{"id":1419,"date":"2021-03-19T15:17:51","date_gmt":"2021-03-19T14:17:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/"},"modified":"2021-03-19T15:17:51","modified_gmt":"2021-03-19T14:17:51","slug":"research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency","status":"publish","type":"events","link":"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/","title":{"rendered":"Research Economic Seminar: Transboundary Haze Games: Local Capture  and Common Agency"},"content":{"rendered":"<section class=\"wp-block-unilux-blocks-free-section section\"><div class=\"container xl:max-w-screen-xl\"><p>We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. The local government collusion and capture problem is modelled as a competing principals and common agency problem that interacts with the central government&rsquo;s game of chicken. The results show that the central government can persuade farmers and prevent burning when the incremental benefits from slashing and burning are lower, the total direct and indirect costs and damages of fire and haze are higher and the required enforcement and abatement costs are not too high. Neighbouring governments can help mitigate the central government&rsquo;s budget constraint and help deter violating multinational companies. We develop a multitask multiprincipal framework to expand our solutions set to include partial burning outcomes and negative compensations. The results inform on a set of policy solutions to these complex transboundary fire and haze negotiation and local capture problems<\/p><p><\/p><\/div><\/section>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. The local government collusion and capture problem is modelled as a competing principals and common agency problem that interacts with the central government&rsquo;s game of chicken. The results show that the central government can persuade farmers and prevent burning when the incremental benefits from slashing and burning are lower, the total direct and indirect costs and damages of fire and haze are higher and the required enforcement and abatement costs are not too high. Neighbouring governments can help mitigate the central government&rsquo;s budget constraint and help deter violating multinational companies. We develop a multitask multiprincipal framework to expand our solutions set to include partial burning outcomes and negative compensations. The results inform on a set of policy solutions to these complex transboundary fire and haze negotiation and local capture problems<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":1420,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"featured_image_focal_point":[],"show_featured_caption":false,"ulux_newsletter_groups":"","uluxPostTitle":"","uluxPrePostTitle":"","_trash_the_other_posts":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"event_start_date":"2021-05-11 13:00:00","event_end_date":"2021-05-11 14:00:00","event_speaker_name":"Ridwan D. Rusli, TU K\u00f6ln, Germany","event_speaker_link":"","event_is_online":false,"event_location":"Participation by invitation\r\n\r\nOnline via Webex","event_street":"","event_location_link":"","event_zip_code":"","event_city":"","event_country":"LU"},"events-topic":[298],"events-type":[],"organisation":[137,100],"authorship":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v22.3 (Yoast SEO v22.3) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Research Economic Seminar: Transboundary Haze Games: Local Capture and Common Agency - FDEF I Uni.lu<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. The local government collusion and capture problem is modelled as a competing principals and common agency problem that interacts with the central government&#039;s game of chicken. The results show that the central government can persuade farmers and prevent burning when the incremental benefits from slashing and burning are lower, the total direct and indirect costs and damages of fire and haze are higher and the required enforcement and abatement costs are not too high. Neighbouring governments can help mitigate the central government&#039;s budget constraint and help deter violating multinational companies. We develop a multitask multiprincipal framework to expand our solutions set to include partial burning outcomes and negative compensations. The results inform on a set of policy solutions to these complex transboundary fire and haze negotiation and local capture problems\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Research Economic Seminar: Transboundary Haze Games: Local Capture and Common Agency\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. The local government collusion and capture problem is modelled as a competing principals and common agency problem that interacts with the central government&#039;s game of chicken. The results show that the central government can persuade farmers and prevent burning when the incremental benefits from slashing and burning are lower, the total direct and indirect costs and damages of fire and haze are higher and the required enforcement and abatement costs are not too high. Neighbouring governments can help mitigate the central government&#039;s budget constraint and help deter violating multinational companies. We develop a multitask multiprincipal framework to expand our solutions set to include partial burning outcomes and negative compensations. The results inform on a set of policy solutions to these complex transboundary fire and haze negotiation and local capture problems\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"FDEF FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/uni.FDEF.lu\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/18\/2026\/03\/03111953\/FDEF_SM-Profile_1600x1600px-scaled.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2560\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"2560\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"1 minute\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/\",\"name\":\"Research Economic Seminar: Transboundary Haze Games: Local Capture and Common Agency - FDEF I Uni.lu\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/fdef-fr\/events\/research-economic-seminar-transboundary-haze-games-local-capture-and-common-agency\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.uni.lu\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/18\/2021\/03\/research_economic_seminar_transboundary_haze_games_local_capture_and_common_agency.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2021-03-19T14:17:51+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2021-03-19T14:17:51+00:00\",\"description\":\"We study how transboundary, intergovernmental fire and haze negotiations interact with local, subnational government collusion and capture in a decentralized country. 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