{"id":3392,"date":"2026-02-02T12:48:13","date_gmt":"2026-02-02T11:48:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/lcel-en\/?post_type=events&p=3392"},"modified":"2026-02-17T10:09:40","modified_gmt":"2026-02-17T09:09:40","slug":"european-competition-law-circle","status":"publish","type":"events","link":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/lcel-en\/events\/european-competition-law-circle\/","title":{"rendered":"II. European Competition Law Circle: Self-preferencing and European Competition law"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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\nSelf-preferencing and European Competition law<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Self-preferencing refers to conduct whereby a dominant undertaking favours its own products or services over those of competitors, typically through non-price strategies. Concerns regarding self-preferencing have been particularly prominent in digital markets, where platforms often act simultaneously as gatekeepers and market participants, enabling them to influence the visibility of, and access to, their own products.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the EU level, efforts have been made to deter self-preferencing both ex ante<\/em>, by regulating it to some extent in the context of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), and ex post<\/em> by investigating alleged conduct as abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. Concerns about self-preferencing were particularly grown in the wake of the Google shopping<\/em> case. More recently, the Commission accepted commitments by Amazon barring it from using non-public seller data to favor its own retail business and requiring equal treatment for third-party sellers in the Buy Box and Prime programme. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concept of \u2018self-preferencing\u2019 is now addressed directly in the Commission\u2019s Draft Article 102 Guidelines. However, its legal boundaries remain blurred, overlapping with established theories like bundling or refusal to supply, while also encompassing novel harms unique to digital ecosystems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n