paris by 196 Parties on December 12, 2015, and it became effective on November 4, 2016. Its objective is to keep global warming far below 2°C, ideally below 1.5, relative to pre-industrial levels.[104]

Countries want to reach the global greenhouse gas emissions peak as soon as feasible in order to build a climate-neutral world by the middle of the century in order to meet this long-term temperature objective. The Paris Agreement is a turning point in the global climate change process because it is the first time that a legally enforceable agreement unites all countries in the fight against climate change and in the attempt to adapt to its effects. The Paris Agreement also aims to increase the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, and to provide financial support to developing countries to help them transition to a low-carbon economy.[105]

However, even if there are positive changes to the climate and despite the significant progress that has been made through international agreements, the current level of action is not sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. Many countries are not on track to meet their emissions reduction targets, and there is a significant gap between the commitments made and the action needed to limit global warming to well below 2°C. The fact that existing emissions trends are inconsistent with this objective and that many nations are not on pace to fulfill their emission reduction objectives emphasizes the urgent need for action. The response to climate change must be thorough, egalitarian, and all-inclusive, and it must take into consideration the various requirements, capacities, and situations of developed and developing nations. Furthermore, it is crucial to understand that the effects of climate change are disproportionately felt by the most vulnerable populations, including indigenous peoples, small island states, and low-income nations. To tackle this, developed nations must offer developing nations the financial, technological, and

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[103] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022, "Climate Change 2022 Mitigation of Climate Change", https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf, (last accessed 23 January 2023)
[104] United Nations, "Climate Change", https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement, (last accessed 24 January 2023).
[105] Ibid.

capacity-building support they need to make the transition to a low-carbon economy and prepare for climate change's effects.[106]

"Climate diplomacy is, to a great extent, preventive diplomacy".[107] Although there is no specific or all-encompassing definition of climate diplomacy, one could say that climate diplomacy refers to the use of diplomatic tools to support the implementation of the international climate change regime and to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change on peace, stability and prosperity.[108] Climate diplomacy might also be defined as the practice, processes, and actions taken to establish and effectively operate the international climate change system. It stems from the ongoing concern for the well-being of nature and the need for a consistent strategy to protect ecosystems. This is particularly important in regards to the services provided by urban ecosystems. The evolution of the climate regime is closely tied to the development of climate diplomacy, which can have varying implications depending on geographic, cultural, and socio-economic factors.[109]

The European Commission has identified four key areas of focus for climate diplomacy at the political level:

- committing to multilateralism in climate policy, particularly the Paris Agreement;
- addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security;
- promoting domestic action and increasing global ambition;
- strengthening international climate cooperation through advocacy and outreach.[110]

Climate diplomacy also entails using the problem of climate change to further other foreign policy goals including fostering peace and confidence as well as bolstering multilateralism. On a global strategic level, it also requires developing proper risk assessment and risk management techniques. Furthermore, via diplomatic discussions, public diplomacy campaigns, and other forms of foreign policy, climate diplomacy places a priority on addressing the issue of climate change with partners throughout the world. This entails bilateral outreach to other nations and promoting more forceful climate action. Climate diplomacy addresses the security and stability implications of climate change by taking into account intersecting issues. It necessitates a strong network of partners, including members of civil society and the private sector, to foster dialogue and foster confidence-building, thereby promoting regional stability.[111]

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[106] United Nations, "Climate Action".
[107] Climate Diplomacy, "What is Climate Diplomacy?".
[108] Ibid.
[109] Anna Hristova and Dobrinka Chankova, "Climate Diplomacy - A Growing Foreign Policy Challenge,", *Juridical Tribune* 2010, 10 (2), pp. 194-195.
[110] Climate Diplomacy, "What is Climate Diplomacy?".
[111] Ibid.

Even though the obstacles facing climate diplomacy may appear formidable, reaching an effective climate regime agreement is still possible. History has shown that significant changes may occur within a short period of time.[112] The history of climate diplomacy can be traced back to the late 1980s, when the international community first began to recognize the threat of climate change and the need for collective action to address it. Therefore, in 1988, the United Nations General Assembly authorized the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As per the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 of December 6, 1988, the IPCC's initial objective was to conduct a comprehensive assessment and provide recommendations on the current state of knowledge about climate change science, the social and economic effects of climate change, and possible response options and components to be considered in a potential international agreement on climate change.[113]

In 1992, President George H.W. Bush joined a number of other world leaders at the Rio Earth Summit to adopt a series of international environmental agreements, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The president later ratified the UNFCCC with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, and the agreement has since been embraced by nearly every country in the world. The UNFCCC aims to prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. To achieve this, the agreement commits all nations to take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, establishes the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (CBDRRC), recognizing that countries differ in their contributions to climate change and their ability to address it, and commits developed countries to assist developing countries in reducing emissions and dealing with the impacts of climate change. Governed by the Conference of Parties (COP), which meets annually, the UNFCCC serves as the foundation of the ongoing global effort to address climate change.[114]

The first significant international agreement on climate change was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which set binding emissions reduction targets for developed countries. The Protocol was adopted at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan and came into force in 2005. However, its first emission objectives were only set to last through 2012, and when it came time to negotiate a second round of targets through 2020, a number of other developed nations balked. The Kyoto Protocol is still nominally in effect, but its goals only partially address global emissions, and no new goals are anticipated. The Clean

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[112] Nick Mabey, Liz Gallagher, and Camilla Born, "The Evolution of Climate Diplomacy and the International Climate Regime." *Understanding Climate Diplomacy: Building Diplomatic Capacity and Systems to Avoid Dangerous Climate Change*, 2013, p. 21.

[113] International Panel on Climate Change, *History of the IPCC*, https://www.ipcc.ch/about/history/, (last accessed 25 January 2023).

[114] Center For Climate and Energy Solutions, *History of UN Climate Talks*, https://www.c2es.org/content/history-of-un-climate-talks/ (last accessed 25 January 2023).

Development Mechanism, which certifies carbon reductions in poor nations as marketable emission offsets, is one aspect of the protocol that may continue. [115]

As the Kyoto Protocol was facing challenges, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had trouble finding a replacement. In 2007, the Bali Action Plan was established to develop a new agreement for the comprehensive implementation of the UNFCCC. During COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, negotiators were not able to reach a formal agreement, however, the Copenhagen Accord, a political agreement, was formed. This accord set a target of limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C, asked all countries to submit plans to reduce emissions, established guidelines for reporting and verifying countries' actions, set a goal of raising $100 billion annually by 2020 for developing countries, and proposed the creation of a new Green Climate Fund. The Cancun Agreements adopted at COP 16 the following year, formalized these elements under the UNFCCC as a temporary arrangement until 2020, and opened the possibility for further negotiations towards a legally binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol.[116] And eventually, in 2015 the Paris Agreement was adopted.

The current state of climate diplomacy is marked by ongoing negotiations, agreements, and initiatives aimed at addressing the urgent threat of climate change. The main forums for these efforts is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is the main international body responsible for negotiating and implementing agreements to address climate change.[117] The Convention's top decision-making body is the Conference of the Parties. At the COP, which reviews the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments that the COP adopts, all States that are Parties to the Convention are represented. The COP also makes decisions regarding institutional and administrative arrangements that are necessary to support the Convention's effective implementation.[118]

The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, is considered one of the most significant international agreements on climate change to date. There are also additional current projects and agreements aiming at tackling climate change in addition to the Paris Agreement. For example, the Sustainable Development Goals that were included in the United Nations' adoption of the goals in 2015. Taking *"urgent action to combat climate change and its devastating impacts"* is one of their main goal, among plenty others such as "*Improving education, awareness-raising and human and institutional*

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[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Center for International Environmental Law, https://www.ciel.org/issue/climate-negotiations, (last accessed 25 January 2023)
[118] United Nations, "Climate Change", https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop, (last accessed 25 January 2023)

capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning" and *"Promoting mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities"* [119]

As the climate regime shifts its emphasis to implementation and climate risk management, climate diplomacy has grown in breadth and complexity. This quick transition has improved how the problem of climate change is addressed in larger-scale international policy and diplomacy. Additionally, it has sparked a rapid rise in alliances between state and non-state actors as well as new strategies for starting a worldwide dialogue on the effects of and solutions to climate change..[120] Even though there are many obstacles to success, efforts to solve climate change need to use the most effective methods of diplomacy and also come up with new ideas.

The likelihood of a successful climate change policy implementation is significantly reduced by the climate system tipping points and prospective agreement of high carbon infrastructure. Risks cannot be retroactively decreased to safe (below 2°C) levels if they are not promptly controlled. The transition to a zero-carbon global energy system during the following several decades is required by the threshold of below 2. Reaching 2°C will need the expensive and early retirement of investments in the energy sector during the following two to three decades.[121]

Dealing with the risks of climate change requires big changes in how countries use energy that will affect their economies and people's daily lives. This includes changes in the cost of electricity, the products people buy, and changes people can make to their homes. Similar changes can be made through trade agreements, but those are usually made through market forces. Climate agreements, however, require government decisions and can be politically controversial because they affect energy production and how people use energy and transportation. To make these changes quickly and effectively, countries will need to work together and use the best methods of diplomacy to reach an ambitious but necessary agreement.[122]

The polarization of politics is one of the biggest obstacles to climate diplomacy. The complicated problem of climate change necessitates international collaboration and collective action, but it is frequently seen through the prism of domestic politics, which can result in competing interests and a lack of political will to act. It can be challenging to come to an agreement on the essential measures

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[119] United Nations, "Sustainable Development Goals*"*, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change/, (last accessed 25 January 2023)
[120] Anna Hristova and Dobrinka Chankova, *Juridical Tribune* p.195
[121] Ibid. pp. 196-197
[122] Ibid. p. 197

to combat climate change since the topic is so politicized in many nations, with political leaders and parties holding radically different perspectives.[123]

Barriers in the economic and scientific spheres are also a big problem for climate diplomacy. Many nations, especially poor nations, lack the financial and technological means necessary to make the transition to a low-carbon economy and prepare for climate change's effects. For developing nations in particular, the costs of making the switch to a low-carbon economy can be considerable, and many of these nations lack the infrastructure and technology required to do so.

The world will not be able to achieve its goals to combat climate change without investing in the right areas. If we don't, the temperature will rise more than 1.5 degrees Celsius, which will harm people's health, livelihoods, and overall well-being. There is a need to spend a lot of money to fight climate change, such as developing new energy systems and building infrastructure that can withstand the effects of climate change. But ignoring the costs of climate change will be even more expensive in the long run. All countries need to reduce their emissions and adapt to climate change, but many developing countries don't have the resources or technology to do so. That's why all countries have agreed that developed countries with money and expertise need to provide more financial support to developing countries, especially the poorest and most vulnerable. International cooperation is crucial in addressing climate change.[124]

Soft power has been used by diplomacy to sway public opinion, shape national and international agendas, and affect political processes. The Marshall Plan, for instance, was created via diplomacy to reconstruct Europe after World War II. Following the Cold War, Europe's economies and government had a mainly peaceful transition thanks to diplomacy. Systems to seize terrorist assets across the world have been developed via diplomacy. From the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), diplomacy has created a variety of multilateral regimes to balance delicate and complex geopolitical landscapes that affect crucial domains of sovereign control. International collaboration may be established to address both enduring and recent global difficulties, according to experience, with the use of political backing and coordinated diplomacy. To address climate change, comparable collective action is needed.[125]

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[123] Columbia Climate School, "How Do We Deal With the Polarization Around Climate Change?*",* https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2022/09/23/how-do-we-deal-with-the-polarization-around-climate-change/, (last accessed 26 January 2023)
[124] United Nations, "Climate Action"
[125] Nick Mabey, Liz Gallagher, and Camilla Born, 2013, p. 21

Countries and non-state actors must improve their analytical and problem-solving skills if they are to meet the aforementioned difficulties. However, it is even more crucial that they make an investment in the capability and expertise needed to develop long-lasting agreements on this broad range of complicated topics because countries will be less inclined to consent to the ambitious promises and regime-building efforts required to keep climate danger below 2°C in the absence of robust diplomatic competence. [126]

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[126] Ibid. p. 34

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Diplomacy Can Fail:
The Example of Russia-Ukraine and the Need for a Renewed Multilateralism

Fiorella Andreoli

After a half century of bipolar confrontation between superpowers, a new phase in history – which some scholars have defined as 'post-modern'[127] – emerged.[128] A real mutation of the international system occurred, which goes hand in hand with the phenomenon of globalization, that is, the movement towards increasing levels of harmonious cooperation between political entities, that shows how international progress is achievable. This new international framework in which we are now living has been described by many scholars with the concept of 'liberal internationalism', which stands for a comprehensive and collaborative (rather than antagonistic) security system.[129] Moreover, both a quantitative – due to the exponential growth of actors (state and non-state ones) – and a qualitative mutation of the international context is underway – the latter referring to the need for a different combination of social, military, and economic components. Since we are living in a globalized world, nowadays, the most important and powerful form of power is connectivity and connection.[130]

"*By the mid-1800s, a new mentality – internationalism – seemed to have burst onto the scene in Europe and North America*".[131] The Congress of Vienna of 1815[132] was the first example of the abovementioned principle of liberal internationalism. It was a fundamental point in European history, since the idea of an organized cooperation among nations and states became a popular and attractive way to guarantee a better future to new generations. After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the major European powers decided that the time had come to work together towards the establishment of a cooperative security system replacing the previous antagonistic one

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[127] The concept 'post-modern' refers to the fact that the premises on which international relations had been based since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia have now disappeared; international progress is now possible through cooperation between sovereign states.

[128] Lenzi, *Internazionalismo Liberale*.

[129] Ibid

[130] Ibid

[131] Amy Sayward, *The United Nations in International History* (London: Bloomsbury Academic: 2017), p. 11.

[132] According to Britannica, the Congress of Vienna was an assembly held in 1814–15 that reorganized Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. It began in September 1814 and completed its works in June 1815, shortly before the Waterloo campaign and the final defeat of Napoleon. Moreover, the settlement was the most-comprehensive treaty that Europe had ever seen. Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Congress of Vienna". Encyclopedia Britannica, 11 Dec. 2022, https://www.britannica.com/event/Congress-of-Vienna, (last accessed 11 March 2023).

of the balance of power.[133] They established the so-called Concert of Europe,[134] with the main aim of re-constructing and re-integrating the European system of relations for the first time in history. Also, the concept of 'European Public Law' was created, with 'law' standing for the common rule for the benefit of all nations. The idea of how the world ought to develop appears to have been inspired in part by Immanuel Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' of 1795,[135] and – with the exception of some minor disputes during the course of the 19th century – this 'concert' lasted for one hundred years, until the First World War broke out.[136]

Later, after World War I, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, "*the gathered victors created three new international organizations. The Treaty of Versailles included the large and complex League of Nations covenant (whose Article 14 led to the creation of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague) and provisions for the International Labour Organization (ILO)*".[137] Basically, the Treaty of Versailles with the newly created League of Nations was the next step and the second attempt to establish this cooperative liberal system. Its failure, again – with the outbreak of the Second World War – led to the third crucial attempt by European powers to create some sort of postwar international organization which should keep the peace and international stability. "*The U.S. State Department began sketching plans for the new organization, and these became the starting point for the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences that wrote the U.N. Charter and established the main organization*".[138] Nowadays, the United Nations Charter can be seen like the 'Bible' of the international system of relations between states.

Russia-Ukraine and the need for a renewed Multilateralism in nowadays global world
Today, in the present state of things, we need – again – to face another attempt to launch that collaborative rather than antagonistic system that goes under the name of liberal internationalism – that approach that advocates an open and cosmopolitan society. The role of diplomacy – which means, basically, international (peaceful) politics – comes with the recognition that an international community exists. However, as I shall argue, diplomacy can fail.

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[133] In the field of international relations, the theory of the balance of power asserts that states may secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining in the international arena enough military power to dominate all the other states; so, basically, power is balanced in such a way that states avoid aggression of other states due to fear of retaliation.

[134] The 'Concert of Europe' refers to a period of relative international (European) peace in the post-Napoleonic era, when consensus among the European powers favored the preservation of the territorial and political status quo.

[135] According to the book of the German philosopher Kant, democratic, commercial, and institutional peace are the three kinds of peace which should be pursued by governments in a joint peace program for the future prosperity of international relations among nations.

[136] Lenzi, *Internazionalismo Liberale*.

[137] Sayward, *The United Nations in International History*, p. 13.

[138] Ibid. p. 19.

Significantly, in this regard, *"the Russia-Ukraine war is a 21st-century sign of failed diplomacy"*.[139] The invasion of mainland Ukraine by Russia on 24 February, 2022, can be seen as a major crisis within a broader conflict that has been ongoing since 2014 when the Russian Federation annexed Crimea.[140]

Notably, *"neither side is likely to win a war that is currently devastating Ukraine, imposing massive costs in lives and lucre on Russia [...]"*.[141] The rest of the world is also suffering; Europe is probably in recession, the overall American economy is worsening, and the whole world is living in a situation of uncertainty and is at risk of a nuclear escalation. This conflict clearly shows the need to achieve a permanent global order where peace prevails, overcoming those gaps in diplomatic efforts and policies that prevent the correct and good functioning of this – rather practical – discipline.[142]

There is a urgent need to find a solution for a peace agreement between the involved states of this new conflict which is occurring at the heart of Europe. In this regard,

> 'a credible agreement would first need to meet the core security interests of both parties. [...] In a peace agreement, Ukraine would need to be assured of its sovereignty and security, while NATO would need to promise not to enlarge eastward. (Although NATO describes itself as a defensive alliance, Russia certainly feels otherwise and firmly resists NATO enlargement)'.[143]

However, since Russia and Ukraine cannot reach such a peace alone, the only solution lies in the involvement of neutral nations (that is, third parties) in the process which must lead to an agreement. Such parties could be – as proposed by the American economist and public policy analyst Jeffrey David Sachs in an article for 'The Economist' in January 2023 – neutral states such as India, China, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa, all of which have – as he states – *"repeatedly called for a negotiated end to the conflict."* Moreover, as he underlines, *"these countries are neither Russia-haters nor Ukraine-haters. They neither want Russia to conquer Ukraine, nor the West to expand NATO eastward [...]."*[144] Also, neither Russia nor Ukraine wants to squander

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[139] Mary Grace Wedel, 'Refined Diplomacy for the Global Order Restoration; Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War', *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities,* 5(5): 374-388, p. 381.
[140] The Russo-Ukrainian conflict officially began in February 2014 when Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and supported pro-Russian separatists in the war in Donbas against Ukrainian government forces. In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, thus bringing a major escalation into the conflict.
[141] Jeffrey Sachs, 'Jeffrey Sachs on why neutral countries should mediate between Russia and Ukraine', *The Economist*, 18 January 2023.
[142] Wedel, *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*.
[143] Sachs, *The Economist*.
[144] Ibid.

their relations with them, thus contributing to their status of potential guarantors of peace. The just mentioned countries are becoming major players in the global economy and as a consequence they are also crucial to global governance. In addition to them, as Sachs further proposes, Turkey, Austria, and Hungary are other potential future guarantors of peace. On the one hand, Turkey "*has skillfully mediated Russia-Ukraine talks*"[145], on the other hand, Austria has been a neutral country for a long time, while Hungary has called many times for negotiations between the two belligerents to end the conflict (and it is also holding the UN General Assembly presidency at the moment). The UN Security Council,[146] at the same time, should play the role of co-guarantor in this complex framework. Moreover,

"Some compromises would need to be found regarding Crimea and the Donbas region, perhaps freezing and de-militarizing those conflicts for a period of time. A settlement will also be more sustainable if it includes the phased elimination of sanctions on Russia and an agreement by both Russia and the West to contribute to the rebuilding of war-torn areas".[147]

As the former Italian ambassador Sergio Romano points out, the world cannot do without Russia or leave Russia apart – a country in the heart of Europe which is necessary for the stability of the continent – and the only solution lies in a common project for the future (of course acknowledging, in any case, that Russia has brutally violated international law and principles).[148] Recalling the Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres – in one of his speeches of March 2022 – Romano reminds that this war cannot be won (since wars have no winners, but just losers) and that the need to sit down at the bargaining table in the view of negotiating towards a peace project has become of primary importance.[149] Again, as Sachs notably says, "*The world should not allow the two sides to continue a reckless spiral of escalation.*"[150]

Besides the Russia-Ukraine crisis, other tensions and threats have emerged or are emerging in the form of civil wars, terrorism, and various other territorial disputes. We now have to face some major issues, especially emerging from the so-called 'failed states'. Terrorism and migrations are a symptom of the fact that the system is broken. We need a common effort from the broader international community to address this kind of problems. Again, "*diplomacy in the 21st-century is*

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[145] Ibid.
[146] The United Nations Security Council is a principal organ of the UN which has the primary responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security.
[147] Sachs, *The Economist*.
[148] Sergio Romano, *La Scommessa di Putin. Russia-Ucraina. I motivi di un conflitto nel cuore dell'Europa* (Milano: Longanesi: 2022).
[149] Romano, *La Scommessa di Putin*.
[150] Sachs, *The Economist*.

experiencing radical and unprecedented changes that necessitate a fundamental reorientation and refinement".[151]

Moreover, important global powers such as China and Russia are not fully integrated into the liberal multilateral cooperative international order.[152] The People's Republic of China (PRC), since the 1970s, has emerged on the international scene as an important global economic actor. From being a continental entity, it is now projecting itself outside, as an expansionist power (with the main examples of Africa and the South China Sea).[153] China is circumventing the international system for its own purposes and breaking the system from within, while at the same time disputing the Western model of IR through its 'sharp' power. Russia, on the other hand, is obstructing the functioning of the international system (with the main example of Ukraine).

Notably, a lot of critical issues today cannot be solved by letting the parties involved negotiate bilaterally. They need the contribution of the international community, in the form of encouragements, guarantees, as well as mediation. Also, once the agreements have been made, the parties cannot be left alone. We need long-term guarantees that the agreements will be implemented and respected. Critical situations require processes, and nowadays we have no superpower that can ensure that a certain achieved result will stick. Multilateralism[154] is indispensable to come to the result, and to guarantee it will last.[155]

Having said this, the best approach is made by engagement (that is, trying to bring these states into the system), and adherence to the same common rules. The UN model is a Western model (since world history has been made mainly by Europeans), but is one that can be beneficial for all. We cannot solve nowadays problems on the international political scene – the so-called 'strategic voids'[156] [157] – bilaterally (for example letting alone Russia/Ukraine, but also Israel/Palestine, and

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[151] Wedel, *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, p. 374.

[152] Guido Lenzi, *La Diplomazia. Passato, presente e futuro* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore: 2020).

[153] In the past recent years, China has become increasingly 'aggressive' in the South China Sea, trying to assert its authority in the region through the creation and militarization of artificial islands, and the testing of missiles, while it is trying, at the same time, to assert its prominence in the African continent through a sharp practice of foreign direct investment.

[154] In international relations, multilateralism is opposed to both unilateralism and bilateralism. According to Britannica, qualitative elements or principles that characterize multilateralism are: the indivisibility of interests among participants, a commitment to diffuse reciprocity, and a system of dispute settlement intended to enforce a particular mode of behaviour. Scott, James. "multilateralism". Encyclopedia Britannica, 27 Feb. 2022, https://www.britannica.com/topic/multilateralism. (Last accessed 11 March 2023).

[155] Lenzi, *La Diplomazia*.

[156] In international relations, strategic voids refers to those issues which have been dealt with by major actors in a bad way and which have altered the global scene. Examples of strategic voids, nowadays, are issues relating to countries such as Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, the Balkans, Russia/Ukraine, and many more. Strategic voids needs the concurrence of, and a joint effort from the whole international community.

[157] Lenzi, *La Diplomazia*.

many more), because it cannot work. A joint effort from both the UN and major neutral countries is necessary for the promotion of a new era of peace.[158] The UN, significantly, is understood by historian Amy Sayward as a borderland, an arena, or intersection in international history *"where nations and peoples came (and come) together to influence and put pressure on other countries and people with their words, their ideas, their actions [...]"*.[159] We must recognize that we have a common interest in dealing together.

The common interest has become in the twenty-first century the supreme value. We need to act in the spirit and in the intention of the UN, within a system of norms to which countries can relate. Sovereign nations should cooperate and deal together with common problems. International organizations should provide stability and at the same time forward movement. The UN needs to be re-energised from the bottom-up. The era of international convergence and collaboration has begun; there is now the need for a renewed cooperative system, replacing the antagonistic and anachronistic one of the balance of power on which history has been based for millennia, and which re-emerged again last year.

To sum up, we have been here for two hundred years or more – in this cooperative liberal system – which is still there and just needs to be revitalised. I would argue that there is no possible Plan B. Again, as the former British politician and diplomat Harold Nicolson wrote in 1954, the chief aim of diplomacy has always been – and still is – the preservation of international stability and peace, and, notably, *"negotiation must always be a process rather than an episode [...]"*.[160] The path has been again interrupted last year, but it has not been cancelled. The only solution lies in our globalized diplomacy – one of the oldest professions in the world. The desirable shared agenda must be based on pluralism, that is, on the common global interests that have become supreme values. The purpose of diplomacy is to narrow down the options and try to find a common denominator. The remedy for the current situation of complexity and uncertainty can only be a return to that mentality of liberal internationalism. We need essentially to go back to when, in particular, in 1945 with the UN, that liberal internationalism that had been running throughout Europe for more than one hundred years was re-proposed.[161] Collaboration, rather than opposition, appears to be a useful tool for the promotion of both national and international interests. We need, again, to get rid of that approach to international relations which is called 'realism', according to

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[158] Lenzi, *Internazionalismo Liberale.*
[159] Sayward, *The United Nations in International History*, p. 2.
[160] Harold Nicolson, 'The Transition between the Old Diplomacy and the New' (Ch. IV), in Harold Nicolson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (Being the Chichele Lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953), p .77.
[161] Lenzi, *La Diplomazia.*

which the international political system is anarchic and world politics is necessarily a field of conflict among different actors pursuing both wealth and power. No country can isolate himself in today's multilateral global world.[162]

Conclusion

As we have recently experienced and we are still experiencing nowadays, big challenges and crisis at the international level may also arise from pandemics, climate change issues, and other non-political factors. Exactly for this reason, more collaboration is needed among sovereign states as well as international organizations; a collaboration which focuses on the adoption of a so-called 'refined diplomacy', that is, a kind of multilateral and liberal diplomacy which is able to secure long-term peace, democracy, and prosperity to all nations and which fills in the gaps in current diplomatic approaches.[163] As stated by the American politician and diplomat Henry Kissinger in 1994, "*the Wilsonian goals of […] peace, stability, progress, and freedom for mankind—will have to be sought in a journey that has no end*".[164] Finally, "*[…] I believe that the principles of sound diplomacy, which are immutable, will in the end prevail, and thus calm the chaos […]*".[165]

Fiorella Andreoli graduated from the University of Mantova with a B.A. in Languages for International Relations (English and German language). In the meantime, she worked as a secretary/receptionist during summer periods for four years in a private resort. She is now enrolled in the final year of the Master Degree in International Relations of the University of Bologna. During the winter semester of the 2022/2023 Academic Year, she had the opportunity to study at the University of Luxembourg (Master in European Governance) as an Erasmus student. There she took part in the Diplomacy Lab, which she found very interesting and useful for her future career. She is now doing an internship in Frankfurt a.M., at the Italian Chamber of Commerce for Germany. Interested in Diplomacy, she is writing her final Master thesis on the evolution of the diplomatic method.

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[164] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (USA: Simon & Schuster: 1994), pp. 929-930.
[165] Nicolson, 'The Transition between the Old Diplomacy and the New', p. 93.

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Chapter III

Post-globalization Asymmetries Strike Back: The Impact on Regional Arenas

Western Balkans (WB6),

An Attractive & Competitive Playing Field for National & Supranational Soft Powers

Sana Hadžić-Babačić

2022 has been a very challenging year from a diplomatic perspective. With the world just starting to recover from the COVID19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine did not spare anybody from another crisis period. The global geopolitical order has never been so disturbed since World War II, provoking multiple crises all around the world and revealing a new break-up between the Western & the Eastern blocks, since the Cold War. In the context of the relentless war in Ukraine, the situation awoke memories of the 1992 war in the Western Balkans region[166], which is already haunted by considerable political instability since 2021.

This research paper will focus on the Western Balkan countries, by analysing the influence of the present national and supranational soft powers in the region, also called the WB6. According to Florian Marciacq[167], there are many semantic discussions regarding the term "Western Balkans" since the word "Balkan" doesn't convey a positive connotation. Janusz Bugajski[168] argues that the term Western Balkans has a geopolitical terminology that has been "initially used in the 1990s by USA & EU to describe the part of the Balkans Peninsula that remained outside of both NATO & the EU". As a result, it can be stressed that Slovenia and Croatia that were considered part of the region before joining NATO - respectively in 2004 and 2009 and into EU in 2007 and 2013 - are not mentioned in the Western Balkans anymore since they joined NATO and EU. This research will define the Western Balkans as a geographical region, which includes the six countries located in the South-eastern part of Europe that are not part of the European Union: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia.

Located at the crossroads of the East & the West, this region has always been influenced by multiple great powers. Behind influences, we may assume that there is a willingness to show power. Further to Alessandro Politi[169], a power is "the capability to conserve or change a situation taking into account available resources, means and mentalities, which bring us a broad definition that encompasses the soft power, the hard power and even beyond". In addition, Joseph S. Nye Jr. insists on the main goal and results sought, by specifying a power as "the ability to affect others to obtain

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[166] Dejana Saric and Pierre Morcos, 'The War in Ukraine: Aftershocks in the Balkans', *CSIS*, 15 March 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-ukraine-aftershocks-balkans (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[167] Interview with Dr. Florian Marciacq on a definition of Western Balkans.
[168] Foreign Policy Analyst at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington DC.
[169] Interview with Alessandro Politi on a definition of a power, hard power and soft power.

the outcomes wanted"[170]. Among powers available, we may distinguish the hard power and the soft power. While a soft power is more considered as a set of attractive elements of a region, which may inspire other countries to follow the same dynamic, a hard power is the root cause of wars and represents the use of military force. In this paper, we will focus on the notion of soft power, which is mainly used by political scientists to discuss foreign policy and the governing styles of political leaders in the world. Joseph S. Nye Jr. describes three soft power's resources: its culture, its political ideals, and its foreign policies[171]. He also mentions the importance of the role of States and especially the role of non-state stakeholders such as NGOs, businesses, universities, and religious associations in wide spreading influence[172]. Besides, building a soft power also means building networks and communities through positive narratives and storytelling that may contribute to increase the attraction of a country's influence, according to Professor Josip Glaurdic[173].

What are the main national and supranational soft powers we may identify in the Western Balkans? What are the main diplomatic instruments deployed to spread their influence in the region? Can we observe a real competition between them on the ground? To answer these questions, this essay will explore the soft powers identified in the region of Western Balkans, respectively: the European Union, the United States of America, Russia, Turkey, China and Gulf countries, by following the methodology of Joseph S. Nye Jr. Spotlighting the degree of soft powers in the region, we will lay the structural foundations of a multidimensional matrix as a measurement tool and conclude on the importance of combining hard and soft power to adopt a "smart power" approach that is essential nowadays to reinforce the arsenal of diplomacy tools in a post-globalized world.

The European Union

Among the different actors making use of its soft power to influence the region, the European soft power is probably the most advanced, mainly stemming from its culture and enlargement strategy, which strives to bind the region to the EU in terms of both economics and politics. From an economic perspective, the Western Balkan nations have several trade and investment opportunities with the EU, which is a significant economic partner (see diagram below). Additionally, the EU made huge investments by implementing projects to aid in the modernization of the region's economies. Last July 2022, the EU has agreed on an unprecedented financial support for the WB6

[170] Joesph Nye, *The future of power* (New York City: PublicAffairs: 2011), p. 94.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Joseph Nye, *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*. (New York City: PublicAffairs, 2004), pp. 90-97.
[173] Inteview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic on the importance of storytelling and the power of attraction.

amounting to 30 billion euros to bring the WB6 closer to the EU and bring positive change in the region[174].

In 2021, the EU accounted for almost 70% of the region's trade in goods

Western Balkans' main trading partners (2021)

others 13%

EU 68%

China 8%

Russia 3%

United Kingdom 3%

Türkiye 5%

Trade in goods

175

Part of its EU enlargement policy[176], considering the status of each country in the EU membership process, it also provides support for democratic reforms aimed at improving governance, the rule of law, human rights, where the European soft power is primarily based on European values and social welfare[177]. In addition, the EU fosters stronger links with the Western Balkans, particularly by offering EU membership opportunities to the member states of the region. Also, the Stabilization & Association Process[178] or the Copenhagen criteria[179] played a role to target a progressive Europeanization, a stabilized region and a free-trade area.

Despite its willingness to support the normalization of relations between the member states of the region and participating in peacekeeping and conflict-resolution initiatives, the most recent tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have shown the limits of the European diplomacy[180]. Besides, the

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[174] European Council, Infographic - The EU: main trade partner and investor for the Western Balkans, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/the-eu-main-trade-partner-and-investor-for-the-western-balkans/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[175] Ibid.

[176] European Council, EU enlargement policy, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[177] Interview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic.

[178] European Council, EU enlargement policy, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/enlargement/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[179] EUR-Lex, the Copenhagen criteria, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/accession-criteria-copenhagen-criteria.html (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[180] Dimitar Bechev, 'The Latest Kosovo-Serbia Tensions Reveal the EU's Diplomatic Limits', *Carnegie Europe*, 25 August 2022,

credibility of the whole European project is at stake and may lead to more skepticism in the region if the EU Member States do not reach a common position regarding the EU enlargement policy in the WB6, since a real and strong EU alignment would be crucial to progress on the EU membership process of the whole region. What is certain is that the Western Balkans will keep an eye on the outputs of the 24th Summit between EU and Ukraine[181] and push for an EU rapprochement, which goes beyond the motionless discourse[182] - see map overview of EU & NATO membership below, considering that Bosnia is an EU candidate since December 2022 . All things considered, the European Union is probably so far, the player in the Western Balkans, which still holds the greatest promises to citizens of the region from a political, economic, democratic and EU membership perspective - far behind the other players.

The Western Balkan's tortuous road to integration with the West

[183]

The United States of America

The United States of America exercises an incontestable hard power in the region on security issues, notably through NATO membership or the presence of KFOR (Kosovo Force) to maintain a safe and secure environment. Indeed, many countries from the WB6 joined NATO during the last

https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/08/25/latest-kosovo-serbia-tensions-reveal-eu-s-diplomatic-limits-pub-87755 (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[181] European Council, EU-Ukraine Summit, 3 February 2023,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/international-summit/2023/02/03/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[182] Interview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic.

[183] Belrim Reka, 'The Balkans' next challenge: curb corruption', *GIS,* 01 March 2018,
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/wars-western-balkans/ (last accessed 01 April 2023).

15 years: Albania in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, North of Macedonia in 2020 while Bosnia and Kosovo applied in 2022. The security dimension of its engagement is indeed crucial to maintain and promote the stability in the region of Western Balkans, especially in Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Also, the US has always been a strong advocate for the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO (see map section 1.). The involvement of the US in the WB6 has a historical starting point as the US was leader in the negotiations of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995. The security issue in the region is key nowadays, since it can not only affect the stability in the WB6 region, but also may have effects of the global order[184]. Otherwise, the US uses its soft power by investing in energetic resources in the region and joining the AMBO pipeline project (Albanian, Macedonian and Bulgarian Oil Corporation), which implicates Albania, North of Macedonia, and Bulgaria. In addition, the US has promoted tighter connections with the countries in the region, notably through trade and investment efforts and security cooperation programs, to offset Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans, in the same dynamic of the EU[185]. Furthermore, the Russo-Ukrainian war has opened new paths to international organizations for countries at risk of Russia's interference. Bosnia and Kosovo had asked the EU to accelerate the accession process for its EU candidate status to help prevent instability in the two countries. Despite the fact that the "global powers, and architects of the Dayton's Agreement" are to fault, the EU has consistently placed the burden for the absence of changes on the Bosnian government. From the American hard power perspective, the key decisive point for the future of the region is in Bosnia and Kosovo[186].

Russia

In terms of projection of power, Russia tends to adopt a disruptive approach[187] in its foreign policy contrary to other soft powers in place. The geopolitical context in the region brings the actors to an informal confrontation and polarization of opinions[188] among the region in many aspects, notably political, economic, or cultural. From a political perspective, the Russian strategy consists of controlling the leaders in crucial positions[189] by getting them to be troublemakers to manage stability or instability on the ground. Russia has strategic interests in the region, particularly in

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[184] Interview with Dr. Florian Marciacq, Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic, Alessandro Politi.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Ibid.
[189] Interview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic on the role of Russia in the Western Balkans.

Serbia and Republika Srpska (Bosnia & Herzegovina), by keeping the leaders Vucic and Dodik in power and supporting the Serb community[190], seen as "buffer spaces"[191] of Russia.

Share of gas supply from Russia in Europe in 2021, by sel

Country	Share
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	100%
Moldova*	100%
North Macedonia*	100%
Latvia	92%
Serbia*	89%
Austria	86%
Bulgaria	79%
Finland	75%
Slovakia	68%
Greece	64%
Hungary	61%
Slovenia	60%

[192]

Indeed, Russia has the not-underestimated ability to destabilize the region with targeted political games and tactics (propaganda, fake news), and is the traditional ally of Serbia, where it exercises its hard power, notably by providing military and economic assistance[193]. From an economic perspective, Russia is an important energy supplier for some countries in the region. Since the war in Ukraine started and considering the energetic crisis the world is facing, Russia uses energy resources as a tool of influence[194] in the region as it is heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. Furthermore, Russia has a history of conducting propaganda and deceit campaigns in the area to advance its agenda and challenge the dominance of the West. From a cultural and religious perspective, its soft power is mainly spread through linguistic cooperation programs and the presence of Orthodox churches in each country of the region. In sum, Russia does not have a significative influence in the region, but it uses its soft power by betting on three main elements: a) the destabilization and blockades of important decisions through pro-Russian leaders – such as by forestalling the accession of Balkan countries to EU and NATO, or the recognition of Kosovo , b) the offensive policy to target a Russian energetic dependency (see graph, Satistica, 10/2022) in the

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[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Statista, Dependence on Russian gas in Europe 2021, by country, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1201743/russian-gas-dependence-in-europe-by-country/ (last accessed 01 April 2023).
[193] Interview with Alessandro Politi on the role of Russia in the Western Balkans.
[194] Ibid.

region and beyond , and c) the Russian culture, which bring us to understand the decisive point for the future of the region is in Serbia.

Turkey

Turkish soft power in the Western Balkans is visible through several channels, including historical, cultural, and religious ties, economic, and political support for certain political parties and leaders[195]. From an economic perspective, Turkey is known for its significant investments in Serbia as a first position (see graphic below), spread through the presence of banks such as Halkbank, well implemented in the region, especially in Serbia and North Macedonia[196]. On the other hand, Turkey acts as a strong advocate for Muslim population and increased its investments in the region mainly through its non-state stakeholder TIKA[197] (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) or Turkish Maarif Foundation[198], more active on actions supporting children's education. Hotspots were established by TIKA in each WB6 country , together with investments in specialized infrastructure and assistance for Balkan societies in the fields of health and education. Furthermore, the increasing number of Turkish television programs in the Balkans or Turkish movies and series on Netflix[199] are well-liked by the locals and act as an effective soft power strategy instrument to spread the Turkish culture and lifestyle, awakening in this way the Ottoman nostalgia[200]. Beyond the cultural aspect, the religion is also part of the Turkish soft power strategy, by helping in financing the constructions of mosques, while defending a Turkish model based on economic liberalism concealing democracy and religious conservatism[201] led by an "Erdogan centred foreign policy"[202].

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[195] Interview with Dr. Florian Marciacq on the role of Turkey in the Western Balkans.
[196] Cosim Conceatu, 'Halkbank wants to further expand activity in Balkans', *xprimm*, 23 May 2019, https://www.xprimm.com/HALKBANK-wants-to-further-expand-activity-in-Balkans-articol-2,10,22-13565.htm (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[197] TIKA, Homepage, https://www.tika.gov.tr/en (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[198] Turkish Maarif Foundation, Homepage, https://turkiyemaarif.org (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[199] 97 Turkish movies and series are available on Netflix in April 2022, see: https://www.whats-on-netflix.com/library/list-of-turkish-movies-tv-series-on-netflix/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[200] Nicole Ely, 'Much-loved Soaps Polish Turkey's Image in Balkans', *Balkan Insight*, 18 June 2019, https://www.balkancrossroads.com/soaps-polish-turkish-image-balkans (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[201] Interview with Dr. Florian Marciacq on the role of Turkey in the Western Balkans.
[202] Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere, 'Turkey's Soft Power in the Balkans Reaching its Limits', *Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy*, 1 July 2021, https://www.eliamep.gr/en/publication/τα-όρια-της-ήπιας-ισχύος-της-τουρκίας-σ/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

Table 1: Official Development Assistance of Turkey from 2002 to 2017 expressed in dollars

Year	Amount of Official Assistance in dollars
2002	85 million
2003	76 million
2004	339 million
2005	601 million
2006	712 million
2007	602 million
2008	780 million
2009	707 million
2010	976 million
2011	1273 million
2012	2533 million
2013	3308 million
2014	3591 million
2015	3919 million
2016	6487 million
2017	9084 million

Source: Authors' own analysis based on the annual reports of TIKA from 2005 to 2017 and OECD (2019) [203]

In a nutshell, Turkish soft power activities contribute to improve relations between Turkey and the Balkan countries. Unlike the European, American, and Russian powers, Turkey seems not to interfere in appearance in the internal politics of the countries. The country adopts a balanced foreign policy without distinction of religion, which bring a positive image and contributes to gain the confidence of the Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox communities[204]. Finally, although there is a willingness of Turkey to act as a mediator in the region, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans showed its limits, since it is guided by its own projection of interests as well[205].

China

The main strategy of China consists of wide spreading its economic ties as wide as possible, by leading a "debt-trap diplomacy"[206], ideally through capital projects with the aim of tying Europe and China economically and creating many dependencies through financial capital[207], by only

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[203] Faris Kocan and Jana Arbeiter, 'Is TIKA Turkey's platform for development cooperation or something more? Evidence from the western Balkans', *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies*, 12(1): 180.

[204] Alex Sinhan Bogmis, 'Fruit de la politique positive: la Turquie, un acteur principal dans les Balkans', *Anadolu Agency*, 08 September 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/turquie/fruit-de-la-politique-positive-la-turquie-un-acteur-principal-dans-les-balkans-analyse/2357904 (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[205] Vuk Vuksanovic, 'Turkey's pragmatic policy in the Balkans has its limits', *Balkan Insight*, 11 November 2021, https://balkaninsight.com/2021/11/11/turkeys-pragmatic-policy-in-the-balkans-has-its-limits/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[206] Notion used in 2018 by the US Vice President to qualify the long-term debt approach of Chinese diplomacy: Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, 'The Chinese 'Debt Trap' Is a Myth', *The Atlantic*, 06 February 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[207] Interview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic & Dr. Florian Marciacq on the role of China in the Western Balkans.

mentioning the case of the most expensive highway in the world in Montenegro[208]. Another key aspect of China's influence is marked by its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to expand China's economic and trade interests globally. All these investments are accessible on the BIRN's interactive platform "China in the Balkans"[209], which lists all Chinese loans and investments by country. According to the platform, China invested 32 billion euros in the region during the period 2009-2021[210]. Further to Choice, a Chinese think tank, a "Digital Silk Road" (DSR) came up in the Balkans, part of the "Smart City package"[211] of Chinese diplomacy toolbox, which conduct us to think that the Chinese soft power is not that harmless than we think, while inconspicuous.

Also, China deepened its political ties with the countries of the Western Balkans, through vaccine diplomacy[212] or cultural programs through the silent deployment of the Institute of Confucius, implemented at least in each university of each Western Balkan country and beyond (see the table below)[213], acting as a non-negligible soft power in the academia. In sum, China's influence in the WB6 sounds invisible in appearance, but one must have a deeper look at facts and figures to understand the long-term vision of Chinese diplomacy with an ambitious willingness to sell its illiberal global order to less democratic countries as an alternative to the western liberal one to serve its geopolitical interests[214] and compete with the West.

Gulf countries

During the last few years, we observed some attempts of influence of Gulf countries in the Western Balkans, mainly from an economic and cultural perspective. Since the Arabic Spring period, people from Gulf countries looked for other holiday places such as in Bosnia & Herzegovina, where they find landscapes full of rivers, forests, and mountains, which they don't have in their home

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[208] Hans von der Brelie, 'Le Monténégro piégé dans le scandale de l'autoroute chinoise', *Euronews*, 8.5.2021, https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/05/07/le-montenegro-piege-dans-le-scandale-de-l-autoroute-chinoise (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[209] Balkan Insight, China in the Balkans, https://china.balkaninsight.com, last accessed 12 March 2023.

[210] BIRN, 'BIRN presents online platform on China's activities in Western Balkans', 16 December 2021, https://birn.eu.com/news-and-events/birn-presents-online-platform-on-chinas-activities-in-western-balkans/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[211] Choice, 'China's Digital Silk Road enters the Western Balkans', *Chinaobservers*, 30 June 2021, https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-digital-silk-road-enters-the-western-balkans/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[212] European Parliament, China's strategic interests in the Western Balkans, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733558/EPRS_BRI(2022)733558_EN.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[213] Plamen Tonchev, 'China's Soft Power in Southeast Europe', *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, 2020, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sarajevo/16005.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[214] Interview with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic, Dr. Florian Marciacq, Alessandro Politi; Katherina Atha et al., US – China relations on Smart Cities Development, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/China_Smart_Cities_Development.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2023).

countries[215]. Considering the low standards of living[216], they might be tempted to buy apartments or invest in holiday residences projects (ex. the Sarajevo Resort[217], a Kuwait financed project that failed mainly due to the lack of attraction). Although Sarajevo is well known as a holiday Eldorado for Gulf states tourists and taking into account the increasing appetite of Gulf states investors to buy lands for real estate projects, the complexity and the slowness of the administrative procedures to obtain necessary authorizations, do not allow them to speed the implementation of them[218]. Considering the ethnically divided Government, fears raised about the Islamification of Bosnia, which divides the region when it comes to welcoming Gulf states influence[219].

Beyond the economic aspect, one may observe a willingness to spread the Arabic culture in the region by financing the construction of mosques or implementing advertisement signages in Arabic, while most people don't read in Arabic[220]. Some of the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are involved in religious and cultural initiatives aimed at supporting the Muslim communities in the Western Balkans, which help the Gulf community to enhance their influence in the region: a question that has been recently raised at the European Parliament, notably regarding the case of investments from Qatar in Kosovo[221]. Also, we may add that the opening of new direct airlines Doha-Belgrade or Dubai-Belgrade, may underline the willingness of emerging actors as UAE and Qatar to have one foot in the region to engage strategic investments. However, their activities are often seen as controversial due to concerns over the spread of extremist ideologies and the lack of information and transparency of their investments. Considering all these elements combined and despite of their visible cultural and economic presence, we can argue that Gulf countries have limited direct influence in the Western Balkans[222].

Conclusion

As a conclusion, we may argue that the Western Balkans are at the center of a "great power struggle" mainly between the EU, Russia, US, China, and Turkey. The WB6 region became indeed a space of confrontation of great powers with a high level of competition in many aspects, but also

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[215] Guy de Launey, 'Inside Europe: Bosnia Arab Investment', *Deutsche Welle*, 27 Februrary 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/inside-europe-bosnia-arab-investment/audio-52557587 (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[216] Hans von der Brelie, 'La Bosnie-Herzégovine sous l'influence arabe et turque?', *Euronews*, 26.04.2018, https://fr.euronews.com/2018/04/27/la-bosnie-herzegovine-sous-influence-arabe-et-turque- (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[217] Sarajevo Resort, Homepage, https://www.sarajevoresort.com/home (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Dominique Bilde, Qatar's investment in Kosovo and radical Islam, European Parliament, 22 July 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-003722_EN.html (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[222] Interviews with Prof. Dr. Josip Glaurdic, Dr. Florian Marciacq, Alessandro Politi on the role of Gulf states.

triggered opportunities for great powers to reinforce their footholds in the region. Although the structure of this paper has been made in blocks to highlight the different soft powers in place, one must consider that all these influences are overlapping and connected between themselves. According to Joseph S. Nye Jr., the best strategy for foreign policy in the twenty-first century is "smart power," which is a combination of hard and soft power and this smart power need to lie on a strong and convincing storytelling, since they are both complementary and essential components to adopt efficient leadership in diplomacy within a post-globalized world. Beyond the confrontation of external powers, several questions remain: to what extent does the region suffer of foreign intervention and what prevents WB6 countries to develop a propitious space to adopt more "domestic power" in the region?

In the light of the recent events in Ukraine, the risk that the WB6 region may become a theater of war by proxy between superpowers again is not ruled out, hence the interest of WB6 countries to rethink their memberships and alliances, to keep a sufficient level of security and stability in the region. Last February 2023 at the last Munich Security Conference, Emmanuel Macron called EU Member States and beyond, mentioning Western Balkans to redesign a new architecture of European security and trust. How would Europe be able to consider the Western Balkans in this new security scheme and how important is it to shape new European security schemes including Western Balkans considering the Russian influence in Serbia? What is certain is that the only path for the region to reach stability and prosperity is the path of peace, security, freedom, and democracy, that's why one can only hope that the future of Western Balkans will be European.

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von der Brelie, Hans. 'Le Monténégro piégé dans le scandale de l'autoroute chinoise'. *Euronews*, 8 May 2021, https://fr.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/05/07/le-montenegro-piege-dans-le-scandale-de-l-autoroute-chinoise (last accessed 12 March 2023).

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The Euro-Arab Dialogue:
New Perspectives for a New Era?

Rizane Taleb

Throughout history, Europe and the Arab world have always been in contact. They first opposed each other as early as in the 7th century during the Arab conquests in North Africa and Jerusalem which were then controlled by the Romans. By dint of wars and religious differences, they became historical rivals if not enemies leading to even more confrontations in the 11th century during the crusades. Eventually, they started to inspire one another in Sicilia (Italy) and Andalusia (Spain) between the 8th and 15th centuries. In fact, Arabs played a prominent role in achieving the Renaissance period in Europe, they were the ones who first rediscovered, improved and translated the work of the Greeks into the vernacular languages[226]. More than that, they promoted the culture of beauty by enrolling the best architects they could find giving birth to architecture and music achievements including the Alhambra castle and the Andalusian music. Moreover, the world's first modern university still in activity, Al Qarawiyyin, was founded in 859 in Morocco[227]. And the majority of historians agree to say that the first form of modern hospitals with patients, then called Birmâristân, were built in Baghdad back in 805[228]. Thereafter, the European colonisation of the Arabs started from the 19th century until the 20th, although this period is often deemed as oppressive for the Arabs, it has greatly contributed to pushing the Arab countries' industrialisation, as well as in the realisation of some good achievements in the field of architecture, or even lately with the improvement of human rights standards following decolonisation. Furthermore, Arabs have been a source of inspiration even in modern days for the establishment of such concepts as Erasmus which was also inspired by the scientific mobilities then practiced between the Mederssas in the whole Muslim world, which included fully funded mobilities and accommodations both for students but also, thanks to the harmonisation of the language, the mobility of professors mainly starting from the 10th century[229]. In addition, one could almost consider the Arab language as an EU official language considering that the Maltese language is historically deemed to be an Arabic

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[226] Maria Mavroudi, 'Translations from Greek into Latin and Arabic during the Middle Ages: Searching for the Classical Tradition', *Speculum 90*(1): 28–59.

[227] Thomas Buttery and Chris Griffiths, 'The world's oldest centre of learning', *BBC*, 19 March 2018, https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20180318-the-worlds-oldest-centre-of-learning (last accessed 22 March 2023).

[228] Driss Cherif, 'Al-Moristan ou l'hôpital dans le monde arabo-musulman', *Histoire des Sciences Medicales* XLVII(2).

[229] Mustapha Ali-Bencherif, 'La mobilité en quête du savoir dans la tradition islamique: Essai de typologie', in Nathalie Thamin and Mohamed Zakaria Ali-Benchérif (eds.), *Mobilités dans l'espace migratoire Algérie France Canada* (Presses universitaires de Provence, 2019), pp. 25-46.

dialect with Italian and English influences[230]. Today, Arabs are looking towards Europe for inspiration, technology and the achievement of such concepts as long-lasting sustainable development, security and democracy.

However, despite this historical proximity, it is tempting to ask whether there is still a Euro-Arab dialogue today, and if it is heading in the right direction? Therefore, in order to answer this question, it would be interesting in this essay to examine the contemporary historical context of the Euro-Arab dialogue and to look at the possible new perspectives for this dialogue.

Contemporary Historical Context of the Euro-Arab Dialogue

So before illustrating the future possible nature and scenarios of the EU-Arab partnerships, it appears important to first assess the contemporary historical context of these relations which started back in the 1970s and analyse the current state of the Euro-Arab dialogue including the issues and challenges it faces, as well as the level of engagement and participation from European and Arab countries.

One can say that the Euro-Arab dialogue has always been divided into two folds. First, the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, which includes all the EU countries as well as the Mediterranean Arab countries that is to say: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Syria. Then, one can also point out the Euro-Gulf Region dialogue essentially with the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council which includes: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Informally, it was back in 1969 that the first bilateral preferential trade and cooperation agreements between the then six EU founding members and the Maghreb countries were established as a first move towards a Mediterranean and Arab cooperation. Unfortunately, these agreements were characterised by a period of economic protectionism in the agrarian field from the side of the then freshly independent countries (Libya in 1951, Morocco & Tunisia in 1956, Mauritania in 1958, Algeria in 1962) which strived to develop their own new-born industries first. In addition to the 1973 oil crisis enacted by the Arab countries including those in the Maghreb region as an answer to the western support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, igniting the first frictions between the so-called potential partners.[231]

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[230] Antoinette Camilleri and Martine Vanhove, 'A Phonetic and Phonological Description of the Maltese Dialect of Mġarr (Malta)' *Zeitschrift Für Arabische Linguistik* 28: 87–110.
[231] Smail Goumeziane, 'Relations Europe-Maghreb : quel avenir?', *Fondation Jean-Jaurès,* 02 May 2019, https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/relations-europe-maghreb-quel-avenir/ (last accessed 22 March 2023).

Nevertheless, starting from the 90s, relations with the Mediterraneans almost became an urgent matter in the European Agenda. For several reasons, which includes, the European's will to accomplish itself as a dominant power rather than a regional one to face the American's world hegemony. The question of security and immigration was also of a primary interest as the terrorism threat was starting to emerge in some Arab countries in the Mediterranean area leading to important immigration flows to Europe. Furthermore, already at that time, energy access in the region was seen as an alternative to the Russian oil supply[232]. The Arabs, on the other hand, were more eager to benefit from European access to technology in order to advance their development.

So, it was in this context that the first formal Euro-Med cooperation have seen light in 1995 with the establishment of the Barcelona Process, a political and security union which strived to create a peace and prosperity zone in the Euro-Med area, by promoting such principles as the rule of law, democracy, and the struggle against terrorism. This was upheld by the creation of a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which came into force in 2002, in addition to economic & cultural relations promoted by such instruments as the MEDA programme. Despite the constant interest expressed by some Arab countries to join the European Economic Community such as Morocco in 1987[233], three conditions were imposed to the realisation of this partnership: no prospect of membership; no freedom of movement; and much less financial aid than offered to the candidate countries to the EU[234]. The parties involved at that time were fifteen EU member states and ten Southern & Eastern Mediterranean states. Subsequently, over time the EU cooperation with its Mediterranean partners went further, and eventually, six countries were added to the original ten partners in addition to the League of Arab States. Although it is important to note that the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region is not limited to Arab countries. Therefore, some non-Arab countries were also invited to join this agreement including Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and the most problematic one in the context of this dialogue "Israel".

The establishment of the Association Agreements between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners first resulted in a beneficial growth between 1995 and 2001, the growth rate of EU imports from the Mediterranean was reported as twice as high as the growth rate of EU exports to these same partners; however, starting from the 2000s a clear slowdown in the trade

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[232] Asli Süel, 'From the euro-mediterranean partnership to the union for the mediterranean', *Journal of International Affairs*, 13(3): 93-121.

[233] Adil Zaari Jabiri, 'Quand Rabat demanda l'adhésion à la Communauté européenne', *BAB*, 24 March 2019, http://www.babmagazine.ma/quand-rabat-demanda-ladhesion-la-communaute-europeenne (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[234] Smail Goumeziane, 'Relations Europe-Maghreb : quel avenir ?'.

balance was noticed being mostly favourable to the European Union[235]. This is mainly due to the nature of this cooperation which cannot be interpreted as being a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, but rather a bilateral one, a Euro-Algerian, Euro-Egyptian, or a Euro-Lebanese one, but also to the lack of economic trade between the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. For this reason, it seems obvious that a more tangible Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation can only be deemed to be achievable, if the Arab countries in the region first develop a free trade regional economic area which would imply a diversification of their economy, often considered as being similar and mostly based on energy resources exportations. Such a perspective could first be developed with the creation of smaller regional trade areas to increase internal economic interactions, such as a Maghreb Union between Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, and a Middle Eastern Union between Egypt, Jordania, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, internal conflicts between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara which lead to the closure of the borders between the two countries, the chaotic Libyan and Syrian situation and the worrying circumstances in Lebanon act as hurdles to the realisation of these unions.

However, although this process was certainly promoting economic cooperation, the core elements of the Euro-Med cooperation were foremost supposed to focus on security, democracy and immigration. Nevertheless, the EU was forced in this context to cooperate with countries known for the most as being freshly independent and therefore inexperienced but also authoritarian. Therefore, during the 2010s Arab Spring which emerged in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. Europe found itself trapped in a dilemma. It had to choose between promoting democracy and supporting the Arabe Spring, a core purpose of the Euro-Med cooperation. This would in turn inevitably result in political and energy instability, but also important migration flows towards Europe; or sustaining the authoritarian governments. Undoubtedly, the EU had to stick with the latter to preserve the European interests.

Furthermore, Euro-Med cooperation is often described as a subject of high discord between the EU member states. The Northern countries such as Germany are not necessarily willing to further finance this cooperation as they consider it would mostly benefit the Southern European countries located in the Mediterranean area such as Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Cyprus.

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[235] Pascale Joannin, 'Commerce et conflits : Dix années de partenariat euro-méditerranéen', *Fondation Robert Schuman*, 14 November 2005,
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0009-commerce-et-conflits-dix-annees-de-partenariat-euro-medit erraneen (last accessed 22 March 2023).

Another element that could explain the cooperation failure is probably the war in Iraq in 2003 and the rise of terrorism in the European countries, in addition to the Western recurrence in supporting the Israelian cause, this contributed to creating a climate of distrust from both sides, resulting in a lack of investment in the project.

Today, the Barcelona Process has evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean, expanding the Union to two new members Cyprus and Malta. However, although new preferential agreements have been established removing some trade barriers in 2010, and the will to promote the so-called European values in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries has been reiterated, this cooperation is still struggling to happen.

On the other hand, the Euro-GCC cooperation in the Gulf between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council started as early as 1988. The GCC is an interregional organization of six states that was established to ensure security and stability for the monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula, following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. Despite the formation of this Council, the GCC member states were still in need of foreign military security. Therefore, the USA appeared as the perfect candidate to be the leading security guarantor in the area, offering a privileged status to the USA as regards trade with these countries. However, The EU and GCC formalised their cooperation with the signing of the EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement which came into force in 1990. It aimed to strengthen their relationship in various areas such as political, economic, free trade negotiations and security.

Nevertheless, it soon became blatant that the EU was mostly interested in the trade aspect of this relationship to ensure a stable energy supply and better export market access for the Union. It believed that securing a Free Trade Agreement would be a first step to a greater partnership. Unfortunately, until this day, and after more than 30 years of negotiations no FTA was signed between the two entities, as a consequence of several factors including the difference of standards between the EU and GCC countries as regards Carbon taxation and human rights, but also internally due to a lack of enthusiasm from the GCC countries to build their own custom Union for several reasons such as their undiversified type of economies relying mostly on energy exportation, their goods imports dependence from China and the West. In addition to old rivalries and a degree of competition among the ruling families or the smaller states' fear that any form of Gulf integration would mean sacrificing their sovereignty to Saudia Arabia's pre-eminence[236]. Moreover, the lack of

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[236] Adel Abdel Ghafar and Silvia Colombo, 'EU-GCC Relations The Path towards a New Relationship', *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,* 2020,

coordination between the EU member states is also to be blamed, as they often strive to protect their national individual interests first with bilateral agreements with the Gulf countries at the expense of a Common EU policy approach[237].

Furthermore, the relationship between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council hit a roadblock in 2008, when the global financial crisis caused a shift in negotiation power in favour of the Gulf countries, who subsequently halted free trade agreement talks. In an effort to revive the relationship, the EU-GCC Joint Ministerial Council approved a Joint Action Plan (JAP) in 2010, which aimed to improve cooperation in areas such as trade, culture, information technology, education, and scientific research. However, the JAP failed to meet expectations and came to a close in 2013, partly due to the Arab Spring uprisings that occurred in several Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, including GCC members, which destabilized the region. Tensions between GCC member states reached a boiling point in 2017 when several of them severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. The EU and its member states were divided in their response, with some taking a more cautious stance to avoid jeopardizing their bilateral relations with the Gulf countries. The US, on the other hand, took a more decisive stance, aligning with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and imposing sanctions on Iran. The subsequent Iranian attack on the American embassy in Baghdad and the killing of General Qassem Soleimani by the US in early 2020 escalated conflicts in Iran and emen, which had a negative impact on the security of the GCC and could mark the end of the US's role as the external regional hegemon[238].

New perspectives and future possible relations

Even though a global multilateral EU-Arab relation seems to be hard to achieve in the next few years for the reasons described in the latter section, it appears blatant that further bilateral relations between the EU, the individual member states and a given set of Arab countries is likely to take form in a broader way. In fact, one can consider that we are currently witnessing the eve of a new wave in the EU-Arab partnership. This can be symbolised by the restoration of Iraq which is slowly returning to the international scene after reopening its borders to tourism last year[239].

https://www.kas.de/documents/286298/8668222/200401+Policy+Report+No+2+GCC-EU+Path+towards+a+New+Relationship.pdf/25e95278-7689-2ec2-0b14-e27197b49969?version=1.1&t=1585898593194 (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[237] Valentina Kostadinova, 'What is the Status of the EU-GCC Relationship?', *Gulf Research Center*, 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167338/EU-GCC_9227.pdf__.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[238] Annalisa Scaletta, 'EU-GCC relations: past, present, and future in the post-Brexit scenario', *ES Think Thank*, 14 December 2021, https://esthinktank.com/2021/12/14/eu-gcc-relations-past-present-and-future-in-the-post-brexit-scenario/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[239] KAWA News, 'Iraq reopens its borders to tourists from around the world', *Kawa*, 01 April 2022, https://kawa-news.com/en/iraq-reopens-its-borders-to-tourists-from-around-the-world/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).

Moreover, the Palestinian cause which once used to be considered as sacred for the Arab world doesn't seem to be as primordial. In fact, it was back in 1978 that the first Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan recognised Israel, 16 years later, the Abraham Agreements once again enacted the normalisation of the relations with Israel for Bahrein, the UAE, Morocco and Soudan. And might suggest a possible domino effect, for the least regarding such countries as Saudia Arabia and Qatar. Moreover, the drastic Islamist terrorism decrease in Europe, and the decline of Daesh could as well signpost a fertile ground for better future partnerships[240].

Furthermore, the question of de-colonialism and de-protectoratism can also be brought to the table. Indeed, although some Arab countries such as Egypt, Transjordania and Iraq managed to walk away from protectoratism as early as 1923, and 1932 for Iraq, one can deem that building a relationship with the former colonial powers was seen as a difficult matter for a long time due to a feeling of resentment from both sides, especially for those which recently freed themselves from protectoratism (Morocco, Tunisa in 1956) and other colonised countries such as Algeria which was granted independence a few decades ago in 1962. Such an idea can be portrayed by the recent visit of the French President, Emmanuel Macron to Algeria[241].

But foremost, the main factor that could effectively spark such relations is the Ukrainian war, which began in February 2022. In fact, following the European scale decision to move away from dependence on Russian gas, many European countries decided to engage in deeper relations with the Arab countries to look for alternative partners to Russia, and avoid future energy shortages. As a result, various diplomatic moves were performed by the Europeans to showcase the importance of these new relations. Such moves can be outlooked essentially through the prism of one country in the MENA region which is Algeria and several ones in the Gulf region.

Before the war in Ukraine, Algeria supplied about 13% of the EU'S natural gas needs, while Russia about 47%. Algeria being the biggest gas producer in the MENA region and in Africa, in addition, to the regional and historical proximity to Europe, but also considering that it is the Arab country with the most pipelines heading towards Europe (GAZ MAGHREB EUROPE, MEDGAZ, GALSI and TRANSMED). It could be tempting to deem this country as an alternative to Russia for Europe. Following this reasoning, Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, paid a visit to Algeria in which he declared, "Given the international circumstances we all face, energy

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[240] European Council, Terrorisme dans l'UE : faits et chiffres,
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/infographics/terrorism-eu-facts-figures/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[241] Hugh Schofield, 'Visite de Emmanuel Macron en Algérie : le président français veut resserrer les liens avec Alger',
BBC News Afrique, 25 August 2022, https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/ck7ygr30lr0o (last accessed 12 March 2023).

cooperation is obviously essential, and we see Algeria as a reliable, loyal and committed partner in the field of energy cooperation". At the same time, he also stressed the need to renegotiate the Association Agreement which came into force in 2005 and removed custom tariffs between the EU and Algeria, so it can be beneficial for both parties. In fact, so far, the balance trade of this agreement has been resulting in an economic deficit of about 30 billion dollars for Algeria, as the Algerian companies were not able to compete with their European counterparts due to the country's economic non-diversification. Therefore, it seems that this climate crisis has pushed Europe to consider their homologue trade bilateral imbalances, which were in this case, claimed by the Algerian authority for a long period [242].

Moreover, Italy was the first European country to engage in talks with Algeria ever since the beginning of the Ukrainian War, thanks to their excellent trade relationship, which doubled from $8 billion in 2021 to $16 billion in 2022. As a result, several officials visited the country in the last months including Luigi Di Maio, Mario Draghi and Finally Giorgia Melloni. During these meetings, the two signed agreements in areas ranging from energy to sustainable development, justice and micro-enterprises, in addition to a $4 billion oil and gas production-sharing agreement between Algeria and several energy companies including the Italian ENI and the French Total. Algeria engaged itself to double the production of gas in the coming years, notably through the construction of a third pipeline that could transport gas, hydrogen, ammonia and electricity to Italy which would then act as an Energy hub for Europe. In exchange, Algeria would benefit from Italian investment in the industrial and agrarian fields[243].

In the case of the Gulf countries, several state visits were accomplished in Qatar, UEA, and Saudia Arabia by the Europeans including Germany, France, and the UK during the last months, to tackle the energy crisis in Europe[244]. Qatar first appeared as a good alternative to Russia after the country announced an increase in liquefied natural gas production from 77 million tonnes per year to 126 million tonnes by 2027[245]. However, it seems difficult to consider these countries as long-term

[242] INFEMES, 'Les défis de la sécurité énergétique en Europe : l'Algérie peut-elle être une alternative à la Russie?', *Atalayar*, 11 November 2022,
https://atalayar.com/fr/blog/les-defis-de-la-securite-energetique-en-europe-lalgerie-peut-elle-etre-une-alternative-la (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[243] France 24, 'Italy says to boost energy ties with gas giant Algeria', 23 January.2023,
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230123-italy-says-to-boost-energy-ties-with-gas-giant-algeria (last accessed 22 February 2023).
[244] Frank Jordans, 'Germany secures more gas shipments as Scholz visits Gulf', *AP News*, 25 September 2022,
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-boris-johnson-united-arab-emirates-germany-b2ff121c9b7e3931ab3c89acdf76beaa (last accessed 22 February 2023).
[245] Oxford Business Group, 'Qatar moves to bolster gas production and sustainable energy - The Middle East 2022', 2022,
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/reports/the-middle-east/2022-report/economy/transition-time-efforts-to-expand-gas-pr

alternatives to Russia first due to the long distance and the absence of pipelines between Europe and the Gulf, impacting the price balance resulting from the LNG transportation. Nevertheless, although there is a project to build an Arab gas pipeline between these two areas, it is only in the early talks process, and there is no guarantee such a thing would ever happen given the long distance between the two regions[246]. Moreover, these countries are largely interested in the security factor, and although the UK, France and Italy can be considered as large weapon producers, they only represent a handful amount of European countries. In addition to the fact that they have been pre-empted by the United States on this partnership, giving the US an advantage in the relations with these countries.

In conclusion, one can say that the Euro-Arab dialogue remains persistent today, however, it is difficult to consider this latter as a multilateral cooperation, for the moment, it can only be achieved in a bilateral manner. Moreover, it is important to divide this dialogue into two sections the MENA and Gulf regions, which both have different interests, the former is historically closer to Europe and seeks an economic development and could also be opened to improve human rights and environmental issues. The latter is more interested in preserving its security above all. Furthermore, despite the failure to establish a concrete dialogue in the past. The recent economic crises in Europe have proven to be effective in accelerating these relations. And even though these new partnerships might mainly focus on gas/oil trade, which is not necessarily a good approach for a long-lasting dialogue, it is possible to believe that with time, in a snowball effect, one cooperation in a given field could eventually result in further cooperations in other fields.

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oduction-capacity-continue-apace-while-sustainability-is-taking-on-increasing-importance (last accessed 22 February 2023).

[246] Christian Stoffaes, 'The Arab gas pipeline project makes it possible to bypass Russia and avoid the long LNG tanker journey from Qatar', *Le Monde*, 18 July 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/07/18/the-arab-gas-pipeline-project-makes-it-possible-to-bypass-russia-and-avoid-the-long-lng-tanker-journey-from-qatar_5990543_23.html (last accessed 22 February 2023).

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Arctic Diplomacy: Between an Iceberg and a Cold Place

Juho Toppari

Guido Westerwelle, the late German politician who did remarkable work relating to the Arctic in the early 2000's, noted in his speech for the Parliament in 2012 that the stage of Arctic has been mostly neglected and overshadowed in the global affairs.[247] This statement provides a great synopsis for the Arctic affairs of today, as well. Although intuition tells that the Arctic has not been so neglected anymore, as it has often appears in public discussions (even if only in the extent of it's possible resources), but, when compared to the global affairs the Arctic continues to be overshadowed.

On February 24th, The Russian Federation began its unjustified full-scale incursion to Ukraine's territory, eminently freezing the Arctic Council, whose rotating presidency was held by Russia at the time[248]. Not unexpectedly, The Council and its 130 on-going projects were put to a halt once its president decided to go to war. This event has back-tracked has the international cooperation in the Arctic to a state where it was founded during the end of the Cold War — almost non-existent.

The increased tensions in the Arctic have not come to a halt, even though the Arctic cooperation has, nor the climate change stopped even when there is a War in Europe. These are the obstacles that Norway has to surpass once it assumes the chair in 2023.[249]

This paper examines the Arctic and its international cooperation (so called science diplomacy), in relation to the EU's external diplomacy and the institutional structures. The present sense of gravity regarding Arctic cooperation will be examined against the backdrop of historical development of the Arctic cooperation. As the Russian incursion of Ukraine territory has frozen the Arctic cooperation, the optimal moment for evaluation and possible reforms would be now.

The three critical spheres of Arctic

The Arctic basin is cold and hostile, yet beautiful and fragile.

From the point of view of the Arctic, it would be an urgent matter to return to the Arctic cooperation and continue the sustainable development in the region. It plays a crucial dual role in

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[247] Guido Westerwelle, 'Climate Change, International Law and Arctic Research – Legal Aspects of Marine Research in the Arctic Ocean', in Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Ingo Winkelmann & Katrin Tiroch (eds.), *Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change* (Springer Berlin, Heidelberg 2012), p. 1.

[248] Michael Paul, 'Arctic Repercussions of Russia's Invasion, Council on Pause, Research on Ice and Russia Frozen Out', SWP Comment 2022/C39: 1.

[249] Ibid. 4.

combating climate change, as it carries tremendous effect of global climate change, and at the same time, it can also deliver raw materials for the green shift in energy in Europe. But, the Arctic is also home for 4 million people, from which 10 percent are indigenous.[250] These are the three common themes that are repeated in many of the contemporary Arctic policies: climate change, the resource allocation (economic cooperation and geopolitics), and indigenous welfare.

Arctic resources and geopolitics

Prior to the Russian full-scale war against Ukraine in February, the Arctic atmosphere had already increased in geo-political tensions amongst the global actors in the region. Russia had increased its military presence, and China had taken a keen interest in the North.[251][252] The Arctic tensions regarding security and defence build-up steadily when actors try to increasingly achieve their interest in a region which has been famously said to be the heritage of all mankind. Arctic can be understood to have a community interest behind it, albeit no common understanding of its governing[253]. These issues risk the militarization in the Arctic coast and its waters. It has been estimated that the competition in the Arctic over resources will increase throughout time, particularly after 2030.[254] Countries will compete over developing renewable energy technologies to become leading exporters and gain market share as the energy transition picks up speed.[255]

Traditionally, post-Cold War, the Arctic cooperation has not been dealing with these kind of issues. Security and defence have not been part of the Arctic Council's mandate, and thus, has not been subject for discussion in the Council.[256] The question of militarization is also complicated due to the difficulty of sea navigation in the Arctic. If sea routes keep defrosting in summertime as expected, the naval transportation will increase. If naval transportation increases in the Arctic sea-routes, more surveillance and emergency aid will be needed to counter possible accidents involved among the travelling ships (coastal guard, oil spills, emergency units, etc.). The harsh conditions of the Northern Sea paths are enough of a reason for an Arctic state to practice and sustain military

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[250] Arctic Council Secretariat, The Arctic Council: a quick guide, 3rd edition, 2021/2022, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2424/AC_quickguide_2021_web.pdf?sequence=24&isAllo wed=y (last accessed 12 March 2023).

[251] Reinhard Biedermann, 'Adapting To the Changing Arctic? The European Union, the Nordics, and the Barents Governance Mosaic', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 28(2): 176.

[252] Arseniy Kirgizon-Barskiy 'European Union and Cooperation in the Arctic Council', *Arctic and North* 45(6): 71.

[253] Kristin Bartenstein, 'The 'Common Arctic', Legal Analysis of Arctic & non-Arctic Political Discourses', in Lassi Heinien, Heather Exner-pirot & Joel Plouffe (eds.), *2015 Arctic Yearbook. Arctic Governance and Governing* (Akureyri: Northern Research Forum 2015), pp. 1-2.

[254] National Intelligence Council, Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040. National Intelligence Estimate. NIC-NIE-2021-10030-A. 2021, p 2.

[255] Ibid. p. 6.

[256] Arctic Council, Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council. Joint Communique of the governments of the Arctic countries on the establishment of the Arctic Council. Ottawa, Canada (1996).

presence in the Arctic waters, which makes the problem of militarization in the Arctic extremely difficult to combat. [257]

Climate change

Environmental issues: the maelting of the ice caps is an irreversible phenomenon. The rising sea levels obscure the currencies, multiplying the disasters of climate change globally.[258] Albeit climate change entails disaster in the related regions and global coasts, the issue itself is not as black-and-white in the Arctic regions themselves, where indigenous people blame the non-arctic states from practicing "green-colonialism".[259] The issue is that "new forms of extraction, such as wind and solar energy, that, if beneficial in other ways, tend to disregard [local] cultural and social impacts".[260]

Due to the evitable course of climate change, it can be estimated that the demand for minerals will increase with the shift for greener energies, and two biggest importers of these would be the EU and China (both have already established their interest in the region).[261] Possibly, this can lead to "a strong political focus on climate mitigation…",[262] causing "…a dramatic expansion of mining in the Nordic Arctic, supported by public investments and streamlined permit processes".[263] This will ultimately put a lot of stress on the local communities, but will advance the overall global sustainability.[264]

The increasingly melting ice during summer periods in the Arctic opens up the Arctic Sea routes, connecting the Asian market to the Atlantic, or as the Chinese have named it, the "Polar Silk Road". This intense naval activity entails problems for the environment.[265] While some suggest that the shorter route would reduce emission due to shorter distances and thus burning less fuels, the lesser burning of fuels may still impact the Arctic much worse than in the traditional sea routes. Frequent

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[257] Andreas Østhagen, 'Unboxing Arctic Security Relations and Dynamics. Global Development in the Arctic', in: Andrey Mineev, Anatoli Bourmistrov and Frode Mellemvik (eds.), *Global Development in the Arctic* (London: Routledge 2022), p. 48.
[258] NIC-NIE-2021-10030-A, p. 2.
[259] Sverker Sörlin 'The Extractivist Paradigm: Arctic Resources and the Planetary Mine', in: Sverker Sörlin (ed.) *Resource Extraction and Arctic Communities: The New Extractivist Paradigm* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2022), p. 17.
[260] Ibid. p. 17
[261] Reinhard Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic? The European Union, the Nordics, and the Barents Governance Mosaic', *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 28(2): 175.
[262] Annika Nilsson and Simo Särkki 'Scenarios and Surprises: When Change Is the Only Given', in: In Sverker Sörlin (ed.) *Resource Extraction and Arctic Communities: The New Extractivist Paradigm* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2022), p. 100.
[263] ibid. p. 100.
[264] ibid. p. 100.
[265] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 167.

naval ships might produce deposition of black carbon on the sea ice and the snow in the Arctic, which might cause even more complex regional warming/cooling effects (dark dirt on white snow causes it to absorb more heat).[266] This would, for example, speed up the process of melting perma frost and increasing sea levels ever more globally.

The future of the people

Socially, the people living in Arctic are the most neglected civilizations on the planet, living in the most rigid environments, yet their heritage extends far into the history which has not been necessarily kind for the indigenous people. The latest development has been the false promise of rich soils of resources that are waiting to be unfrozen in the Arctic, creating a tension between the local life and the outside "resource abusers" who want to tap in. While the factories and mines do provide jobs for the local people, they often do not promote sustainable development in the region.

Finland, one the Arctic Council founding members, has already begun to combat this problem by introducing new mining-laws. These will put the regional governments more in power against multi-national mining corporations and will also approve a mining-tax targeted to help the local municipalities sustain the future mining projects.[267]

The EU-Arctic Forum 2019 shared ideas of future economic growth with reindeer husbandry, ecotourism, arts and culture, ecosystem services, food knowledge and land use, which are all forms of competitive advantage for indigenous people[268]. It has been shown that for the sparsely populated regions, for example the Swedish Norrbotten, the EU funding is a noticeable driver for regional governance and development. When examining the Arctic development numbers, for example on Finnish Sparsely Populated regions in the north, over half of the allocated money comes from EU funding.[269] Needles to say, the EU's external diplomacy plays a crucial role in the region.

However, some Arctic states have also experienced significant problems with the EU's external diplomacy. For example, where the EU plays an important role in future developments and provides crucial fundings, it also collides with the indigenous people's interests. The Nordic countries have criticized the EU's ban on seal imports for decades, but with the World Trade Organization siding

[266] Yevgeny Aksenov, et al., 'On the Future Navigability of Arctic Sea Routes: High-Resolution Projections of the Arctic Ocean and Sea Ice', *Marine Policy* 75(34): 313.
[267] Anne Kauranen, 'Finland plans new tax on mining', *Reuters*, 27 September 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/finland-plans-new-tax-mining-2022-09-27 (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[268] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 178.
[269] European Commission, Overview of EU Actions in the Arctic and Their Impact. Final Report June 2021. FWC Policy Support Facility for the Implementation of the EU Foreign Policy – PSF 2019 Worldwide Lot 2: Technical assistance Letter of Contract No. 300002090, p. 124.

with the EU, the ban has not been lifted. This has led the Arctic states doubt EU's sensitivity to indigenous culture.[270] But, when discussing "the EU", one must retain from the idea of a single entity with a single interest. That is never the case. These conflicts have given incentives for increased engagement with indigenous people for the same EU (with different interests), but they might have also delayed the EU's observer status application in the Arctic Council.[271]

There is an evident tension between EU green policies and indigenous life in Arctic states as well. To make the green shift possible certain precious metals will be needed in large quantities, yet the people in Greenland, or the Sami people, oppose local mining and also disagree with wind farming due to cultural damages.[272]

The Arctic Council

The Council of Arctic is represented by the eight Arctic states that were established in the Ottawa Declaration 1996: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the US.[273] The circumpolar countries do not all have sea access, the coastal states exclude Finland and Sweden, and the biggest coast in the Arctic is held by Russia. The Council also includes several expert groups and task forces which play crucial role in its effectiveness, and undoubtably, makes the Council the best in the globe when it comes to specializations towards the Arctic.[274]

In 1974 the first international conference on human environment in Northern regions was held in Japan. It had representatives from Canada and the US, as well as from Finland, Norway and Sweden. This three-day conference actualized the common interests of the participants. There was a mutual understanding that they all shared polar regions with similar climatic conditions, meaning that the environmental challenges would be best tackled by cooperation. As it is noted by the Northern Forum (as the conference was called afterwards), "they discovered that the way one northern region addressed a particular issue might apply to similar issues in many - if not all - northern regions".[275] Government representatives realized that improved communication and cooperation could vastly enhance the way of life for all residents of the Arctic. Northern Forum is now a permanent observer in the Arctic Council.[276]

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[270] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 177.
[271] Ibid.
[272] For reference I would like to thank the ex-EU Special Envoy for Artic Matters, Michael Mann, for the special lecture held in the University of Leiden, also thanks for Dr. Scepanovic for the occasion.
[273] Arctic Council Secretariat, *The Arctic Council*, p. 5.
[274] Boris Krasnopolskiy, 'Coordination of International Organizations of the North-Arctic Regions: to the Program of the Presidency of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Council', *Arctic and North* 41(9): 129.
[275] Northern Forum, History 1974-1989, https://www.northernforum.org/en/about-nf/history/969-1974-1989 (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[276] Krasnopolskiy, 'Coordination of International Organizations of the North-Arctic Regions', p. 130.

The EU has been a de facto observer since 2013, and the European Union, via the Arctic ambassador, is present at all Arctic Council meetings, and has rights and obligations that do not differ from the rights and obligations of other observers.[277]

Post Russian incursion to Ukraine in February, the Arctic Council has been "frozen", as it becomes clear from their joint statement:

> "…our representatives will not travel to Russia for meetings of the Arctic Council. Additionally, our states are temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies, pending consideration of the necessary modalities that can allow us to continue the Council's important work in view of the current circumstances". [278]

I will return to the "pending modalities" later in this paper.

EU in the Arctic

Ever since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU and the European External Action Service has been placing the EU's foreign policy into effect, together with the member-states and their diplomatic services.[279] In 2008, the European Commission introduced its Arctic strategy, and in 2009, the European Council decided upon the development of a common Arctic Policy.[280]

The EU policy towards Arctic could be said to be pro-active, as it does provide for broad expertise and financial support for the Artict Council's projects, and the introduction of the position of the EU Special Envoy for Arctic allowed the EU to play a more significant role in the Arctic.[281]

However, when discussing the EU diplomacy towards the Arctic, there is neither a single EU foreign policy overruling national policies, nor is there a coherent international actor with a single policy.[282] On matters of 'low politics', such as trade, environment or economic issues, the EU often manages to defend its interests with a single voice.[283] Albeit, not always. With high politics however, whether as traditional diplomacy or national sovereignty, the EU fails to speak as one.[284] It

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[277] Kirgizon-Barskiy 'European Union and Cooperation in the Arctic Council', p. 66.

[278] U.S Department of State, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. 3 March, 2022.

[279] Andreas Raspotnik and Andreas Østhagen, 'The EU as a Fisheries Actor: Internal and External Policies', in Olav Stokke, Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik (eds.), *Marine Resources, Climate Change and International Management Regimes* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing 2020), pp. 64-65.

[280] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 169.

[281] Kirgizon-Barskiy, 'European Union and Cooperation in the Arctic Council' p. 71.

[282] Raspotnik and Østhagen, 'The EU as a Fisheries Actor', p. 66.

[283] ibid. pp. 65-66.

[284] ibid. pp. 65-66.

can be argued that the European Union is both an institution, and a process of continuous dialogues and negotiations among the member states. And, after one has tried studying this Union, it will become evident that the "institution of the EU" is also made out of institutions, which themselves consist of numerous departments and individuals.[285] Thus, it could be said that the EU-Arctic cooperation is troubled by the EU's hidden (or perhaps elusive) interests in the region, albeit pro-actively establishing them on policy papers.

It has been argued that Canada, Russia and Denmark have always been critical towards the EU's interference in the Arctic, especially concerning the EU's environmental policies and the rulership it desires to have.[286] Given the complex agency of the EU, these have been legitimate concerns in the recent Arctic cooperation. A study case of snow-crab fishery in the Svalbard conducted by Raspotnik and Østhagen (2020) shows how the EU's "limited (economic) interests may succeed in hijacking [its] broader political and strategic interests".[287] The snow-crab issue started over the EU-Norway disagreement over the status of the maritime zone and related continental shelf around the archipelago of Svalbard (the Treaty of Svalbard forbids discriminatory fishery policies towards signature countries in these waters, yet Norway issued a ban on snow-crab fishing).[288] In the study case it is argued that the Commission and the Council (of European Union) might have been initially pursued by member state interests (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) in the pursuit of fishery rights, yet quickly adopted an independent position on the case which over-reached the member state consensus.[289] Perhaps path-dependently, once the Commission and the MEPs became more involved in the matter, raising it on the agenda and investing resources and reputations, it became difficult to backdown. [290]

It is cases like this that jeopardizes the EU's overarching aspiration of being seen as a sensible and responsible actor in the Arctic.[291] But, at the same time EU's supranational role does often manage to challenge and bring forward countries inherit biases. Yet, the Arctic Council is already an institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation, and thus does not suffer from jeopardizing state biases, and even then EU involvement is unlikely to reduce it. And there are plenty of other examples where the EU's climate over-reach policies have been criticized inside the EU (e.g. the

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[285] ibid. p. 66.
[286] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 169.
[287] Raspotnik and Østhagen, 'The EU as a Fisheries Actor', p. 71.
[288] Biedermann, 'Adapting to the changing Arctic?', p. 175.
[289] Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik, 'Snow Crabs, the EU and Diplomatic Headaches', in Olav Stokke, Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik (eds.), *Marine Resources, Climate Change and International Management Regimes* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing 2020), p. 205.
[290] Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik, 'Snow Crabs, the EU and Diplomatic Headaches', p. 205.
[291] ibid. p. 208.

adaptation of LULUCF and its unjust and wrong carbon sinks and timber cut-ratios), for delivering hard policies without having much output legitimacy for them.

To summarize, there are three critical spheres of Arctic cooperation, all of which have faced unsuccessful encounters with the EU.

i. EU's tendency to hijack political issues jeopardizes its trustworthiness in international Arctic cooperation (over-reached member state consensus).

ii. The EU has frequently faced social problems countering the indigenous people's interest in the region.

iii. The EU's questionable environmental policies have proven that the EU's "global leadership role in climate change" has yet to be extended to Arctic specialization.

The function of regional cooperation in the Arctic

So far, this paper has considered the functions of Arctic cooperation, and the EU's external diplomacy in the region. Next, the paper will move towards an "autopsy" of this functioning, which is a different matter that should be contemplated within its historical context.

The research indicates that not only has Russian incursion to Ukraine frozen the cooperation schemes in the Arctic, but it might have also forced the actors to re-evaluate current institutional setting of the Arctic cooperation, and possibly plan future actions regardingly. The EP politicians have claimed that the reforms of the Arctic cooperations are "long overdue", and showed desire for reforms. [292] [293] The question is, has the Russian incursion forced the Arctic actors to desire cooperation with the exclusion of Russia?

There are many reasons to continue the cooperation (tap into resources, climate combat, boost rural welfare, etc.), reasons which have already been mentioned in this paper, and all of these can be found in the policies of the Arctic Council. But, due to the full-scale war in Ukraine, the question still arises. No negotiations that include Russia can be continued in Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Forum or in the Arctic Council, if there remains an on-going and unsettled war in Ukraine. And even after the war would have been settled (to a reasonable extent), there remains grave trust-issues between the East and the West, which is something that can disturb or even suspend Russia's involvement in the Arctic region.

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[292] Raspotnik and Østhagen, 'The EU as a Fisheries Actor', p. 69.
[293] Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik, 'Snow Crabs, the EU and Diplomatic Headaches' p. 207.

Historically, Arctic cooperation has been a well proven medicine for such trust-issues between the East and the West. There are certain payoffs for both actors (not excluding China as well) in cooperation in the region that all the parties can acknowledge. Positively, there are potential gas exploitation to be shared, which might be accessible only from inside. Negatively, no state wants to give up control over such geo-political threat for climate as the Arctic is (rather acquire control for yourself than leave it for others, even if corrections might be short). Political engagement would be required regardless whether state perceives Arctic developments in negative or positive light.

Should the EU make efforts to build a new channel for Arctic cooperation, excluding the Russian influence? History proves that the scientific development in the Arctic has been able to reclaim itself outside of the realm of geopolitics.

During the Cold War the Arctic was a playground for the superpower's rivalry, and did not pose any major environmental threats, nor economical gains. The level of regional cooperation was non-existent, as the region was namely a frontline for nuclear submarines and bombers (some of them still lay at the bottom of the ocean).[294]

The Arctic initiative played a crucial role in the defuse of Cold War tensions; Gorbachev's speech, given in Murmansk over a ceremonial occasion, entails this turning point: "Let the North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace".[295] It was two years after these words, in 1989, that Finland's Arctic initiative saw global daylight. Called Rovaniemi Process during its time, it is argued to be the original standard that set out the framework for the Arctic cooperation as we today vision it.[296] The initiative was a diplomatic letter to the seven other Arctic countries, calling in for a cooperative effort.

The initiative was dual natured: it was a combination of traditional diplomacy and scientific (environmental) research. Given the on-going challenges of that time, the initiative was well received yet, it required the cooperation of all Arctic states, from which Norway and the US were acting reluctant.[297] In October 1990 the three most active countries in the Rovaniemi Process,

[294] Andreas Østhagen, 'Unboxing Arctic Security Relations and Dynamics', in Mineev Bourmistrov, Anatoli Bourmistrov and Frode Mellemvik (eds.), *Global Development in the Arctic: International Cooperation for the Future* (Milton Park: Routledge 2022) pp. 52-53.
[295] Michail Gorbachev, *The Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting On the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the City of Murmansk, October 1, 1987* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency 1987), pp. 23-31.
[296] Markku Heikkilä, 'The Rovaniemi Process: The Beginning of the Arctic Era', *Arctic Finland*, https://www.arcticfinland.fi/news/The-Rovaniemi-Process-The-Beginning-of-the-Arctic-Era/39969/15e81f13-69fe-4972-9668-a4d0b578318d (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[297] ibid.

Canada, Finland, and Sweden, issued a joint proposal for the next Arctic cooperation, which included the idea of the Arctic Council. It was during this time when Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney brought the Canada initiative also to global light, and subsequently snowballed the process towards the Ottawa declaration of 1996.[298] In the end, it was Finland and Canada who started to build the bridge between West and East in the name of the environment and indigenous people.[299]

This regional diplomacy of environmentalism as well as indigenous people's welfare built a long-lasting cooperation between the West and Russia. The Arctic science diplomacy was able to insulate the geopolitical tensions from the Arctic dialogue, a "safe space" of East-West cooperation.[300] The Council has since then contributed on landmark research on climate change, vast number of projects in the Arctic, forays into international law, and changed regional treaties.[301]

Institutional reforms

History shows that the Arctic cooperation has been able to "unfreeze" the Cold War relations between the East and the West. But obviously the question remains if the Council is enough to perform the task again in the future. The unforeseen halt of the action in the Arctic Council and the other Arctic organizations has given an unique opportunity to explore and possibly implement the institutional reforms that had been "long over-due".

Krasnopolskiy recognizes few institutional problems with the current framework of the Council. There are a few institutional imbalances in the umbrella of Arctic governance, yet the biggest issue has been recognized to be the lack of methodologies for interregional and pan-regional forum cohesive efforts.[302] There are plenty of sub-institutions of the Arctic Council, which all have some data associations, yet there has been no efforts in the Council to develop coordinating methods for directing this level of cooperation, pan-institutionally.[303] The macroregional organizations of the Arctic regions should be utilized better with special mechanisms and tools of permanent coordination.[304] This area of reasearch is yet to be explored, and its urgency is pressing.

Conclusion

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[298] Heikkilä, 'The Rovaniemi Process'.
[299] Andreas Østhagen, 'Unboxing Arctic Security Relations and Dynamics' p. 53.
[300] Evan Bloom, 'Reflections on the past and future of the Arctic Council', *Arctic Council*, 10 May 2021, https://arctic-council.org/news/reflections-on-the-past-and-future-of-the-arctic-council/ (last accessed 12 March 2023).
[301] ibid.
[302] Krasnopolskiy, 'Coordination of International Organizations of the North-Arctic Regions', pp. 136-137.
[303] ibid. p. 137.
[304] ibid. p. 135.

History proves the vital gravity of Arctic cooperation in world affairs, yet the future seems grim for the task of gaining trust between the West and Russia. The unfitting role of the elusive EU interests in Arctic cooperation could be overcome with EU's initiative to solve the current institutional problems in the Council. The EU should invest in efforts for better macro-regional governing in the Arctic region, which could place EU's diplomacy on a track towards a role of good office, rather than an active player in discussion, yet increase its importance. The research show that the institutional expertise of the EU could be better utilized in the favour of Arctic cooperation, which also open up a window to achieve closer ties with the region. More notably this kind of development provides a balance of interest between the EU and the Artic Council. The historical context of the Arctic Council showcases the successful unfreezing of relations between the West and Russia. It remains a question if such foreign relations can be sustained with Russia, and if the Council decides to continue without Russia as a negotiating actor in the Arctic. However, if such task will be attempted, the Arctic cooperation would be the best effort, perhaps acquired with the permanent EU good-office, which would provide a more specialized macro-regional coordination.

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U.S Department of State, Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. 3 March, 2022. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ (last accessed 15 March 2023).

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EU's Stakes on Oppositional Leadership in Belarus

Sofiia Zhuchyk

The Republic of Belarus is the 13th largest country in Europe[305] with a population of 9.3 million[306] and a 1,250 km border with the European Union[307]. With traditionally (for authoritarian post-Soviet republics) internal political stability, which was ensured at the expense of the tools of institutionalized violence, in recent years the attention of Western politicians to this country has increased significantly. Of course, such a factor as its geographical location, partnership relations with Russia, from which they demonstrate the world's so-called "alternative interpretation of the norms of international law", as well as existing authoritarianism, which is becoming an example even for Russia (the current president has been in power for 30 years out of 31 years of independence).

At the same time, Belarus has recently also distinguished itself from other countries of the post-Soviet category by rather revolutionary attitudes that prevail among post-Soviet states, but rarely lead to effective results. Accordingly, such movements cannot but be of interest to the EU and the "Global West", since the perfectly normal desire of a group of democratic countries would be to have a neighbor who would rather share its ideas than consciously distance itself from them.

Briefly characterizing the EU's relations with Belarus since its independence - they differed little from those relations that the EU built concerning relatively small post-Soviet countries - the only difference was the lack of European integration aspirations of the Belarusian authorities, positioning relations with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and, in particular, Russia, more priority and strategic, while at the same time popularizing in their country the narrative of "subversive activity of the West".[308]

Against the background of fairly moderate EU-BY cooperation during the independence of the latter, 2014 becomes quite a turning point for relations on this axis, mostly due to the fact that the two political actors share different visions regarding the "Ukrainian question", respectively -

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[305] Statistics Times, List of European countries by area, https://m.statisticstimes.com/geography/european-countries-by-area.php (last accessed 20 January 2023).
[306] World Bank, Population Belarus, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BY (last accessed 20 January 2023).
[307] State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Interactive map, https://gpk.gov.by/en/situation-at-the-border/map/ (last accessed 20 January 2023).
[308] InterAffairs, 'Lukashenko spoke about Ukraine's proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact', 24 January 2023, https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/38690 (last accessed 20 January 2023).

regarding norms of international law and universally recognized rights person, which is fundamental for Western democracies.

Since 2020, when significant protest moods were observed, related to the dissatisfaction of a part of the population with the results of the presidential elections[309], opposition leaders appeared in the political arena, who, according to calculations, were able to accumulate a significant electorate around them (it is impossible to find objective statistics on the support of opposition movements in Belarus due to the increased influence of instruments of institutionalized violence and a certain information isolation). After the appearance of such candidates, criminal proceedings were initiated against many of them, some were sent to prison, and some went abroad.[310]

Immediately after the election fraud, the EU allocated 3.7 million euros to provide emergency assistance to victims of repression and independent media.[311] The EU then allocated 30 million euros in support in 2020 and another 30 million euros in 2021, in particular to civil society and independent media inside and outside Belarus, youth, small businesses, the health sector, and cultural figures.[312]

Moreover, in 2021, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced a comprehensive three billion euro economic support plan aimed at stabilizing the Belarusian economy, unlocking growth potential, creating jobs, and democratizing the country's institutions.[313] The EU plan includes a $3.6 billion investment package; $500 million (non-refundable) grants; a high-level Belarus-EU investment forum under the opportunities of the new Belarus; a meeting of EU high-level donors to allocate grants for the economic transformation of Belarus.[314]

The specified statistical information was provided in order to demonstrate the real state of EU support for democratic movements in Belarus in recent years, considering its further necessity within the paper to update the issue of so-called efficiency and the main problems of the implementation of the specified initiatives, as well as the implementation of the specified support by the representatives of the Belarusian opposition elected by the EU.

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[309] Wilson Center, Crisis in Belarus: Main phases and the role of Russia, the European Union, and the United States, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/KI_220125%20Crisis%20in%20Belarus_Cable%2074-V1r1.pdf (last accessed 20 January 2023).
[310] Ibid 5.
[311] Svetlana Tikhanouskaya, 'The European Commission told how 65 million euros were spent to support Belarusians', *Euroradio*, 20 May 2022, https://euroradio.fm/ru/evrokomissiya-rasskazala-kak-rashodovali-65-mln-evro-dlya-podderzhki-belorusov (last accessed 20 January 2023).
[312] Wilson Center, Crisis in Belarus, p. 7.
[313] Ibid.
[314] Ibid.

According to the Press Freedom Index in 2019 and 2022, Belarus remained in the same lowest positions rating 153 out of 180[315] which in turn demonstrates that the implementation of the specified funds over the years with the specified purpose is ineffective, but why?

As a result of the uprisings, the figure of Svitlana Tikhanovskaya stood out among opposition circles to a large extent, and managed to shape public consciousness for a long time around the need to change the authoritarian form of government in the country. Of course, taking into account an integral element of her political image - her husband, who was sentenced to 18 years for inciting social hatred and others as of 2020, she was an ideal candidate for the position of the main opposition in the country.

Taking into account the conditions in which the opposition in Belarus has to be in 2020 (repression, control of finances), Svitlana Tikhanovskaya faced two tasks - to consolidate the opposition movements in Belarus, which, given the unity in the issue of removing O. Lukashenko from power, was quite simply, as well as the accumulation of finances for a long-term revolutionary campaign to remove the President from power.

After the phenomenon of an opposition leader with the necessary attributes (repression by the authorities, a husband behind bars, threats to the family) was practically formed, Tikhanovskaya secured the support of the EU for her actions, mostly actively speaking at public events with the participation of European leaders.

The European Union, and especially some of its members, really support Tikhanovskaya and her movement as a whole[316], however, in two years, the discourse of the EU regarding her person can be followed. Over these two years, the narratives of European politicians regarding support for opposition movements in Belarus have changed from supporting Tikhanovskaya as a representative of the opposition movement in Belarus to supporting opposition movements in Belarus as a whole.

Such a change in rhetoric took place due to the unjustified hopes of European leaders regarding the political capabilities of both the political force and Svitlana Tikhanovskaya personally to the necessary extent to consolidate the Belarusian people for the implementation of the necessary democratic transformations.

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[315] Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index: Belarus 2019-2022, https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2022 (last accessed 25 January 2023).
[316] 'Tikhanovskaya meets wth EU top officials, bloc allocates extra €30 mln for Belarus' civil society', *Belsat.eu*, 13 December 2021, https://belsat.eu/en/news/13-12-2021-tsikhanouskaya-meets-wth-eu-top-officials-bloc-allocates-extra-e30-mln-for-belarus-civil-society (last accessed 25 January 2023).

In this connection, in my opinion, it is necessary to single out two main catalysts that influenced the implementation of the democratic scenario by the EU- Tikhanovskaya symbiosis: the false universalization of the post-Soviet model and the replacement of the phenomenon of internal legitimacy by external.

False universalization of the post-Soviet model

Taking into account all the revolutionary movements to change the authoritarian form of government to a democratic one in the post-Soviet countries, the political technologists of Tikhanovskaya and some EU politicians mistakenly took as an example the revolutionary transformation in Ukraine, which among other countries of the post-Soviet camp demonstrated the most effective work of civil society and the consolidation of public opinion around precisely democratic development of society.

Revolutionary changes in Ukraine were preceded by the Orange Revolution (2004), "Euromaidan" (2013), and currently, democratic changes are taking place even under the conditions of a full-scale military invasion of Russia on its territory (2014-nowadays). Moreover, the fact that six presidents were changed in Ukraine during independence, one of them by removal from power, is quite indicative of this connection.

Such a strategy of Svitlana Tikhanovskaya was quite effective for a rather short-term period, however, it did not justify itself given several factors. In the conditions of Lukashenko's escalating policy, the West has to become more and more involved in the issue of Belarus, and in this context, Tikhanovskaya becomes a natural partner for interaction.

However, Tikhanovskaya's influence on life in Belarus is very limited. Unlike international activities, most of the initiatives called for by her headquarters inside the country failed: the national strike was quickly suppressed, the call for the start of spring protests did not arouse enthusiasm among Belarusians, and the security forces, whom Tikhanovskaya personally repeatedly urged to take the side of the people, remained loyal to Lukashenko.[317]

Mass protests broke out on Kyiv's main streets and in other Ukrainian towns in 2013 when the government of Ukraine declined to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. As the conflict continued to escalate, calls for the resignation of the government and of that time president as well

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[317] Chatham House, Belarusians' views on the political crisis,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/2021-06-14-belarusians-views-political-crisis.pdf (last accessed 25 January 2023).

as fights between protestors and law enforcement personnel were made. The entourage in Minsk first appeared to be identical to that in Kyiv.[318]

However, the lack of personification, true leadership, and strategy in the opposition leaders, which severely demotivated the protesters, is the main distinction between the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and the present protests in Belarus.[319] And those opposition figures in whom Belarusians had put their confidence and faith turned out to be unable to lead the demonstration.

Thus, the protest turns into revolutionary chaos with the transition to local clashes with significantly overpriced and better-trained police officers.[320] Their arbitrary measures instill a sense of unfairness and the realization that Belarus' de-Sovietization process is only just getting started being a matter of time before it reaches its "hottest point".[321]

The absence of a national liberation movement is another distinction between the Belarusian Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. While Belarusians voice their displeasure with the ruling class alone and do not favor changing the country's geopolitical trajectory, Ukrainians urged altering the direction in which the country was developing. Giving up freedom, free elections, and democracy entails doing this.

In this way, we understand that the construction of another paradigm of civil society takes place over years or tens of years. In Belarus, they wanted to implement the mentioned changes in a relatively short period in conditions where the country has formed a whole generation in 30 years, which did not know an alternative vision of public administration, except the authoritarianism of Lukashenko.

External legitimacy

The EU's support of the Belarussian opposition demonstrates its increased engagement in Belarus and renewed will to free the Belarusian people from the current authoritarian dictatorship.[322] The EU took notice of Tikhanovskaya's diligent efforts to arrange more transparent and fair elections in Belarus, and she also made it known for being interested in working with specific European leaders.

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[318] Ibid 13.
[319] Ibid 13.
[320] Mischa Gabowitsch, 'Belarusian protest: Regimes of engagement and Coordination', *Slavic Review*, 80(1): 27–37.
[321] Ibid p. 15.
[322] The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Belarus 2020. 1161/20.

On the one hand, the EU is more and more willing to retaliate against the dishonest behavior of the Belarusian government and its ruthless repression of opposition movements. Until the European Union demands an attitude to protesters and the release of previously detained persons, dozens of Belarusian politicians have been denied entry.

Additionally, tensions between Belarus and the main European countries have increased as a result of the continuous savage crackdown on public demonstrations, which compelled the European Union to officially denounce the regime's conduct. It is also intended to scale back the economic assistance the European Union formerly gave to the Belarusian state.[323]

Election fraud and the harsh crackdowns that followed on peaceful protestors, civil society, and the media led the EU Foreign Affairs Council to adopt new Opinions on Belarus, outlining EU policy toward Belarus.[324] The EU-Belarus relationship was thoroughly examined following these conclusions, and financial aid to Belarus was restructured and oriented toward the Belarusian society instead of the government.[325]

However, Tikhanovskaya's political headquarters mistakenly and prematurely emphasized the legitimization of its opposition force through European high-ranking officials, at the same time weakening the work directly with the active civil population. In this situation, both actors - both the EU and Tikhanovskaya found themselves hostage to their expectations of each other.

The main prerequisite for the support of Tikhanovskaya's opposition movement by EU forces was precisely her position as a leader of public opinion - socially recognized. Svitlana's headquarters, on the other hand, obviously shifted the emphasis from the consolidation of civil society to the external vector of support for its political power, gradually losing its leverage over the rather unstable oppositional social mass.

In general, the opposition failed to translate its specific class interests into "national interests", which in turn prevented a true revolution. Using EU funding and the leverage of Tikhanovskaya's diplomacy, the opposition failed to convince Belarusians that they are true members of society. On

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[323] Sabine Pennings, 'Belarus divided: The impact of Tikhanovskaya's campaign for democracy on EU-Belarusian relations', *Foreign Affairs Review*, 22 November 2020, https://www.foreignaffairsreview.com/home/belarus-divided-the-impact-of-tikhanovskayas-campaign-for-democracy-on-eu-belarusian-relations (last accessed 25 January 2023).

[324] EEAS, The European Union and Belarus, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/belarus/es-i-belarus_ru?s=218 (last accessed 25 January 2023).

[325] Ibid 13.

the contrary, such direct foreign aid allows Lukashenka to easily accuse the opposition of being a puppet of the West[326].

Overall, it is necessary to understand that revolutionary sentiments and the willingness of Belarusians to trust certain opposition leaders will decline over time, which will make it impossible to further effectively use funds aimed at democratization in Belarus. Obvious triggers for a possible increase in revolutionary moods in society would be the objective factors of worsening living conditions, a deeper distrust of state institutions (which is still not in the best condition), and a deep economic crisis (which the Belarusian authorities can associate with Western sanctions). It would also be effective to create an emotional catalyst that would demonstrate the radicalization of the actions of the current government and launch a new chain of revolutionary sentiments. If such events do not occur shortly, the only mechanism for democratic transformation in Belarus will remain the lobbying of external pressure on Minsk.[327]

The topic of the effectiveness of support for opposition movements in Belarus is more complex and includes a greater number of triggers and catalysts, both internal and external. They should also include dissonance regarding the support/non-support of the Belarusian people in the face of real threats to European migration security (referring to the aggravation of the migration crisis on the border with Belarusians and Lithuanians and Poles), the presence of a full-scale war in Ukraine, and the influence of this factor on the political content of the support of the Belarusian society in terms of the complicity of Belarus in the bombing of the territory of Ukraine and war crimes and others. At the same time, the insufficient research on these factors, as well as the time frame of the above, do not allow us to assess their impact on the issues mentioned in the essay.

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[326] 'Protesters are Western Puppets, says Lukashenko', *The Hindu*, 21 August 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/protesters-are-western-puppets-says-lukashenko/article32406907.ece (last accessed 25 January 2023).

[327] Artem Schrayban, 'Between isolation and integration. Political Regime and International Orientation of Minsk in the Early 2020s', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 10.02.2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/10/ru-pub-86353 (last accessed 25 January 2023).

branch of the National Reforms Council, an advisory body under the President of Ukraine, on the implementation of a unified state policy of reforms. It is a priority, following graduation, to contribute to the post-war transformation of Ukraine by drawing on the knowledge acquired abroad. The Uni.lu Diplomacy Lab is an outstanding platform that provides Sofiia an opportunity for professional self-development and networking.

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'Tikhanovskaya meets wth EU top officials, bloc allocates extra €30 mln for Belarus' civil society'. *Belsat.eu*, 13 December 2021, https://belsat.eu/en/news/13-12-2021-tsikhanouskaya-meets-wth-eu-top-officials-bloc-allocates-extr a-e30-mln-for-belarus-civil-society (last accessed 23 January 2023).

Building Peace or Image Building: Why Did the European Union Cut the Scientific Relations with Russia after the Ukrainian War?

Mahmoud Moussa

Krasnyak defined the concept of Science diplomacy as where both the interests of science and diplomacy intersected and situated particularly in international relations[328]. Among the successful historical examples about the science diplomacy he mentioned was the birth of the idea of the program of ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor). When Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan met for the first time in Geneva in 1985, they agreed to launch an ambitious program of research and experimentation and work together on the scientific and technological feasibility of nuclear fusion as a new source of energy. The purpose of this proposal for a peaceful use of nuclear energy had a symbolic meaning of cooling of tensions in the Cold War, and controlling the process of the nuclear sector in order to produce clean energy through a collaborative and continuous scientific investment. The following year, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the Soviet Union conducted this program, with the aspiration of a considerable economic reach. Later, China, India and South Korea joined them. This program became a global project that combines the specific interests of each country involved in it and an example of how diplomacy could work in support of science.

This was a concrete application for science diplomacy. So, what is science diplomacy? In his research "The Evolution of Science Diplomacy", Turekian framed science diplomacy as this kind of diplomacy that is not motivated by the creation of new knowledge, but is considered as a strategic approach[329]. In other words, it is the exchange of science engagement in support of broader objectives beyond science discovery. Science diplomacy is characterized by being driven by institutions such as governments, universities, private sector and civil society because it requires an institutional arrangement. He mentioned that the roots of the science diplomacy could be found in the formalized agreement of the Peace Treaty between Ramesses II and Hattusili III completed in 1300 BC. The treaty was not a technical cooperation, it was a simple exchange focused on science to build peace between the two monarchs. Therefore, science diplomacy has a long history and it is an essential part of ancient and modern diplomacy that can be exerted with the purpose of cooling the tension and could be a successful tool for building peace.

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[328] Olga Krasnyak, 'Science and Diplomacy. A New Dimension of International Relations', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 14(4) 2019: pp. 505-507.
[329] Vaughan Turekian, 'The evolution of science diplomacy', *Global Policy* 9: 5-7.

Is science diplomacy powerful?

In the framework of soft power theory of Joseph Nye, Ruffini stated that science in this case is a power of influence[330]. Although science is historically linked to hard power, diplomacy includes the recognized importance of a knowledge society with the so-called "diplomacy of knowledge" which could be understood as "the growing interdependence between science and diplomacy in foreign policy of states". However, he distinguished between two key levels. The first level is about the interactions between issues of science and issues of diplomacy, and the second one is the practice of research actors to exert the soft power of science on the global stage where the internationalization of research comes into the picture, in a diffuse but real manner, into the broad field of the diplomacy of influence. This policy paper is focusing on the science diplomacy that involves interdependence between the states in times of war.

After Ruffini (2019) tackled the development of the science diplomacy during the wars such as the First World war, the Second World War, the Cold War and then the post-Cold War, he noted that the last 20 years, there are rising concerns about many issues could be solved by science such as biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions. These issues brought science to the heart of geopolitics, as all these issues need a framework of multilateral diplomacy.[331]

According to Gluckman et al. (2017), using science to address specific bilateral or cross-boundary issues is strategic only when the country serves its national interests[332]. A concrete example mentioned was the cooperation between Jordan and Israel in the Great Rift Valley Sections, and the result was overcoming occasional tensions and sustaining the agricultural potential in this area. These efforts were developed and continued to bilaterally and multilaterally address the contraction of the Dead Sea. Science diplomacy can facilitate communication in times of wars or tensions, therefore it should be an essential part of a nation's diplomacy strategy, and it should be structured and covered by science agencies through which the issues on the national, regional, and global levels could be addressed for the good of the reduction of conflict.

Although there is a sense of optimism in the literature related to science diplomacy which is helpful in improving mutual understanding between peoples, enhancing the international order, work towards the satisfaction of common interests and reaching goals on both bilateral and international

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[330] Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, 'Conceptualizing science diplomacy in the practitioner-driven literature: a critical review', *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 7(1): 1-9.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Peter Gluckman et al., 'Science diplomacy: a pragmatic perspective from the inside', *Science & Diplomacy* 6(4): 1-13.

arena, Ruffini criticized the science diplomacy when the a country uses it to achieve its own interest at the expense of other countries or at the expense of the common interest. On the other hand, he mentioned other situations such as attracting scientific talents, seeking to influence debates in international arenas, so this means using scientific supremacy for purposes that are not inspired by the spirit of collaboration. All these situations could not be categorized under an absolute criticism, but a lack of conceptualization and a missing manifestation of the reality of science diplomacy could be found in the literature.[333]

Science diplomacy is useful and helpful when two countries decide to cooperate in times of war or tensions to facilitate communication. The essential factor for a successful one is when the result is a mutual benefit for both. When this goal deviates to a unilateral benefit or even cutting scientific cooperation through diplomacy, the result will generate more tensions and continuity of war.

On the other hand, when Russia's war against Ukraine erupted, the European Union decided to cut all ties with the Russian scientific institutions and suspend all the scientific diplomatic relations. In other words, "while there is a war and people are fighting, the only decision is to stop everything," according to Augusto Marcelli, a physicist at Italy's National Institute of Nuclear Physics and adviser to Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Stone argues that the Western scientific community decided to dissolve their partnership and cut the other ties with the Russian scientific institutions due to its bloody war against Ukraine.[334]

This research paper analyzes the research question: Why did the European Union suspend all scientific cooperation with Russia although science diplomacy proved success in many periods of times?

I designed the research paper in four parts: the first part is suggesting the conceptual and theoretical framework which define the perspective of science diplomacy. The second part is analyzing how Science diplomacy should be used and how it could be a common space for the countries to face the global challenges. The third part is explaining how Russia is using science diplomacy in a different way using it as a tool for image improvement in the international area, and this could give the European Union the justification why the member states decided to cut the scientific ties with Russia as keeping the scientific cooperation could achieve the target created for this purpose. The

[333] Ruffini, 'Conceptualizing science diplomacy in the practitioner-driven literature: a critical review', pp. 1-9.
[334] Richard Stone, 'Western nations cut ties with Russian science, even as some projects try to remain neutral', *Science*, 08 March 2022,
https://www.science.org/content/article/western-nations-cut-ties-russian-science-even-some-projects-try-remain-neutral (last accessed 28 March 2023).

fourth part is the conclusion which is the reason why the European Union decided to cut the scientific relation through this perspective of analysis as a result of how Russia is using science diplomacy.

Theoretical framework

Ruffini (2020) argues that Science Diplomacy is where science and innovation intersect and overlap with international relations and foreign policies. Historians confirm that there is a great impact of science on international affairs when the scientists take part in the negotiations in the foreign policies.[335] In their article "time for a new era of science diplomacy", Lord and Turekian declared that even if the concept of Science Diplomacy itself is not new, but the terminology coined by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) when it have created the Center for Science Diplomacy.[336]

The definitions used to describe Science Diplomacy could be indicators about how it is perceived in international relations. Ruffini mentioned that practitioners brought their academic world into the policy making field to engage the countries together when the relations need to be improved, so the application of science can build bridges and develop the relations between societies through addressing the common challenges. There are three pillars that shaped the understanding of Science Diplomacy which are "science in diplomacy", "science for diplomacy" and "diplomacy for science". Even if there are criticisms because of the overlapping between these three dimensions, the simplicity and the clarity could be an advantage created by this overlapping.[337]

The university of the values in science allows a kind of transformation in the field of international relations because science created the idea of improving the international order. Therefore, through the "values of science" the scientists can act as mediators in peace-building because they can use the neutrality tone, openness, sharing, evidence based merit mentality, trust, transparency, hope and the non-ideological dialogue to reduce the tensions during conflicts and the political differences in times when the classical diplomac ways fail, constrained or even do not exist. One of the prominent examples as evidence is the Sustainable Development Goals Agenda that science was involved in policy-making to address the challenges that face the globe. The importance of Science diplomacy was stressed due to the growing interest in the USA's foreign policy goals, especially when President Obama announced in the Cairo speech (2009) the "reset" of diplomatic relations based on

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[335] Ruffini, 'Conceptualizing science diplomacy in the practitioner-driven literature: a critical review'.
[336] Turekian, 'The evolution of science diplomacy'.
[337] Ruffini, 'Conceptualizing science diplomacy in the practitioner-driven literature: a critical review'.

cooperation to prevent conflicts. This understanding enhanced the Science Diplomacy vision due to the geopolitical interests of the United States in that time. Ruffini also mentioned another example when Gluckman et al. mentioned the suggestion of potential use of science diplomacy to build bridges between the Musilm countries in the West after the 9/11 attacks and the war against terrorism. These examples could be understood from the perspective that cooperation through science can absolutely contribute to bringing peace.[338]

Science diplomacy as a preventive diplomacy

The roots of the development of science diplomacy as a preventive diplomacy could be found at the end of the Cold War II when the informal diplomatic relations began compared to the classic one. Vitorovic et al. argue that the legal basis of this concept is formulated by the Egyptian UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali in his UN Report 'Agenda for Peace.' Generally speaking, this legal basis allows individuals and groups of people inside a given society or between different countries to connect in an informal way to achieve two main purposes: the first is to prevent conflicts, and the second is to develop ideas and visions for the future eliminating the idea of othering in an environment of different religious, ethnic and political affiliation. It seems that the accelerating challenges that encounter the relations between the countries could be faced through this ideal concept of informal forms of diplomacy to prevent any emergence of a conflict. From this perspective, many forms of preventive diplomacy have emerged and classical diplomacy has developed into a complex variety such as cultural diplomacy, soft diplomacy and sports diplomacy. The goal of all these derivations of preventive diplomacy is the achievement of cooperation and peace, however science diplomacy aims to spread knowledge and enrich scientific thinking.[339]

The transformation of both science and diplomacy have been accelerating and in times of crisis such as COVID-19 are merged and crossed. Vitorovic et al. confirmed that the challenges that have been created due to the pandemic have required more contribution from the side of scientists and experts in the field of politics because politicians wanted to know how they can manage the new situation with more knowledge to face the insecure reality. In the European Union, the level of scientific excellence is high, therefore exchanging its experience and potential is definitely useful in

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[338] Ibid.

[339] Zoran Vitorovic, Luigi Santacroce, Marijana Secibovic, and Andrei Gorokhov, 'Science Diplomacy: Science for Diplomacy, Diplomacy for Science', in Leonid Grinin, Ilya Lyin and Andrey Korotayev (eds.), *Globalistics and Globalization Studies: Current and Future Trends in the Big History Perspective* (Volgograd; Uchitel Publishing House, 2021), pp. 136-147.

the framework of external policies. The importance of science diplomacy lies in using it in the field of multilateral and bilateral relations in the international arena.[340]

Russia's Science diplomacy potential

Science is clearly an international field where researchers from all over the world inevitably interact with each other with the purpose of bringing countries together. Kharitonova et al. discussed how science diplomacy is usually utilized in major countries. Mainly, science diplomacy is utilized in the context of the economic field, and implemented in technology and innovation policies to support national businesses and involve the national scientific community.[341]

In some cases, Kharitonova et al. confirmed that science diplomacy could be utilized as a tool to increase soft power in the context of public diplomacy. In times of global risks, it plays a crucial role in global governance to find solutions to save lives and the scientists became negotiators to contribute to build peace. Therefore, science diplomacy could be overlapped in many areas. Russia's increasing attention to this diplomacy tool could be explained in the light of all these areas, but the Russian policy makers are using science diplomacy to improve its position in the international scene as a global power, taking advantage of the blurred distinction between the science as cooperation and science as an image improving tool. In fact, Russia is politicizing science and uses it as a propaganda tool and instrument to influence diplomacy because, first of all, science in Russia is apparently dependent on the political regime and the scientific community is playing an actor in international relations because it is manipulated by the state propaganda and their public activities are usually limited in public activities like diplomats.[342]

In the context of rivalry between the west and Russia, Kharitonova et al. argue that even in times of deteriorated relations the scientific cooperation continues, connections are maintained, personal dialogue is alive because they were keen to find solutions through science diplomacy. On the other hand, it is clear that Russia uses science diplomacy as an influence tool in the public diplomacy sphere with the purpose of improving its image in the international scene and creating opportunities to build ties with the other countries, due to its science and technology development and its long-term experience in this field.[343]

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[340] Zoran Vitorovic, Luigi Santacroce, Marijana Secibovic, and Andrei Gorokhov, 'Science Diplomacy'.
[341] Elena Kharitonova and Irina Prokhorenko, 'Russian science diplomacy', in Anna Velikaya and Greg Simons (eds.), *Russia's Public Diplomacy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 133-146.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Elena Kharitonova and Irina Prokhorenko, 'Russian science diplomacy'.

There is much evidence that proves Russia's investment in science. As examples, Russia is among the top ten countries in the world that spend gross domestic on R&D, it has a growing number of researchers and scientists, the number of scientific papers, citations of Russian scientists and the number of patent filings is growing. Kharitonova et al. confirmed that Russia is using science diplomacy to influence the international agenda through creating a network of scientific contacts, participating in missions in which diplomats and politicians are trying to find shared interests and options in the scientific communities.[344]

When the Russian war against Ukraine started, the European Union announced its solidarity with the Ukrainian people and the European Commission decided to stop all scientific cooperation with the Russian entities and research institutions, decided not to conclude any new form of agreements and stop payments to the Russian programs or entities under Horizon Europe and Horizon 2020 which is the previous EU programme for research cooperation with Russia. The national research councils of European countries, including France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, dissolved collaborations with Russia. The reason that was announced by the European Union is that scientific cooperation is based on the freedom and the respect of rights that enhance innovation and cooperation, and the military attack against Ukraine cannot go hand in hand with the same values. Therefore, putting an end to the scientific cooperation is the adequate and suitable response for Russia. Instead, the European Union has decided to strengthen their scientific cooperation with Ukraine, to make sure that Ukraine will enjoy successful beneficiaries and to send funding from the different research and innovation programmes.[345]

Stone argues that the scientific cooperation between Russia and the West occurred in 2011 when the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States gave $300 million to help found the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) in Moscow, because the West thought this scientific cooperation will normalize the international relations after the Cold-War era and it would boost the innovation to inspire to create a place like the Silicon Valley in Russia.[346]

Conclusion

Cutting scientific relations with Russia came in a broader context of suspending diplomatic relations. Russian attacks on values such as freedom and human rights did not give any space for future cooperation during the military aggression against Ukraine. Science diplomacy as a tool to

[344] Ibid.

[345] European Commission, The Commission suspends cooperation with Russia on research and innovation, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1544 (last accessed 28 March 2023).

[346] Stone, 'Western nations cut ties with Russian science, even as some projects try to remain neutral'.

improve the image of Russia could be used to justify their attacks and could change the course of the war to the benefit of the Russian regime. It is obvious that the European Union is exerting international pressure against Russia through the scientific field because it seems that it is an effective tool to end or even mitigate the negative consequences of the aggressive war. In the past, the European Union used its scientific excellence because maybe there was a room for peace and there was a hope for mutual cooperation that could lead to a solution for the conflict during the Cold War. On the other hand, it seems that Russia did not leave any opportunity to keep the cooperation possible and the European Union decision to stop sharing scientific knowledge could be the only way to convince Putin to stop his aggressive military attack against Ukraine.

It is obvious that cutting scientific diplomacy will deteriorate both the scientific research and innovation and the diplomatic relations in the international arena. On the other hand, the European Union decision will (re)position the image of Russia and isolate Putin especially because science comes among the priorities where Putin classified science as a crucial element for his external policies.

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Turekian, Vaughan. 'The evolution of science diplomacy'. *Global Policy* 9: 5-7.

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Migration and Border Diplomacy:
The Weaponization and Cooperation over EU Migration Policy

Emilie Uehara

The post-globalized world is marked by its complexity in the management of increased migration and control of borders. The International Organization of Migrants' (IOM) had reported around 281 million foreign migrants[347] worldwide accounting for 3.6% of the global population in 2020, the rate of which already surpassed certain 2050 projections. There are now three times as many people living outside of their country as migrants as there were in 1970.[348] These statistics illustrate the transformation of the globalized world and the emergence of significance of what is often categorized as migration issues.

Given this statue, migration has emerged as one of the most crucial elements of diplomatic relations that have an impact on both internal and foreign-state policy. States use diplomatic tools and procedures to control migration, often emphasizing its cross-border movement as a prominent component of foreign policy strategies. Subsequently however, multilateral migration regimes are often described as largely missing today;[349] despite the fact that managing migration frequently calls for increased cross-country cooperation specially between destination and host countries.

When examining at the European level, a six-year high of around 330,000 unauthorised entry attempts were attempted into Europe according to Frontex[350]. The European Union (EU) has adopted various sets of rules and frameworks to manage legal migration[351] flows, such as the Skills and Talents Package in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Nevertheless, with regard to what the European Council refers as "other migration flows", which is essentially what is viewed commonly as problematic within the intergovernmental consultations, the EU has not come to an agreement on a mutual immigration policy or a potential mechanism of solidarity for the migration.

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[347] As there are no universally accepted definition for "migrant", the definition developed by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) will be applied in this paper: "a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons".

[348] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020* (United Nations), https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789290687894 (last accessed 15 March 2023).

[349] Sara Goodman and Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Migration: a step too far for the contemporary global order?', *Journal of European Public Policy* 27(7).

[350] Frontex, EU's external borders in 2022: Number of irregular border crossings highest since 2016, 13 January.2023, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-s-external-borders-in-2022-number-of-irregular-border-crossings-highest-since-2016-YsAZ29 (last accessed 15 March 2023).

[351] The legal migration includes highly skilled workers, students and researchers, seasonal workers, and people seeking family reunification, Consilium Europa, EU migration and asylum policy, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/ (last accessed 15 March 2023).

The EU common rules solely address the processing of asylum requests and readmission agreements for returning irregular migrants.[352] Furthermore, what needs to be emphasized is the EU's coercive migration diplomacy between its external border countries. It is highlighted by the EU's growing dependence on its instrument of foreign policy to address migratory issues, and its use of migration as a possible political weapon, often described as "weaponized migrants".[353] By agreeing on the diplomatic deals, the EU has substantially moved its responsibility of overseeing European migrant management. This can also be argued that states have utilized migration as diplomatic weapons to "weaken" Europe.[354]

This paper begins by introducing the concept of Adamson and Tsourapas' "migration diplomacy", considering its possible broadening as important elements of the relationship between states and the political system of the EU. In the next section, by examining the definition of "weaponized migrants", the EU-Turkey relationship regarding the Mediterranean refugee crisis will be analyzed in regard to its political direction and its implication until today. The final section titled "the dilemma of migration diplomacy" will describe the definition of cooperative migration and explain its limitation of application to the EU's externalized migration policy. The conclusion highlights the fact that migration diplomacy today, particularly in the context of EU and neighboring states' bilateral agreement is categorized by its frequent use of its coercive migration diplomacy, contrary to what the EU calls "cooperative" measures.

Migration diplomacy

Similar to what can be called as traditional diplomacy,[355] Migration diplomacy involves government-to-government contact and is modelled by the conflicting interests and power dynamics of governments.[356] According to Adamson and Tsourapas[357], states' place in the web of international migrant flows influences its diplomatic strategy and extends beyond conventional military and economic measures. Thereby, it is oftentimes possible to view the migration flows as

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[352] Consilium Europa, EU migration and asylum policy.
[353] Bianca Mascareñas, 'CIDOB - Migration as coercion', *CIDOB*, http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/2021/migration_as_coercion (last accessed 15 March 2023).
[354] Leslie Carretero, 'Migrants are being used as diplomatic weapons to 'weaken' Europe'. *InfoMigrants*, 19 November 2019, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/36528/migrants-are-being-used-as-diplomatic-weapons-to-weaken-europe (last accessed 31 January 2023).
[355] Traditional diplomacy implies conducting negotiations with representatives of a foreign country to help a sending government pursue its foreign policy objectives and protect its national interests, see: Diana Khomeriki, 'Benefits and Risks of Digital Diplomacy: Is Traditional Diplomacy in Decline?', in Nika Chitadze (ed.), *World Politics and the Challenges for International Security* (Hershey: IGI Global 2022), pp. 261-281.
[356] Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Understanding Migration Diplomacy', *The Global*, 04 June 2020, https://theglobal.blog/2020/06/04/understanding-migration-diplomacy/ (last accessed 15 March 2023).
[357] Ibid.

its projection of national or supranational interests and objectives: the negotiation tactics that they use to try to control migrant flows can be illuminated by a migration diplomacy approach. Ceccorulli claims that there has been a noticeable increase in the interest of this concept today. The concept of migration diplomacy has emphasized its expanding applicability to the newly measures taken among states, especially highlighted by EU's increasing reliance on its diplomatic tools to cope with migration challenges[358].

Adamson and Tsourapas further explain the possible attitude of states that elaborate within this concept: the absolute or relative gain approaches, where certain governments give focus on the "absolute gains, developing a zero-sum and conflictual strategy vis-à-vis their partners". This can be explained by the threats of unilateral action which Turkey has used in its migration diplomacy since 2015 in relation to its Syrian refugee population.[359] On the other hand, states may "opt for a relative-gains, or positive-sum, bargaining strategy": Ethiopia agreed to a large aid package early in 2019 that would generate over 100,000 employment as a reward for the nation's efforts to protect internally displaced people.[360] Accordingly, it is possible to relate the following: different perspectives on the interpretation on the migration diplomacy abound as states and their leaders increasingly project their political views onto the migration challenges. Migration management plans are considered as means of advancing their security, pursuing their economic objectives, or expanding their soft power through cultural or public diplomacy.[361]

"Weaponized migrants" as diplomatic tools

According to Greenhill, migrants, especially refugees, have been used as "foreign-policy bargaining chips" or, more accurately, "coercive weapons" to influence a target. In fact, what Greenhill calls the coercive engineered migration (CEM) undertaken at least 75 times and utilizing displaced persons as nonmilitary tools of state-level coercion has long been a recurrent element of international politics.[362] Migrants are used as a weapon in diplomatic negotiations towards the states that fear the growing immigrant's population, as a tool to possibly gain some leverage and thus relative power. The rising trend of weaponized migration can be understood by the fact that migration issues became a security threat to many states after the refugee crisis in 2015. From the

[358] Michela Ceccorulli, 'Triangular migration diplomacy: the case of EU–Italian cooperation with Libya', *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 52(3): 328–345.
[359] Adamson and Tsourapas, 'Understanding Migration Diplomacy'.
[360] Ibid
[361] Ibid
[362] Kelly Greenhill, 'Migration as a Weapon in Theory and in Practice', *Military Review* 96(6).

perspective of the country originally hosting migration, it has therefore led to the likelihood of success as a diplomatic tool to gain state interests.

The use of migration as a new diplomatic tool has been clearly apparent in the EU, particularly in relation to the EU-Turkey relationship regarding the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Düvell explains that previously, relations between Turkey and the EU were largely defined by the accession process, which required Turkey to adhere to EU norms with its national interests in modernizing institutions and laws. However, the refugee crisis rearranged ties between Turkey and the EU by adding a new factor to the list of factors that determine the power balance between the two and subsequently reconfigured relations. This was particularly clear during the resuscitation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan in October 2015 and the Statement of cooperation in March 2016, which exchanged funding and visa liberalization for effective control of sea borders, the return of undocumented immigrants, and organized resettlement to benefit EU citizens.[363] The statement of cooperation, often referred to as the "EU-Turkey deal" was signed by the EU member states and the Turkish government in March 2016. There were three main points that Turkey agreed upon for its condition: Its effort to prevent individuals from traveling illegitimately from Turkey to the Greek islands, its illegal migrants from Turkey who entered the Greece can be sent back to Turkey, and finally each Syrian refugee who had been waiting in Turkey must be accepted by an EU Member State for every Syrian who returned from the islands.[364] In exchange, it was agreed that Turkey gets 6 billion euros to help with the humanitarian situation that migrants are facing and also, allowing Turkish citizens to be able to travel to Europe without a visa. Reduction in the number of refugees landing in Greece was perceivable in the short term; nonetheless, the agreement was arguably a failure both politically and practically, the possible end to a "migrant crisis" remained as an optimism for the EU. The numbers of asylum-seekers sent back to Turkey under the deal have been negligible, leaving thousands of Syrian refugees trapped in Greece.[365]

The "fear" of weaponized migration is also considered as a significant additional diplomatic tool that might affect diplomatic relations or change a nation's geopolitical situation.[366] The construction of border walls or fences along the border may most likely be inferred from this. From its fears of

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[363] Frank Düvell, 'The EU's International Relations and Migration Diplomacy at Times of Crisis: Key Challenges and Priorities', *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 22(4).

[364] 'What is the EU-Turkey deal?', *International Rescue Committee*, 18 March 2022, https://eu.rescue.org/article/what-eu-turkey-deal (last accessed 2 February 2023).

[365] Amanda Meral, 'Learning the lessons from the EU–Turkey deal: Europe's renewed test', *ODI*, https://odi.org/en/insights/learning-the-lessons-from-the-euturkey-deal-europes-renewed-test/ (last accessed 2 February 2023).

[366] 'EU border states extend physical barriers to stop migrants', *InfoMigrants*, 07 September 2022, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/43132/eu-border-states-extend-physical-barriers-to-stop-migrants (last accessed 31 January 2023).

migrant flows entering the EU states, the EU continues to create heavily armed and guarded physical barriers. For the recent instances of this influence, Greece's civil protection minister Theodorikakos has spoken the plans to extend the border fence were Aimed to sending a clear message of Greece's determination "against those who invest in human suffering to serve concealed interests", and has addressed the Turkish government as "those who weaponize migration in an attempt to blackmail Europe." [367] In addition to its function in improving immigration control, the symbolic construction of the wall may be considered as a means for the states and the international community to send a clear statement.

These deals and actions resulting have drawn criticism for undermining the fundamental principles of the EU to promote and defend human rights, and at the same time feeding a perilous populist narrative.[368] Human rights organizations have openly criticized the EU and the government for taking this measure.[369] This could be argued to come at a high cost given the organization's core principles; however, the EU's stance on migration, border control, and the use of migration as a diplomatic instrument has not forged away as well as for states like Turkey, which continues to wield migration as a political weapon. At the summit in February 2023, the EU government is anticipated to reaffirm its call for tighter border controls and more pressure on surrounding states that migrants cross to escape or enter Europe.[370] In terms of its aid budget, it described to offer "the best possible use" to encourage states to act toward the inflow of migration; meanwhile, it had already listed the consequence for the uncooperative states: if they do not accept their nationals back, they will "find it harder to get European visas". [371]

The dilemma of migration diplomacy

Despite the consequences, the general trend in the EU is still for its increased "externalization" of refugee protection with the existence of deals that help third countries host refugees or limit migration: Moreover, the agreement with Turkey is often still referred to as a blueprint for further cooperation with other third country states.[372] As a tool to advance negotiations, this unconventional

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[367] 'EU border states extend physical barriers to stop migrants', *InfoMigrants*.

[368] Meral, 'Learning the lessons from the EU–Turkey deal: Europe's renewed test'.

[369] Leila Nezirevic, '5 Baltic countries strengthening borders fearing Russia, Belarus will 'weaponize migration', *Anadalou Agency*, 21 November 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/5-baltic-countries-strengthening-borders-fearing-russia-belarus-will-weaponize-migration-/2742497 (last accessed 31 January 2023).

[370] Lorne Cook, '10 years after EU's 'never again' tragedy that killed 300 migrants, little has changed', *Los Angeles Times*, 31 January 2023, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2023-01-31/10-years-after-eu-migrant-tragedy-little-has-changed (last accessed 2 February 2023).

[371] Ibid.

[372] Olaf Kleist, 'Beyond the Crisis Mode of the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement', *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*, 2022, https://eu.boell.org/en/2022/03/17/beyond-crisis-mode-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement (last accessed 15 March 2023).

migration diplomacy is often considered to be successful.[373] In fact, coercive diplomacy was studied to be successful in well over half of cases, obtaining the majority of what was desired as deals, in comparison to three-quarters of the 81 cases identified to the conventional[374] means.[375] One may contend that the regulations governing admission are not symmetrical, which allows recipient governments to restrict the number of migration allowed and sort potential migrants in accordance with desired characteristics.[376] Nevertheless, as discussed in the instance of the relationship between the EU and Turkey, the adoption of coercive migration diplomacy has only worked to decrease the number of short-term influxes, rather than facilitate fundamental issues concerning the larger context of the migration issue.

The actual form of cooperative migration diplomacy is potentially defined by Tsourapas (2017), as "the promise or act by a state, or coalition of states, to affect either migration flows to/from a target state or its migrant stock as a reward, provided that the target state acquiesces to an articulated political or economic demand". Cooperative migration in diplomacy is founded on interstate negotiating expressly seeking for mutually advantageous agreements in the absence of hostility such as use of violence or the threat of using violence. In essence, this form of cooperation is uncommon and hard to achieve with limited examples including the cooperation between particular EU member states, where the states must have equivalent levels of development, comparable labor market shortages, and arrange reciprocal immigration rights in order to establish cooperative migration diplomacy.[377]

Conclusion

Coercive migration policies that use migrants as weapons may be successful in the short term by temporarily reducing the number of entries, as demonstrated with the relation of the EU and Turkey after the inflows of Mediterranean refugees. In contrast to many other types of diplomatic instruments, it is challenging in the present world to adapt a migration agreement that is near to a win-win situation among the states, that is anywhere close to the results expected within the definition of cooperative migration diplomacy. This highlights the fact that migration diplomacy

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[373] Meral, 'Learning the lessons from the EU–Turkey deal: Europe's renewed test'.

[374] The conventional coercive diplomacy are best explained by its use of sanctions and military action including war in this context, see: Meral, 'Learning the lessons from the EU–Turkey deal: Europe's renewed test'.

[375] Kelly Greenhill, 'When Migrants Become Weapons', *Foreign Affairs*, 22 February 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-02-22/when-migrants-become-weapons (last accessed 30 January 2023).

[376] Jeannette Money, 'Why Isn't There More International Cooperation Around Migration?', *IGCC*, 06 March 2020, https://ucigcc.org/news/why-isnt-there-more-international-cooperation-around-migration/ (last accessed 15 March 2023).

[377] Gerasimos Tsourapas, 'Migration diplomacy in the Global South: cooperation, coercion and issue linkage in Gaddafi's Libya', *Third World Quarterly* 38(10).

today, particularly in the context of EU and neighboring states' bilateral agreement, frequently uses migrants as weapons instead of seeing them as a subject to be engaged with protection under state-cooperation. The agreement between the EU and Turkey has undermined regional cooperation on managing migration and protecting refugees. Additionally, by exploiting refugees and migrants as political pawns and turning into diplomatic weapons, it can be argued to have further weakened the moral and legal standing of the migration policy at the EU level. The externalization of migration policies has therefore threatened the EU's fundamental values. The EU, in its potential intention to increase cooperation in the field of migration policy, needs to face and resolve the current paradox: to cease the cooperation to exist within weaponization measures.

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Chapter IV

National Perspectives on Global Affairs

A Small Country with a Big Heart:

Luxembourg's Push for Democracy in the Western Balkans

Stefan Marković

Being a small country, The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg does not have a permanent presence in the Western Balkan countries. Nonetheless, it actively supports the integration of candidate countries into the EU and better implementation of the rule of law and democracy in general. Luxembourg's support is invaluable to key NGOs that help nurture democratic thought inside their respective countries. Furthermore, in the last couple of years, companies from Luxembourg started appearing in the Western Balkan market, thus managing to further solidify the country's presence in the region. In order to have a clear picture of the NGOs that the Grand Duchy supports, I have compiled a list of all relevant organizations that encourage cooperation and democracy in the Western Balkans, as well as some companies that have made the region their home. Additionally, the activities of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the Western Balkans from 2019 to 2021 will also be outlined in this paper.

Following the Ministry's Mission Statement, it is clear that the goal of Luxembourg's diplomacy is to advance and defend the country's international interests while enhancing the reputation of the nation. With its wide network of embassies, international prestige and commitment to democracy, Luxembourg is in a perfect position to promote European values globally.[378] In the Western Balkans, Luxembourg's diplomatic activities primarily focus on supporting the candidate countries in their accession negotiations, giving special focus on the rule of law and democracy.[379] The Ministry, with the help of the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), also provides seminars for concrete judicial topics for public servants of candidate countries in the region.[380] Over the last three years, there has been an increase in diplomatic activity conducted by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs in all the Western Balkan countries, predominantly by financing non – governmental organizations (NGOs), whose projects are crucial in promoting the changes required for closer ties with the European Union.[381]

Non – governmental organizations and their importance in today's public discourse

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[378] The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Mission Statement, 2022.

[379] The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2019 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes,(2020) pp.39.

[380] EIPA Luxembourg,'Luxembourg: The small, yet strategic center of Europe' https://www.eipa.eu/about-us/eipa-luxembourg/(last accessed 21 March 2023).

[381] The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2021 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, (2022)52.

But what is an NGO and why are they so prevalent nowadays? NGOs are non – profit organizations in which members operate on a voluntary basis promoting various topics that range from fair elections to environmental issues. They are beneficial to society because they help advertise problems that the government does not want or does not have enough resources to address. Their increasing number contributed to the constant digitalization of civilization which in turn allowed NGOs to advertise their actions and gather support from different groups of people. Moreover, they are extensively used by actors in public diplomacy campaigns in order to shape public opinion and to create a positive viewpoint towards an idea or a project.[382] The European Union appears to view NGOs as members of civil society trying to have an impact on political processes. The EU entrusts NGOs, particularly in the areas of humanitarian and development aid, environmental protection, and culture, with the implementation of 1.7% of its overall budget, according to the Report published by the European Court of Auditors in 2018. The report also states that 6.8% of the European Development Fund is being implemented by NGOs.[383]

Luxembourg's efforts in bringing Albania closer to the European Union can be seen in numerous projects that have helped the citizens, especially the youth, understand the importance of fair elections, youth empowerment and good governance. Luxembourg endorsed a think tank based in Tirana, called Cooperation and Development Institute (CDI) and their 'EU and Connectivity' program.[384] The aim of the program is to invite participants to play an active role in reforms and practices concerning EU integration. Through their events, they support spreading the knowledge of the EU accession negotiation process and advocate the importance of EU integration for the Republic of Albania.[385] The Grand Duchy also financed a project of an Albanian NGO called HANA (Hand to Hand Against Nation Apathy), a non-profit organization created with the mission of educating Albanian society, especially young people, about the value of community involvement in public affairs and decision-making.[386] In order to secure the resources required, the group will pursue this goal by building collaborations with official institutions, civil society organizations, local residents, and national or international development organizations.[387] Finally, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs assisted a non – profit organization that, in 2021, observed the

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[382] Natalia Broś, 'Public diplomacy and cooperation with non-governmental organizations in the liberal perspective of international relations', *Journal of Education, Culture and Society* 8(1): 14-16 .

[383] Natalia V. Burlinova, 'The Role of NGOs in International Relations and Public Diplomacy', J*ournal of International Analytics* 13(1) : 115-116.

[384] The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2020 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, (2021), p. 41.

[385] Cooperation and Development Institute, EU and Connectivity,https://cdinstitute.eu/programs/connectivity/ (last accessed 21 March 2023).

[386] The Luxembourg Government, 2021, p. 41.

[387] Hana Centre, About Our Work, https://www.hanacentre.org/about-our-work/ (last accessed 23 March 2023).

electoral process of Albanian elections, called 'Coalition for Reforms, Integration, and Consolidated Institutions' (KRIIK).[388] The EU – Western Balkan summit held in Tirana was an important event for all countries that are on the EU path. It was attended by Prime Minister of Luxembourg Xavier Bettel, and the goals of the summit were to intensify the process of EU integration and foster cooperation in the region.[389]

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also one of the countries that are seeking closer relations with the European Union. Therefore, Luxembourg is trying to help in any possible way, especially through its program of technical support designed to acquaint the Bosnian government with the process of European integration. Additionally, Luxembourg provided a project manager for two years to the High Representative's office in Sarajevo as part of its ongoing support.[390] TRIAL International, a project in Bosnia and Herzegovina that works to improve the country's judicial system while seeking justice for victims of various crimes committed during the war, was recognized by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs as an important actor.[391]

Being the country that has advanced the most in the EU negotiation process, Montenegro has a bright future ahead and that fact is acknowledged by numerous Member States, Luxembourg being among them. That stance was confirmed when the Prime Minister of Montenegro, Zdravko Krivokapić, had a working visit to the Grand Duchy on the 22 of June 2021. He met with Prime Minister Bettel to discuss Montenegro's accession process and the bilateral relations between the two countries, underlining the importance of the Montenegrin minority and the benefits that the direct flights launched by Luxair will have on further cooperation.[392] Bettel stated that:

'EU membership entails responsibilities and reforms, particularly in the areas of the rule of law and the independence of justice, the fight against corruption, the rights but also in the fight against organized crime. With the continuation of the reforms, Montenegro will be able to count on the support of Luxembourg during the ongoing accession negotiations'.[393]

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[388] The Luxembourg Government, 2022, p. 52.
[389] The Luxembourg Government, Ministry of State, 'Xavier Bettel at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana' https://me.gouvernement.lu/en/actualites.gouvernement%2Ben%2Bactualites%2Btoutes_actualites%2Bcommuniques%2B2022%2B12-decembre%2B06-bettel-tirana.html (last accessed 21 March 2023)
[390] The Luxembourg Government, 2022, p. 52.
[391] TRIAL International, 'What We Do', https://trialinternational.org/countries-post/bosnia-herzegovina/ (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[392] The Luxembourg Government, 'Visite de travail à Luxembourg du Premier ministre du Monténégro, Zdravko Krivokapić'https://gouvernement.lu/fr/gouvernement/xavier-bettel/actualites.gouvernement%2Bfr%2Bactualites%2Btoutes_actualites%2Bcommuniques%2B2021%2B06-juin%2B22-bettel-krivokapic.html (Last accessed 21 March 2023).
[393] The Luxembourg Government, 'Visite de travail à Luxembourg du Premier ministre du Monténégro, Zdravko Krivokapić'.

Luxembourg endorses the Centre for Democratic Transformation, an NGO that works to enhance Montenegro's democratic institutions and society in order to bring the country closer to the ideals and principles of the European Union.[394] Their objective is to create independent institutions that uphold democracy and ensure free and fair elections as well as checks and balances between the three parts of government. They also support measures that will move Montenegro towards Western democracies as well as examine and evaluate the damaging political and economic impacts from abroad.[395] The opening of a world – renowned designer and creator of specialist 3D scanners and applications in Bar, Montenegro also marked a new stage of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Artec 3D, a company with its headquarters located in Luxembourg, is aiming to grow its elite teams with fresh experts in programming, research & development, and marketing with this brand-new European site.[396]

Another country in the region that aspires to join the European Union is North Macedonia. Bilateral relations between Luxembourg and North Macedonia were always on a high level, which was confirmed in 2020 when Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Jean Asselborn visited the nation's capital. In order to ensure peace and stability in the region and to make the gains made irreversible, Minister Asselborn emphasized the significance of assisting the Western Balkan nations in their efforts to become members of the European Union.[397] This was firmly established when Prime Minister Zoran Zaev attended a bilateral meeting in Luxembourg, with his counterpart Xavier Bettel. The ministers examined the most recent regional events in the Western Balkans and evaluated the COVID-19 pandemic's progression as well as the financial assistance offered by the EU in this regard.[398] The Prime Minister of Luxembourg congratulated the country by saying:

'I congratulate North Macedonia for taking courageous decisions to advance the country's reform process. We know the essential role of the Western Balkans for the stability of the Union as a whole. I thank Zoran Zaev for our constructive exchanges and encourage him to continue to strengthen the rule of law, among other things through the reform of the judicial system and the fight against corruption.'[399]

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[394] The Luxembourg Government, 2022, p. 53.
[395] Centre for Democratic Transition https://en.cdtmn.org/#o-nama (Last accessed 21 March 2023).
[396] Artec 3D, 'Artec 3D opens a new office in Montenegro to attract more talent to its multinational team', *Artec3D* 31 May 2022.
[397] JCA, 'Luxembourg Advocates Opening of EU-North Macedonia Accession Talks', *Chronicle.lu,* 09 March 2020, https://chronicle.lu/category/abroad/32041-luxembourg-advocates-immediate-opening-of-eu-north-macedonia-accession-talks (last acccessed 21 March 2023).
[398] The Luxembourg Government, 'Visite de travail du Premier ministre de la république de Macédoine du Nord, Zoran Zaev'https://gouvernement.lu/fr/actualites/toutes_actualites/communiques/2021/03-mars/16-bettel-asselborn-zaev.html (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[399] The Luxembourg Government, "Visite de travail du Premier ministre de la république de Macédoine du Nord, Zoran Zaev'.

Furthermore, funding was allocated for an NGO called "CIVIL - Centre for Freedom" which works to advance and defend human rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression, and lasting peace and reconciliation processes.[400] Support was also given to an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) project called 'Building Bridges' which aims to empower the youth in order to stop interethnic violence and extremism. One of the goals of the OSCE Mission in Skopje is to help young people develop their abilities to deal with the problems that violent extremism poses.[401]

The Republic of Serbia still has a long way to go in order to become a full-fledged member of the European Union. Nevertheless, the efforts made by the Serbian authorities have been recognized by Luxembourg whose Prime Minister went to Belgrade for an official visit in 2019. This was the first official visit since 2003 and was meant to serve as a reminder of the strong ties between the nations' peoples as well as the strong political, economic, and cultural ties that bind the two countries. One of the main topic areas of the visit was ICT and digitalisation which is seen as one of the main domestic policy goals for both countries.[402] This sentiment was confirmed only a few months later when the Prime Minister of Serbia, Ana Brnabić, visited Luxembourg City. Attending the Serbia – Luxembourg economic forum the focus being, once again, on start-up culture and ICT infrastructure. Emphasizing the good bilateral relationship between the two countries, Xavier Bettel added:

'Luxembourg is a long-standing partner of Serbia and has always supported its European path. Future EU membership clearly remains the objective of the Serbian government and I welcome the efforts made by your authorities. But your efforts to implement these measures, particularly in the area of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and freedom of the press, must continue.'[403]

The most recent meeting was conducted in Luxembourg by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Jean Asselborn commended the fact that Luxembourg is one of the biggest foreign direct investors in Serbia. Numerous paths have been investigated to strengthen bilateral economic ties, particularly in the areas of information technology and the digital economy. The introduction of direct flights by Luxair between Belgrade and Luxembourg was also appreciated by both sides. The establishment of the European 2022 Capitals of Cultures Esch-sur-Alzette and Novi Sad was also welcomed by the

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[400] The Luxembourg Government, 2021, p. 42.
[401] Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 'North Macedonia: Building bridges to empower youth against violent extremism', https://www.osce.org/secretariat/463191 (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[402] Embassy of Luxembourg in Serbia,'Xavier Bettel en visite officielle en Serbie'
 https://serbia.mae.lu/en/News/Xavier-Bettel-en-visite-officielle-en-Serbie (Last accessed 21 March 2023).
[403] Embassy of Luxembourg in Serbia, 'Visite officielle au Luxembourg de la Première ministre de la république de Serbie, Ana
Brnabić',https://serbia.mae.lu/en/News/Visite-officielle-au-Luxembourg-de-la-Premiere-ministre-de-la-republique-de-Serbie-Ana-Brnabic (last accessed 21 March 2023).

two officials.[404] Regarding the European Capitals of Culture, there was a collaboration program implemented that would allow the cities to work together on certain projects, therefore using culture to bring people, communities, and nations together.[405] Another aspect of Luxembourg's influence in Serbia is the impact that its partner NGOs have on society. The Centre for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA) is one of those organizations that has had a profound effect on Serbian society, especially from 2016 onwards due to their activities as electoral observers. They are committed to establishing the rule of law and fostering democratic discourse by formulating suggestions for public policy, promoting the values of responsible behavior by the government and state institutions, and informing people about their political rights. All of these activities made them one of the most diligent and well-established non – profit organizations in Serbia.[406]

Finally, the world's leading company in the production of graphene nanotubes OCSiAl came to Serbia in order to open their new European production plant in Stara Pazova. Their reason for expanding was increased demand for their products and Serbia was a perfect choice, due to the country's location as well as having pre-established industrial infrastructure. The company plans to hire over 200 employees, most of whom will have highly specialized jobs and will be selected from the local market. The production line is designed specifically for that location which means that OCSiAl plans to stay and further develop its presence in the country. The company is looking forward to even more integration between Serbia and the rest of Europe which will in turn help local businesses prosper.[407] One key message that the project manager of the production plant, Marius Ferent, wanted to send is that

'The Serbian country and the Serbian people will benefit because of the mutually beneficial environment between the company and the people that will benefit from the company workstyle and standards. This has long-lasting benefits not just for the local economy but also for the people. In general, we are hiring young people which in the long term, gaining experience here, will be able to support the rest of the country for many decades to come. I believe that this is the kind of mutual benefit that every company should look after. Not for the immediate interest but also to look for the long-term gains that can be developed by such a collaboration.'[408]

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[404] The Luxembourg Government,'Visite de travail au Luxembourg du ministre des Affaires étrangères de la république de Serbie, Nikola Selaković',
https://maee.gouvernement.lu/fr/actualites.gouvernement%2Bfr%2Bactualites%2Btoutes_actualites%2Bcommuniques
%2B2021%2B09-septembre%2Bvisite-selakovic.html (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[405] ESCH2022, 'The partnership with Kaunas and Novi Sad Lithuania's and Serbia's European Capital of Culture',
https://esch2022.lu/en/the-partnership-with-kaunas-and-novi-sad-lithuanias-and-serbias-european-capital-of-culture-202
2/ (last accessed 21 March 2023).
[406] Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability https://crta.rs/en/about-us/ (Last accessed 21 March 2023).
[407] Marius Ferent , Personal communication,15 December 2022.
[408] Marius Ferent , Personal communication, 15 December 2022.

Source: Acquired directly from the author Marius Ferent.

Conclusion

Today's diplomacy is not about secret meetings and mysterious people making agreements behind closed doors. Nowadays, the career has evolved in such a way that even diplomats can not put their finger on just one primary task. They have become service providers for domestic and international companies, mediators, representatives, and even visiting professors. With the digital age and new technological achievements their lives and their profession are represented to the public like never before.

As we can see from the aforementioned examples, Luxembourg has been one of the countries that, through diplomacy and encouragement of civil society, support the Western Balkan countries on their road to becoming members of the European Union. This path is filled with difficulties and requires plenty of reforms on the candidate's part, but with the help of other countries like Luxembourg, we could see new members joining the Union in the next decade.

__Stefan Marković__. After graduating from the Faculty of Diplomacy and Security in his hometown of Belgrade, he set out to further enhance his knowledge about the EU and the European continent as a whole. Luxembourg was his one and only choice, not only for its central position, but also because he always considered the country as his future home. Therefore, he joined the Master in European Governance at the University of Luxembourg in September 2022. Apart from his studies, he was a member

of the European Youth Parliament and, more recently, one of the members of the Luxembourg delegation to the ConSIMium 2023, the Council of the EU simulation. His goal is to become a diplomat in the European External Action Service and with the knowledge acquired there help improve his country in the future.

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The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2019 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, p. 39

The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2021 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, p. 52

The Luxembourg Government, The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Publications, Rapport d'activité 2020 du ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, p. 41

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Germany's Future Energy Diplomacy: A Bumpy Road Ahead

Jérôme Seibert

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has produced shockwaves felt in every European capital and across a plethora of policy fields. The assertion that the Russian war of aggression presents itself as an historic moment of paradigmatic shifts or – to use the terminology of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz – as a global 'Zeitenwende'[409] is not novel but commonplace. Yet, there is still much uncertainty about challenges in specific policy areas and how individual states could react to them. In the case of Germany, the most obvious and dramatic challenge is that of managing and overcoming the energy crisis for which it dominated German discourse ever since the war began (and already before that). It had to come to terms with the harsh consequences of its past energy policy and diplomacy against which it was precautioned by many. Though Germany proved capable of managing the most immediate outfall of the Ukraine war and Russia's stop of gas exports to the EU, it needs to stay vigilant because the harder and more consequential challenges lie ahead. Germany needs to find new ways to secure its future and rising energy demand and with that comes the necessity of a new energy diplomacy. This paper explores some of the manifold and interconnected challenges Germany will face in that endeavour. In order to achieve this, this paper first discusses what exactly energy diplomacy constitutes in the modern world. This discussion reveals a lack of proper theory building and political science perspectives with regards to international energy relations. Against this backdrop a preliminary conceptualisation is adopted and used to map out Germany's future challenges.

The importance of energy, which today still means mostly oil and natural gas, in the modern world is obvious. After all, it is literally the fuel on which the global economy runs and which is used to power states' militaries, their trucks, tanks, and planes. Yet, as Van de Graaf et al. point out 'there is a deplorable paucity of peer-reviewed studies on the international world of energy. There is no established set of theories and concepts to which students can turn to interpret the global politics of energy.'[410]

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[409] Olaf Scholz,'The Global Zeitenwende', *Foreign Affairs,* 5 December 2022.
[410] Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare, 'States Markets, and Institutions: Integrating International Political Economy and Global Energy Politics', in Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy* (Londong: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), p. 4.
See also: Natalia Chaban and Michèle Knodt, ' Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS', *Cooperation and Conflict* 50 (4): 458.

Those political scientists that care about energy mostly come from a realist background and are most interested in geopolitics and pure security policies. Notwithstanding their importance, because their unit of analysis is the state, they tend to overlook the role of both domestic and international non-state actors such as energy companies and the myriad of international organisations (IOs) involved in global energy governance.[411] Analyses coming from International Political Economy could complement such analyses by emphasising the economic role energy plays and by integrating more actors into analyses.

For our purposes it is still useful to use a statist or neomercantilist approach. Applied to energy this means that states have an interest in preserving control over the energy sector and that energy is a strategic good, wherefore 'national interest revolves around secure supplies of energy'[412]. The German state is thus an independent actor with its own goals that might diverge from those of domestic interest groups[413]. However, this must be complemented by an appropriate understanding of Germany's political (economic) architecture, which influences with which means and to which extent it can achieve its energy policy goals. It makes sense to take up the commonly accepted characterisation of Germany as a corporatist state with a strong bureaucracy and powerful policy networks with connections into the state[414]. For instance, the German 'pipeline diplomacy' with the USSR and Russia served foreign and economic policy goals concomitantly and was achieved by a cooperation of the German state and private companies[415]. Indeed, Germany's energy sectors apparently continues to be intertwined with the German state and politics, but it remains unclear which capacity to act the German state has and how precisely this is influenced by private influences and institutional set-up.[416] Here, much could be learned from recent studies examining geoeconomic competition and the 'weaponization' of infrastructures and global economic networks[417]. Germany's membership in the EU and the various international organisations involved

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[411] Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare, 'States Markets, and Institutions: Integrating International Political Economy and Global Energy Politics', pp. 7-8;
Thijs van de Graaf and Fariborz Zelli, 'Actors, Institutions and Frames in Global Energy Politics', in Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy* (Londong: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), pp. 57-62.

[412] Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare, 'States Markets, and Institutions: Integrating International Political Economy and Global Energy Politics', p. 15.

[413] See for example the classic study by Stephen Krasner, *Defending the national interest: Raw materials investments and U.S. foreign policy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

[414] Jennifer Spencer, Thomas Murtha, and Stefanie Lenway, 'How Governments Matter to New Industry Creation', *The Academy of Management Review* 30 (2):321–337.

[415] Frank Bösch, 'Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union and the Oil Crises of the 1970s', *Historical Social Research* 39 (4):165–185. Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, 'Nord Stream 2: Versuch einer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Einordnung', *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik SWP Studie* 21.

[416] Unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence for that. An exception is Matthias Corbach, 'Energiepolitischer Lobbyismus in Deutschland: Eine Fallanalyse zur Einführung des Emissionshandels', Freie Universität Berlin, 2018.

[417]Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, 'Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion', *International Security* 44 (1):42–79;Geoffrey Gertz and Miles Evers, 'Geoeconomic competition: Will state

in energy governance further complicates analysis, though the burgeoning literature on global energy governance proves insightful[418].

Progress is further hindered by the absence of renewable energies from many studies on energy[419]. Given their still negligible role in global energy production[420] this is understandable but causes issues for assessing the future for the energy diplomacy of Germany and other states.

But what exactly is energy diplomacy and what are its goals? There is no generally agreed upon definition, yet we can use Goldthau's definition as a first approximation: Energy diplomacy is 'the way countries give their energy companies a competitive edge in bidding for resources by using the state's power: consumer countries strengthen their supply situation by diplomatically flanking energy contracts, whereas producer countries use diplomacy to enhance access to markets.'[421] In this definition, states remain the central unit of analysis and use 'foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies abroad and to promote (mostly bilateral, government to government) cooperation in the energy sector.'[422]

Though helpful, this definition has clear limits. First, it does not incorporate other actors such as IOs or transnational actors such as private companies or interest groups, which too can be subject to governmental energy diplomacy as part of multistakeholder diplomacy[423]. Secondly, it remains confined to the frames of security and competitiveness. However, development and environmental concerns have gained considerable importance in energy diplomacy. Most obvious is the challenge of climate change, wherefore 'energy policy is climate policy'[424].

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capitalism win?', *The Washington Quarterly* 43 (2): 117–136; Joscha Abels, Hans-Jürgen Bieling, 'Infrastructures of globalisation. Shifts in global order and Europe's strategic choices', *Competition & Change* 0 (0):1-18.

[418] Thijs van de Graaf, *The politics and institutions of global energy governance.* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Dries Lesage and Thijs van de Graaf, *Global energy governance in a multipolar world* (London: Routledge: 2016); Thijs van de Graaf and Jeff Colgan, 'Global energy governance: a review and research agenda', *Palgrave Communications* 2(1):1-12.

[419] Daniel Scholten, Morgan Bazilian, Indra Overland and Kirsten Westphal, 'The geopolitics of renewables: New board, new game', *Energy Policy* 138(111059):1.

[420] In 2019, renewables (including hydropower) had a share of 11% in the global primary energy mix as per Hannah Ritchie, Max Roser and Pablo Rosado, 'Energy. Our World in Data', https://ourworldindata.org/energy (Last access 26 January 2023).

[421] Andreas Goldthau, 'Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas', in Andreas Goldthau and Jan Witt (eds.), *Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game.* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), p. 25.

[422] Andreas Goldthau, 'Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas' , p.15.

[423] Natalia Chaban and Michèle Knodt, 'Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS', *Cooperation and Conflict* 50 (4):457–474.

[424] Ivan Scrase, Tao Wan, Gordon MacKerron, Francis McGowan and Steve Sorell, 'Introduction: Climate Policy is Energy Policy' in Ivan Scrase and Gordong MacKerron (eds.), *Energy for the Future: A New Agenda* (Londong: Palgrave Macmillan UK 2009), pp. 3-19.

Van de Graaf & Zelli's identification of four overarching frames or dimensions in global energy policy serves as a useful starting point for a more comprehensive definition. These dimensions are availability, affordability, sustainability, and social acceptability[425]. Thereby we can formulate Germany's goals as a question: Can Germany have secure, affordable energy services that are environmentally and climate compatible and socially acceptable?[426]

This allows a more comprehensive analysis and points to the various dilemmas Germany will inevitably encounter. As discussed above Germany's capacity to achieve at least some of its goals is not just a function of its relative power position, but also a function of its internal composition.

Secure energy supplies

For decades Germany relied on Russia to satisfy its gas demand and did not diversify its imports sufficiently[427]. Since the war in Ukraine gas imports from Russia dropped considerably[428] and presumably will not recover for the foreseeable future, except in the unlikely event of a regime change in Russia. Even then, the (partial) destruction of the Nord Stream system would provide a difficulty. Therefore, Germany needs to find new sources for natural gas; its saving measures will not be sufficient alone. Germany's ability to come out of the current winter with only a few bruises must not distract from the fact that the winter 2023-24 will be much more difficult to manage. This creates several problems. First, despite progress thank to LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) there is still no truly global gas market[429]. Second, global natural gas supply in the (very) short run is fixed[430]. Germany can increase imports by paying much higher prices, but it is questionable how long it can sustain this because its energy intensive industries need low gas and electricity prices to stay competitive. Germany has spent hundreds of billions (€) to support private and commercial customers, which puts pressure on the state budget. Though it built several new LNG terminals in an impressively short time period and spent € 3 billion of tax money on LNG cargos[431], Germany is hesitant to sign long-term contracts with large volumes, which are still the norm despite the

[425]Thijs van de Graaf and Fariborz Zelli, 'Actors, Institutions and Frames in Global Energy Politics', pp. 50-54.

[426] Meghan O'Sullivan, 'The Entanglement of Energy, Grand Strategy, and International Security' in Andreas Goldthau (ed.), *The handbook of global energy policy* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), p. 51.

[427]Ikonnikova and Berdysheva show that Germany was a clear outlier regarding import diversification in Svetlana Ikonnikova and Sofia Berdysheva, 'Managing Energy Security: The Analysis of Interfuel Substitution and International Energy Trade' *Econpol Forum* 23(6): 3-28.

[428]Statista, 'EU and UK gas imports from Russia weekly 2021-2023', https://www-statista-com.proxy.bnl.lu/statistics/1331770/eu-gas-imports-from-russia-by-route/ (Last accessed 26 January 2023)

[429] Matthew Hulbert and Andreas Goldthau, 'Natural Gas Going Global? Potential and Pitfalls' Andreas Goldthau (ed.), *The handbook of global energy policy* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), pp. 98-113.

[430] Daniel Gros,'Implications of Gas Scarcity for European Energy Policy' *Econpol Forum* 23 (6):13–16.

[431]Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, 'Whither the Liberal European Union Energy Model? The Public Policy Consequences of Russia's Weaponization of Energy' *Econpol Forum* 6(6): 5.

emergence of spot trading, because it aims at reducing its energy and gas demand altogether as part of its energy transition. In so doing, Germany has problems finding exporting countries willing to sign onto contracts as the complicated negotiations with Qatar show[432]. This new situation indicates that Germany should foster relationships with potential suppliers of LNG to secure imports. The EU's new energy framework can serve as a useful coordination tool for the purchase of gas[433]. On EU level, Germany should further push for more gas saving efforts. The EU must further complement how it envisages its future energy regime. From a security standpoint scrapping the exceptionally liberal energy regime and replacing it with a much more statist model would be beneficial[434]. Geopolitically, increasing LNG imports should not infringe on Germany's position as most LNG exporters are not adversaries of Germany. Germany could (or already does so) also push for the continued exploitation of the Dutch gas fields which are planned to stop by the end of 2023 and to expand operations in Norway.

Germany also plans to radically accelerate its transition to renewable energy sources, the security dimension of which has gained more prominence due to the Russian war. A faster switch to solar and wind energy is not only important for achieving emission reductions but is seen as a way to reduce dependencies. Suddenly, they are 'freedom energies' as German finance minister Christian Linder proclaimed. However, the German and global energy transition brings with it major geopolitical shifts; their magnitude remains to be fully seen. For instance, China has by now a near monopolistic position in solar panel production on all levels and is a major manufacturer for onshore wind turbines. Therefore, increased reliance on solar and wind energy can easily lead to simply becoming dependent on yet another autocratic power with revisionist tendencies[435]. This position cannot be easily broken. China is also a major player in the production of batteries. Here, Germany needs to engage in state-company diplomacy to convince companies to invest in European

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[432] International Energy Agency, 'World Energy Outlook 2022',
https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf (Last accessed 28 March 2023)
[433] European Commission, EU Energy Plattform(2022a),
https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/eu-energy-platform_en. (Last accessed 26 January 2023)
European Commission, (2022b) REPower EU Plan (2022b),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A230%3AFIN&qid=1653033742483 (Last accessed 26 Jannuary 2023).
[434]Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, 'Whither the Liberal European Union Energy Model?', EconPol Forum 23 (6):. 4–8.
[435]Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Carole Mathieu, 'The European Union and the Energy Transition' in Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra (eds.), *The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition*. (Luxembourg: Springer International Publishing AG 2020), p.37.

based factories. According to a new study, reduced dependency is feasible if the right measures are taken by Germany and the EU[436].

Finally, the energy transition fuels a new scramble for resources, this time a scramble for critical minerals (e.g., lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel) and rare earths (e.g., Terbium or Yttrium) which are highly concentrated geographically[437]. Important depots are found in Chile, Brazil, Peru, Russia, and central Africa[438]. Again, China is also an important player in this sector. 'Control over the supply chain of critical metals is a strategic asset [and] the EU greatly depends on imports to cover its growing needs.'[439] Thus, Germany must identify its needs, foster relationship to potential exporting nations to promote investment or trade agreements and assess the shifts in geopolitical importance this will cause[440].

Finally, the emerging role of hydrogen will also cause geopolitical shifts. Germany has made a promising start with the Canada-German Hydrogen Alliance to govern this transition. It should be carefully assessed how viable some hydrogen projects are and avoid investing in 'white elephant' projects that could fail for various reasons.[441]

Affordability

The discussion above already indicates that Germany must expect higher energy prices in the future. In terms of diplomatic efforts there is little it can do to relieve this situation, though some options exist. It could acquiesce to demands for more comprehensive long-term contracts for LNG gas. It can also accept the security risks associated with the high level of dependence on Chinese supplies. The EU-wide gas price cap helps suppressing prices, but might lead to fewer LNG imports, if demand in East Asia will increase again, and with it global LNG prices[442]. Domestically, Germany has already delayed the phasing-out of nuclear energy and reactivated some coal plants. The

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[436] Transport & Environment, 'A European Response to US IRA', https://www.transportenvironment.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2023_01_TE_Raw_materials_IRA_report-1.pdf. (Last Accessed 26 January 2023).
[437]International Energy Agency, 'World Energy Outlook 2022', p.48.
[438]Duncan Woods, Alexandra Helfgott, Mary D'Amico and Erik Romanin, 'The Mosaic Approach: a Multidimensional Strategy for Strengthening America's Critical Minerals Supply Chain', *Wilson Center,* 2022.
[439] Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Carole Mathieu, 'The European Union and the Energy Transition', p. 39.
[440] For amplification see e.g.: Morgan Bazilian and Mark Howells, 'Preface to the special issue on 'The geopolitics of the energy transition', *Energy Strategy Reviews* (26):100413;Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra (eds.), *The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition*. (Luxembourg: Springer International Publishing AG 2020); Daniel Scholten, Morgan Bazilian, Indra Overland and Kirsten Westphal, 'The geopolitics of renewables'.
[441] For instance Germany is interested in Namibian projects as in Jakob Rus and Lisa Ossenbrink, 'Germany eyes Namibia's green hydrogen', *DW Online*, 12 February 2022.
[442] There is some debate about this as per Marcel Fratzscher, 'Die Bundesregierung sollte jetzt die Chancen einer europäischen Gaspreisbremse nutzen', *DIW,* 20 December 2022; Anja Stehle, 'Ein schlechter Tag für Deutschlands Gasversorgung' *Zeit Online,* 19 December 2022.

mentioned return to a state-led energy policy to strengthen security and resilience could decrease affordability due to high up-front costs and reduced competition between energy companies.

Sustainability

The current energy crisis must not deflect from the long-term challenge of climate change mitigation and environmental protection. Here, Germany is in a tough spot. The new LNG infrastructure causes environmental problems in the North Sea and some observers warn that Germany is building overcapacities that will incentives a prolonged use of natural gas instead of switching to renewals, especially if Germany signs onto long-term contracts[443]. The increasingly harsh competition for critical minerals could further undermine the already low environmental standards in many countries for mineral extraction. Perversely, the push for renewals in Germany can lead to dramatic environmental damages in other world regions, for example through deforestation to gain access to mineral depots. Of course, Germany could advocate for higher standards by making investment and development aid conditional upon such measures, but that could again increase prices and is difficult to achieve. Countries already turn to China to avoid such measures. Furthermore, Germany's recent domestic energy policies undermine its international credibility when it comes to environmental and climate standards. Countries can easily accuse Germany of hypocrisy given its temporary return to coal and the environmental damages caused by the new LNG terminals[444]. The recent eviction of climate activists from Lützerath which made international headlines is a case in point. As discussed, the implosion of Russian gas exports to Europe and the latter's subsequent efforts to secure LNG gas led to a dramatic increase in prices. East Asia, the major buyer of LNG gas, still needs to recover from recent economic turmoil, for which it depends on affordable energy. For that reasons, coal becomes more attractive again[445]. Germany should develop foreign policies that can support East Asian countries in their transition to renewables.

Turning again to the EU level, the introduction of a state-led energy regime will benefit both security and sustainability goals, because member states can actively steer the transition to green energy and champion their companies to that end.

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[443] New Climate Institute, 'German LNG terminal construction plans are massively oversized', https://newclimate.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/German%20LNG%20terminal%20construction%20plans%20are%20massively%20oversized.pdf, (Last Accessed January 2023).

[444]Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'The geopoliticization of European trade and investment policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (57):106.

[445] Andreas Goldthau and Simone Tagliapietra, 'Energy crisis: five questions that must be answered in 2023', *Nature,* 16 December 2022.

Social Acceptability

Though connected to sustainability, this frame is still distinct due to its particular emphasis on human well-being. Germany's need for affordable renewables can not only cause environmental problems. Substandard safety standards leading to workers' injuries and deaths and incidents of child labour are a well-known and persistent problem in the extraction industry. China reportedly uses forced labour in some of its regions, possibly also in the production of batteries and renewables. Thereby the German energy transition contributes to socially unacceptable business practices. Every effort to alleviate standards can lead to higher prices and a delayed transition which prolongs high levels of emissions. So again, Germany enters a dilemma. Insisting on social acceptability could jeopardise not only energy security, but also affordability and emission reduction goals. Nevertheless, a possible avenue for action could be a constant improvement of the recently adopted Supply Chain Act complemented by efforts to implement similar legislation on EU level.

Finally, Germany must consider in which manner it wants to conduct itself. Phrases like 'scramble for resources' immediately evoke dreaded images of the colonial past and the famous, though controversial 'resource curse'[446]. Geopolitical tensions and an increased competition between the USA, the EU and China can lead to a new form of 'energy imperialism'[447] and worsened living conditions for those affected by it. Additionally, the focus on energy transition in the industrialised economies deflects from continuous energy poverty elsewhere and can have negative effects on food security[448].

Conclusion

This essay touched on many issues, all of which deserve to be analysed more comprehensively. By mapping challenges centred around the frames of security, affordability, sustainability, and social acceptability, it unveiled that Germany will face difficult choices in the near future. It must find ways to balance out each goal and should therefore intensify policy discussions in that regard. There is a real and grave danger that sustainability and social acceptability will be seen as optional extras, as 'nice to haves', which would lead to worsening living conditions for millions of humans.

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[446] William Gochberg and Victor Mendalo, 'The Resource Curse Puzzle Across Four Waves of Work' in Thijs van de Graaf, Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern and Michael Klare (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy* (Londong: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), pp. 505–527.

[447] Benjamin Wehrmann, 'Germany must avoid "energy-imperialism" in hydrogen deal with Namibia - minister', *Clean Energy Wire*, 06 December 2022.

[448] Robert Bailey,' The 'Food Versus Fuel' Nexus', in Andreas Goldthau (ed.), *The handbook of global energy policy* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), pp. 265–282.

There are still large research gaps that must be filled by political scientists working in conjunction with economists, geographers etc. Worryingly, studies that do exist often do not explore interconnected problems, but remain separated from each other, do not receive adequate attention and do not sufficiently address how we can conceptualise and theorise about these issues.

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Artificial Intelligence and the Digitalization of Chinese Public Diplomacy: The Legitimization and Operationalization of the 'Rise-of-the-*Rest Order*'

Mário Afonso Ramada

'I truly believe we are in a moment where history is going to look back on this time as a fundamental choice that had to be made between democracies and autocracies. (...), there are a lot of autocrats in the world who think the reason why they are going to win is democracies cannot reach consensus any longer; autocracies do. That is what competition between America and China and the rest of the World is all about.

It's a basic question: Can democracies still deliver for their people? Can they get a majority?

I believe we can. I believe we must.'[449]

US-China systemic rivalry: the decline of the West and the rise of the *Rest*

'Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values'[450]

In the seminal work that came to be *Diplomacy* (1994), Kissinger describes how Americans, either protected or blinded by their own idealism and mistrust of the Old World, as well as the size and isolation of the country, conducted a foreign policy grounded upon the way they wanted to World *to be*, and not how it actually *was*.

In fact, and as Kissinger[451] has put it, America's approach to its self-assigned role in the liberal world order - based on democracy, free commerce, and international law - has oscillated between being a beacon for its values and a crusader. Both of them, though, reflect a common underlying faith: that the American government system was ideal, and that the rest of the world could only attain peace and prosperity by adopting it in place of its bloody, traditional models of diplomacy.

Much has changed in the one hundred years that have passed since the United States (US) entered the arena of world politics; yet, nothing did. Edifying its order throughout the 20th-century

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[449] Joe Biden, 'Remarks by President Biden on the American Jobs Plan'. *The White House*, 31 March 2021.
[450] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (NewYork: Simon & Schuster: 1994), p. 17.
[451] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 18.

international agreements, the victory in the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union were America's political and ideological vindication. And in the biggest act of irony, its greatest win was the start of its greatest war. 'The victory without war' confronted America with Oscar Wilde's dilemma, in George Shaw's[452] words: 'There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it.'

The world order emerging after the Soviet collapse was characterized by the haunting reality that the US could neither withdraw nor dominate it[453]. America could no longer 'pay any price, bear any burden'[454] to sustain its desires, as others rose to share its *great power* status.

The balance of power system was never intended to stop wars or bring peace to the world; only to limit its scope. When properly working, the pretensions of the - perceivable - most powerful and aggressive state are kept in check by the cooperative effort of the remaining. As such, it silver lines realpolitik by keeping dissatisfaction below the level of an overthrow trial. Whilst in place on this side of the Hemisphere, the Asian territory we now call China never saw such an instrument. The Chinese Empire did not need such way of operating in the international system, because it aspired to be *the* system[455]. This is how China has conducted its foreign policy throughout history. And one cannot close their eyes to the past when trying to foresee the future: if America's notion of international politics was the result of a unique sense of security that only a country bordering Mexico and Canada could have; and the European a result of centuries of blood-shedding; China's was the product of centuries of self-idolization between the middle-kingdom clouds.

China faced exponential growth ever since it began the process of opening to the world markets and its 1978' economic reform. In fact, after the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, whilst the world was still in shambles, China came to be the only major economy to have in 2020 a positive growth (even though the recovery was uneven and the shock accentuated pre-COVID structural changes).[456] This economic success, paired with political durability, came to be the Chinese way of showing that development *does not* require democratization in its equation. Moreover, as China grows, its influence grows as well; and in a time when Europe and the United States (US) were perceived as losing its swing, the discussions in the public spheres are that China may come to 'ultimately

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[452] George Shaw, *Man and Superman* (NewYork: Penguin Classics: 1903).

[453] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 19.

[454] As declared by the then US President John F. Kennedy in 1961.

[455] Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 21.

[456] See China's GDP annual growth (%), calculated by the World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2019&locations=CN&start=1989; See China's World Bank economic overview, available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview

present a stronger ideological challenge than the Soviet Union did'[457]. A number of debates were made about this subject, and whether 'Does the 21st Century Belong to China?'[458].

The Chinese world order is a new proposal for global governance that challenges the US-dominated international system, anchored in Chinese power and values. For such, China has been both moulding the existing institutions - such as the UN, pushing to strip its resolutions of all the references to the existence of universal human rights - and creating new, China-centric ones - the Belt and Road Initiative, the New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others, all rival western counterparts and ought to, eventually, replace them.

Bringing the era of pragmatic governance to a crashing termination, Xi Jinping has developed a *sui generis* form of Marxism nationalism shaping the country's politics - pushing them to the Leninist left -, economy - pushed to the Marxist left - and foreign policy - pushed to the nationalist right[459]. While doing so, he has reasserted the influence - and control - that the CCP exerts over all domains of both public policy and private life. The new assertive foreign policy is 'turbocharged' by the (post-)positivist critical-Marxist belief that a world anchored in Chinese power would lead to a more just international order[460]. Part of its systemic proposal, this quest for a more just world has been heavily reliant on the promotion of its own development model throughout the LDC's group/Global South - that largely accepts China as 'we' versus the 'we/them' narrative towards the historically imperialist Global North. This model represents a direct alternative to the Washington Consensus prescriptions encompassing free-markets and democracy.

As one can read in the leader's published writings and public addresses, his thinking and decision-making process is intertwined with historical materialism - an approach that puts progress as a result of the ongoing class struggles - and dialectical materialism - an approach that sees political change as the aftermath of the collision of contradictory forces. Through this perspective, we can realize the true meaning of the contest between the CCP and reactionary forces both at home - an arrogant private sector and other organizations influenced by the West and religious groups - and abroad - the west itself[461]. In a 2013 address to the Central Conference on Ideology and

[457] K. M. Campbell and J. Sullivant, 'Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China', *Foreign Affairs,* 1 August 2019.
[458] Henry Kissinger, Niall Fergusson, David Li, Fareed Zakaria, *Does the 21st Century Belong to China? The Munk Debate on China* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc: 2011).
[459] Kevin Rudd, 'The World According to Xi Jinping: What China's Ideologue in Chief Really Believes' *Foreign Affairs*, 10 October 2022.
[460] Rudd, 'The World According to Xi Jinping'.
[461] Rudd, 'The World According to Xi Jinping.

Propaganda, between top party leaders, Xi[462] stated how 'the disintegration of a regime often starts from the ideological area', as once 'ideological defences are breached, other defences become very difficult to hold'. Moreover, he placed as western intentions 'to vie with us for the battlefields of people's hearts and for the masses, and in the end to overthrow the leadership of the CCP and China's socialist system'. As such, this requires the muzzle of the ones who are 'harbouring dissent and discord'.

This doctrine has been a continuum, and from theory, it went to practice. Its new territorial acclamations in the South China Sea; its missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the subsequent simulations of blockades; its intensification of the Chinese-Indian conflict; among others are its point in fact. Furthermore, the regime has become far more aggressive towards critics abroad. In March 2021, China announced the first sanctions ever against Western individuals/institutions who openly and publicly criticized the CCP and its assaults on Human Rights. Just hours after European sanctions, Beijing called the EU a 'human rights preacher' that 'grossly interferes in China's internal affairs' while 'sanctions imposed by the EU side were based on lies and misleading information related to Xinjiang,' ending with announcing a set of its own countermeasures[463]. In the end, these actions are in harmony with the new Chinese ethos of 'Wolf Warrior' diplomacy.

The digitalization of Chinese Public Diplomacy: from Panda to Wolf

The traditional form of the embassy is in an ever-losing crisis position. Globalization - or post-globalization, some will argue[464] - paired with the rise of digital communications has dramatically changed the way nations practice diplomacy. Once the government's eyes and ears abroad, embassies are now, through its relatively ponderous bureaucratic ways, the slowest way to get information[465]. Media reporting has become lightning-fast, and the digital world allows governments to be in direct, permanent contact with their counterparts.

Yet, their counterparts are not the only diplomatic targets: their constituents too. The embracing of social media has opened the way to connect leaders to huge domestic and foreign audiences and

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[462] Jinping Xi, 'Address to the Central Conference on Ideology and Propaganda', *China Copyright and Media*, 2013.

[463] Jan van der Made, 'China and the EU in tense stand-off on human rights and sanctions', *Radio France International*, 24 March 2021.

[464] See James F. Smith, 'Wanted: New economic models for a post-globalization world', *Harvard Kennedy School* https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/globalization/wanted-new-economic-models-post-globalization-world (last accessed January 25 2023).

[465] In fact, and with the rising importance of economic diplomacy, we see a government's move towards the opening of other types of offices, such as trade offices and innovation hubs. As pointed out by Alex Oliver (in 'The Irrelevant Diplomat: Do we Need Embassies Anymore?', *Foreign Affairs*, 14 March 2016) and taking the UK for instance, between 2009 and 2015 alone the Foreign & Commonwealth Office closed around 30 diplomatic missions whilst its science and innovation network expanded to 4 countries.

fostered the rise of public diplomacy - this is, the use of soft power[466] to influence public opinions abroad and promote a country's interests. In the past, public diplomacy was primarily conducted through traditional media channels such as television, radio, and print. However, the upturns of the internet and social media have changed the way public diplomacy is conducted. In fact, a growing number of state actors have implemented an expansionist foreign policy by gradually "weaponizing" social media platforms with the desire of promoting political values and reshaping the international order to its reasoning[467].

As its power grows, China learns how much image matters. And whilst its economic prowess impresses much of the world, its image is tarnished by the repressive political system. To address the issue, Beijing has mounted "a major public relations offensive in recent years, investing billions of dollars around the world in a variety of efforts"[468]. According to a study by Huang[469] on China's digital diplomacy efforts, between 2018 and 2021, the government opened - at least - 301 (para-)diplomatic Twitter accounts "to advance its construction of international discursive power online". Moreover, a shift could be seen in the Chinese diplomat's discourse online, towards a more offensive engagement[470], (in)famously coined as wolf warrior diplomacy.

"We should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's message to the world". Xi, 2014[471]

Wolf warrior diplomacy came to be known as the coercive style of conducting diplomatic affairs that China and its officials adopted during the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) Xi Jinping's leadership. Confrontative and loudly denouncing criticism, this approach is in stark contrast with the traditional Chinese diplomatic ways. Aiming at gaining discourse power in the international system, this new practice is set to highlight both the superiority of the Chinese socialist system and the feasibility through which the country can lead the model as an alternative to the one presented by the American order[472]. First brushed off as 'another version of the 'China threat theory' and a

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[466] Coined by Nye, the concept of soft-power defines a nation's ability to co-opt rather than coerce, persuade rather than compel, to set agendas and to attract support. For the author, it is composed by the appeal of a state's values, the legitimacy of its foreign policy, and the attractiveness of its culture.

[467] Ilan Manor and Corneliu Bjola, 'Public diplomacy in the age of 'post-reality', In Pawel Surowice and Ilan Manor (eds.), *Public diplomacy and the politics of uncertainty*, (Cham: Springer: 2021) pp. 111–143.

[468] David Shambaugh, 'China's Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August Issue 2015.

[469] Zhao Alexandre Huang, 'Wolf Warrior' and China's digital public diplomacy during the Covid-19 crisis', *Springer*: *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* (18): 37-40.

[470] Nikolay Litvak and Natalia B. Pomozova, 'Chinese diplomatic discourse for Europe: A change of style', *Russia in Global Affairs* 19(1): 50-69.

[471] Jinping Xi, 'A*ddress to the 2014's 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China'*. Translated by The Wilson Center.

[472] Stephen Nagy and Hanh Nguyen, 'Cowboy diplomacy meets wolf warrior diplomacy: All politics are local', *Canadian Global Affairs institute, October* 2020.

discourse trap tailor-made for China'[473], the concept ended up being embraced and institutionalized by the CCP. As a matter of fact, President Xi[474] charged public diplomacy actors with two missions: to 'effectively carry out international public opinion guidance and public opinion struggles' and 'pay more attention to the strategy and techniques of public opinion struggles'.

Even though some diplomatic ways are centuries old, these soft power tools are relatively new and dependent on technological advancements. Amidst these advancements, artificial intelligence (AI) deserves its due attention given its capacity to outplay any other tools: it can be used to help public diplomats target their messages more effectively; to track public opinion trends and identify opportunities for engagement; to severely mislead audiences with the use of artificially created images - 'deep fakes' -, exacerbating even more the 'post-truth' phenomenon[475]. As such, AI is set to play an increasingly important role in public diplomacy; and albeit its possible good impacts in several aspects of political life, its iniquitous applications and respective repercussions should be specially looked after.

AI Disruption and the Illiberal Red Tide

Information has never been this connected to power. AI, in short, is a technology that allows machines to analyze and, consequently, learn from the environment it exists in, becoming capable to predict actions and make decisions. Its applications as of nowadays are mainly oriented towards consumer goods with practical specific benefits. Nevertheless, technology is advancing with unprecedented speed, and AI is to be singled out as the realm with the most system-disturbing capabilities in the foreseeable future. Weaponry and the space quest are two examples where AI takes great importance, but its political uses are not limited to the new generation of warfare - and I highlight the dangers of its alignment for 'truth control' and government control. According to Wright[476], government control, conceptualized by the author as *Digital Authoritarianism*, by 'allowing governments to monitor, understand and control their citizens far more closely than ever

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[473] Chunying, Hua, 'Foreign ministry spokeperson Hua Chunying's regular press conference on December 10, 2020', *The MFA of the PRC*,12 October 2020.

[474] Xi Jinping, 'Strengthening and improving international communication works to show a true, three-dimensional and comprehensive China (translated)', *Xinhua*, 1 June 2021,

[475] The concept of 'post-truth' refers to the hodiern widespread concern about disputes over public truth claims. Proliferated with the 2016's US elections and Brexit referendum, Oxford Dictionaries defines it as 'relating and denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief'. Furthermore, the latter also highlights how it is often used as an adjective to demark a certain kind of politics - 'post-truth politics'.

[476] Nicholas Wright, 'How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order', *Foreign Affairs*, 10 July 2018.

before, will offer authoritarian countries a plausible alternative to liberal democracy, the first since the end of the Cold War'[477]. Beijing is pursuing both, both within and outside its borders.

In fact, AI came to present a big tool in the new governance model that China is pushing towards the global stage. For decades now, Beijing has been closely and silently observing Western technological progress and developing asymmetric tools to exploit its vulnerabilities. Today, AI is one more technology where China is head-to-head with the West, occupying, under Sandford University's AI Index, second in global AI vibrancy, before the US and in front of the (combined) European countries[478]. Moreover, China's 2017 New Generation AI Development Plan (NGAIDP) makes its ambitions clear: the country is to become a leader in AI by 2030[479]. And specialists[480] say it may well be possible, as China 'has all the ingredients it needs to move into first', such as heavy government funding and a massive population primed for technological change. This last factor carries colossal importance, as data quantity and great AI are directly correlated; and humans - something China has substantially - produce data. In addition, its thriving online commerce and social networks paired with the scarce privacy protections, make the country the perfect pasturing structure for AI systems. As put by *The Economist*, if data is for AI what oil was for the industrial age, then 'China is the new Saudi Arabia'[481]

The NGAIDP highlights how AI carries 'new opportunities for social construction' by facilitating the prediction and 'grasp of group cognition'[482]. And multiple states started following China's vision. Wright[483] proposes that in the same way that competition between liberal/communist and democratic/fascist systems largely defined the twentieth century, the brawl between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism is being arranged to define the twenty-first.

Not just exporting its model, China is also exporting its tools - and the gains seem to be twofold. On the one hand, we have the recognition of its contesting system by a part of the international community: the Great Firewall approach to censuring the internet is already in place in Thailand and Vietnam[484]; Chinese experts were sent to help put up government censors in Sri Lanka[485]; and

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[477] Wright, 'Global Order'.
[478] Human-Centered Artifical Intilligence Standford, *Global AI vibrancy tool: Who's leading the global AI race?,* https://aiindex.stanford.edu/vibrancy/ (last accessed 25 January 2023).
[479] Chinese Government, *New Generation AI Development Plan (NGAIDP), 2017.*
[480] Vincent James, 'China and the US are battling to become the world's first AI superpower', *The Verge,* 3 August 2017.
[481] The Economist, 'China may match or beat America in AI', *The Economist*, 15 July 2017.
[482] Chinese Governement, *NGAIDP.*
[483] Wright, 'Global Order'.
[484] M. Peel, 'Southeast Asian censors test mettle of social media groups', *Financial Times*, 25 May 2017.
[485] R. J. Deibert and M. Crete-Nishihata, 'Global Governance and the Spread of Cyberspace Controls, *Global Governance* 18: 339-361

China supplied surveillance/censorship equipment to African countries - Ethiopia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe[486]-, Iran, Russia, Malaysia[487] and even in European Serbia[488]. Moreover, besides the provision of Chinese-made monitoring systems, countries across the globe are receiving training in 'public opinion guidance', also edifying its ways of conducting public diplomacy.

On the other hand, these packages that China is selling as 'smart cities' have the potential to fully immerse countries in a lock-in point that is simply too costly to back down from[489], constituting debt-trap diplomacy and forms of neocolonialism[490]. Africa, and to a certain but least extent South Asia, in contrast to the Western investment attempts, do not see China's intentions as economic or political exploitation - a result of its lack of colonial aspirations in the continent.[491]

Conclusion

The 'rise of China' and the 'decline of the West' are two of the most important topics in contemporary international politics, and albeit the US won the ideological contest of the XX century, it needs to realize that China is not the Soviet Union[492]. With a new approach to international politics conferred by its immense growth, Beijing started offering the world an order based on lesser democratic practices and essentially rivalling the American, liberal one. For this order to prevail, the country has two tasks: legitimising and operationalising it. Technology came to be one of the main ways for China to do so.

On the goal of legitimation, the CCP has been resourcing to an ever more digitalized public diplomacy for its accomplishment. In the twilight of (post-)globalization, AI can help diplomats process information more quickly and accurately, identify new trends and opportunities, and communicate with a wider audience on narrower, tailor-fit terms. Moreover, and paired with the country's vast espionage network, these tools have enabled China to accurately evaluate the public opinion on China's perception of different countries, allowing the CCP to tailor its diplomatic strategies to the public opinion of its neighbours and international partners.

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[486]FreedomHouse, 'China Media Bulletin', *Freedom House* 82, March 2013.

[487]C. Tan, '*Malaysian police adopt Chinese AI surveillance technology*', *Nikkei Asia*, 18 April 2018.

[488]Belgrade's Republic Square is now under constant surveillance with a system that can monitor, identify and judge people, being part of the eight thousand cameras comprehended in the "safe city" partnership that the country has with Huawei (J. Kyge, V. Hopkins, and H. Warrell, 'Exporting Chinese surveillance: the security risks of 'smart cities' '*Financial Times*, 9 June 2021)

[489]J. Kynge and N. Liu, 'From AI to facial recognition: how China is setting the rules in new tech', *Financial Times*, 7 October 2020.

[490]Herbert Jauch, 'Chinese Investments in Africa: Twenty-First Century Colonialism?', *New Labor Forum* 20 (2): 49-55; T. Lumumba-Kasongo, 'China-Africa Relations: A Neo-Imperialism or a Neo-Colonialism? A Reflection', *African and Asian Studies,* 10 (2-3): 234-266; Mehari Maru, 'Why Africa Loves China', *AlJazeera* , 6 January 2019.

[491]Maru, 'Why Africa Loves China'.

[492]Rudd, 'The World According to Xi Jinping'.

However, there are also risks associated with the use of AI to conduct politics, such as the risk of creating a 'digital divide' between countries that have possibilities to develop and implement AI-based technology and those that do not. Yet, this risk is as much of a problem as a solution. Linking to the operationalization goal, China is exporting its model not just ideologically but also physically, through vast economic and technological campaigns either directly sprouting from the government - as the Belt and Road Initiative - or companies heavily controlled by it - as Huawei and its 'smart cities' packages.

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The Aegean Cold War: An Insight into the Troubling Waters
of Greece and Turkey and the Attempted Reconciliation Processes

Silvia Kasperkovitz

The relationship between Greece and Turkey has always been very troubled - for different historical reasons, the two countries share a common feeling of mistrust and rivalry, that still today hampers the good outcome of diplomatic relations. One of the terrains of the troubles lies in the sea that divides the two states: the Aegean, in which both countries have legitimate interests and rights, and over whose waters the two nations are periodically on the edge of fighting.

Since the first Aegean crisis, in the summer of 1976, many incidents have occurred in the Aegean waters. Most of them regard the intrusion of Turkish research vessels in contested waters, which almost caused a military reaction from Greece. In this fragile context, both the USA, usually acting on behalf of NATO interests, and the EU have tried to act as mediators to prevent a military clash between the two countries. Additionally, the dispute is not limited to the Aegean, but it is related to the Cyprus question as well, which keeps influencing the domestic and international politics of Athen and Ankara. However, despite their efforts, the dispute is still ongoing.

During the Cold War and until 1999, the relationship between the two countries was considered a classic 'adversarial dyad' between neighbors[493]. After 1999, with the granting of Turkey's candidacy to the EU, for a short period of time, the relationship improved. This was also helped by the solidarity shown by both countries when an earthquake destroyed Athens and Izmir. After a period of peace and rapprochement, in 2016, simultaneously with the attempted coup d'état in Turkey, relationships returned to be very tense, to the point that author Christofis, talks about the revival of an 'Aegean Cold War' [494].

This short paper will first present in detail the main causes behind the Aegean disputes, and then discuss the diplomatic efforts made by the two main actors, NATO and the EU, in trying to settle the dispute.

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[493]Alexis Heraclides, 'Greek-Turkish relations and conflict: A bird's-eye view', in Alexis Heraclides and Gizem Alioğlu Çakmak (eds.) *Greece and Turkey in conflict and cooperation: From Europeanization to De-Europeanization* (London: Routledge, 2019), pp. 3-12.
[494]Nikos Christofis 'Securitizing the Aegean: de-Europeanizing Greek–Turkish relations', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 22(1):85.

Historical and legal reasons behind the Agean disputes - A clash of interest

The topics concerning the Aegean disputes are many and interconnected with each other, as they encompass both legal and political claims. The Aegean Sea is a narrow basin that is enclosed between the coasts of Greece and Turkey. Its main characteristic regards its dense network of island formations, the majority of them belonging to Greece[495], which makes its delimitation particularly complex. As it will be presented in this paper, today the Aegean dispute englobes other topics beyond the maritime delimitation.

For its geographical characteristics, it is indeed very difficult to set maritime borders: according to the international law of the sea, islands can generate the same maritime zones as the mainland, which are: territorial sea (which is measured from the baseline to 6 or 12 miles, the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (both extended to a maximum of 200 miles from the baseline). The latter areas are extremely important, as the country has the right to pursue scientific research. Greece and Turkey have however different views on the intricate maritime delimitation process: the Greek thesis is based on the right of islands to generate both the continental shelf and the EEZ like the mainland, whereas Turkey rejects this thesis and argues, on the other hand, that Greek islands lying on top of its continental shelf - which is interpreted as the natural prolongation of Turkish mainland, cannot project any maritime claim.

In this fragile context, a new element has made things more complicated: in January 2021, Greece has doubled the length of its territorial sea from 6 to 12 miles. If with both territorial seas at 6 miles, Greece owned 43.5% of the total waters and Turkey only 7% (and the remaining 49% was made up of international waters), with the new amplitude, 71.5% of the Aegean waters fall under Greek sovereignty, leaving Turkey only 8.8%, and reducing the percentage of international waters to 19.7%[496]. As a final result, Turkey is surrounded by Greek territorial waters, with obvious navigational difficulties, as the percentage of international waters is now very limited. Turkey is indeed today surrounded by a Greek lake, an outcome that Ankara never wanted to happen[497] .

The different approach to solving the controversy reflects how the two countries see the situation. According to Greece, it is a legal issue regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf, and it should be therefore settled in accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention on the law of

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[495]Acer Yücel, 'The Aegean Sea in its Contemporary Context', in Acer Yücel (ed.), *The Aegean Maritime Disputes and international law.* (London: Routledge, 2017).
[496]Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Background Note on Aegean Dispute, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/background-note-on-aegean-dispute.en.mfa. (last accessed: 27 January 2023).
[497]Athanassios, Platias, 'Greek Deterrence Strategy', pp. in: Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos, John O. Iatrides, (eds), *The Aegean Sea after the Cold War*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 61-86.

the sea and the principles of the UN Charter, and the decision should be therefore on the hands of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)[498]. In addition, the ICJ has solved many disputes concerning the delimitation of maritime spaces, and on many occasions, it has provided a practical solution by drawing the delimitation line. Therefore, its judgment would be very beneficial for settling the dispute.

Turkey, on the contrary, prefers to settle the dispute through bilateral dialogue, because it argues that there are many unresolved issues, that go beyond the sole maritime delimitation, as they include also: the extent of the territorial sea, the legal status of islands, their demilitarization, the sovereignty question in some areas of the sea (the so-called grey zones) and the extent of the flight information region. Furthermore, Turkey claims that Greece has repeatedly violated the treaties, especially regarding the remilitarization of some Greek islands. Because these issues are interconnected with one another, they should be discussed and settled through bilateral negotiation. In conclusion, Greece sees the Aegean dispute as a strong legal case, whereas Turkey sees the political side of it.[499]

Another degree of difficulty is represented by the complexity of understanding which islands and rocks are subjected to Greek or Turkish sovereignty. The legal framework is very vague: the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), is the first legal proof that mentions the Aegean islands. As Von Dyke writes, 'Turkey has sovereignty over the eastern Aegean Islands of 'Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands'[500] and Greece has sovereignty over 'Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria.'[501], and all island formations that are situated less than three miles from the coast[502], belong to that country. In addition, the islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Nikaria would have been demilitarized, due to their closeness to the Turkish coasts. Their names are yet not mentioned in the Montreux Convention (1936) – this has suggested, according to Greek scholars, that the Montreux Convention has entirely replaced the Treaty of Lausanne, and therefore, the obligation of demilitarization no longer persists.

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[498]Gokcen Yavas. 'Europeanization of the Aegean Dispute: An Analysis of Turkish Political Elite Discourse'. Turkish Studies 14 (3): 520-539.

[499]Sotiris Rizas. 'Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76' *Cold War History*, 9(3), 367-387.

[500] Jon M. Van Dyke, 'An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law', *Ocean Development & International Law*, 36 : 64.

[501]Van Dyke, 'An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law', p.64.

[502]Before the adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), the majority of states had set the extension of the territorial sea at three miles. It was only after the Second World War that states started to gradually extend it from 3 to 6 miles, and today the majority of territorial seas are extended for 12 miles.

Both countries also accuse the counterpart of expansionistic aims: Turkey fears that Greece has not given up on the 'Megali Idea', the project of including all Greek communities under one flag, while Greece has always feared the ghost of the Ottoman Empire ready to regain the ancient territories. Historical memory has always played a huge role in the relationship among nations. In this context, ancient fears and traumatic historical events are still fresh in the memory of these people, and it still influences the perception that one party has of the other. Lastly, the Cyprus issue keeps playing a pivotal role in Greek-Turkish relations, also in terms of setting down maritime borders. In addition to the complex political situation of the island, Turkey has expressively claimed the sovereignty, in the name of the Republic of Northern Cyprus, of all maritime spaces delimited by the government of Nicosia in the last years, including the EEZ. As Ankara claims the whole Cypriot EEZ, Athens promptly intervenes to defend the maritime interests of the Greek Cypriot community. As long as the Cyprus conflict is ongoing, it will keep the tension between Greece and Turkey very high, and therefore hamper any attempt of dialogue. But this is a topic that should be discussed in another paper – it was presented just to show how complex the geopolitical context in this area is.

The Evolution of the dispute

At the beginning of the 1970s, both Greece and Turkey granted concessions to explore the seabed for oil basins. Turkey, in particular, issued oil exploration licenses near the islands of Lesvos and Chios. Here, in August 1976 the first confrontation happened. There was already a lot of tension between the two countries: Greece had gradually re-militarized some islands, as just two years prior Turkey had military invaded Cyprus and Athens feared a potential Turkish attack.

In this tense context, the exploration of the Turkish research vessel Sismik I in the grey zones, near the shores of Lemnos island, made Greece appeal unilaterally to the ICJ to stop the exploration which was, according to Greece, threatening the peace and stability of the region. However, the ICJ claimed in its final judgment of 1978 that it did not have the jurisdiction to solve the dispute, and it yield the floor to the two countries to find a solution through negotiation.

The drilling of the seabed was at the basis for the 1987 crisis as well. After the refusal to withdraw the vessel from contested waters, Greece put its armed forces on alert and threatened to use the force if the ships would have kept navigating. The escalation to a military confrontation was prevented only thanks to the mediation of NATO secretary general Lord Carrington. The third major crisis happened in December 1995 - January 1996 for the sovereignty of the Kardak / Imia islets: this tiny group of islets, which are 3.8 miles far from Turkish coasts, and whose sovereignty is

uncertain. In late 1995, Turkish journalists removed the Greek flag from the islet and raised the Turkish flag instead. When the Greek forces restored the Greek flag, Turkey responded by gathering a large number of surface combatants[503]. Once again, a military escalation was avoided thanks to the quick mediation of the US. Since then, many other small crises occurred, the most recent happened in the summer of 2020, when the Turkish research vessel Oruc Reis, convoyed by warships, cruised too close to Kastellorizo, a Greek island just one mile away from the Turkish coast.

After each crisis, both Greece and Turkey have committed themselves to avoid possible military escalation, to refrain from the use of force, and to instead have a bilateral dialogue to exchange views and find a common solution. Unfortunately, as the habitual occurrence of crises shows, every attempt of reconciliation has not changed the status quo in the Aegean. As of today (17th February 2023), no steps forward were made, which further underlines how the solution to the dispute is still very far from being achieved.

The attempts of mediation: The role of the US and the EU

In the fragile context of the Aegean disputes, both NATO and the EU have worked hard to de-escalate the conflict, by trying to avoid a war and to encourage both parties to maintain open lines of communication. Historically speaking, NATO tried to normalize the Greek-Turkish relationship until the late 1990s; with the start of the millennium, the EU has tried to take its place.

Even though both Athens and Ankara joined NATO in 1952, their relationship did not improve at all, because shortly after the first Cyprus crisis outbroke. It was immediately clear that the cohesion of NATO in that region was at risk, as the Cyprus issue "took priority over loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and the Cold War considerations"[504]. Especially after the Turkish invasion, Greece felts that the main threat to its security was not coming from the USSR, but from Turkey.

NATO had to be very careful to remain a neutral actor and not give the impression that it was siding with one party at the expense of the other. For instance, while Kissinger thought that bringing the dispute to the ICJ was the best solution since a third party chosen to determine the outcome might have been politically easier for Greece and Turkey to accept a settlement, it did not want to push Ankara in this respect, as the US had not lifted the arms embargo against Turkey yet[505]. In addition, the US disagreed with Greek on many aspects: it was not willing to give full military support in

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[503]Athanassios, Platias. 'Greek Deterrence Strategy' in: Aldo Chircop, André Gerolymatos, John O. Iatrides, (eds), The Aegean Sea after the Cold War. International Political Economy Series. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 61-86.
[504] Rizas, 'Managing a conflict between allies', p. 368.
[505] Rizas, 'Managing a conflict between allies', pp. 372-373.

case of a Turkish attack, and it did not support at all the Greek position on the legal status, as it would affect the US position as a naval power.

A decade later, in 1987, NATO responded promptly and united. Firstly, Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary General at that time, and the US unilaterally offered to mediate. Secondly, some European NATO members, like France and Germany, threatened Turkey to reconsider its request for the EU membership[506]. In the end, thanks to the cohesive action, a military escalation was avoided. Lastly, NATO and the US in particular had to mediate once again during the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis. No resolution to the crisis was however founded, as both countries still have claims on the islets.

As authors Rizas[507] and Brenner[508] point out in their research, while NATO could not prevent the outbreak of crises between the two allies, it managed to intervene and contain the crisis before they could potentially escalate into a war.

In contrast with NATO, the EU does not hold such a strong mediator power, and it lacks a real military and political plan to address a possible war in the region. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that the period between 2000 and 2016 was characterized by a positive rapprochement between the two countries. At the European Council meeting in Helsinki, in December 1999, the EU had granted the candidacy of full membership of Turkey in the Union. This new chapter of Greek-Turkish relationship was supported by the solidarity, shown by both countries after the deadly earthquake that hit Athens and Izmir.

Marias, argued that, due to the huge differences between the two countries, and the unsuccessful previous attempts of cooperation, one solution lies in deepening economic integration between the EU and Turkey, in order to create 'a real partnership between them that will eventually lead to the establishment of a political community in the Aegean area'[509] . This was twenty years ago, and in the meantime, the integration process of Turkey in the EU has stopped. In addition, Erdogan's aggressive foreign policy does not really help to create a positive and welcoming environment to pursue reconciliation. Last summer, Erdogan said that he might even consider ordering a landing on

[506]Stefan,Brenner. 'Military Coalitions in War and Peace: NATO and the Greek-Turkish Conflict 1952 – 1989'. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,* 14 (3&4).

[507]Rizas, Sotiris. 'Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76', *Cold War History,* 9(3): 367-387.

[508]Stefan Brenner, 'Military Coalitions in War and Peace: NATO and the Greek-Turkish Conflict 1952 – 1989', *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14(3&4): 1-18.

[509] Marias, Epaminondas. 'Toward a Political Community in the Aegean Area: New Opportunities for Greece and Turkey. *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 25(1):174.

Greek islands as 'We can come suddenly one night … if you Greeks go too far, then the price will be heavy'[510].

Unfortunately, the gradual radicalization of the AKP party and the rise of Erdogan broke the calm, which lead in 2016 to halt the enlargement process and, as a result, both Greece and Turkey have gone back to hostility. Since 2016, as many researchers claim, the two countries have gone back at re-securitizing the issues in the region.

In recent times, the EU has taken Greece's (and Cyprus') sides in front of Turkey's repeated provocative actions both in the Aegean and in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Christofis writes '[The EU] adopted harsh language criticizing the Turkish government and imposing sanction […] This triggered a scathing reaction from Turkey's president, who boasted about Turkey's military capacity to alter the map with Greece […]'[511] . For these reasons, the EU involuntarily keeps breathing air on top of the fire.

Conclusion

According to Christofis , the inconsistent policy of the EU towards Turkey has "not only undermined any possible solution in the Eastern Mediterranean"[512], but it also showed that "its role in promoting regional cooperation and integration […] has been minimal" . There are many options to solve the delimitation dispute, based also on other examples around the world. The best solution, in short, would be to draw a median line between the baseline, and to grant to some Greek islands only a partial effect; for instance, a shorter territorial sea and no continental shelf or EEZ, due to their proximity to Turkish coasts. Nevertheless, Greece should abrogate the law that extended the territorial sea from 6 to 12 miles, as it is true that it has negative consequences on free navigation in the high sea. This is very difficult to obtain, as Greece is not committing an unlawful act *per se.* This would, however, only solve part of the entire Aegean dispute.

We can claim that as long as Turkey promotes this aggressive foreign policy against its neighbors, negotiation is far from being reached: Turkey has today a significant advantage in negotiations with Greece and the EU, so it can impose its view more easily. At the same time, it seems that there are timid attempts to gradually normalize the relationship and ease the tensions. If NATO tried to play

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[510] Erdem, Suna. 'A need for earthquake diplomacy'. The New European, 11 November 2022.
[511] Nikos, Christofis, 'Securitizing the Aegean: de-Europeanizing Greek–Turkish relations', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 22 (1): 94.
[512]Nikos, Christofis, 'Securitizing the Aegean: de-Europeanizing Greek–Turkish relations', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 22 (1): 95.

as a neutral actor, with the aim of preserving the cohesion of the Alliance, the EU tends to support and defend the claims of Greece (and Cyprus), so it is obviously more biased than NATO.

Proper peacemaking is only a matter of political will –even if both NATO and the EU have put pressure on the two countries to solve the dispute on this matter, Greece and Turkey have shown to not be proactive at all to find a common and definitive solution for their ongoing disputes. In the current state of art, a settlement of the disputes is very far from being achieved, and it is likely that no settlement will be reached in the future. The Cold War in the Aegean waters continues.

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Chapter V

Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Art, Science or Craft?

Aesthetic Diplomacy: An Excursion into the Unscientific

Luis Engelmann

When thinking about diplomacy the representative aspect of it comes to mind. Diplomacy and representation have always relied on soft forces to attain a desired outcome. But why all the exquisite dinners, the outstanding embassies, the promotion of arts and culture? Why not just tell the other side what you want? Why not just scientifically prove that your country is magnificent?

These acts of representation share the common denominator of aesthetics — the study of beauty and taste. In this essay, I will take a closer look at this relationship and seek to answer the following research question: What is the utility of aesthetics and what is the utility of aesthetics in diplomacy?

We ought to answer the former part of the question first in order to be able to reveal why aesthetics play such an important role in diplomacy. And as the question of aesthetics and its utility goes far beyond the scope of political science, we have to turn to philosophy to quench our thirst for knowledge. We will however not surrender all loyalty to the methods of political scientists by choosing our framework arbitrarily. To guide us on our quest we shall be led by Arthur Schopenhauer and his aesthetics as developed in his magnum opus "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung"[513] (English:. "The World as Will and Representation"). In it Schopenhauer combines the epistemologies of Plato and Immanuel Kant and expands them by an aesthetic component. For him art is not just something that exists in parallel to knowledge, instead art is expression of knowledge deeper than anything obtainable through rationality. One level above the rational, art surmounts rationality like the summit cross does the mountain top. This hierarchy of knowledge and how it might explain the importance of aesthetics in diplomacy will be elucidated in the following.

Epistemology

To understand Schopenhauer's position, it is necessary to take a look at the philosophical tradition it is founded on. The first column for him is the theory of knowledge as Plato has developed it.

For Plato the question is how knowledge can be obtained. To him the world is divided into two parts: the visible and the intelligible.[514] The visible world is that that can be apprehended through different senses. All the individual things are part of the visible world.[515] The contrast to the visible

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[513] Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung' (1818), in Ludger Lütkehaus (ed.), Arthur Schopenhauers Werke in fünf Bänden – nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand (Zürich: Haffmans, 2018)
[514] Platon, Politeia, 509d.
[515] Platon, Politeia, 507b.

world is the intelligible world, in which not individual things, but the common ideas behind the individual are to be found.

Individual things are visible but not intelligible, ideas are intelligible but not visible.[516] The difference can be demonstrated with the geometric example of a triangle. The individual triangle one draws is part of the visible world, the insights one gets from analyses of the triangle is part of the intelligible word. Because the angular sum is not just 180° in a singular triangle, but the idea of a triangle itself entails that knowledge. The idea is the form "triangle", the individual triangles are just appearances of the form.

For Plato only knowledge of the intelligible ideas is true knowledge, as it is not based on the senses. The senses, by being prone to deceit, are not a reliable source of knowledge to him. In his infamous allegory of the cave Plato compares the situation of a human to that of people living in a cave. Their heads are fixated and they are facing a wall. Behind them figures are carried in front of a light source, casting a shadow onto the wall they look at.[517] Thus, what they see is merely a shadow of the real thing, yet because that is all they are able to see, they will perceive the shadows as real. Only if they can free themselves from the cave they are able to see more than just shadows. But even if they would be able to leave the cave, it would take the eyes some time to adjust to the bright sunlight. Similarly, when returning to the cave they would not be able to see before the eyes have adjusted to the darkness again.

Just like in the allegory humans have to free themselves from the visible world and turn towards the intelligible in order to obtain real knowledge. But unlike the people in the allegory, humans cannot physically escape from the visible world and into the intelligible. The only getaway would be mentally. But like the eyes cannot adjust to bright light when they are still exposed to darkness, the intelligible world cannot be reached while remaining in the visible world.

Reaching knowledge of the thing-in-itself thus requires isolation from the visible world. Plato is constructing his entire ideal state around the goal to protect the leaders from influences of the visible word. In his "politeia" art thus is massively restricted.

So aesthetic considerations already play a decisive role in Plato's political philosophy. And they are deeply embedded in the fabric of the state, as they are a potential threat to it. Art, as a representation of the visible world, is fit to disrupt the state. It is equal to deceit and falsehood and thus has to be restricted. Only art that represents the ideas should be allowed according to Plato.

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[516] Platon, Politeia, 507b.
[517] Platon, Politeia, 518a.

The second column Schopenhauer's philosophy is based on, is the Kantian metaphysics. For Kant knowledge can only be obtained empirically. He argues that truth is "…the congruence of knowledge with its object […]"[518] [„…die Übereinstimmung der Erkenntniß mit ihrem Gegenstande […]"[519].] Thus, there are two problems: first, obtaining knowledge and second, bringing it in congruence with an object. According to Kant knowledge can either be received or produced. Both consist of an a priori and an a posteriori part. Since received knowledge is obtained through the senses, one might wonder how it can be a priori. For Kant 'received knowledge a priori' is the form of perception. Regardless of their specifics it consists of space and time.[520] All sensible perception is spacial, as spaciality is the condition for something to be perceivable for us. The form any perception has, is that of space. And thus, without space no sensible perception would be possible.[521] Time is equally important according to Kant, as for us perceptions are not all simultaneous. Instead, we perceive things one after another. Time however is nothing the objects have themselves, only the internal form of our perception is that of time. So, while space is the external condition for sensible perception, time is the internal condition. Insofar, as they are both conditions for sensible perception to take place, they precede it and are a priori.

Space and time however are not part of the things-in-themself – they have neither. Only our perceptions have this form.[522]

Produced knowledge shall only be mentioned briefly here. For Kant a priori it consists of "concepts". Concepts are giving structure to the perceptions and enable us to grasp what we have perceived. Only by assigning concepts to perceptions we can create the connection between object and intellect necessary for knowledge.[523]

While the "pure" part of knowledge is a priori, the connection between it and the objects can only be made empirically. That is because pure knowledge only refers to the capacity to know without application. In its pure form it is "logic", that is the capacity to draw conclusions. Using this capacity requires objects given by our perception.[524] In other words: the ability to make (logical)

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[518] This and the following translations of Kant are by me. In contrast to other authors I am translating the Kantian concept of "Erkenntniß" as "knowledge", not as "cognition". I am also translating "Anschauung" as "perception", not as "intuition".
[519] Immanuel Kant, 'Band III, Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (Second edition), in Kants gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902/Akademieausgabe), B 82.
[520] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 43 ff.
[521] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 42.
[522] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 56.
[523] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 164 f.
[524] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 87.

connections requires objects that can be connected. These objects are given through the perceptions of the senses.

Thus, in contrast to Plato for Kant knowledge requires empirical data. In this regard it is also not objective but conveyed subjectively. "Without sensibility no object would be given to us and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[„Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind"][525] Knowledge thus has to make the connection between object and intuition. To know something means that the right connection has been made. "Freeing" oneself from intuitions of the senses (as Plato is suggesting) would mean to stop knowledge. It also follows from this, that we do not have access to knowledge about the things-in-themselves, as any knowledge is necessarily subjectively conveyed.

Schopenhauer's utility of aesthetics

For Schopenhauer both theories are expressions of the same core idea. Despite the differences between their theories Plato as well as Kant would see the things-in-itself as independent of space and time and thus not within the same sphere as the visible world.[526] For Schopenhauer the world is also divided in two: one part where categories like space, time and causality make sense and one where they do not make sense. The former is the world as "representation" ["Vorstellung"] the latter is the world as "will" ["Wille"].[527]

The world as Representation

The world as a representation is the only one we initially have access to. All knowledge is only knowledge of objects in relation to a subject and every perception has to be perceived by someone. Hence, everything is only a representation ["Vorstellung"] of an object in a subject.[528] The first object is the body, as it can be perceived more directly. All the other objects are only perceived intermediately trough the body and its sensory organs.[529] What we receive from our senses however is not a representation yet, but pure "data".[530] Only through the intellect ["Verstand"] the data becomes a representation ["Vorstellung"]. The intellect is built quite simply, according to Schopenhauer it is only capable of recognising causality. The only thing the intellect is capable of is

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[525] Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 75.
[526] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 235.
[527] All translations of Schopenhauer are by me.
[528] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 31.
[529] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 52.
[530] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 42.

to determine which effect has what cause the other way around.[531] Cause and effect however are only between the different representations, as there is no knowledge of anything else. *Verstand* thus is nothing more than the ability to identify causal relationships.

This kind of knowledge is very direct (Schopenhauer calls it knowledge *in concreto*).[532] It is also possessed by animals. Humans however can also prescind from immediate knowledge through their capacity for reason ["Vernunft"]. *Vernunft* cannot create knowledge itself, it can only use the representations that were already perceived and connect or deduce them, to draw new conclusions. It is important though to note, that these are always based on what is given by the data and the *Verstand*. Like with a Lego set these building blocks can be combined into a variety of different models, but the amount and diversity of blocks is limiting the possibilities. Furthermore, the building blocks as well as what is constructed out of it remain representations.

It is for that reason that Schopenhauer thinks that science and knowledge are also only representations and reveal nothing about the world in-itself. Science thus can never uncover the essence of the world, as it merely describes the relationship between different representations to another.[533] Its value lies in its ability to draw more general conclusions from a singular case. But as it can never transcend the world as a representation the problems of epistemology cannot be resolved through the scientific method.

The world as Will

The opposite of a representation is an action. And thus the proof that there is more than just representation is the ability to act. "In reflexion alone wanting and acting are separate: in reality they are one." [„In der Reflexion allein ist Wollen und Thun verschieden: in der Wirklichkeit sind sie Eins."][534] The will is not causing the action, instead will is the immediate form of what becomes an action through the lens of representation.[535] The will is outside of categories like causality and effect. It is neither object nor subject. It is both at the same time and nothing. Only through its single actions it manifests itself and becomes identifiable.[536]

The will thus has no cause, as there is nothing that would be a reason for its existence. That is also why the will is outside of the scientific realm. What can be studied is how the will manifests itself. According to Schopenhauer every single-thing is an "objectification" of the one uniform will, that is

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[531] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 53.
[532] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 53.
[533] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, S. 62.
[534] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 152.
[535] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 151.
[536] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, S. 163.

a manifestation of the will as an object. The forms these objectifications of the will take, are like the ideas in a Platonic sense.[537] The ideas therefore are outside of space and time and differ from the individual things that are located within space and time. The individual stone or human are the individual form of an eternal idea that is an expression of the will. Life is "… nothing but a constant alternation of matter through a firm persistence of its form." [„… nichts Anderes, als ein steter Wechsel der Materie, unter dem festen Beharren der Form."][538] Because while the individuals replace each other in time, the idea remains eternally. The death of the individual human for example does not effect the idea of humanity, it persist even if the individual dies and decays.

Ideas and the thing-in-itself are not the same though. The ideas are the immediate objectification of the will, before it is turned into a representation by the perceiving individual.[539] That means that the individual does not have access to the world as will and the ideas. It is still only capable to perceive the representations. Schopenhauer's epistemology does not further than that of Kant up until this point.

Schopenhauer's Ästhetik solution

Schopenhauer does however think that there is a way to go beyond the world as representation and gain knowledge of the ideas. As the ideas are the opposite of the individual, knowledge of the ideas can only be obtained by transcending individuality in the perceiving subject.[540] To overcome the normal perception that is bound to space, time and causality is only possible in two ways: either through the Kantian method of a "critique of pure reason", or this knowledge can be obtained intuitively.[541] Both are about contemplation of the essential.

As every object is an objectification of the one will, everything also is fit for this kind of contemplation. However as long as the contemplation is subordinated under specific desires of the individual, it can not transcend the individual level. What the artist has to do, in order to go beyond the level of representation, is to focus on an individual thing so much, that he can see the common thing it represents. This is only possible because the knowing subject is also an objectification of the will. Schopenhauer thus resolves the dilemma of knowledge by setting the subject and the object as equal. Both are expressions of the same will. Real knowledge of the thing-in-itself is the will recognising itself.[542]

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[537] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 187.
[538] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 364.
[539] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 239.
[540] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 234.
[541] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 238.
[542] Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, p. 256.

An artist can not force himself to obtain this knowledge. He needs an extraordinary capacity for knowledge as well as inspiration and the intuition to see beyond the individual. Only intuitively he can gain the kind of knowledge that goes beyond the world as a representation. His work of art is a representation of this true knowledge. It may seem paradoxical, but for Schopenhauer art is a representation that goes beyond representations.

The utility of aesthetics in diplomacy

Schopenhauer's aesthetic explains why art is of such importance. Art is not just an extra, but the expression of knowledge and truth. It shows something not perceivable through the senses, something that transcends the individual. Through art one can get a glimpse at something approximating Plato's ideas.

It is not obvious how this is relevant for diplomacy. However, understanding the role of art like that lets us understand why it is so important and so commonly used in diplomacy. Art is representing something greater than the individual, an artist is not just copying what he perceives, he is giving more into the art-work, because he has realised something beyond the visible. By translating his knowledge into a piece of art, he allows those that are not as brilliant as him, to gain a deeper understanding and maybe a glimpse of the ideas or the thing-in-itself. He uses colors, words or sounds to convey his insight.

Aesthetic diplomacy can be understood as serving a similar purpose. Through the means of aesthetics the idea of a country or policy is conveyed in a way that goes beyond individual interests and governments. Aesthetic diplomacy transcends space and time by letting us see the country in a way that is more real than a scientific description. Diplomacy is not always about proving that your position is correct in a scientific way. It can also convey the idea it represents through an outstanding embassy, art, exquisite dinners, good manners or music. Like the artist who can use different media, all the different aesthetic techniques of a diplomat can serve the purpose of representation that goes beyond representation. So just like in art, aesthetics in diplomacy reveal the truth.

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Art of Diplomacy or Aesthetic Performance

Vyara Noncheva

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict changes in power relationships. Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that. [...] power is the capacity to do things. At the most general level, power means to get outcomes one wants. The dictionary also tells us that power means having the capabilities to affect the behaviour of others to make those things happen. So more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want.[543]

The latter is concisely named by the American political scientist Joseph Nye - *soft power* - *and* will be closely investigated: the power of soft power all collected under the elegancy and prestige of the *diplomatic activity*. On the question 'how does this power function without inducements and threats?' Nye responds: "A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it."[544] One of the means to achieve this is undoubtedly through culture. Culture as a notion of foreign security and policy has been attaining prominence over the decades. It has many manifestations in that it could be distinguished between high culture, e. g., literature, art, and education, and popular culture such as mass entertainment. Performing arts such as theatre occupy an eminent position in the realm of culture. No wonder metaphors of these arts prevail in discussions about diplomacy. Journalists often speak about "diplomatic theatre" when negotiations seemingly serve as pure political posturing, purposeless. In other occasions of successful negotiation events, it is widely praised for meticulous "choreographing" and "performance". Despite the banality of these metaphors, they indeed succinctly outline the complexity and multifacetedness of diplomatic activities. The theatrical dimension encompasses the dramatic spectacle in international relations by exemplifying the role of theatre not only as a metaphor for diplomacy but as a notion to imagine and theorise the nature of diplomatic relations: "Diplomats

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[543] Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 1-2.
[544] Nye, *Soft Power*, p. 5.

need a sense of theatricality and an eye for symbolism – an awareness of how actions will be interpreted by negotiating partners and broader public."[545]

Diplomacy is an art per se that inevitably utilizes culture as a secret weapon: "If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead."[546] So, if an ambassador possesses a wide repertoire of "performing" skills and competences to adapt to the situation, then he will achieve success in the elaborate ceremonies of his diplomatic mission. It is indispensable for the maintenance and establishment of good relations to consider cultural differences in diplomatic encounters. Omar Abdolall states in his article *Misconceptions about Culture* that "[c]ulture is a vague concept, and it is complicated even more so by the fact that what constitutes it can change across space and time."[547] This characteristic further complicates the culture as a tool, yet it also provides freedom and flexibility. So, cultural diplomacy would refer to "the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding."[548] For instance, under Louis XIV's reign, the French theorist and playwright Samuel Chappuzeau conveyed that striking performances should "make foreigners see what a king of France can do in his kingdom."[549] This view was shared also among other prominent governors who aimed for international appreciation and tried to captivate the audience by exhibiting wealth and artistic talents.[550] This perception of entertainment's function in the early modern period reminds of what Joseph Nye names *soft power*: the power which "arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture" and values in foreign eyes.[551]

Supportive of the analogy between diplomacy and theatre is also the statement of the Dutch legalist Abraham de Wicquefort in his noteworthy book *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions*: "In all the world's commerce, there is no personage more actor-like than the ambassador."[552] An echo follows in a 1716 oeuvre of the French diplomat François de Callières: "An ambassador resembles in some way

[545] Ellen R. Welch, *The Theater of Diplomacy: International Relations and the Performing Arts in Early Modern France* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), p. 1.
[546] Nye, *Soft power, p. 6.*
[547] Omar Abdolall, *Misconceptions About Culture*, The Korea Times, 28 August 2007, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2007/08/137_9104.html (last accessed 15 January).
[548] Milton C. Culmmings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey* (Washington: Americans for the Arts, 2003), p. 1.
[549] "Un seul des Spectacles que le Roy donne à la Cour . . . fait voir à ces memes Estrangers ce qu'un Roy de France peut faire dans son Royaume." Samuel Chappuzeau, *Le théâtre françois*, ed. Christopher J. Gossip (Tübingen: Narr, 2009), p. 205.
[550] Elizabeth Goldring and J. R. Mulryne, *Court Festivals of the European Renaissance: Art, Politics, and Performance* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
[551] Nye, *Soft Power*, p. x.
[552] 'Dans tout le commerce du Monde, il n'y a pas un personnage plus Comique que l'Ambassadeur.' Abraham de Wicquefort, *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions, dernière édition, augmentée des réflexions sur les mémoires pour les ambassadeurs* (Cologne: Pierre Marteau, 1690),

an actor exposed on the stage to the eyes of the public in order to play great roles."[553] These references to theatrical performance could be indeed considered as a merely accurate characteristics and as a reality. Throughout early modern Europe, diplomats were requested to participate not only in negotiations but also in the artistic festivities of the aristocrats such as dressing for masquerades and dancing at balls. Diplomatic entertainments were regular in these times, yet in what way were they *diplomatic*? "Ballets and other court entertainments functioned as community events or quasi-rituals that brought the diplomatic corps together. They offered themselves as a stylized celebration of social practices common to European aristocrats, a spectacular reification of shared values."[554]

Why would an ambassador be compared to an actor in the theatre? The response is as evident as deeply hidden. Firstly, both an ambassador and an actor have the responsibility over the image and of representing of an institution, whether theatre or their country and negotiating on its behalf in international relations. Thus, both sides prepare with the cautiousness of being fully aware they represent not simply an individual and their understandings but the entire entity of the nation-state respectively the theatre per se, which forms a great responsibility. Diplomats oversee both speaking for their authorities in negotiations repeatedly and standing for the 'dignity' of their sovereigns with regard to other diplomatic representatives. The obligation of maintaining dignity originates from the initial image of the European diplomatic community in the early modern era in which the 'rule of precedence' assigned the European states to a fictive hierarchy of prestige. This rule was applied regardless of the occasion from diplomatic congresses to royal weddings.[555] Theatre actors have draft scenarios, likewise diplomats - a statement of purpose by the principal to be mindful of what are the desired outcomes and to strive towards their completion.

Further, diplomats and theatre actors share similarities in that they both perform in a public setting and must be capable of communicating effectively through verbal or non-verbal means. The position of their country, the conveyed emotions and the message must be presented in a compelling but clear, concise, and persuasive manner, whether it be through a diplomatic statement or a stage performance. To read and interpret body language, voice tone and other nonverbal clues is also of great importance for successful communication. Like actors must connect with their audience and

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[553] 'Un ambassadeur ressemble en quelque manière à un comédien exposé sur le théâtre aux yeux du public pour y jouer de grands rôles.'François de Callières, *François de Callières: L'art de négocier en France sous Louis XIV*, ed. Jean-Claude Waquet (Paris: Éd. Rue d'Ulm, 2005), p.189.
[554] Welch, *The Theater of Diplomacy,* p. 6.
[555] Hamish Scott, 'Diplomatic Culture in Old Regime Europe,' in Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms *Cultures of Power in Europe During the Long Eighteenth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 71.

hence, convey emotions and tell a story through their performance, also ambassadors need to adapt to various audiences and circumstances. So, they are navigating diverse cultural norms and customs. The art of cultural diplomacy and theatre performances can followingly unfold new ways of seeing, understanding, and interpreting the world in which people operate thanks to the interplay of cultures.

On the one hand, the actor on the theatre interface prepares diligently for their role: familiarizing with the identity of the representing character, its mimic, gestures, language, way of talking, attitude, behaviour, visions, and cultural aspects – in sum, getting into the shoes of that personality - understanding the way one thinks, acts, and reacts on external interventions. By getting acquainted with all these details indigenous to the role, the actor will be able to move 'spontaneously' on the stage, which will lead to the impression that their performance is purely natural. On the other hand, we have also 'inhibited' actors whose performance would disturb and even ruin the entire picture and the purpose of the scenes with its falseness that does not leave the intended impression. In this regard, the ambassador has also to prepare beforehand for his meetings and conferences, taking seriously into consideration the cultural differences between the participants of the discussions and the situation to have a beneficial outcome in the relations and in the missions. Often, they must navigate sophisticated political and diplomatic situations, involving sensitive and confidential information, while actors primarily deal with the artistic and creative aspects of their performances.

Having this brief outline concerning the link between an ambassador and a theatre actor here follows a correlation of the institution 'theatre' and the field of 'diplomacy'. Diplomatic events project a certain image, likewise theatrical performances personify different conceptions, e.g., nations or even entire continents as dramatic characters interacting with each other on stage. Like a theatrical performance diplomacy demands a coordinated endeavour by multiple players. For instance, according to Victor Turner *social dramas* have the function to resolve fractures in a community. He makes the following remark: "We are presented, in such rites, with a 'moment in and out of time,' . . . which reveals, however fleetingly, some recognition (in symbol if not always in language) of a generalized social bond."[556] In that sense, the focus of the bond is not on political or legal structures, but rather on a feeling of togetherness. Similarly, diplomatic encounters serve to bridge the Self/Other division and enable collaboration. Theorists from the seventeenth century

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[556] Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 96.

suggest that theatrical entertainments have the power of therapeutic healing of rifts after international conflicts.[557]

Further, theatre plays undergo various stages of dramaturgy before being released. The current historical and political context should be considered. Thus, similarly to diplomacy, theatre is not a static concept, but a dynamic one in which manipulation by artists and situations respond to the shifting political conditions. In this sense, the practice of performance resuscitates with each iteration on the stage to coincide with the political reorganisation of European society. Hence, diplomacy as well as theatrical entertainments play a crucial role in Europe's conceptual integration. Taking an example from the seventeenth century, the attendance of diplomats to events such as masquerades and ballets included their participation in the social dancing after the spectacle with the inclusive purpose of celebrating common European values and attitudes: designating a society "bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions."[558]

An example of the aforementioned elements of a theatre play could be the Bandung Conference, prominent for its symbolism on international diplomacy in the history of Asia and Africa in the twentieth century. What is so symbolic about this event that did not produce significant results? The Bandung Conference could be elucidated as an inauguration ceremony of post-colonial Asia and Africa in which an iconic number of people was represented. In this regard, "Bandung was, in a manner of speaking, a historical pageant, symbolizing the coming of the age of Asia and Africa."[559] It could be claimed that the significance of the conference derives from the 'staging' of it. Some diplomatic events have the nature of public performances and or behind-the-scenes-negotiations.[560] So, considering the analogy of theatre and diplomacy, Naoko Shimazu draws the following correlations: Theatre has three components – stage, performers, and audience.[561] In the Bandung Conference these will respectively be: stage – the city of Bandung; performer – Sukarno, the former President of the Republic of Indonesia; audience – the local people.

Similar to a theatre stage, also the city was intentionally chosen, and many renovations took place before the conference to ensure optimal impression and results. Additionally, several signs of

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[557] Anthony Pagden *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre and Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33, p. 45.

[558] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 2nd ed.), p. 13.

[559] Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1956), p. 35.

[560] Erik Ringmar, 'Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order', in *International Organization*, 66(2) : 1-25.

[561] Paul Rae, 'Wayang Studies?', in Harding, James and Rosenthal, Cindy (eds), *The Rise of Performance Studies: Rethinking Richard Schechner's Broad-Spectrum Approach*, (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2011) pp. 67–84.

Indonesian nationalism such as the creation of the AAC zone and the flagging the revolutionary symbol of 'merdeka' (freedom) were mobilised to raise support and approval of the new regime. The conference offered not only public access but also physical proximity which stimulated close interaction between the conference delegates and the local people.[562] Sukarno demonstrated in his speeches and behaviour impressive acting skills. According to his biographer, John Legge, Sukarno „became almost a personification of the idea of "Indonesia" and symbol of the national challenge to the mystique of colonial authority", to the extent that „he staked his claim to be one of the major spokesman for the whole Afro-Asian world" at Bandung.[563] All this forms the Indonesian 'script' of the Bandung Conference.

As reflected, theatre or performing arts in general are identical to diplomacy political life. The examples given to illuminate the unarticulated assumptions expressed in metaphors that drive and outline diplomatic practices. These are, however, not only roles, scenarios, and performances but conventions based on actual living international relations. Diplomacy and its encounters offer a wide range of thriving fields for intellectual inquiry as they could be observed as more than normative legacies. The bridge between performative studies and the theory of diplomacy invites for consideration of the significance of practices of embodied representation and spectatorship to express differences and constitute a community. A high level of cultural and linguistic competence is required for both professions. Lastly, diplomats as well as theatre actors are performers, yet performing different functions. The ambassador's role in performing official duties is complex and multi-faceted: it involves not only acting for a country and its interests but also maintaining and promoting bilateral relations and representing the country's culture and values. However, as observed, performance with the assistance of culture structures and shapes international relations. Thus, diplomacy sheltered by art and armed by culture plays a part in the appeasement of dramatic conflicts together with diplomatic obliqueness: The ambassador appears as „un visage à la recherche de son masque définitif"[564] (a face in the search of its definitive mask), whose expression alters and articulates based on the circumstances.

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[562] J. D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*,(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 240.
[563] Legge, *Sukarno,* p. 7.
[564] Marc Fumaroli, *Héros et orateurs, Rhétorique et dramaturgie cornéliennes,* (Geneva, 1990), p. 311.

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The Underrated Power of Sports: The FIFA World Cup

Johnny Lamas Varela

In 2022, we were once again witness to the power of influence when it comes to a prestigious international sporting event such as the FIFA World Cup in our daily lives and in the media. The World Cup is considered to be the most widely followed tournament in the world of sport, an estimated 5 billion people viewed the Qatar World Cup, over half of the planet's population. It is not only the celebration of football, but it also serves as a platform to arise awareness of social values, building unity and a sense of community between everyone involved. The goal of hosting such an event, would be to improve its reputation and present its country on the global stage to improve international relations, which can be referred to as sports diplomacy.[565]

However, it's worth noting that being the host of the World Cup, also comes with its own set of challenges and criticisms, as we have seen with all the controversy surrounding the Qatar World Cup 2022. The construction of the infrastructure required for the tournament, has been heavily criticized due to worker abuse and exploitation. Besides, when it was decided Qatar would host the World Cup, there was already an uproar because of the country's poor human rights records, not only when it comes to the welfare of migrant workers but also to the fact that being homosexual is punishable by law.[566] There were many debates leading up to the World Cup whether countries who do not share Western values, should be allowed to host major international sport events. It is an understandable feeling that countries where not everybody is welcome shouldn't host sporting events, but no one can say for sure that excluding these said countries will bring social change within. This paper will focus on explaining as of why the critics of Qatar being host were warranted, but at the same time how sports diplomacy through football is worth it to at least try find a common ground with these nations.

Sports diplomacy through football

For starters, Sports diplomacy refers to the use of sports as a tool in order to promote international relations. It is an effective way to bring different countries together and improve cooperation. Over the last decades, states around the world have come to the realization that sport can be useful in their diplomatic toolkits. Sports offers a universal appeal to billions of people, nations can explore the creation of new relations with other states in order to coordinate sporting events. By improving

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[565] Lisa Pereira, Community and Impact: FIFA World Cup More Than Just a Game,ExoInsight, 17 December 2022.
[566] Finlay Dunseath, 'Qatar FIFA World Cup Controversy: What You Need to Know', RNZ , 12 December 2022.

its international brand, a state can create new political and economic opportunities, for instance trade and tourism. Every state wants his desired outcomes to prevail in the international framework, there are different means to achieve it, either by manipulation, coercion, or in the case of sports diplomacy, attraction. According to Nye, the chances of other nations supporting one nation's cause in world politics will increase due to the bond forged through sharing common interests or have worked together for sports events.[567]

Furthermore, national governments are not the only ones interested in sports diplomacy, for instance non-governmental organization (NGOs) such as Beyond Sport or Right to play want to use sport to raise awareness of social issues and reintegration programs needed in least developed nations. Sports are effective in increasing development initiatives. Thus, this shows that sport does not only play a major part in international relations between countries, but also for non-state actors and people all over the world. Sport between different groups of people can be seen as a symbol of civilization, it helps to avoid conflicts. It's a powerful diplomatic tool that can bring people together. It's a universal language as the likes of music or art, there are no words needed in order for people to form bonds with one another. Additionally, sporting events generate occasions for dialogue between politicians without the pressure of being at the formal negotiating table, it's an indirect method to build bridges between states or communities due to a common interest. As the great Nelson Mandela famously once said, "sport can change the world".[568] Sports diplomacy is also often referred as 'soft' power, considering the aim is to convince other nations by positive means, instead of coercing them to submission. Therefore, it's within the framework of public diplomacy, as it is a process of nations or NGOs trying to achieve political goals through foreign publics. Cultural diplomacy is usually employed in order to engage foreign publics, there are different ways for it, be it through literature, music, cuisine, or in this context, sports. Although sports diplomacy is a branch of public and cultural diplomacy, sports diplomacy itself also has different branches, one famously being football.[569]

One sport used to establish relations or improve them between states, is football through the FIFA World Cup. Football, or soccer as it is called in the United States of America, can bring social change in a number of ways. Over the past decades it has been used for the promotion of gender equality and tackling racism along with its stereotypes, as well as promoting peace between various ethnicities and religions, by saying we are all equal in football. Moreover, the country who hosts

[567] Richard Parrish, 'EU Sport Diplomacy: An Idea Whose Time Has Nearly Come', Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(5):1511.
[568] Stuart Murray, 'Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice', (Routledge (Ed) 2018), pp. 7-10.
[569] Parrish, 'EU Sport Diplomacy', p. 1512

that tournament benefits from infrastructure development, which includes new airports and transportation systems, having a lasting impact on the host's economy and society. From a global perspective, other nations and communities do also profit from it, especially underdeveloped nations. For several players participating at the World Cup, it's an opportunity to present themselves at the biggest stage of football, it's a chance to escape poverty and improve their families lives or more importantly their hometowns. Lionel Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo have contributed massively for charities around the world and are prominent ambassadors for UNICEF. During the last year's World Cup, many people of different countries and cultures, regardless of their past differences, created a sense of a togetherness while celebrating their diversity and unity. This unity is helpful to improve the social and economic development of a country. According to the United Nations, inclusive and diverse societies create higher levels of economic prosperity.[570]

However, it's also important to note that like any other sport, it can also be used to promote division and hostility, it can be a platform for hate speech and discrimination. One example for it could be the Olympic Games in 1936, where the host was Nazi Germany. According to Roche, the Olympic Games held in 1936 were nothing more than simply an "object lesson in how an internationally based cultural event movement can be manipulated by a powerful nation to project its image, ideology and influence internationally, and to reinforce its authority domestically".[571] In summary, sports diplomacy can be an effective tool for promoting international relations and resolving conflicts, but it's important to consider the context in which it's being used, and to be aware of its limitations.

FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022

Qatar could be arguably the most controversial host in the history of all the FIFA World Cups until now. The concern of human rights was massive over the last years, reaching its high in 2022, some months before the kickoff on the 20th of November. The main problem in Qatar is the treatment of migrant workers. Around 2.2 million of 2.9 million of people living in Qatar are migrant workers, meaning that nearly the entire workforce are foreigners. Most of them came from the south of the southeast of Asia, they were brought to Qatar in order to work in construction. They all work under the 'Kafala'[572] system, giving the employers total control over the legal status of their workers. This system is not only used in Qatar, but also in Jordan, Lebanon and most Arab Gulf nations.

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[570] Pereira, Community and Impact: FIFA World Cup More Than Just a Game 2022.
[571] Molly Wilkinson Johnson, 'The Legacies of 1936: Hitler's Olympic Grounds and Berlin's Bid to Host the 2000 Olympic Games', German History 40(2):259
[572] Kali Robinson, 'What Is the Kafala System?', Council on Foreign Relations, 18 November 2022.

Some would call it "modern slavery", due to the living and working conditions the workers face. Workers have told they would live in overcrowded accommodation, receive inadequate nutrition, and negligence to occupational hazards. The disregard for the wellbeing of these migrant workers, is a clear violation of international human rights.[573] Yet, international concern doesn't stop there, the rights of LGBTQ+ people are also a major concern. In Qatar, a same-sex relationship is treated as a criminal activity, considering Qatar operates under the Sharia law, Muslim men engaging in homosexual activities face capital punishment. Qatar's World Cup Ambassador Khalid Salman considers that homosexual people have a "damage in the mind". However, the Qatari governments assured that LGBTQ+ people arriving in Qatar would be safe, as long as they abide and obey Qatari law. With all these controversies surrounding the World Cup, there was a call for footballers and fans to boycott this World Cup, saying that a country like Qatar, should not be allowed to hold an international sporting event.[574]

In the face of the critics, the emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in his remarks at the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, had a dig towards some Western countries, namely the US. He went on to say that "today, many governments and international powers act with impunity, without regard for human rights", hinting at hypocrisy from Western countries. Qatar has tried massively increasing its state's global position and political influence, by providing land for the largest US military base in the Middle East or hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. All these initiatives are in the hopes of turning Qatar into a global destination for business, tourism, culture, etc., in other words a borderless international economy. So, it is no surprise that even the Emir would want to hit back at the critics.[575] Besides, Qatar also gets a lot of attention over alleged mistreatment of women. In Western media, Qatar is considered to be a closed-minded nation, with a lack of gender equality. However, in reality the way the women in Qatar live is not as "bad" as depicted in the Western media. A woman called Wadha from Qatar, who once went to the US, was shocked about the questions she would receive about her home country, people assuming she is only allowed to stay home and be in the kitchen.[576] Many Qataris have been sick of these stereotypes. For instance, women in Qatar are allowed to work, drive, and even hold their own offices. The state's development plan includes to empower women politically and economically, which was seen during the World Cup with women taking some public roles during the advertising and build up to the World Cup. Furthermore, in universities there are more women than men, and the number of

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[573] The Lancet, 'Will the Qatar World Cup be good for health?' *The Lancet (British Edition)*, 19 November 2022, p.1741
[574] The Lancet, 'Will the Qatar Wordl Cup be good for health?'
[575] Geoff Harkness, *Changing Qatar: Culture, Citizenship, and Rapid Modernization* (New York University Press: 2020), p.1
[576] Geoff Harkness, *Changing Qatar: Culture, Citizenship, and Rapid Modernization* , pp. 7-8

women in the workforce has been rising steadily. In 2012 for the Olympic games, for the first time in its history Qatar send female athletes. Nahir, a Qatari woman, explained that "people think that being modern is taking the Westernized culture, and I don't think that's appropriate". Thus, it can be said that Qatar has been progressing and working, even if it is slowly, towards social change.[577]

Arab nations united once more

During the World Cup, because of certain events, some positive results were noticed which showed that social change or even diplomatic relations were being improved and developed. For the social benefits, researchers acknowledged that a major sport event like the World Cup, can have a lasting impact on the youth of Qatar and the Arabic World. Many young Arabs were involved in sport activities and festivities with people coming from all over the world during the tournaments, resulting in psychological benefits. Additionally, it increased their general interest in sport, especially football, which then also has physical benefits. It can be understood that the social benefits from hosting such an event, can be multidimensional for future generations as it will have an impact not only psychological but also physically.[578] As mentioned, Qatari people aren't the only ones benefitting from the World Cup, but the Arab world in general. Many were focused on the economic and political aspects, but there is also an impact on the whole Arab community. The FIFA World Cup played a major role in bonding certain groups of people within the Arab World. A study confirmed that the Arab youth for last year's World Cup, was more excited for the tournament than the non-Arab youth.[579]

This result should not surprise that much, considering it is the first World Cup to be held in the Arab region. During the tournament, there were many events which unfolded showing the social impact of the World Cup, especially politically. Before the World Cup, Qatar was facing for some years a lengthy embargo from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. This blockade meant severing diplomatic ties and shipments between these nations with Qatar.[580] However, during the tournament, diplomatic relations between Qatar and these nations were restored with the help of historic sporting achievements. When Saudi Arabia won against Argentina, or Morocco was able to reach the Semi-Finals, even being the first African nation to do so, many Arabs and the whole continent of Africa, even in Yemen, people came together for public celebrations. On a skyscraper in Qatar, the flag of Saudi Arabia was even displayed. These football victories were significant to

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[577] Ibid, pp. 10-12
[578] Wadih Ishac and Kamila Swart, 'Social impact projections for Qatar youth residents from 2022: The case of the IAAF 2019', Frontiers in Sports and Active Living 4, pp. 2-4
[579] Ishac and Swart, 'Qatar youth residents', p. 11
[580] Harkness, 'Changing Qatar', p. 1

unify a region with different cultural and religious traditions, giving everybody a reminder of Pan-Arabism. An Emirati sociology researcher hopes that strong regional politics can be restored as a result of all these developments. The reason for it being that not only the citizens of the Arab nations came together, but even their leaders with long-standing rivalries. As said earlier, diplomatic ties were restored between Qatar and other Arab nations, there were pictures of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman with a Qatar scarf, or the Egyptian President Abel Fattah stating that the tensions between Qatar and Egypt have been cooling down. Thus, the FIFA World Cup was able to revive a sense of unity between different Arab nations which we hadn't seen for a long time.[581]

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be considered as a fact that sport through a tournament as the FIFA World Cup, is able to bring communities together. Where fans are able to celebrate their differences and create a sense of unity, as we saw with the Arabs. Whereas diplomacy failed to ease tensions between Qatar and other Arab nations over many years, a football tournament was able to do it in a matter of weeks. Sports diplomacy can or rather should be considered as a strong way of establishing conversation between different nations. The contrast between Western culture and the culture of Arabic nations such as Qatar, is still huge and the concern from people is understandable. However, excluding every nation who don't share the same values, will probably only result in more conflict and hate between colliding world cultures. If we were to take that route, then the hope that countries who still have a long road ahead will improve when it comes to equal and social rights, would be diminished. As the Emir also said, many states have had their share of violating human rights, if we were to exclude every nation, then also some Western nations would have to miss out on the World Cup. Nevertheless, the human rights under which the migrant workers had to build the infrastructure, is something which shouldn't be tolerated and can never happen again. Although the FIFA organization shouldn't exclude countries for not having Western values, they should make sure in the future that countries respect the human rights of everyone involved in the build up to the tournaments.

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[581] Yasmeen Serhan, 'The World Cup Is a Rare Moment of Solidarity for Arab Nations', *Time*, 30 November 2022.

Johnny Lamas Varela. Since his role once as a Youth Ambassador for Luxembourg at the EU Parliament, Varela has been fascinated with EU Politics and International Relations. This led to his pursuit of doing the bachelor's in European Cultures and History at the University of Luxembourg, as History is important to understand how today's political world functions. Furthermore, the master's degree in European Governance to broaden his knowledge about EU Politics. He decided to take the course on diplomacy, as for him diplomacy plays a vital role in global politics, especially when it comes to preserving or creating stable relations between states.

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The Future of International Relations is Female, but When Are We Going to Take It Seriously?

Roberta Risso

Women's role in diplomacy through history

Gender still plays a much too important role in politics, in particular in foreign affair politics and in diplomacy. The purpose of this research is to analyse what role gender has in the negotiation processes, being during diplomatic missions or during business negotiations; but first a light must shine on the women and diplomacy, in order to understand the reasons why in diplomatic occupations or in diplomatic matters gender is still focal.

The role of women in particular in diplomacy throughout history was on the side-line, their contribution was fundamental, but their recognition was marginal. Their efforts were carried out as wives of diplomats, of politicians; or their role was of 'gift' to appease international relations between men in power.

Women were not seen in terms of official agents, their role could in certain cases be of a 'present', at the same level of an object, to bring enemies on the good side; otherwise, they were seen as mean to peace, marriage in fact was much more about diplomacy and politics, than love.

Women's position as diplomatic actors was omnipresent, however their status in society as wives gave them a sort of power, even if limited. Officially, they were not ever accredited as diplomats, in fact 'in the early modern period, women were deployed neither as ambassadors nor at the lower rank of envoys'[582]. It is from the 17th century that we see that the wives of ambassadors came to be given the title of 'ambassadrice'. The wives of ambassadors became a central part of the official life of the embassy. Their role in ceremonial events was crucial, given that these moments represented official or semi-official political business meetings.

Women's informal role in diplomacy was multiple, they could be part of espionage, and use their seductive powers, especially in case of military attacks to extrapolate information from soldiers. Their role in court was also fundamental to conduct foreign affairs, between the courts different channels and networks of information were created. In addition, there are examples in history of

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[582] Matthias Pohlig, 'Gender and the Formalisation of Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe', *The International History Review* 44(5): 1062-1076.

women conducting peace treaties, the most common example being the Treaty of Cambrai (1529), known also as 'The Peace of the Ladies'. The treaty 'Paix Des Dames', in original language, came to life thanks to the efforts of Louise de Savoy, the mother of King Francois I of France, and the Archduchess Margaret of Austria, who was the emperor Charles V aunt and governor of the Spanish Netherlands. These women were a symbol of stepping out of society norms where women were considered inferior to men, without official responsibilities. Yet, even if women could play a central role in diplomatic and foreign affairs, the formalisation of diplomacy made them excluded from the official practice. The general masculinisation around the role of diplomacy, the way negotiation and meeting are carried out and the style made the inclusion of women in these positions even more difficult.

Gender and the negotiation process

What first needs to be acknowledged is the distinction that ought to be made between sex, 'which biologically categorises males and females, and gender, which includes both cultural and psychological markers of sex'[583]. In the study of negotiation procedures and on its research, the term to be used is gender rather than sex.

In general, literature has overlooked the role of gender in negotiations, however it is important to analyse the reasons why gender differences arise at the negotiation table and in particular what are these, if they are actual dissimilarities or they just rely on stereotypes. The existence of gender differences in negotiation can arise for several reasons, based on the negotiator, the context, the interactions, and the topic to be negotiated. The expected differences relate also to status and power. The two words are not synonyms, as a matter of fact one of the differences relies on the fact that man is considered to have power and status, whereas women lack status in the negotiation process. In fact, 'in general status differs based on gender, with individuals associating greater trait competence with men than women'[584]. This affirmation comes from the multiplicity of stereotypes that have been inculcated in our culture regarding women. The stereotypes encompass 'women are found to be more gullible or naïve than men' or 'men are rational, assertive, and highly protective of their own interests' and 'women are passive, emotional, and accommodating of others' need'[585]. These affirmations are poisonous, but still are quite believed in not only negotiation, but in the diplomatic field and in politics. Nowadays in fact 77% of the world's parliamentary seats are

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[583] Layne Paddock and Laura Kray, 'The role of gender in negotiation', *Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University*,p. 4

[584] Cecilia L. Ridgeway, 'Gender, status, and leadership', *Journal of Social Issues* (57): 637-655.

[585] Sandra L. Bem, 'The measurement of psychological androgyny', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (42): 155-162.

occupied by men[586], and 85% of ambassadors globally are men[587], and only 9% of women are negotiators[588] as of 2018.

There is also another aspect of negotiation that must be taken into account, and that is that the nature of negotiations per se remains attached to masculine traditions. Culturally women have been constructed as the negative side of men, and they have been kept away from male privileged domains, give that 'western patriarchal discourse is based on a historical masculine system that excludes women'[589].

The body and the clothing are one aspect that particularly to diplomatic affairs is crucial, and a distinctive feature of the diplomatic tradition is that the role belonged to men. The clothing often consists of dark-coloured business suits which convey power and status, and this standard has to be adopted by women working in diplomatic institutions.

Another element which renders diplomatic tradition quite masculine is the setting of meetings or negotiations. For men belonging to certain clubs or supporting sport teams or playing the same sport becomes a place where meetings and compromises are reached. In these fields women have tendentially more difficulty to succeed to be a part of.

It is of the utmost importance that feminism has to be added to diplomacy, this means avoiding discourse on who between men and women is the best diplomat, however it should focus on how the presence of women can disrupt the patriarchal power structure [590].

Women, Gender, and negotiation procedures in practice

It is interesting to denote the role of women in negotiation processes throughout various historical and political examples. The cases analysed relate to certain specific moments, as in the role of gender during the Brexit negotiations, the historical figure of Matilde di Canossa, or the power portrayed by Graça Machel wife to Nelson Mandela during the negotiations in the Kenyan Crisis.

Matilde di Canossa

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[586] UN Women, 'Facts and figures: Leadership and political participation', 2017.
[587] Anna Towns and Birgitta Niklasson, 'Gender, International Status, and Ambassador Appointments', *Foreign Policy Analysis* (13):521-540.
[588] Karin Aggestam and Isak Svensson, 'Where Are the Women in Peace Mediation?', *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 2018). p. 149.
[589] Cindy Minarova-Banjac, 'Gender Culture in Diplomacy: A Feminist Perspective', *Culture Mandala,* 13(1): 20-44.
[590] Minarova-Banjac, 'Gender Culture in Diplomacy', pp. 20-44.

Matilde di Canossa is known as the woman that in the eleventh century fought for peace in Europe, being a mediator between the papacy and the empire. The duchess was in a delicate position as she was a strong supporter of the Church, but also a vassal cousin of the emperor Henry IV. Matilde di Canossa is known as a firm believer and a supporter of the reformation of the Church. She is also an influential figure of her time and convinced that peace is built through dialogue, mediation, and negotiations. The duchess knew that a 'zone of potential agreement' (ZOPA) must be reached between the Pope and the Emperor over the clash between the two entities on the right to appoint bishops. The Pope over this fight decided to excommunicate Henry V, this move was a catastrophe for the emperor, as he was distanced from the church and his subjects did not recognize its authority anymore. Here, only thanks to the Duchess' mediation the emperor was able to ask the Pope for the revocation of the excommunication. Matilde di Canossa invited the Pope to her residence in the Castle of Canossa and convinced Henry V to publicly apologize for his actions [591].

Graça Machel and her role in the negotiation of the Kenyan Crisis

Graça Machel, wife of Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa, was part of the Negotiation team in the mediation process after the crisis of the elections in Kenya in 2007. The mediation process concerned an African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities, and the main personalities were former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, and Mozambican luminary Graça Machel.

The Kenyan procedure has been hailed as an example of good practice, given also the high level of women involved. The 25% of the team were in fact women. The involvement of the former First Lady of South Africa meant that women rights were taken into consideration. She requested that each political party in the crisis present had a female representative. Her role of advice was 'to build consensus on women's human rights during the crisis'[592]. She understood that it was crucial that women participated in the mediation process.

Gender in the EU-BREXIT negotiation process

The study on the EU-Brexit negotiation process is a clear example of the practical application of the discussion on the role of gender and negotiations. For scholars Guerrina, Wright and Haastrup

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[591] Storica National Geographic, Martina Tommasi, 'Matilde di Canossa, una vita per la diplomazia', https://www.storicang.it/a/matilde-di-canossa-vita-per-diplomazia_15473 (last accessed 2 February 2023)
[592] Meredith Preston McGhie and E. Njoki Wamai, 'Beyond the numbers, Women's participation in the Kenya national dialogue and reconciliation', *Centre for humanitarian dialogue*, https://hdcentre.org/insights/beyond-numbers-womens-participation-in-the-kenya-national-dialogue-and-reconciliation/ (last accessed 2 February 2023).

'Brexit is one of the last examples of marginalization of gender concerns in negotiations, as gender mainstreaming has been treated in a superficial and fragmented way before and during the process'[593]. Several studies have confirmed that the masculinisation in the campaign of Brexit was the same in the negotiation process. In the UK's team there was a clear absence of women, only one woman was included in the seven negotiators. In this case of the negotiation process in Brexit the core element was not the women participation, but it is relevant to analyse gender equalities in these events. Women inclusion is fundamental, as women's participation in negotiations elevates the probability that gender-sensitive language and provisions are discussed and incorporated in the agreements'[594]. At the same time also the EU side failed to reach gender equality and a balanced team. It is anyway a recent example of how still policy makers have not shifted the trend in gender stereotypes and start to consider that a different gender attitude including feminist perspective could only be beneficial [595].

Conclusive remarks

The role of women in diplomatic matters has been analysed and it has reported the fact that women were considered at the side-line of diplomacy, however, their role even in an unofficial manner was still considerable. Matilde di Canossa is the true example on how women power is fundamental even if ignored at official rank. Diplomatic work still seems to concern a traditional men approach, from informal aspects as clothing and attire or negotiation style, however the inclusion of women in foreign politics, and in diplomacy must improve.

'Femininity cannot be simply added to existing discursive frameworks for there is no space for such an addition'[596], in fact what needs to be addressed is that this competition approach between women and men in diplomacy is not useful to the matter, what needs to be included is a discourse that allows for the development of feminism aspects in diplomacy, not parallel to it. Patriarchal traditions need to be abandoned, because on an ignorant basis nothing can actually improve.

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[593] The London School of Economics, Roberta Guerrina, Katharine Wright, and Toni Haastrup, 'Living up to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda? Gender Must Be a Core Element of Brexit Negotiations', https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/02/19/living-up-to-the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-gender-must-be-a-core-element-of-brexit-negotiations/ (last accessed 1 February 2023)

[594] Andrea Schneiker, 'The UN and Women's Marginalization in Peace Negotiations', *International Affairs*, 97(4): 1165–1182.

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[596] Elizabeth Grosz, *Sexual Subversions: three French feminists* (Alen & Unwin: 1989), p.126.

Modern examples presented in these brief analyses show that gender balance and women inclusion can only improve negotiation and its techniques, also indirectly developing women rights.

Roberta Risso successfully completed her Bachelor's in Global Law and Transnational Legal Studies at Università degli Studi di Torino in 2022. During her years in Turin she had the chance to complete a semester at Maastricht University, through the Erasmus program. In addition, she was given the possibility by her Professor of Criminal Law to explore how the law works in practice, participating in mediation sessions and going to court. She is now enrolled in the European Governance master at the University of Luxembourg. Being a member of the Diplomacy Lab and studying European Governance are the perfect fit for Roberta, whose dream would be to work in foreign affairs or pursue a diplomatic career.

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