{"id":11725,"date":"2025-02-10T16:05:34","date_gmt":"2025-02-10T15:05:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/research-en\/?post_type=events&p=11725"},"modified":"2025-03-24T12:00:24","modified_gmt":"2025-03-24T11:00:24","slug":"doctoral-defence-orestis-papageorgiou","status":"publish","type":"events","link":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/research-en\/events\/doctoral-defence-orestis-papageorgiou\/","title":{"rendered":"Doctoral Defence: Orestis PAPAGEORGIOU"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Doctoral School in Science and Engineering<\/a> is happy to invite you to Orestis PAPAGEORGIOU’s defence entitled<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\nBlockchain Governance: Promises, Mechanisms, and Broken Ideals<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Supervisor<\/strong>: Prof Gilbert FRIDGEN<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rapid advancement and adoption of blockchain technology have fundamentally transformed various aspects of digital interaction, leading to the emergence of novel governance frameworks that challenge traditional centralized models. At the forefront of this transformation are decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) and an array of other governance structures applied in both permissionless and permissioned blockchain environments. Unlike conventional organizations that rely on hierarchical authority, DAOs within permissionless systems strive to operate through decentralized networks where decision-making power is distributed among all members, facilitated by smart contracts and governance tokens. In parallel, permissioned blockchain applications, often employed by consortia or enterprises, experiment with more structured membership and delegated authority, blending decentralized principles with selective participation to maintain compliance, accountability, and operational efficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These governance mechanisms, whether in DAOs or permissioned networks, are envisioned to enhance transparency, inclusivity, and autonomy. Yet, despite their idealistic promises, practical implementations have revealed significant challenges. Within DAOs, governance tokens intended to promote equitable decision-making often lead to power concentration and stakeholder inequality. Moreover, vulnerabilities in smart contract design and the absence of robust accountability frameworks have produced notable failures. In permissioned contexts, while governance structures can mitigate some of these issues through established roles and clearer recourse mechanisms, complexities arise in balancing decentralized ideals with enterprise-grade stability and oversight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This thesis critically examines the foundational principles of blockchain-based governance\u2014spanning from permissionless DAOs to permissioned consortia\u2014alongside their operational realities and limitations. It explores the effectiveness of governance tokens and the vulnerabilities undermining participatory ideals. It further examines whether emerging innovations, such as quadratic voting, market-based, and NFT-based voting mechanisms, mitigate any of the identified issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n